The Aliakmon line : an Anglo-Greek misunderstanding in 1941
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Abstract
The plan to form an allied front against the German invasion of Greece
in April 1941 was severely compromised by a disagreement between the Greek
and British General Staffs over the line to be held and the timing of its formation. These questions were discussed at meetings in Athens on 14-15 January, 22-23 February, and 2-4 March, 1941. The choice of a defensive line lay between the northern frontier of Greece (continued by the River Nestos or the Strymon) and the so-called “Aliakmon line” running west and south of Thessaloniki. Since the latter choice would entail abandoning the northern capital, the Greeks were reluctant to adopt it if there was any hope that the Yugoslavs (and more doubtfully, the Turks) would join the allied front. At the February meetings in Athens, General Papagos and his staff thought it was agreed that before he ordered a withdrawal to the Aliakmon line, the British would ascertain the Yugoslavs’ intentions. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, undertook to raise the question with Prince Paul, the Yugoslav Regent, by telegram; but he and his staff all thought it was agreed that Papagos would order the Greek withdrawal without awaiting the Yugoslav reply. Although Eden received a negative reply from Belgrade, while on a visit to Ankyra, he failed to communicate it to the Greeks in time to affect Papagos’ decision. The misunderstanding arose partly from the lack of a common language understood by all those present. The discussions were mainly in French, aided by a bilingual Anglo-French interpreter (General Heywood). But two separate records were kept, in Greek and English (both of which survive), and these were not compared for accuracy. The meetings in early March attempted to repair the misunderstanding. Papagos thought it too late to make an orderly withdrawal to the Aliakmon line, and wanted to revert to the frontier line. The British still insisted on the Aliakmon line. The Greeks formed the impression that the British might refuse to send a force to Greece at all unless their wishes prevailed. Under strong pressure from the King of Greece, who emphasised the political consequences of a breach with Britain, Papagos reluctantly gave way. Only in the case of the final session on 4 March were the two records harmonised, the Greek being a straightforward translation of the English. The final agreement on an immediate withdrawal of the Greek forces to the Aliakmon line was drafted in French. By then it proved too late to form and hold the line successfully against the German attack. Probably it would have been impossible in any case; but the lesson for allies remains—always to ensure that agreements recorded in different languages are unequivocally harmonised.
in April 1941 was severely compromised by a disagreement between the Greek
and British General Staffs over the line to be held and the timing of its formation. These questions were discussed at meetings in Athens on 14-15 January, 22-23 February, and 2-4 March, 1941. The choice of a defensive line lay between the northern frontier of Greece (continued by the River Nestos or the Strymon) and the so-called “Aliakmon line” running west and south of Thessaloniki. Since the latter choice would entail abandoning the northern capital, the Greeks were reluctant to adopt it if there was any hope that the Yugoslavs (and more doubtfully, the Turks) would join the allied front. At the February meetings in Athens, General Papagos and his staff thought it was agreed that before he ordered a withdrawal to the Aliakmon line, the British would ascertain the Yugoslavs’ intentions. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, undertook to raise the question with Prince Paul, the Yugoslav Regent, by telegram; but he and his staff all thought it was agreed that Papagos would order the Greek withdrawal without awaiting the Yugoslav reply. Although Eden received a negative reply from Belgrade, while on a visit to Ankyra, he failed to communicate it to the Greeks in time to affect Papagos’ decision. The misunderstanding arose partly from the lack of a common language understood by all those present. The discussions were mainly in French, aided by a bilingual Anglo-French interpreter (General Heywood). But two separate records were kept, in Greek and English (both of which survive), and these were not compared for accuracy. The meetings in early March attempted to repair the misunderstanding. Papagos thought it too late to make an orderly withdrawal to the Aliakmon line, and wanted to revert to the frontier line. The British still insisted on the Aliakmon line. The Greeks formed the impression that the British might refuse to send a force to Greece at all unless their wishes prevailed. Under strong pressure from the King of Greece, who emphasised the political consequences of a breach with Britain, Papagos reluctantly gave way. Only in the case of the final session on 4 March were the two records harmonised, the Greek being a straightforward translation of the English. The final agreement on an immediate withdrawal of the Greek forces to the Aliakmon line was drafted in French. By then it proved too late to form and hold the line successfully against the German attack. Probably it would have been impossible in any case; but the lesson for allies remains—always to ensure that agreements recorded in different languages are unequivocally harmonised.
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