

caused for two days with your last-minute refusal? -I had my reasons, replied Makarios cryptically» (p. 456).

Le livre de Xydis est fondamentalement de l'histoire diplomatique, l'un des meilleurs exemples du genre. Aussi bien les forces profondes que l'homme d'Etat, en sont absents. Le grand historien français, aujourd'hui décédé, Pierre Renouvin, fondateur de la discipline connue sous le nom d'histoire des relations internationales, marquait les possibilités qu'avait cette dernière de dépasser l'histoire diplomatique, en insistant sur les faits suivants: «Pour comprendre l'action diplomatique, il faut chercher à percevoir les influences qui en ont orienté le cours. Les conditions géographiques, les mouvements démographiques, les intérêts économiques et financiers, les traits de la mentalité collective, les grands courants sentimentaux, voilà quelles forces profondes ont formé le cadre des relations entre les groupes humains... [D'autre part], étudier les relations internationales sans tenir grand compte des conceptions personnelles, des méthodes, des réactions sentimentales de l'homme d'Etat, c'est négliger un facteur important, parfois essentiel». (P. Renouvin et J.B. Duroselle, *Introduction à l'histoire des relations internationales*, Paris, Colin, 1964, p.2). Voilà ce que le livre de Xydis n'est pas.

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Charles Foley and W.I. Scobie, *The Struggle for Cyprus*, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1975, pp. 193.

This latest addition to the growing literature on the Cyprus Question is the work of two journalists who are known observers of the Cypriot political scene. *The Struggle for Cyprus* should be viewed in large part as a combination of Foley's earlier works *Legacy of Strife* and *Island in Revolt*. In addition, a brief account of the 1964-1974 period is also given.

This particular book is useful in that it is based both on the authors personal experiences in Cyprus and extensive personal interviews with various people that have over the years been involved in the Cyprus Question. Notable though is the absence of Raouf Denktash from the list of interviewees.

The beginning reader who is interested in the anti-colonial phase of the Cyprus Question should read this book in conjunction with Grivas' *Memoirs* and Byford Jones' *Grivas and the Story of EOKA*. In this manner the reader will get a more balanced assessment of the Cypriot anti-colonial struggle.

Aside from its discussion of EOKA's organization, its practices and the people who made the anti-colonial movement, this book, compared to Foley's earlier works, does not add anything substantially new to the discussion of the Cyprus Question.

Also, it must be noted that the phase of the anti-colonial struggle, with which the authors are most familiar, is analyzed in some 160 pages, while less than 30 pages

are devoted to the post-colonial phase of the dispute. Despite the emphasis on the anti-colonial phase of the dispute there is no serious discussion of the London and Zurich agreements, and of why and how Makarios signed these agreements. Even though this book is not presented as an account of the diplomacy of the Cyprus Question, these agreements were a turning point in the evolution of the dispute and should have been dealt with more elaborately.

The analysis of the 1964-1974 period is the weakest part of *The Struggle for Cyprus*. The less than thirty pages that have been devoted to this crucial decade contain no new information, and they do not have any indication of the extent of the overt and covert diplomatic initiatives whose aim was the removal of President Makarios and the Greco-Turkish partition of Cyprus. These covert and overt activities, which involved the U.S., Greece, and Turkey, culminated in the 1974 coup against Makarios and the Turkish invasion of the Cypriot Republic. Having read this book, I am quite concerned about the superficial treatment that has been given to this important phase of the dispute. This publication leaves the impression that the authors and the publisher may have simply rushed to present a «timely» book on the market.

The bibliography that is included at the end of the book is useful, but it is overwhelmingly based on sources in English. And, I could not help but notice the absence of such major works as those of Stephen G. Xydis, Thomas Ehrlich, and F. Crouzet, to name a few. This book can only be recommended for its discussion of the anti-colonial struggle. Even so, those who have read Foley's earlier works should be aware that *The Struggle for Cyprus* is a largely repetitive and somewhat revised edition of his earlier works. Otherwise, readers interested in the post-1964 period should turn elsewhere for a critical analysis of this crucial phase of the Cyprus Question.

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VAN COUFOUDAKIS

Jesse W. Lewis, Jr., *The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean*, With a Foreword by Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Washington, D.C., The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976, pp. 169.

This is a very timely, up-to-date book which should interest all students concerned with problems of the inland sea. As the author remarks, «in many ways, the Mediterranean is a barometer of the world's political climate», an observation which is perhaps truer today than at any other period in recent history, because of developments within and among the seventeen Mediterranean countries, stretching from the Pillars of Hercules to the Turkish Straits and the Suez Canal, leaving aside the two super-powers, the USSR and the United States, with their enduring interests in the area. The Mediterranean, the author notes, is the geographical, political, military and economic—or strategic—junction of three continents and even more cultures—Southern Europe, the Balkan area, the Middle East and North Africa. It is also a