

fact that other motives could explain these phenomena, e.g., economic repression in 1907; irridentist feelings after 1918, does not eliminate the reality of anti-Semitism, which almost everywhere manifests hostility toward the Jews, masking other underlying social and economic problems.

Fischer-Galati's statement on the holocaust is imprecise as well. It is true that Marshall Antonescu was not the anti-Semite that Corneliu Codreanu and Octavian Goga were, but the escape of the Regat Jews from the holocaust was due mainly to events in the course of the war. Precisely the same situation occurred for the same reason in neighboring Bulgaria, where all Jewish citizens escaped the Final Solution (thus the Romanian events were not unique!) and where anti-Semitism was indeed a minimal factor. We may well add that Romanian soldiers participated in the killing of Jews in the Ukraine with such brutality that even accompanying SS officers commented unfavorably. Theodor Lavi in the contribution which follows Fischer-Galati's essay gives a much more reasonable explanation of why the Romanian Jews were not deported, noting both the war and internal protests. Indeed Fischer-Galati's concluding statement that today "the Jews of Romania have never been better off" (p. 174) contradicts his implication that they really never had it that bad in the past.

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Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean, eds., *East European Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation*, New York and London, Praeger, [Special Studies in International Politics and Government] 1974, pp. 254.

The final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975, contained three principal provisions, which have come to be identified as baskets: Basket One, a declaration of principles and a series of measures designed to build confidence in military relations; Basket Two, provisions for commercial and scientific cooperation; and Basket Three, humanitarian issues. King and Dean and their collaborators, all but three of whom are present or former employees of Radio Free Europe, published this volume just as the CSCE was getting under way. The quality of the essays, which concentrate, as might be expected, on the matters treated in the first two baskets, is reasonably even and higher than one might expect of a collection of this kind. Most draw on RFE's careful monitoring of the East European press and air waves and therefore stay close to their subjects. Whatever RFE's political motivations may be, and one of them is surely to persuade scholars of the organization's credibility, the result in this case is a generally useful collection of materials by which to judge what is still three years later an unresolved moment in East-West relations.

If there is a single theme running through the ten chapters in this book, it is the relationship between détente and the internal political order, either of a given state or expressed in terms of inter-state relations within Eastern Europe. It is a theme to which we return on the eve of the follow-up to CSCE in Belgrade, at a time when human rights have gained prominence equal to that accorded by King and Dean, along with most other observers, to military and economic questions.

In their introduction, King and Dean write,

"In the five years since the Czechoslovak reformist experiment was aborted by the Soviet Union, the Western approach to Eastern Europe has undergone a fundamental change. Western policy has now turned away from the assumption that an evident, if

inchoate, East European desire for greater independence from Moscow was capable of acceleration and exploitation, and that therein lay opportunities for enhancing Western security, and has accepted the premise that, at least in the short term, the real opportunity, indeed the only opportunity, for reordering political and social relations in Europe in the interest of general European security lies in negotiations with the USSR" (xvii).

There has been another wrinkle since Helsinki: The West has gone on the offensive against Eastern Europe through the manipulation of the human rights issue. With trade with the individual East European states now tied to compliance with Western interpretations of the provisions of Basket Three, the United States can pursue—or attempt to pursue—*détente* at the military level through direct negotiations with the Soviet Union while remaining true to democratic values at home. By pursuing what amounts to a functional approach to international relations, therefore, the West is acting on the assumption that achievements in one realm may be accomplished in the face of overwhelming blockages in another. The disaggregation of *détente* into its component parts may therefore have a salutary, if temporary, effect on international relations. That is not to say that such an approach is guaranteed to alleviate hostility. Indeed, it may serve to put states on the defensive where they hadn't been before. On the eve of the Belgrade follow-up meeting on CSCE, President Tito used the occasion of a visit by Vice President Mondale to assert that "no reproach can be addressed to Yugoslavia in this connection" of human rights. Mondale had not raised the issue. Eastern European political leaders can hardly be faulted for their suspicion of the West's pluralistic approach to *détente*. After all, if the West has decided to separate human rights from questions of military security, Eastern Europe is left at the mercy of both sides. In effect, the United States is reserving to itself the right to challenge Eastern Europe on human rights and reserving to the Soviet Union, through the so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine (the Brezhnev Doctrine with a Republican accent) the right to set military policy for the region. The irony is that, while the U.S. went to Helsinki to improve the status quo in Europe, it has come out endorsing it. Furthermore, as King and Dean put it,

"It is to be assumed that East European leaderships are being advised by their Soviet mentor that the pace of *détente* must be matched by their ability to control its impact on their domestic stability and on their relations with Moscow. This means that even closer bonds and greater accommodation with Moscow are more than ever the essential condition for taking advantage of increased collaboration with the West in the national interest" (xxi).

Of CSCE's three baskets, it is the second which seems to promise the most leeway for East-West cooperation. Commercial cooperation has always been assumed to carry fewer ideological burdens than either questions of military security or of human rights. It is evidently for this reason that King feels safe concluding that "The evolution of the European Economic Community will be a major factor in influencing the evolution of Eastern Europe during the coming decade" (242). As Charles Andras observes in his essay on "European Cooperation and Ideological Conflict", however, there has in fact been a re-ideologization in Eastern Europe in recent years; and it should not be forgotten that it was Czechoslovakia's growing economic relations with Germany that served as one of the pretexts for Soviet occupation of that country in 1968. Structural convergence and/or economic interdependence have not resulted in ideological homogenization across the Oder-Neisse line. Commercial interchange, therefore, takes place not within an ideological vacuum but within the context of an ideology (or ideologies) updated to accommodate that exchange while maintaining domestic political integrity. In the end, though, despite these contradictions, there is no question that the Soviet and East European goals of consolidation of the bloc and the establishment of its

economic vitality work against one another. This is so because the insistence upon maintaining ideological standards within each East European state is no longer identified in the minds of its political leaders with the maintenance of bloc solidarity. Because of their small size and relative powerlessness, the states of Eastern Europe, as Henry Schaefer notes in his essay "Economic Impulses Toward Détente", approach the West with motives that are more purely economic than those of the Soviet Union. And because of the built-in disadvantages dictated by their size relative to the Soviet Union and of their very need to compete against it in Western markets, it is difficult for them to develop the alternatives and internal accommodations to Western economic structures for whose absence Schaefer takes them to task.

One of the virtues of this volume is that it distinguishes diverging and sometimes competing as well as common interests among the East European states. John Dornberg's very interesting chapter on East Germany notes that that state is more interested in sovereignty and the protection of its national integrity vis-à-vis the demands of Basket Three than in anything else, its economic status already quite secure. In contrast to the heightened nationalism apparent elsewhere in the region, the interests of the DDR as reflected in preparations for CSCE, Dornberg tells us, dictated a downgrading of all references to the words "Germany" and "German" in public discourse in the hope of countering West German noises about a unified German nation across two states. By contrast, Robert Dean's chapter on Poland and Czechoslovakia describes two states on the international offensive. Poland in particular is portrayed as internationalist, especially in economic matters. Like the Yugoslavs, the Poles have concluded that

"the mere fact that we exist guarantees nothing. Our guarantee lies in the function we perform in the international system of the political and economic powers" (123. Jan Szczepanski in *Zycie Warszawy*, 4 June 1970).

Also like the Yugoslavs, the Poles draw universal conclusions from their particular case:

"We start from the tenet that the major powers in this world possess enough megatons to involve everyone [in a holocaust], yet —without the participation of small and medium-sized states— they cannot cope with the task of straightening out all the world's problems and turning toward constructive cooperation" (134. Wladyslaw Machejek, in *Zycie Literackie*, 9 July 1972).

Again like Yugoslavia, and especially because of its close geographical proximity to the powerful core of the West European economy, Poland has resisted the growth of a stronger EEC because of the limits on its own independence of action such an economic grouping imposes. The desire for the benefits of economic cooperation therefore runs up against the need not only for internal political integrity but also for the freedom to undertake international initiatives which guard the country's flexibility in future dealings with both West and East.

Rumania's concerns are similar, as King points out. That country was the first champion from within the bloc of the rights of small states in international relations, and it carried that message to Helsinki. Unlike Yugoslavia, though, Rumania has not matched its international independence with economic policies calculated to garner domestic political support; indeed, in a reversal of the policies of less adventurous East European states, as well as of Yugoslavia, Rumania has strengthened its economic ties to the Soviet Union. Apparently the lesson is that an East European state can be either economically adventurous or politically outspoken, but not both. Only Tito can say, "Europe cannot become an island of tranquility and prosperity in the middle of an ocean of instability and poverty. Europe's security is inseparably linked to the independence, security, and general prosperity of all nations" (194), and follow through with foreign economic policies to support his claim. But then Yugoslavia is a special case.

Many other issues are raised in this volume, not all of them dealt with satisfactorily. But there is still information to be had on the varying East European perspectives on regional cooperation, on nationalism, on the German question, on China. Lawrence Whetten's chapter on "The Military Dimension" is a useful review of the technical and political background to the mutual force reductions talks. Whetten's question,

"Will the USSR be able to convert the mainly political CSCE into a peace conference codifying the results of World War II largely on Soviet terms, while minimizing Western demands for military disengagement as the price for normality by delay and tactical maneuvering?" (76).

remains open as we go into the second CSCE. Prior notification of military maneuvers cannot take the place of a lasting arms control agreement. The United States indeed recognizes *de facto* if not formally the existing borders in Eastern Europe and is now putting its money in Basket Three while trying without much success to get on with the SALT talks. The CSCE took three years, from the preparatory talks until the promulgation of the Final Act. Two of the Act's basic principles have collided—as they were bound to collide—nonintervention in the internal affairs of states, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. This collision provides the background for the resumption of talks in Belgrade, while the basic military issues remain as unresolved in 1977 as they were in 1972.

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A Library of Literary Criticism: Modern Slavic Literatures, vol. II, *Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Polish, Ukrainian and Yugoslav Literatures*, Compiled and edited by Vasa D. Michailovich, Igor Hájek, Zbigniew Folejewski, Bogdan Czaykowski, Leo D. Rudnytsky, Thomas Butler, New York, Frederick Ungar, 1976, pp. xvi + 720.

The companion volume to *Russian Literature* (1972), this book provides an unusual kind of information about twentieth century writers of Slavic Europe. Instead of schematic biographies, it quotes critical opinions about writers and books. The purpose here is double: to provide a different kind of perspective than one found in encyclopedias and histories, and to reflect the concerns and methods of critics who responded to the works in question. The editors selected passages from the best critics they could find and presented them to the reader without an attempt to reconcile divergent opinions—indeed, sometimes focusing on controversy. E.g., the section on the Czech writer Josef Škvorecký tells the story of his novel *Zbabeľci* [*The Cowards*] which was first blasted by stalinist critics and later declared a landmark in Czech fiction. I wish more such polemics were included—e.g., one that arose around the Polish novelist Henryk Sienkiewicz. However, not every author has been subject of a major controversy and could be presented in a dramatic way. Critical comments about some Eastern European writers have been consistently descriptive and this is evident in the present volume.

By and large, the writers of Eastern Europe have spent less time probing the inner life of man than their Western colleagues. Instead, they devoted more time to social life and to language experimentation. This opinion of mine was confirmed by the selections in this book. The critics quoted tend to recognize writers not as lonely individuals who express the ineffable in man but as workers in language and in the social field. The editors tried to avoid what might be called patriotic criticism, yet in dealing with this part of the world it could not altogether be omitted. Many Eastern European writers and critics take it for granted that na-