

spect for his social and economic betters, but as modernization progresses he tends to make "instrumental" choices, those which will produce concrete social or economic benefits for himself and those around him. In thoroughly modern societies, the voter feels capable of basing his choices on a "civic sense" of what will be good for the nation as a whole. Third, the *bases* of political participation change: in a traditional society ties of kinship and community are the most important, but in a modern society a voter tends to identify more with those of his own nationwide economic and social class. Fourth, the *amount* of political participation changes as the wealth brought by modernization allows greater numbers of people to move up into the more politically-active middle class. The author's theoretical basis for this study is taken from the current sociological literature, with frequent references to it.

Özbudun finds the Turkish case to fit the general mode overall, but to differ in several minor but significant ways. For instance, as the Turkish middle class increased in numbers, there was actually a *decline* in voter turnout from this class, especially in the election of 1969, rather than the increase which the theoretical framework demands. The author suggests that this anomaly comes from a particular voter disenchantment with the party positions in 1969, as these positions were undergoing significant realignment, and many voters found it easier to stay away from the polls than to come to grips with these changes. Also, Özbudun reminds his readers that political participation is not limited to voting but also includes attendance at rallies, organizing activities and the like, and that these may have increased in intensity even though voting decreased.

Several of the author's speculations will have to be supported by further research, but data on the 1973 elections (unavailable to the author during the major part of his work) support many of his important hypotheses. A summary of the 1973 results and notes on their significance are given in the book's concluding chapter, with fuller coverage available in an article by Özbudun and Frank Tachau (*IJMES*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October 1975), pp. 460-479). Full data on the elections of 1977 will not be available for some time, but a glance at newspaper reports tends to support Özbudun's findings.

Historians may take exception to the highly generalized comments on political development under the Empire and early Republic, but it must be remembered that the author's purpose is sociological and his focus the 1960's and '70's. For a full appreciation of social change and political participation in Turkey during this focal period, the scholar in Turkish studies will find it helpful to begin with this well-written and very useful book.

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THOMAS F. BROSNAHAN

Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks*, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1975, pp. 508.

In the war and the revolution which took place in Yugoslavia from 1941 to 1945, three main forces took active part: the Chetniks, the Ustashas, and the Partisans. Dr. Jozo Tomasevich, Professor Emeritus of Economics at San Francisco State University, has divided his magistral work into three volumes, of which *The Chetniks* is the first. The Chetniks, an old Serbian ultranationalist organization, began their existence during the Balkan Wars. Later on in Yugoslavia they became active proponents of the Great Serbian idea, assisting the police in the persecution of left-wing elements and particularly in the repression of peasantry. The Ustashas, who will be the subject of the second volume, were extreme Croatian nationalists founded after the assassination of the Croatian Peasant leader Stjepan Radić in 1928, as a

militant reaction against the Chetniks. The Partisans, subject of the third volume, were active during the last War, organized by the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party.

The war in Yugoslavia, while an international conflict imposed upon the country by the Axis powers, Italy and Germany, degenerated into an internecine war fought mainly between the Serbs and Croats, between the Chetniks and Ustashes, and often between both of them against the Partisans. Contrary to the Chetniks and Ustashes, the Partisans advocated and fought for the union of Yugoslavia on what had to be a new and progressive national federation of autonomous republics, the present Federal Socialist Yugoslavia.

Introducing this first volume which deals with the Chetniks, Tomasevich provides an objective survey of the political, social and economic history of Yugoslavia between the two Wars, a survey which is one of the most illuminative for the student of South Slav affairs. Singling out the conflicts between the Croats and Serbs, the two leading constitutive nations that make Yugoslavia, without whose concordance there cannot be the possibility of existence of a multinational state such as Yugoslavia, the author puts a major responsibility for the decline and finally the fall of the prewar royalist regime on the Serbian establishment. Instead of dividing Yugoslavia into national federal units, it stubbornly persisted in continuing an anachronistic unitaristic policy, using Yugoslavianism as a disguise for a Great Serbian centralistic policy which discriminated against the other nationalities, parts of Yugoslavia's multinational state. The fact that the Chetniks and the Ustashes fought each other contributed to the victory of the Communist-led Partisans in their national liberation war.

Through the use of new documents Dr. Tomasevich exposes in this volume the formative years of the Chetnik movement, its determination to rule Yugoslavia according to the exclusive Great Serbian interests, fighting mostly the Croatian Catholic and Moslem population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the Serbian Orthodox were also persecuted by the Ustashes, thus opening the door to the Partisans' successes. The Chetniks' policy, sponsored by the Royal Yugoslav Government in exile under the control of its Serbian members, yielded to the extreme Serbian policy. When the Government nominated as the chief of the official guerrilla effort in Serbia and elsewhere Colonel Draža Mihailović, later a general and Minister of War in the country, the Yugoslav Government lost its last chance to rally the country's divided nations around the idea of a democratic Yugoslavia. Moreover, it contributed to the growth of the Communist-dominated Partisans, who appeared as the only unifiers of a deeply broken country.

Tomasevich succeeds in bringing out new documents from German, Italian and Yugoslav sources from which it appears that very little of the real fighting by the Chetniks and Mihailović was directed against the Italian and German occupying forces: their efforts were aimed instead against the Partisans. These sources show that the Chetniks and Mihailović collaborated with the German and Italian military authorities. On the other hand, these same sources also reveal that the Partisans too were in contact at least once or twice with the Germans: M. Djilas himself, together with one assistant, visited the German command in occupied territory in order to exchange prisoners, among whom was Tito's former wife. This fact has now been established in Djilas' book *Wartime*, and had earlier been documented in Walter R. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941-1945*.

In his conclusion Tomasevich offers the most accurate and profound analysis of Mihailović's role: "One of the principal characteristics of Mihailović's personality was that he was not a creative leader. Except for his decision to fight the Partisans as the chief enemy in the autumn of 1941 in Serbia—a policy from which he never swerved—his military and political conduct mostly followed the familiar patterns established during the interwar period by Serbian-dominated governments in Belgrade, or else was simply a reaction to the actions of others,

notably his rival Tito. Perhaps worst of all, Mihailović did not grow in a professional, political, or ideological sense as his responsibilities grew... But his background, his professional training as an officer, and his average intellectual capacities prevented him from growing into his historical role, and as a result he became daily less capable of successfully handling the ever more difficult and complex problems that arose for the Chetniks. The discrepancy in this respect between Tito and Mihailović is one of the most important differences between the two leaders and goes a long way to explain the one's success and the other's failure" (p. 469). This observation agrees with Mihailović's last confession: "Destiny was merciless towards me ... I wanted much, I began much, but the whirlwind, the world whirlwind carried me and my work away" (p. 471).

Tomasevich's book is one of the best examples of true scholarship so far written on the Chetniks. It is free of official or other bias, while dealing effectively with one of the most controversial and tragic periods of Yugoslavia's history.

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BOGDAN RADITSA

Robert F. Byrnes (ed.), *Communal Families in the Balkans: The Zadruga*, Notre Dame-London, University of Notre Dame Press, 1976, pp. 285.

This book is a collection of essays to honor a highly respected scholar, and much loved human being, Philip E. Mosely (1905-1972), late Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Relations at Columbia University. The book reprints Mosely's significant articles on the family as it developed in Eastern Europe, particularly its intriguing variant, the Balkan Zadruga. It also includes essays on the Zadruga by scholars from Europe and America. The introductory encomium of Mosely (an expert on East European and Balkan societies) is written by that venerated matriarch of anthropology Margaret Mead.

The Zadruga, or communal joint-family, has been the outstanding institution of peasant life in the Balkans. The student of Balkan social organization and development, as Mosely would argue, could not but carefully explore its variant forms, for modern Balkan societies grew out of this more archaic form of human organization. Mosely's classic definition of the Zadruga is "a household composed of two or more biological or small-families, closely related by blood or adoption, owning its means of production communally, producing and consuming the means of its livelihood communally". Thus the Zadruga is a variant of the extended family as found in many other peasant and pre-literate societies, but with certain unique features peculiar to the region. Although today Zadrugas are found in most of the Balkan countries, like Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, they are very few in existence. Their disappearance was due to urbanization, modernization and political changes in the region. Yet the cultural impact of the Zadruga is significant. Even when the Zadruga disappears, states Mosely, it usually leaves a spirit of mutual help, which finds expression not only in the traditional cooperative labors of the peasantry but also in the modern cooperative organizations which are growing in the more developed regions of the Balkans. The Yugoslav variety of the Zadruga is particularly noted for its egalitarian and democratic organization that led some scholars to conclude that what distinguished the Zadruga from other forms of extended family systems is its element of democracy. "Decisions regarding all efforts in the Zadruga are made by all married men together". Perhaps, it is partly because of the cultural impact of the Zadruga that Yugoslav socialism differs from that of other Eastern European countries.

Byrnes' edited work should appeal not only to specialists in the family or those inter-