

Party in the Israeli Parliament comes from the Arabic-speaking Orthodox community. Thus doctrinal dissent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries must be studied in order to understand many of the groups who appear as ideologically autonomous in the twentieth. This is also shown by Haddad with respect to the Melkites in Syria.

In these two volumes there is much of value for the specialists. They are strongly recommended too for the general reader interested in the complex origins of the contemporary Middle East and Balkan controversies. We now have a valuable introduction to the study of the ethnic minorities of the Ottoman Empire and their constitutional experiences and along with it an indication of the kinds of research planned for the coming decade. The new questions raised are as fascinating as the new material and interpretations offered.

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Paul N. Hehn, *The German Struggle Against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World War II: German Counter-Insurgency in Yugoslavia 1941-1943*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 153 pages.

This is a rather curious little book. First, it is really a translation of «Die Bekämpfung der Aufstandsbewegung in Südostraum» by Ernst Wisshaupt who was an archivist for the German Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief in Southeast Europe (Army Group F) dated February 1, 1944, and covered the period from June 1941 through August 1942. This is available in abbreviated form as Document No. NOKW-1898, Office of the Chief of Counsel, Nuremberg, mimeographed copy, 190 pages. As such, Hehn is really more of a translator, and the real author is Ernst Wisshaupt. Hehn does acknowledge in the introduction that the work was «written by General (sic) Wisshaupt while the conflict was still going on» (p. 1). However, that is not accurate since no one by that name or rank can be located on the army lists of the Third Reich of Nazi Germany. Nonetheless, Hehn did write an interesting introduction, conclusion and some bibliographic notes.

Procedurally, the book is rather difficult to read even for someone familiar with the wartime campaigns and resistance movements in Yugoslavia. First, the book lacks a «German Chain of Command at the Start of the Balkan Campaigns» such as is available in A.C. Smith, *The German Campaigns in the Balkans* (Spring 1941), Washington, D. C.: Department of the Army, November 1953), p. 152A. Without such a chart, it is difficult for the uninitiated to know the various acronyms such as OKH-Army High Command, OKW-Armed Forces High Command, AOK-Armed Forces Operations, *et cetera*, as well as the *dramatis personae* such as Chief of OKH-Halder, Chief of OKW-Keitel, and Chief of AOK-Jodl. The profusion of military organs and commanders becomes even greater at the lower levels of command such as the XVIII Mountain Corps under General Boehme. The problem becomes even worse as commanders are changed, and military units replaced. In short, it is very difficult for an experienced military historian to keep track of the organization and all the changes, and virtually impossible for the ca-

sual reader. Second, the book lacks a short summary of the various Yugoslav resistance movements, leaders and programs, such as is available in David L. Larson, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Yugoslavia, 1943-1963*, (Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1979) pp. 330-333. Without such a guide it is impossible for the uninitiated to understand the complex and dynamic structure, program, organization and operation of the major movements including the «Chetniks», «Partisans» and «Ustashi», much less the minor movements and their leaders. Third, it would have been most helpful to identify the «Partition of Yugoslavia» and the zones of occupation and annexation with something more than a small map in the front. For example: Germany annexed Maribor and Celje, and occupied a reduced Serbia including Belgrade; Italy annexed Dalmatia and the offshore islands, as well as a large part of Slovenia including Ljubljana, and also annexed Kosovo-Metohija to Albania and controlled Montenegro; Hungary annexed part of Slavonia, and the Voivodina. Bulgaria occupied Macedonia, but was not permitted to annex it; «Croatia» was a puppet state under German control, formed out of former Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and part of Dalmatia. It is also important to understand this partition and annexation of Yugoslavia in order to help understand the resistance movements. Fourth, a chronology of events in Yugoslavia during the critical period of the report or study would be helpful to place events in their proper context. Fifth, an annotated bibliography on Yugoslav works dealing with the resistance movements would also be helpful. Sixth, an index is needed to make the book more useful.

Substantively, the translation of Wisshaupt's report into English helps to reveal more clearly the German perceptions of Colonel Draza Mihailovich of the «Nationalist Chetniks» and Josip Broz Tito of the «Communist Partisans». This definitely helps to shed some light on the alleged collaboration of Mihailovich with the Germans, which was the *raison d'être* for Mihailovich's subsequent trial and execution in July 1946. Although the report only covers the period from June 1941 through August 1942, a few excerpts are illustrative:

«General Bader and Colonel Kewisch (Chief of General Staff of LXV Corps Command) do not trust the Chetniks. Orders have already been found which prove that the Chetniks and Communists have been collaborating».

«As already mentioned, bloody combats occurred for the first time between Mihailovich units and communist bands about the 11th of November near Loznica».

«About the middle of November, Draza Mihailovich, the most influential leader of the national Serbian insurgent movement, made an offer through his intermediary to the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, to fight with his bands together with the German troops against the Communists. For this purpose he demanded weapons for his Chetniks. As the Wehrmacht Commander Southeast wired to the OKW on November 13 in reply to an inquiry, this offer was turned down and unconditional surrender was demanded... Mihailovich did not answer».

Later in November and December, 1941, the Germans launched a major offensive against Mihailovich and his Chetniks, and in mid-December «The Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia confirmed that 'the Mihailovich group can be considered beaten' and 'Mihailovich was proscribed as a criminal insurgent and a price of 200,000 dinars was put on his head'». These and other passages add to the

discussion and controversy that still surround Mihailovich today, as summarized by Jozo Tomasevich in *The Chetniks*, (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1975).

Another point of interest is the German accounting of the killed, captured, and civilians killed in reprisal for the attacks and depredations of the insurgents. After one year of counter-insurgency the Germans claimed 49,724 insurgents killed in battle or reprisal. The strange thing is that the Germans did not seem to fully realize that the consequences of the *Nacht and Nebel* reprisal decree were counterproductive in losing what little tolerance the populace may have had for the German occupation, and in driving thousands of non-combatant civilians over to the Chetniks and Partisans.

In summary, while this translation makes an interesting story for the expert, it would have been of much greater value if some of the procedural difficulties had been overcome.

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David J. Alvarez, *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey 1943-1946*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1980, 135 pp., Bibliography, Index.

The title and organization of this brief volume speak to the author's intentions. As the sub-title suggests, the book treats Turkish-US relations and though one chapter surveys the whole of the subject, the focus of the later chapters is on the Dardanelles in the inter-war years and on Turkey as an issue at Yalta, Potsdam, and immediately after. Based, naturally, on western sources this work shows the growing concern for the eastern Mediterranean which resulted in the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in March of 1947. Contrary to the assumptions of many, the decision to aid Turkey and Greece was reached three months before Great Britain informed Washington of its inability to continue a forward policy and called upon the US to shoulder the burden.

The main title, *Bureaucracy and the Cold War*, suggests that Professor Alvarez had more in mind than the description of a given diplomatic event. His focus is on the making of policy, in this instance on the impact of American bureaucracy on the formation of what became known as «The Truman Doctrine», and it is this which makes the book particularly interesting and valuable. Almost thirty years ago William McNeill criticized what he depicted as «Cartesian history», that in which «Everything seems to happen inevitably». It is unfortunately quite normal for people to assume that national policy reflects, at least, the consensus of the national leadership. Policy, at the highest level, should be the result of agree upon steps and mutually held assumptions. Otherwise, how can an historian seek the hidden cause behind the obvious event? Yet we all know that we have less than total control over our personal lives, that there are unexpected outcomes to many undertakings, and that some of our greatest successes were unexpected. McNeill argued that the same could be said of nations and that what may be presented