

brought Greece and Turkey on the brink of war and serious diplomatic rupture. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus could have been prevented especially by England, as the only "neutral" guarantor of the Independence of the Republic of Cyprus, as recorded in the 1960 London-Zurich agreement. If the United States and England had intervened in the summer of 1974, the terrible crisis in Cyprus could have been avoided and so too the directly related diplomatic crisis in the relations of Greece and Turkey.

The calamitous failure of the United States policy in the Cyprus situation was a profound and alarming disappointment to the majority of the American people and members of Congress. "While the United States has professed a public policy of support for democratic and constitutional principle, the unarticulated thrust of its influence has been to align itself with the politics of *status quo*". In the case of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, American foreign policy was dominated by military and strategic interests rather than human rights and ethical principles. Mr. Stern writes, "In the case of Greece and Turkey the military relationships conceived in the name of NATO became the driving imperatives of foreign policy ... Toward Cyprus the American attitude was schizophrenic, with its public professions of support for the elected government headed by Makarios and its tacit support for policies and political forces seeking to assimilate Cyprus into the dominion of NATO by means of partition". In Cyprus the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford administrations failed to observe and even ignored the application of American laws—written into two statutes, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act—explicitly forbidding the use of American arms by one ally of the United States against another. Nixon-Kissinger-Ford made perhaps their worst mistake in Cyprus by allowing and tolerating repeated violations of American moral and constitutional laws. American law was intended to be in tune with American morality. The Nixon-Kissinger-Ford disastrous policy in Cyprus was one of antipathy, indifference and a total disregard of U.S. laws. As Mr. Stern claims, Mr. Kissinger not only ignored U.S. intelligence reports and predictions of the plot against Makarios, but clearly "misjudged the stubbornness of Makarios, the territorial ambitions of Turkey, the political volatility of Greece, and the adversary temper of Congress". Members of the United States Congress and the majority of the American people took up the just cause of Cyprus and demanded that American moral and constitutional laws and ethics should be observed and applied in the conduct of American foreign policy.

The book by Mr. Stern, relying on sources ranging from field research and interviews to government documents, is finely written and well organized, bringing together and perceptively presenting materials on a subject that has had no adequate treatment. *The Wrong Horse* constitutes indispensable reading for all who have an interest in Cyprus and United States diplomacy in post World War II years in southeastern Europe.

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Daniel Chirot, *Social Change in a Peripheral Society. The Creation of a Balkan Colony*, New York, Academic Press, 1976, pp. 179.

Professor Chirot has written an interesting and provocative study of Wallachia, a rather small and unknown country of Eastern Europe. Wallachia is one of the constituent provinces of present Romania, the other two being Moldavia and Transylvania. The work, as the title suggests, is a social history of Wallachia (*Țara Românească*), and covers a period of more than 650 years, from its formation as an independent state in the middle of the thirteenth cen-

tury to World War I. The author examines the changes in the social and economic structure of this "peripheral society", situated on the margins of the European capitalist world, and the process by which this Balkan country became an "economic colony" subservient to the Ottoman Empire until the beginning of the nineteenth century, and a "neocolony" of the more advanced industrial countries of Western Europe in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries.

The author divides the social history of Wallachia into three main periods. The first period begins from the creation of Wallachia as an independent state in the middle of the thirteenth century (1250) to the beginning of the sixteenth century. In this context he discusses the early communal trading economy, the role of the village, the state, and commerce, and the class composition of the Wallachian society.

The second stage extends from 1500 to the beginning of the nineteenth century. During those centuries the economy of Wallachia underwent important changes: the old communal-trading economy declined, much of the old trade routes collapsed, and Wallachia fell to the Ottoman Empire. The entire system of taxation changed, the province was forced to pay a large tribute to the Porte, and the power of state declined while that of the nobles increased. An important feature of this era was the rise of the seignoral state and the creation of the social institution of serfdom.

The immediate effect of the Ottoman conquest was the transformation of Wallachia into a "protocolony" subservient to the Ottoman Empire. Although the Ottoman Turks ruled the province indirectly, without ever incorporating it into the Ottoman administration, they nevertheless controlled the economy of the country by the right of pre-emption in the internal market, which allowed them to exploit its vital economic resources for the benefit of the metropolis.

The last period covers the social history of Wallachia from 1821 to World War I. The major feature of it was the transformation of Wallachia into a "neocolony" of the industrial countries of the West. The rural economy of the province shifted from a pastoral-oriented to a cereal-growing exporting economy. The Wallachian economy produced now for an international market. Its export of agricultural produce, especially grain and corn, increased substantially, while foreign goods from Germany, England, France, Austro-Hungary and Belgium, had been imported in greater quantities. Wallachia had become, according to the author, "a modern neocolonial, grain-exporting society tied to the Western capitalist market" until 1917.

Professor Chirot studies the social and economic changes of Wallachia not through the use of "orthodox theories", "universal laws" or "stages", but through the utilization of certain prototypes or models of colonial political economies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He then attempts to fit or apply these models into the study of the social and economic history of Wallachia. Furthermore, the social changes and economic development of the province are placed in the context of the European economic systems and empires. But while Wallachia might be properly considered a "protocolonial" society during the Ottoman rule and fits the pattern of colonial societies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the use of the term "modern neocolony" appears rather inappropriate for nineteenth century Wallachia. There is no doubt that Wallachia (united with Moldavia to form the Romanian state after 1859), as a grain-exporting country, became increasingly tied to western European market, but to consider it a "modern neocolony" is to lose sight of its internal political developments of the nineteenth century when the country achieved independence and formed the Romanian kingdom. Although the author properly stresses the internal forces which produced the changes in the history of Wallachia in the nineteenth century, he nevertheless overemphasizes the international factors in shaping its economic, political and social

developments. One cannot reduce all internal changes to the generalization that "they were caused primarily by the changing international context". By attempting to explain the changes through the agency of foreign or international factors, the author minimizes, the endogenous forces which played a decisive role in the transformation of the grain-exporting economy into an incipient capitalist economy.

As a whole, however, the work of Professor Chirot is a very important contribution to the study of the social and economic history of Wallachia, especially the study of the peasant, or agrarian, question which remained a central issue in the Romanian history down to the present time. The book is not only original in its conceptual interpretation of the history of Wallachia, but it opens new avenues in continuing the exploration into other fields. It is highly recommended to all those who are interested in the history of Romania and the Balkan area in general.

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Lord Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries. The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire*, New York, William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1977, pp. 638.

In this posthumous work, Lord Kinross tells the 650 year-old story of the Ottoman peoples. He notes their rise from wandering fourteenth century tribesmen in eastern Anatolia to the world's greatest sixteenth century power. He chronicles the shock of Napoleon's Egyptian invasion from the West, the competitive power of Muhammad Ali in Cairo, the rise of reform-minded sultans and pashas who hoped to resuscitate the "Sick Man of Europe" and the collapse of the liberal Constitution of 1876. He traces thirty-two years of autocracy under Abdul Hamid II, the decade of Young Turk dictatorship, the disaster of World War I, and the amazing revitalization of the Anatolian Turks who, in establishing the Republic in 1923, discarded forever the sultan-caliph's regime.

Though he relies almost entirely on western sources for pre-nineteenth century material, Lord Kinross delightfully pulls together the classic (and sometimes erroneous) version of the foundation, rise, and fall of the Turkish Empire. We read Edward Gibbons' views of the conquest of Constantinople, Ambassador Busbecq's account of the armies of Suleiman the Magnificent, and Joseph von Hammer's version of the decline of seventeenth and eighteenth century Ottoman power. For the period after Napoleon's invasion, Kinross leans heavily on the work of European scholars but also, happily, the brilliant study by Professor Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford, 1961) which helps to balance the pro-West emphasis.

In this regard, Lord Kinross attaches a certain aura of European superiority over the Ottoman peoples: the great reforming sultan Mahmud II "may have had a French mother", which obliquely suggests a European origin for the reforms; he implies strongly that the *Hatt-i Humayun* of 1839 was not as much the result of Ottoman labor as of the brilliant British ambassador to the Porte, Stratford Canning. When in 1854 the Ottoman commander of Silistre was killed in battle, asserts Kinross, two young British officers gave important counsel which eventuated in an Ottoman victory. And so on.

The author also chooses curious points to emphasize. He devotes one half a page to the Ottoman capture, in 1517, of the eastern Mediterranean region (modern Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, the Arab Peninsula including Mecca, Egypt and Libya), but three pages to the