

it covers "Essays on the Intellectual, Military, Political and Economic Aspects of the Habsburg War Effort". Its 12 chapters deal with: Part I: Domestic Affairs ("The Union of Czech Political Parties in the *Reichsrat* 1916-1918", by Victor S. Mamatey; "Leap into the Dark: The Issue of Suffrage in Hungary", by Gábor Vermes; "Mlada Bosna and the First World War", by Wayne S. Vucinich). Part II: Military Affairs ("The Habsburg Army in the First World War: 1914-1918", by Gunther E. Rothenberg; "A Unique Army: The Common Experience", by Jay Luva; "Contradicting Ideologies: The Pressure of Ideological Conflicts in the Austro-Hungarian Army of World War I", by Richard G. Plaschka; "Transportation: The Achilles Heel of the Habsburg War Effort", by J. Robert Wegs; "Elements of Limited and Total Warfare", by Béla K. Király). Part III: Intellectual Life ("Trends in Austro-German Literature During World War I", by Robert A. Kann; "The Turning of the World: Hungarian Progressive Writers", by Eve S. Balogh; "The German Concept of *Mitteleuropa* 1916-1918 and its Contemporary Critics", by Stephen Verosta; "Americans and the Disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy: The Shaping of an Historiographical Model", by Paula S. Fichtner).

Although there are several standard histories on the downfall of Austria-Hungary this symposium adds, here and there, some valuable details to our knowledge of this segment of history. The best contribution is probably that of Mamatey. The chapter by Verosta could have been strengthened by citing additional references available on this topic; and the same applies to the chapter by Fichtner.

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Luza Radomir, *Austro-German Relations in the Anschluss Era*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 420 + index.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading since it does not concern itself with a traditional recounting of Austro-German diplomatic relations leading to *Anschluss*. This work fills a more basic need by answering many of the nagging questions about Nazi Germany's internal administration and foreign policy because it is primarily about Germany and Austria after the *Anschluss*. Germany's Austrian rule contained elements of both internal and foreign policy. Even though Austria was a part of the Reich by 1938, it was administered differently from the rest of the country and here was the problem of assimilation since Austrian customs and laws were very different from those of Germany. The new Nazi administration swung from trying to stamp out differences to trying to keep Austrian culture alive.

Part of this changing policy came from internal differences among the Nazis. In 1938, Hitler placed Josef Burckel, the leader of the Saar Nazis, in charge. Burckel acted as he had during and after the Saar plebiscite, and he brought many of his people from the Saar with him to help organize and control Austria as the Nazis had done in the Saar a few years before. Of course, Burckel came into immediate conflict with unhappy local Nazis who expected more power after the *Anschluss*. Burckel squeezed out local leaders like Seyss-Inquart and ruled Austria as a satrapy of his own. When Baldur Schirach replaced Burckel, the Nazi youth leader encouraged Austrian cultural independence, and sometimes directly opposed Goebbels' cultural policies. However he could not stop the growing Austrian disenchantment with German rule. Originally, most Austrians, including the Socialist leader Renner, had supported *Anschluss*. Many Austrians continued to approve of the concept of union, but disliked the way it was being administered. They felt they were an economic colony, ruled for the benefit of the Reich, with German industry profiting at Austria's expense.

Here in Austria, as in other parts of the Nazi Empire, one finds one segment of the Nazi hierarchy pitted against all the others. When the problems of Austria were brought to Hitler, he was indecisive on administrative policy. He would not define what group should rule Austria and what policy should be followed. It would almost seem that Hitler purposely let his people work against each other in the sort of survival of the fittest theory which in *Mein Kampf* he wrote was essential if the German or any civilization were to survive.

One part of Hitler's plans for Austria involved the Balkans. Economically, Hitler wanted to restore the kind of relations which once had existed between Vienna and Southeastern Europe. Many former Habsburg bureaucrats were restored to their former functions because the Germans assumed that Austrians would be better acquainted with the area than the Germans. Upon occasion, Hitler consciously revived the symbols of the dual monarchy. Once, he appeared in the white military jacket of a Habsburg general. In 1941, Hitler honored the grave of the Austro-Hungarian Commander-in-Chief, Conrad von Hotzendorf. Hitler had to revive the, for him, hated memories of the Habsburg monarchy in order to trade with Central and Southeastern Europe.

Professor Luza has thoroughly researched this book relying heavily upon Nazi archives. Consequently, there is much valuable material, not only on Austria, but there are also important insights into the decision making and foreign policy in the Third Reich. The only flaw is that Professor Luza tends to concentrate on the period of Nazi consolidation between 1938 and 1940. The later years are passed over relatively quickly. A second volume on the 1940-1945 period would have been preferable to so much condensation. Despite this shortcoming, the book is an extremely valuable addition to the literature on the Nazis.

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James Dugan and Laurence Lafore, *Days of Emperor and Clown: The Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-1936*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1973, pp. 354.

Glen St. J. Barclay, *The Rise and Fall of the New Roman Empire: Italy's Bid for World Power, 1890-1943*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1973, pp. 191.

James Dugan, a noted author, originally conceived of *Days of Emperor and Clown* and collected the material for it but died before any manuscript was written. Laurence Lafore is a professional historian who teaches at the University of Iowa and is the author of many books such as *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I* and *The End of Glory: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War II*. The publisher asked him to finish the project, and thus Lafore is really responsible for the book.

The book consists of the following themes: One, Fascist Italy's attack on Ethiopia as an act of naked colonial aggression; two, a synoptic history of the feudal Ethiopian Empire, undemocratic in its political nature and caught in the trauma of modernization; three, a diplomatic history of the oft-told failure of the League of Nations because of the appeasement policies of the British and French governments; four, at the same time, a brilliant and original description of the League and of the Emperor Haile Selassie as the moral and psychological spokesmen that crystallized and transformed world opinion into a democratic alliance against fascism; (it was the appearance of this "romantic internationalism" as a new political consciousness that made possible the international brigades and the will to resist fascism in Spain the following year in spite of the conservatism of the democratic governments of France and England), five, the military conquest and repressive occupation of Ethiopia which, cause and