

Jerusalem Patriarch Anthimos in 1798 (pp. 56-64) and to a different degree the Ecumenical Patriarch's anathematisation of the *Philiki Etairia* in March 1821 (pp. 203-208), are examples of gestures by some leading hierarchs who cast their lot against the revolutionary movement. This kind of proclamation can easily be interpreted as evidence of opportunism within the church. But then we hear of other clergymen such as the Metropolitan Ignatios of Oungrovlakhia who defended the moral role and activity of the church, and about Athanasios of Smyrna who becomes a neomartyr in 1819 instead of betraying his faith (pp. 66-69).

The same applies to the Phanariotes and other Greek merchants within and without the Ottoman Empire and who for a number of personal reasons would presumably favor continuation of the status quo. Consciously or unconsciously, nevertheless, members of this group make worthwhile contributions to the surging rational movement through the support of Greek schools, printing presses, and the distribution of Greek books and revolutionary pamphlets. This is partly the context of the Greek intellectuals of the "Neohellenic enlightenment" who will struggle for national independence, either immediate as was the case with Rigas (represented in this collection with his "Revolutionary Proclamation", "The Rights of Man" and "The New Political Constitution of the Inhabitants of Rumeli, Asia Minor, the Archipelago, Moldavia and Wallachia"), or gradual as was the case with Korais who despite his unqualified hatred for the Turks, nevertheless advocated a form of nationalism based on education. Unfortunately, not included in the volume under review is Korais' *Adelphiki Didaskalia* or "Brotherly Constructions" the biting response to Patriarch Anthimos' *Patriki Didaskalia*.

In short, the documents are remarkably eloquent betraying the subtlety which characterized the relations of the various social groups and their attitudes toward the national movement. They also attest to the existence of a certain political humor and social criticism as reflected in the *Rossanglogalos*, a satire against Greek élites or in the well-known Greek Monarchy, (mistyped as Manarchy in the volume under review), a *word about freedom* (pp. 96-117). After a careful reading of the documents, one emerges with a greater appreciation for the mobility, complexity and dynamism of Greek society on the eve of the 1821 Revolution, a phenomenon oftentimes ignored by historians who treat the Greek national movement as merely a detail in the international diplomacy of the Eastern Question.

*The Movement for Greek Independence 1770-1821* will delight students of modern Greece. It is the hope of this reviewer that a similar companion volume, concentrating on the Greek War of Independence itself will soon follow.

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Smith, Peter C. and Walker, Edwin, *War in the Aegean*, London, William Kimber and Co., Ltd., 1974, pp. 304.

*War in the Aegean* is a study of Britain's unsuccessful 1943 campaign to seize the Dodecanese Islands. It explains how the Germans, after Italy's collapse in early September 1943 and despite growing Allied power, were able to continue their domination of the Aegean, thereby protecting their Balkan position and oil sources, discouraging Turkey from entering the war, and blocking Allied hopes of using the Straits supply route, all at small cost to Germany. The book does not avoid all the problems found commonly in military histories, but it combines effectively the discussion of strategic planning controversies and information on

local operational difficulties, producing a narrative that is generally well balanced and understandable to non-specialists.

Italy's surrender led to a race between Hitler and Churchill to control its holdings in the Aegean. But the Germans had anticipated the crisis and Operation "Axis" begun on 8 September proceeded quickly to secure the Dodecanese islands. The decision to hold the Aegean was apparently made by Hitler himself, against the views of some military advisers, and Germany already had some troops at Rhodes and other key bases, giving it the decisive advantage of air fields. Churchill meanwhile faced numerous problems in his efforts to mount a campaign in the Aegean. Certainly the most important factor was the bitter Anglo-American dispute over general strategy for future military action. The Americans wanted direct efforts against Germany in western Europe; the British sought to exclude Russia from southeastern European areas. In the end Britain acted alone and had little chance to change Aegean conditions. It lacked manpower, air support, and even shipping. Small British forces that occupied such islands as Cos and Leros lost them after heavy fighting with German invaders. The authors underscore that basic miscalculations rather than battlefield events were responsible for the failure. They emphasize the effects of Anglo-American differences over military allocations, the insistence of British leaders upon pressing an operation for which Britain lacked real capabilities, and the weaknesses of the British Mediterranean military command structure. Their conclusions seem to be incontestable.

The book has a number of aids —the military and naval unit lists, photographs, and specialized indices are quite useful— but maps are both few and poor. Readers will also be annoyed by grammatical errors and typographical mistakes that should have been corrected. But despite some weaknesses and faults, the book provides valuable information, explaining a confused and tragic episode.

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Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study*, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1976, pp. xii + 462.

Although the various patterns of techniques and tactics of warfare, called today guerrilla war, have been known and practiced nearly through all history of mankind, until quite recently these guerrilla wars had attracted little notice in the academies and in the manuals of military history. In fact, the revolutionary armies of the 19th and 20th centuries in such places as on the American frontier or in Africa and India were considered as being only peripheral to the basic interests of the military of the major powers, and the war games of states until quite recently were played according to the theories of the major powers which saw the war-board as orderly squares and orthodox armies as its pieces — victory going, essentially, to the large battalions.

As a matter of fact, although the word "guerrilla" ("little war") can be traced only to the Spanish resistance to Napoleon (1808-1814), civilians and "irregulars" had been actually fighting as guerrillas since ancient times. (Caesar, for instance, encountered guerrillas in Gaul and Germany. The Old Testament describes the guerrilla campaign of the Maccabees against the Syrian armies). Guerrillas were also prominent aspects of European and American wars in the last century; these included the Cossack and partisan attacks on the French columns retreating from Moscow in 1812. And we can especially note the Greek partisan and revolutionary operations against the Ottoman Empire between 1821-1827. World War I developed one of the