

local operational difficulties, producing a narrative that is generally well balanced and understandable to non-specialists.

Italy's surrender led to a race between Hitler and Churchill to control its holdings in the Aegean. But the Germans had anticipated the crisis and Operation "Axis" begun on 8 September proceeded quickly to secure the Dodecanese islands. The decision to hold the Aegean was apparently made by Hitler himself, against the views of some military advisers, and Germany already had some troops at Rhodes and other key bases, giving it the decisive advantage of air fields. Churchill meanwhile faced numerous problems in his efforts to mount a campaign in the Aegean. Certainly the most important factor was the bitter Anglo-American dispute over general strategy for future military action. The Americans wanted direct efforts against Germany in western Europe; the British sought to exclude Russia from southeastern European areas. In the end Britain acted alone and had little chance to change Aegean conditions. It lacked manpower, air support, and even shipping. Small British forces that occupied such islands as Cos and Leros lost them after heavy fighting with German invaders. The authors underscore that basic miscalculations rather than battlefield events were responsible for the failure. They emphasize the effects of Anglo-American differences over military allocations, the insistence of British leaders upon pressing an operation for which Britain lacked real capabilities, and the weaknesses of the British Mediterranean military command structure. Their conclusions seem to be incontestable.

The book has a number of aids —the military and naval unit lists, photographs, and specialized indices are quite useful— but maps are both few and poor. Readers will also be annoyed by grammatical errors and typographical mistakes that should have been corrected. But despite some weaknesses and faults, the book provides valuable information, explaining a confused and tragic episode.

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Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study*, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1976, pp. xii + 462.

Although the various patterns of techniques and tactics of warfare, called today guerrilla war, have been known and practiced nearly through all history of mankind, until quite recently these guerrilla wars had attracted little notice in the academies and in the manuals of military history. In fact, the revolutionary armies of the 19th and 20th centuries in such places as on the American frontier or in Africa and India were considered as being only peripheral to the basic interests of the military of the major powers, and the war games of states until quite recently were played according to the theories of the major powers which saw the war-board as orderly squares and orthodox armies as its pieces — victory going, essentially, to the large battalions.

As a matter of fact, although the word "guerrilla" ("little war") can be traced only to the Spanish resistance to Napoleon (1808-1814), civilians and "irregulars" had been actually fighting as guerrillas since ancient times. (Caesar, for instance, encountered guerrillas in Gaul and Germany. The Old Testament describes the guerrilla campaign of the Maccabees against the Syrian armies). Guerrillas were also prominent aspects of European and American wars in the last century; these included the Cossack and partisan attacks on the French columns retreating from Moscow in 1812. And we can especially note the Greek partisan and revolutionary operations against the Ottoman Empire between 1821-1827. World War I developed one of the

greatest leaders of irregular warfare, Col. T.E. Lawrence, who led Arab bands in typical guerrilla actions against the Turks. The guerrilla-terrorist activities of the Zionists in Palestine (1917-1945), and the numerous anti-Nazi partisan campaigns in occupied Europe (1940-1945) were the outstanding examples of those times, including the activities of the Bulgarian (IMRO) terrorists, and the present activities of the outlawed Irish Republican Army agitating for the end of separation of northern Ireland from Eire.

These and other guerrilla activities are well-described in Laqueur's competent "historical and critical study". The main questions treated in this publication are: In what circumstances have guerrilla and terrorist movements appeared? What are the conditions necessary for success? Why do some fail? Who are the guerrillas and terrorists? What are their motives? What becomes of victorious guerrillas and terrorists? The author takes issue with the conventional wisdom of the 1960s by showing that the connection between guerrillas and revolution is tenuous; with rare exceptions guerrillas have succeeded only against foreign powers or in times of general war. They have invariably failed to make any inroads against native totalitarian regimes.

The case of Greece illustrates some of these points. Scattered information on guerrilla activities in Greece can be found throughout the book's second half. Thus, we learn that "most of the guerrilla fighting was done... after the war had ended", and that "great claims were later made with regard to the Greek contribution to the Allied war effort" (p. 226). The Greek Communists (ELAS) were "the sturdiest of the partisan movements", and their party "had been in existence since the early 1920s..." Their closest rivals were EDES under General Napoleon Zervas, the "National Band" of General Sarafis, and EKKa commanded by Colonel Psaros. According to Colonel Woodhouse, second in command of the British military mission among the partisans at the time, the value of the guerrilla operations "was not inconsiderable in 1943" (p. 227). After Italy's surrender, the overextended German forces could no longer sustain a prolonged campaign against the partisans; and the Communist insurrection in Athens in December 1944 had tragic consequences: subsequently the Communists engaged the Greek army for three years in a bloody and costly guerrilla war.

Although Laqueur appears to be able to read some foreign-language sources, this ability to do so does not particularly apply to Greek sources (since he cites only: Komninos Pyromaglou, *Ἡ Ἑλληνική ἀντίστασις ΕΑΜ, ΕΛΑΣ, ΕΔΕΣ: κριτική εισαγωγή εἰς τὴν διαμόρφωσιν τῆς* [The Greek resistance, EAM, ELAS, EDES; critical introduction to its formation], Athens 1975. Obviously, his report on this segment of Greek history will eventually be probed more deeply than this otherwise competent summary offers. When, however, viewed from a general overview of the topic, Laqueur's contribution is one of the ablest introductions to its subject.

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Jeff Beaubier, *High Life Expectancy on the Island of Paros, Greece*, New York, Philosophical Library, 1976, pp. 138.

The people of Paros, an island in the Aegean Sea (population in 1971 was 7,314) have a life expectancy of 77.0 years, several years higher than all the developed countries of the world today and in some cases almost twice as much as some of the societies of the Third World.

What is the secret of the Parians' longevity? This is the question that Jeff Beaubier, an anthropologically trained epidemiologist tries to answer. Longevity he tells us is largely a