

The last chapter deals with transportation. Heavy emphasis on historical transport networks weakens this chapter, since it merely summarizes what has been dealt with in the better known history texts of the region. In addition, more is known about contemporary transportation networks. In general, Mellor's very brief discussion of ports, shipping, and airways leaves much to be desired.

Part three, Comecon and the National Economies, consists of three chapters. The first chapter describes the genesis of Comecon, and the Soviet influence on the region. This chapter is a fine mesh of previously dealt with topics, but with emphasis on events since World War II. Treated are the basic interrelationships between the political and economic geographies of the Eastern European countries, and the overpowering Soviet influence. This is the strongest and most valuable chapter in the volume, and is most relevant to contemporary students of the region.

The last two chapters of the book, the Eastern European Countries, discuss each country in the context of their economic geographies. The penultimate chapter examines the more developed countries, while the last chapter summarizes the conditions of the developing economies. Treatments of economic topics consist of strengths and weaknesses for each nation through status surveys of their industries, agricultural conditions, and transport networks.

Despite some serious deficiencies, this book can be recommended reading for Eastern European specialists. On the other hand, it should not be treated as an introductory level text. Previous exposure to systematic geography is necessary, because Mellor uses terms often unknown to the non-geographer, and to the introductory level student. Many maps suffer from poor design, and previous knowledge of the area is necessary for recognition. A valuable inclusion is a list of important place names with various spellings, aiding the reader to a great extent.

This volume is a reasonable addition to the personal library of the student of Eastern European Studies. It is a positive step towards an understanding of the very complex and varied, albeit understudied, region of the world and, at a cost of U.S. \$9.00 (paper), an affordable purchase.

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Δημήτρη Κιτσίκη, *Ἑλλάς καὶ Ξένοι, 1919-1967. Τὰ Ἀρχεῖα τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ὑπουργείου Ἐξωτερικῶν*. Ἀθῆναι: Ἑστία, 1977, 217 σελ.

In his introduction to this slender volume the author, professor of international relations at the University of Ottawa, explains that the present publication represents a sequel to his study *Ἡ Ἑλλάς τῆς 4ης Ἀγοῦστος καὶ αἱ Μεγάλαι Δυνάμεις* (reviewed in *Balkan Studies* 17, 1, 1976), which dealt with the foreign policies of the Metaxas regime. The earlier study was the subject of considerable controversy in Greece less for its central theme (that the British-backed King George II, and not Metaxas, was the dominant figure in the dictatorship) than for the fact that Kitsikis had been given access to the "closed" files of the Greek Foreign Ministry and was quoting from heretofore classified documents. Although the present publication also carries the ambitious sub-title "The Archives of the Greek Foreign

Ministry", it is not likely to receive the same critical attention which greeted the earlier volume.

"Greece and Foreigners, 1919-1967", consists of six unrelated but chronologically arranged essays of which several appear to have been previously published in French journals. Their subjects are: Greek government attempts during the 1920s and 1930s to purchase favorable publicity in the French press; French Prime Minister A. Briand's 1930 plan for a European union; the Balkan cooperation schemes of 1930-1934; the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in relation to King George's restoration; the "political consequences" of famine during the occupation of Greece in World War II, and the socio-economic origins of Greek deputies from the 1830s to the 1967 coup.

In the first essay the author, relying mostly on the archives of the Greek embassy in Paris, documents in considerable detail the more-or-less clandestine moves of the Greek government to secure favorable attention in the French press by paying large sums to Leon Renier, director of the Agence Havas which controlled the news coverage of the leading dailies of Paris, as well as to other prominent journalists. This practice of bribing select organs of the foreign press, mostly of France and Britain, appears to have been well established before World War I and was continued by the Metaxas government which, however, was much more frugal and much more difficult to satisfy than its predecessors.

This is an interesting and important subject. It sheds light on the attitudes of the Greek government (which may be assumed to have been fairly typical in such matters) toward propaganda abroad, as well as on the susceptibility of Europe's news media to bribery. Parenthetically, it also shows that the much-criticized attempts of American government agencies during the heyday of the cold war to influence news and other media in Europe and elsewhere were hardly original. Kitsikis suggests that the efforts of the Greek government to influence the French press were not particularly successful, and that other governments were engaged in similar activities, presumably at times in opposition to Greek propaganda objectives. Yet the substance of the matter is left essentially to the reader's speculation. Thus, one can only wonder as to the issues the Greek government wished to see projected and with what slant. Similarly, it is not clear what the Greek government really hoped to accomplish. It is hardly possible that its purpose was to influence French policy since, as Kitsikis points out, the French government was aware of the payments to French journalists. On the other hand, French public opinion was not likely to become so exercised over Greek affairs as to pressure the French government to be more sensitive to the wishes of Athens. The precise purpose and effect of the exercise remain obscure and one becomes sceptical about the wisdom of the Greek officials who sought to impose their generosity upon willing or unwilling foreign journalists.

In his essay on Briand's scheme for a European federal union the author touches on the reaction of the Greek press (sympathetic) and government (non-committal) and focuses his attention on the speculation which developed concerning the motives behind the French leader's proposal. On the basis of reports of Greek diplomats in Europe's principal capitals Kitsikis demonstrates that while some observers believed Briand's purpose to be to unite Europe against Soviet communism, others thought he wished to prevent a general revision of the Versailles settlement which might favor Germany; still others saw in the proposal a desire to limit Britain's influence in Europe and the League of Nations. The Briand plan, which was doomed from its inception, represents a very small and unimportant footnote in the turbulent diplomacy of the interwar period. As for the Greek diplomats whose views

are quoted here, they were little more than passive observers of Europe's power scene. Thus Kitsikis' essay will be of interest only to the narrow specialist.

Turning next to the movement for Balkan unity in the early 1930s the author outlines the diplomatic activity of the Greek-Turkish and Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement, the Balkan conferences in which A. Papanastasiou played a key role, and the conclusion of the Balkan Pact. He also traces the generally disruptive influence exerted by the European powers throughout the period in question. He is particularly interested in the idea of a Greek-Turkish federation (which at various times both Kemal and Venizelos professed to favor) and views it as a natural competitor of the region's Slavic states. Kitsikis believes that "hellenoturkism", a subject to which he has devoted a major scholarly book, has great potential but does not expound here on this view. In general, and while he provides some interesting details especially from the Venizelos papers, his essay offers nothing of substance which has not been developed much more fully elsewhere.

Perhaps the most important among the essays contained in this volume is the one which seeks to link the restoration of King George II in 1935 with the consequences of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. Relying on the private archive of Loukas Roufos, Minister of Foreign Affairs and liaison between the exiled monarch and his principal supporters in Athens, Kitsikis concludes that Britain decided to support the king's restoration as a counterweight to Italy's rising power in the eastern Mediterranean. This is an important contention but it is based here more on conjecture than on documented evidence. Indeed, British policy and tactics on the issue of the king's return are presented in outline form. What is much more fully documented is the king's knowledge of, and vague support for, the plans to overthrow the Tsaldaris government and replace it with a dictatorship which would recall the king through a fraudulent plebiscite. Although one learns considerably more about the views of Roufos than of the king (the monarch was careful not to commit to paper potentially incriminating statements), Kitsikis' account leaves little room for doubt that George was prepared to resort to dictatorial measures in order to regain and hold his throne. By extension, Kitsikis' interpretation that the king was the motive force behind the Metaxas dictatorship (a thesis developed in his earlier volume) receives here considerable, if circumstantial, support.

In his essay on the famine of the occupation years the author discusses the diplomatic aspects of the issue and reviews the policies of the Axis and Allied powers toward the problem of feeding the starving Greeks. In general he blames Britain, whose blockade caused severe shortages in enemy-held countries. He praises Turkish efforts to send supplies to Greece but points out that not only quantities were small but that it had been pressure from Britain, the United States and even Germany that had forced Turkey to help its starving neighbor. Kitsikis also raises the interesting question of whether famine delayed or speeded up the growth of the resistance movement. On this he appears to take a middle position: he argues that although famine impeded resistance activity, it nevertheless paved the way for it through a process of forced social equalization created by near-universal suffering which in turn caused unrest and fostered the will to fight back.

The final essay attempts to categorize and analyze the social origins of Greek deputies up to 1967 and to consider their impact upon ideology and political orientation. It raises (but does not answer) the point, argued by Hariton Koryzis in a 1966 study, that Ottoman oppression left Greece so impoverished as to be without social classes. He also argues, however, that prior to the 1909 coup, election to parliament was the privilege of the very

wealthy and that an untitled aristocracy was in fact very much in evidence. The members of the 1936 and 1964 parliaments are compared as to age, geographic origin, profession and political views. Not surprisingly, Kitsikis finds that traditionally the Right came mostly from "old Greece" and had a rural constituency, while the Center and Left were strong in the newer towns and among the refugees from Asia Minor. By 1964 such distinctions had been blurred, allegiance to political personalities had weakened, and antimonarchism was on the rise. The essay provides some useful facts and arguments on the changing character of Greek political elites but its conclusions are modest and contain no surprises. Moreover, the connection between this topic and that of the other essays in this book is not made clear.

The student of contemporary Greek foreign relations labors under major handicaps. On the one hand, Greek government archives are either closed or incomplete; on the other, important records are scattered in private collections to which their owners allow access rarely and on the basis of personal favor. Therefore, new primary materials such as those presented in this volume, however fragmentary, are a welcome addition to the established diplomatic record. Moreover, Kitsikis has already proven himself a serious student of Balkan affairs. Accordingly, this small volume deserves the attention of all those interested in twentieth century Greece.

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Γ. Χ. Κώττη, *Βιομηχανική αποκέντρωση και περιφερειακή ανάπτυξις*, σελ. 479, 'Αθήναι 1980.

Professor G. C. Kottis' book published recently deals with the decentralisation of industry and regional development. In view of the concentration of Greek industry mainly in the Athens-Piraeus area and up to a certain degree in the Thessaloniki area, an intensive discussion has started in Greece about the disadvantages connected with this development, and about the possibilities of neutralising same. The Greek Government decided the application of various measures which were often amended and which until now did not produce results considered satisfactory. The author is perfectly right when stressing that the transfer of factories is not satisfactory from the owners' point of view as, during the period of transfer, they will lose customers and will face substantial expenses. Considering that a high percentage of factories operating in Greece has been started in the sixties and in the seventies, the over concentration of industry would have been avoided if the incentives for their establishment outside the Athens, Piraeus and Thessaloniki areas would have been considered satisfactory by those concerned. As shown from the results of an investigation carried out by the author and his collaborators, the owners of the industries which were transferred from the Athens-Piraeus area into other parts of the country, are not satisfied by the new surroundings where they are active. Despite subsidies, reduced taxes, cheap land and lower wages for unskilled workers, the firms concerned, complain on the difficulties of securing managers and skilled workers, on the impossibility of settling on the spot their problems with the authorities and with their banks as all decision making is concentrated in Athens, on the difficulties of transport and on other problems they are facing more intensely when out of the Athens-Piraeus area.

The author does not deal with the possibility of prohibiting the establishment of new