

published (with slight differences in the reading) by Cornelius, *ibid.*, p. 13. ~ Document n° 604 (p. 234-235) has also been published by Cornelius, *ibid.*, p. 113-114 (with many differences in the reading of words). ~ In document n° 651 (p. 255-256), also known to us from H. Noiret's edition ("Documents inédits", Paris 1892, p. 462), the words "comino Sancti Johannis Palmoye" should correctly read "iconomo Sancti Johannis Palmose"; see also the correction in Tsirpanlis' "Cardinal Bessarion's Legacy", p. 73. ~ It should be noted that document n° 676 (p. 266) has already been published by Noiret, *ibid.*, p. 533; see also Tsirpanlis, *ibid.*, p. 118. It should be added that "cetera eius Turchus occupat. Cardinalis..." should correctly read (according to Noiret) "cetera enim Turchus occupat, Cardinalis..." ~ Document n° 708 (p. 284) has already been published by M. I. Manousakas in 'Αρχιερείς Μεθώνης, Κορώνης και Μονεμβασίας γύρω στα 1500 [Prelates of Methoni, Koroni and Monemvasia circa 1500], *Peloponnesiaka* 3-4 (1958-1959), p. 136; see also M. Manousakas, Recherches sur la vie de Jean Plousiadénos (Joseph de Méthone) (1429?-1500), *Revue des Études Byzantines* 17 (1959), p. 47. The differences in the script between the two editions (of Manousakas and Fedalto) are significant. I note only that "...venerabilis vir dominus Ioannes Phisindino" (ed. Fedalto) should read "...Venetiarum vir chir Joannes Plusiadino" (ed. Manousakas). The incorrect reading of the surname also creates two different individuals; therefore in the index (p. 299) Iohannes Phisindino should be identified as Iohannes Plagudino (Plusiadeno).

It seems to me that it would have been useful for this collection to include, together with the decisions of the Venetian Senate, the documents (or their summaries) published by the Venetian senator Flaminio Cornelius in 1755. These decisions, of course, relate to ecclesiastical problems on Crete, as do the documents of 16.7.1334 ("Creta Sacra", vol. 2, p. 11), circa 1366 (*ibid.*, p. 345-347), 15.2.1367 (*ibid.*, p. 53), 22.3.1368 (*ibid.*, p. 53-54), 10.5.1411 (*ibid.*, p. 63-64), 15.9.1415 (*ibid.*, p. 369-370), 2.1.1448 (*ibid.*, p. 81-82).

The additions or corrections mentioned above are mere trifles when set against the impressive contribution made by this three-volume work, and more generally against Fedalto's contribution to studies in the field of Greek-Venetian relations during the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

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Richard Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 234.

Richard Clogg's *A Short History of Modern Greece* is probably the best book of its kind, with the possible exception of Nikos Svoronos' *Review of Modern Greek History*. Designed for a general but an educated audience, this volume digests nearly 800 years of Greek history in less than 250 pages. The end result is an eminently readable summary skillfully synthesizing the insights of a large body of in-depth scholarship, including Clogg's own works, into a well-balanced, thoughtful, and informative essay on modern Greece.

Richard Clogg systematically employs in this volume an empiricist orientation with standard historical interpretative techniques. In recounting the turbulent history of Modern Greece, he quietly suggests that political developments are the product of a multiplicity of "causes" that can be traced in the domestic arena and in the foreign environment of Greece.

In telling his story, the author emphasizes political developments and is quite conscious

of the fact that he pays less attention to the social, economic and cultural ones. The book strongly suggests that in the history of modern Greece (especially in the 20th century), conflict appears to be a constant companion. Yet, he avoids facile, grand design, and mono-causal interpretations for this phenomenon. He does not overestimate any one explanatory approach. The reader is left, rather, with the distinct impression that "reality" is too complex to be explained by approaches emphasizing either the geopolitical location of Greece, or its class-struggle, or the social origin of Greek elites, or the national character of its people, and so on.

The book opens in the year 1204 with the Byzantine Empire in decay, "waiting for the Barbarians" who finally do arrive in 1453. The defeat of Byzantium in the hands of the Ottomans is seen as a synthesis of social discontent fueled by the rise of predatory local aristocracies and the inability of the Byzantines (rank and file) to choose between Western religious domination and Eastern (Muslim) political domination. The question of "where does Greece belong", which is still of some significance today, is raised quite sharply in the opening pages of the book.

Clogg devotes the next chapter to the nearly 400 years of Greece under Ottoman rule. This is very useful reading for those of us who have been brought up by accounts that treat this interesting period as a formless "black hole". The chapter, among other things, sheds light into the reasons for the survival of the Greek nation... its language, culture, and historical memory. The *Millet* system of segregating administration by religious affiliation in the Ottoman Empire is naturally assigned central importance in this respect. In this chapter too, Clogg continues with the theme of Greek ambivalence between East and West. The Church (especially its hierarchy), the phanariots, and the prokritoi (kodjabashis), on the one hand, had a convenient proclivity for the Ottoman *status quo* and for an Eastern orientation. The marchant class, on the other hand, helped to generate a Western secular orientation and to feed the flame of Greek nationalism.

Greece's War of Independence provides the next subject for treatment. Here we are presented with some new evidence regarding the character of the Philike Etairia which is based on George Frangos' study of the petty bourgeois social origins of the Etairia's membership. Clogg ably recounts the ups and downs and the heroism and sacrifice of the Greek War of Independence. He demonstrates how the struggle against the Ottomans was often muted by internecine struggles and explains these intra-Greek conflicts in terms of sectional, regional, and personal differences rather than class differences.

At this point, our author introduces a major theme which runs across the whole book, and which (at least in the mind of this reviewer) needs further elucidation and justification. This theme, incidentally, is also found in much of the literature dealing with Greece's political development. In Clogg's words... "It was (the) grafting of the forms, but not the substance, of Western constitutional government onto an essentially traditional society, with a very different value system from that prevailing in the West, that was to create within Greece a fundamental political tension that has continued for much of its post-independence history". The implication of this thinking is that, perhaps, Greece under a traditional (paternalistic/authoritarian) system would have experienced fewer tensions in the 19th and the 20th centuries. This reviewer would like to see some more probing done in this area, particularly in regard to the following three questions: Did Western institutions "fail" to work in modern Greece? What particular values of Greek society were inconsistent with values of Western societies? What specific culture and time-related indicators can one select as a good basis for comparison between Greek and Western values?

Clogg, then, proceeds to describe nineteenth century Greece in a beautifully written chapter entitled "Independence, Nation-Building and Irredentism". The fundamental contradiction of building a modern state amid pressures to continue the struggle for the liberation of the remaining unredeemed territories provides the organizational spine of this period's treatment. Further, the author does an excellent job in highlighting the heavy impact of foreign intervention in 19th century Greek politics.

The twentieth century is covered in greater detail in the second and larger "half" of the book. Clogg discusses the Balkan Wars, the First World War and the Anatolian adventure, tracing this turbulent period to 1923 (and the conclusion of the Megali Idea process). The interwar period is recounted next, with great emphasis being placed on the deep impact of the Asia Minor refugee influx on the very nature of Greek life. Clogg points up that the 1920s and 1930s were marked by frequent military intervention. However, he makes no attempt to trace the "causes" of praetorianism in Greece.

Coming closer to our times, the author carefully treats the period of "Occupation, Resistance and Civil War". He views this period as a tragedy of errors committed by the British and by *all* the Greek factions competing to fill the political vacuum of post World War II Greece. Clogg asserts here that Greece was unfortunately "caught" in the storm-center of the first major struggle of the Cold War.

It is in connection with this fine chapter that I have found a small bone to pick. On p. 142 Professor Clogg argues that... "Official British policy toward Greece (during the war period) was to support the return of the king on liberation. This was partly because it was believed in the Foreign Office that constitutional monarchy would provide the best guarantee of friendly post-war Greece". The word "friendly" as employed above is perhaps misleading. For liberal, centrist but non-monarchical governments could have easily proved very friendly to Britain. Perhaps the word "dependent" would have fit "reality" much better, given that SOE was steadily informing the Foreign Office throughout the war years of the extreme unpopularity of King George's restoration to the throne.

The remaining two chapters, entitled "Uncertain Democracy and Military Dictatorship" and "From Authoritarianism to Democracy" respectively, should be classified among the finest interpretative essays written to date about these times.

Analyzing the Greek Junta, Clogg juxtaposes its rhetoric and its reality and demonstrates the huge gap that separates the two. He attributes the fall of the dictatorship, in 1974, primarily to economic factors (inflation and income maldistribution) and to a foreign adventure (the junta-engineered coup against Makarios). He clearly states that the United States supported the Greek Junta but also reminds us that there is no evidence available implicating the United States in the planning and execution of the 1967 coup.

The intelligently selected cover page of this volume symbolizes well the post-junta period. It is a photograph showing Constantine Karamanlis being sworn in as Prime Minister at four o'clock in the morning of July 24, 1974, by the Archbishop of Athens in the presence of the then President (and remnant of the military dictatorship) General Gizikis. Symbolically Karamanlis is positioned on the Western side of this photo, the Church occupies the Eastern side and the military—noticeably tilting to the East—is seen as grudgingly receding in the background.

Clogg praises the solid post-junta record of Karamanlis (unlike the treatment of the prime minister's activities in the 1950's and early 60's). He credits Karamanlis with managing a remarkably smooth yet substantive transition from dictatorship to democracy. He also presents a very well-done survey of the views on domestic and foreign policy issues of each

of the major political parties. Our author closes with a cautious but guardedly optimistic, note, identifying the challenges and the opportunities that post-junta Greece will face in Western Europe. Democratic Greece may still have to ride a rather bumpy road, but the durability of the "democratic vehicle" appears to Clogg to be strong enough to get Greece back to "Ithaca".

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Basil Kondis, *Greece and Albania, 1908-1914*, Thessaloniki, 1976, pp. 151.

L'évolution des relations gréco-albanaises n'a pas jusqu'à nos jours constitué le sujet d'une étude approfondie et systématique. Cette lacune n'est pas, toutefois, due à un manque d'intérêt, au moins du côté hellénique; mais le regard des historiens et des publicistes Grecs avait été presque exclusivement concentré soit sur le problème nord-épirote soit sur les réactions du gouvernement d'Athènes, manifestées en fonction de celui-ci. De l'autre côté, les auteurs albanais et étrangers étaient presque toujours motivés dans leurs écrits par l'idée fixe que les Grecs étaient animés de sentiments hostiles à l'égard du principe de l'indépendance albanaise. Même le travail très important de Stavro Skendi ne se réfère aux relations gréco-albanaises que pour répéter, assez brièvement, cette idée sommaire et schématique.

Basil Kondis est venu combler cette lacune de l'historiographie et ouvrir une nouvelle perspective dans l'analyse des rapports gréco-albanais. Les dates limites fixées dans son étude—1908-1914—lui permirent de souligner, d'une part, les répercussions de la chute de l'ancien régime ottoman et de la prise du pouvoir par les Jeunes Turcs sur le sort de la nation albanaise et aboutir, de l'autre, à une analyse concluante au sujet de la première création d'un État albanais indépendant. Dans ce contexte, l'auteur tend à démontrer que l'attitude du gouvernement d'Athènes n'a pas été exclusivement déterminée par le seul souci de préserver l'avenir des populations grecques irredimées de l'Épire du Nord; la prévision, l'instauration et, ensuite, la participation du nouvel État albanais dans la vie internationale ont été liées à des questions et des réalités multiples à l'égard desquelles les dirigeants d'Athènes ont été portés de prendre position et arrêter, même, une stratégie. Les constantes de cette dernière reflétaient l'esprit largement amical et conciliant qui avait animé les rapports entre les milieux politiques et diplomatiques d'Athènes et certains représentants du peuple albanais dès les dernières décennies du XIXe jusqu'aux débuts du XXe siècle. L'abandon—sous l'effervescence de l'esprit nationaliste—de l'idée d'un régime dualiste initialement préconisée, n'a pas suspendu ces contacts bilatéraux. À la suite des événements de 1908, le gouvernement hellénique n'a pas seulement adopté le principe de l'indépendance albanaise, mais elle a encore abouti à juger la création d'un État albanais amical conforme à certains de ses propres intérêts: cette Albanie indépendante n'aurait-elle pas pu constituer un élément d'équilibre dans son voisinage balkanique et un soutien éventuel contre toute prétention excessive des États slaves? Certes, cette attitude favorable du gouvernement d'Athènes tenait largement à l'idée que le territoire de l'Épire n'aurait pas été incluí dans les frontières du nouvel État.

Le travail de Basil Kondis est basé sur l'étude d'un matériel inédit très important.