

BYZANTIUM AND GREECE

A REVIEW ARTICLE *

À PROPOS OF ROMILLY JENKINS, *BYZANTIUM AND BYZANTINISM*

In two public lectures, given at the University of Cincinnati in November, 1962,¹ Prof. Romilly Jenkins discussed the character of the Byzantine State and its influence on Modern Greece.

Lectures, as a rule, partake of the transient nature of the spoken word and rarely afford occasion for a review article. But Professor Jenkins' lectures at Cincinnati must be treated as an exception. The distinguished background of the lecturer, and the high reputation of the university as a center of Greek studies, are two factors that lend importance to the event. Even more interesting is the content of these lectures — especially Professor Jenkins' attempt to revive the old theory of Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer. Fallmerayer's theory concludes that the Greek people disappeared from Greece in the early Middle Ages. Their place, according to the theory, was taken by Slavs, who invaded the country between 577 and 615 A. D.² After the Slavs came large numbers of Albanians, so — to quote

* This article was written on my return to the United States from a very profitable visiting research professorship, under the Fulbright Program, at the Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki. It is my pleasant duty to express my thanks to the members of the committees that were instrumental in my appointment; to the Administration of the University and to the Faculty of Philosophy for the hospitality extended to me on all occasions; to the Board of Directors of the Institute for Balkan Studies and of the Society of Macedonian Studies; and last but not least, to the U. S. Educational Foundation in Greece (Mr. G. L. Grant, director) and its Thessaloniki branch (Mr. T. J. Gunning, cultural officer).

1. Published by the University of Cincinnati Press, 1963 (42 pp.).

2. Constantine J. Amantos, *Ἱστορία τοῦ Βυζαντινοῦ Κράτους* [*History of the Byzantine State*] (Athens, 1939), I, 279 - 284, and "The Slavs in Greece" (in Greek), *Byzantinisch-neugriechische Jahrbücher*, XVII (1944), 210 - 221, concluded that the historians Evagrius and Menander used the term "Hellas" as synonymous with the north of the Balkan Peninsula, hence the Avaro-Slavic invasions did not take place in the sixth century in Greece proper. This is the consensus of Greek historical opinion. As regards the time of the first Slavic settlements in Greece, Amantos' view is that they occurred in the eighth century. Amantos' article was written *à propos* of the work of Max Vasmer on the Slavic toponymics in Greece. Vasmer's

Fallmerayer — “not a drop of pure Hellenic blood flows in the veins of the Christian inhabitants of Modern Greece ... Scythian Slavs, Illyrian Arnauts, children of northern lands, blood relations of Serbs and Bulgars, Dalmatians and Muscovites, are the people whom we call Greeks at present and whose genealogy, to their own surprise, we have traced back to Pericles and Philopoemen.”

Fallmerayer's theory appeared in the two-volume work — *Geschichte*

historical section is limited to a *resumé* of the available information and his opinion is that the Slavs settled in the Peloponnesus in the sixth century. Vasmer's work, entitled *Die Slaven in Griechenland*, was published in the *Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Phil. - Hist. Klasse, 12, (Berlin, 1941). Stilpon P. Kyriakides, *Βυζαντινὰὶ Μελέται*, VI: *Οἱ Σλάβοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ* [*Byzantine Studies*, VI: *The Slavs in the Peloponnesus*] (Thessaloniki, 1947), agreeing with Amantos along the main lines, rejects the conclusions of Charanis, noted below. Apostolos E. Vakalopoulos, *Ἱστορία τοῦ Νέου Ἑλληνισμοῦ* [*History of Modern Hellenism*] (Thessaloniki, 1961), I, 19-26, approaches Amantos' view that the Slavs began to settle in the northern provinces of the Balkan Peninsula at the end of the sixth century and entered the Peloponnesus around the middle of the seventh century. Their settlements there date from the 700's. D. A. Zakythenos, *Οἱ Σλάβοι ἐν Ἑλλάδι* [*The Slavs in Greece*] (Athens, 1945), p. 47 f., concludes that the Slavs moved into the Peloponnesus after the plague of 746. Peter Charanis, depending on the Chronicle of Monemvasia and reinforced by a scholium of Arethas, seeks to prove that the Slavs settled in the Peloponnesus (western and central) in the reign of Maurice (582-602) and remained undisputed masters of the area until the beginning of the ninth century. See Charanis, "Nicephorus the Savior of Greece from the Slavs 810 A. D.," *Byzantina - Metabyzantina*, I (1946), 75-92; "The Chronicle of Monemvasia and the Question of the Slavonic Settlements in Greece," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, V (1950), 141-166; and "On the Slavic Settlement in the Peloponnesus," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XLVI (1953), 91-103. Kenneth M. Setton, "The Bulgars in the Balkans and the Occupation of Corinth in the Seventh Century," *Speculum*, XXV (1950), 502-543, cites documentary evidence leading to the probability that the great invasion of the Peloponnesus occurred in the middle of the seventh century and was the work of Onugur Bulgars, kinsmen of the Hungarians. Neither Charanis (e.g. *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, V, 163), nor Setton (*op. cit.*, p. 511), accept Fallmerayer's theory of the eclipse of the Greeks from the Peloponnesus, though Charanis tends to accept the duration of Slavic preponderance as given by Fallmerayer (218 years). Charanis and Setton engaged in a very interesting discussion (*Speculum*, XXVII, 343-362), the former rejecting the theory of the Bulgar occupation of Corinth, the latter insisting that it actually took place. If there was a Bulgar occupation of Corinth shortly after 641, as Setton believes there was, it came to an end after a Byzantine victory in 657-658, according to Setton. For Charanis, the probable date of the recovery of Corinth by the Byzantines is 586 (*Speculum*, XXVII, 348). For a discussion of the whole problem of Slavs in the Peloponnesus, and further bibliography, see Antoine Bon, *Le Péloponnèse Byzantin jusqu'en 1204* (Paris, 1951), pp. 27-87.

der Halbinsel Morea während des Mittelalters (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1830-36). Because of the theory, these two volumes created a sensation, coming as they did immediately after Greece's nine-year struggle for national independence, when philhellenism was still alive in Europe and America.

Before the close of the century, however, several leading historians — among them the German Karl Hopf³ and the Greek Constantine Paparrhegopoulos⁴ — proved that Fallmerayer's theory lacked a solid scholarly basis. The consensus of historical opinion, since then, has regarded him as an extremist. Though he was mentioned favorably in Russia, both czarist and Soviet, prominent Slav historians of our age — for example, M. V. Levchenko,⁵ George Ostrogorsky,⁶ and Alexander Vasiliev,⁷ — never went so far as to assert that the Greek race was exterminated, though they spoke of an influx of large numbers of Slavs into Southern Greece already in the sixth century. Greece's Marxist historian, John Kordatos,⁸ wrote that "not all of the Greeks were displaced (by the Slavs) or exterminated by the plague. They survived in many places." He, too, like the Slav historians, but unlike his fellow-countrymen, placed the descent of the Slavs in the sixth century.

It is generally admitted that the newcomers, whether they came in the sixth or in the seventh or in the eighth century, were hellenized (with a few exceptions) in the ninth and tenth centuries, and so were most of the Albanians who immigrated into Greece in the fourteenth century and after. In both instances, the process of hellenization, which, in the case of the Slavs, carried with it conversion to Christianity, was synonymous with a more advanced stage of civilization.

The question of "blood," however, remains an unsolved riddle. The subject obviously enough, does not lend itself to scholarly treatment and Professor Jenkins would agree with this view (pp. 21-22). In our days, particularly, no one can speak seriously about the "purity" or "impurity"

3. *Geschichte Griechenlands vom Beginn des Mittelalters bis auf unsere Zeit*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1867-68), pp. 23-53.

4. "Slavic Settlements in Greek Lands" (in Greek) in *Ἱστορικαὶ Πραγματεῖαι*, A' [Historical Treatises, I] (Athens, 1858); *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους* [History of the Greek Nation] 6th ed. (Athens, 1932), III, i, 151-168.

5. *Byzance* (Paris, 1949), pp. 128-129.

6. *History of the Byzantine State* (Rutgers University Press, 1957), p. 85.

7. *History of the Byzantine Empire* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1952), pp. 178-179.

8. *Ἱστορία τῆς Βυζαντινῆς Αυτοκρατορίας* [History of the Byzantine Empire] (Athens, 1959), I, 251-252.

of a nation's blood. What matters in a nation's history is culture and national consciousness.⁹

Hence the central theme of Fallmerayer's theory — the sources of a Greek's blood — would present no interest to a cultured audience of our time. But the subject of the "extinction" of the Greek people in a large area of the Greek homeland, for as long a period as two hundred years (577 or 615-805 A. D.), is an entirely different matter: it poses the question of the continuity or interruption of Greece's cultural tradition.

When a theory, long discredited, is suddenly conjured up by a well-known scholar, we should start examining the ground on which we stand. What new evidence is there that the specter, which troubled the sleep of Greek patriots and ardent philhellenes in the nineteenth century, should be entitled to a place under the sun? Are there new materials — facts hitherto ignored or archeological finds of recent date — that may shed light on the bridge of transition from Byzantine to Modern Greece? This is the key problem in the Jenkins lectures: the continuity of Greece's cultural tradition.

The first lecture — "The Byzantine State: Its Essential Qualities" — should be expected to offer the new basis for the old theory. So let us turn our attention to it with an open mind.

In a vivid style that does not lack literary charm, Professor Jenkins describes the Byzantine State as an oriental autocracy, totalitarian and monolithic, whose loyalties are an uninterrupted — as it seemed to the Byzantines — imperial tradition, adherence to Christian dogma and use of the Greek language. The Byzantine, in other words, belonged to Orthodoxy, as opposed to free thought or any kind of deviationism; was obedient to a "divinely ordained *basileus*," who was "the vice-gerent of God;" shared the vision of a well-ordered Christian Oekoumenē; believed in a Kingdom of Heaven, where Christ is king; and admired the Ancient Greek language, which the educated class tried to imitate in poetry and prose. At the same time, the Byzantine disliked paganism and pagan thought, thereby accepting the vessel of Ancient Hellenism but rejecting the content. The multinational population of the Eastern Roman, or Byzantine, Empire, who cal-

9. A Greek anthropologist, Ares Poulianos, now Soviet citizen and member of the Ethnographical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow, in his book *Ἡ καταγωγή τῶν Ἑλλήνων* [*The Origins of the Greeks*] (Athens 1960, pp. 160, translated by the author himself from the original Russian) on the basis of extensive and detailed anthropological research maintains that there is no racial difference between Classical and Modern Greeks.

led themselves "Romans," found great satisfaction in the thought that they were God's "Chosen People." "If they abstained from sin, the empire expanded and prospered, the menace of the barbarians receded, and the discords excited by heresy declined. If they did not so abstain, the reverse was the inevitable consequence" (p. 4). This was the Christian conscience of the empire and it is much the same among devout persons in Modern Greece. That Christian faith and good deeds are rewarded by God on earth, as well as in Heaven, is part of the common conscience of Christendom. In this respect, we might add the Byzantines were like other Christians.

Coming closer to the Byzantine mind, Professor Jenkins observes three outstanding qualities — one essentially religious in origin, one political, and one cultural. They can be briefly analyzed as follows:

First, belief in perfection already attained through God. "This," he adds, "is antagonistic to anything which Western civilization has stood for since the Renaissance or the Reformation: the West believes in progress by means of practical empiricism ... Since dogma was divinely ratified, any fundamental reform was construed, not merely as rebellion, but also as blasphemy" (p. 5).

Second, faith in the divinely ordered supremacy of New Rome; "hence the Byzantine's own innate superiority to every other part of mankind" (p. 5). Referring to this attitude as "self-love," the lecturer goes on to say that the Byzantine lost touch with reality around him whenever that reality did not agree with the concept of his own superiority.

Third, acceptance of Hellenic culture, except that of birth. "To the privileged *élite* alone was given the command — as it seemed to them — of the noblest idiom, and with that idiom of the noblest genius, ever granted to mankind" (p. 11). This third quality of "Byzantinism" is particularly important for our discussion, since Professor Jenkins considers it the medium of the hellenization of the Slavs who "took possession" of Greece.

Reduced to their common denominator, the three qualities of "Byzantinism" merge into an unshaken (and too often unreasonable) faith in Byzantine superiority. This faith, Professor Jenkins goes on to say, did not die with the fall of the empire. "It survived to become the most powerful and intractable element of the Byzantine legacy to Eastern Europe" (p. 17).

Thus, presumably, we can see the Byzantine mind reflected in the attitudes and actions of Russian czars and Ottoman sultans. Can we find it in Modern Greece? Is Modern Greece the nearest heir to Byzantium's emotional and intellectual world thus described? Or, viewing the problem

from a different angle — is Greece a typically Eastern country? And is Byzantium undisputably Eastern? These are questions to which we must find adequate answers *à propos* of the Jenkins' lectures.

In the first place, the "Eastern" character of the Byzantine Empire cannot be accepted without certain important reservations. For one thing, Byzantium was nowhere near China or Japan in its "superior" view of the world, or its "Eastern-mindedness." Byzantium's Hellenism connected it with the West. Even more so did its Romanism. Roman law, the backbone of Byzantine society, was no doubt Western in origin. Byzantine art can trace its roots to Rome, albeit the cosmopolitan character of Roman imperial art cannot be gainsaid.¹⁰

Neither was Byzantium an advocate of stagnation and an enemy of progress, as we shall see in the course of our discussion. In our days, Prof. Arnold J. Toynbee has theorized on Russia's world view originating from the "Orthodoxy" (or sense of "superiority" — to use Toynbee's and Jenkins' definition) of the Byzantine Empire.¹¹ The czarist and the communist minds, in their political philosophy, according to Professor Toynbee, are essentially one and they have a common ancestor — New Rome, or Byzantium. After the fall of Constantinople, Moscow became the "Third Rome" — and "a fourth Rome there cannot be." Rome in this sense is the citadel of the "true faith." The Modern Greeks, we must note in this connection, aside from purely religious circles, never entertained a similar notion of exclusiveness, such a tendency to monopolize wisdom and faith. As to Greek religious groups — for example, the monks of Mount Athos — their attitude is understandable: every church professes, implicitly or explicitly, superiority over other denominations or else it would close its gates and invite its followers to join another faith. But Byzantium is described as bigoted all over. If this is the essence of "Byzantinism," Modern Greece has a strong predilection for the "West."

Professor Jenkins reminds us that in the Era of Enlightenment, Western writers, impressed by the "Eastern-ness" or "static character" of Byzantium, were inclined to regard it as no more than the "decline and fall of the Roman Empire." Edward Gibbon, who used this phrase as title for his monumental and elegant work, does not explain how such longevity — eleven centuries! — was compatible with the nation of decrepitude

10. See Emerson H. Swift, *Roman Sources of Christian Art* (Columbia University Press, 1951).

11. See Arnold J. Toynbee, "Russia's Byzantine Heritage," in *Civilization on Trial* (Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 164 - 183.

and senility. Gibbon's contemporary, Voltaire, whose satirical genius often got the better of his objectivity, saw "a worthless history, containing nothing but declamations and miracles — a disgrace to the human mind." Professor Jenkins quotes Voltaire's words but, fortunately, does not agree with him, nor with Gibbon (p. 2). Nonetheless, the lecturer's approach to Byzantium is that of the Modern Western European or American who has identified the West with progress, and progress, with change or movement. Byzantium, which is accused of remaining static, especially after the twelfth century, is presented as a denial of the Western, or "progressive," way of life. "Up till that time [i. e. the twelfth century], the conservatism of Byzantium had been her salvation in a world of flux and barbarism" (p. 15). Henceforth "to stand still was to regress both relatively and absolutely."

Yet one should not overlook certain progressive aspects of Byzantine society, not only until the twelfth century but also after it. Byzantium was not "standing still" during those centuries which in the West, though not in the East, could be called the Dark Ages. Even the Palaeologian period of Byzantium contributed to the Renaissance of the West. From the fourth to the eleventh centuries, the long wars with the Persians and the Arabs and with the new nations of Europe could not have had a soporific effect on the Byzantine world. On the contrary, if wars are likely to become catalysts of progress, social or material, there was no dearth of challenge, no invitation to sleep or apathy. Surrounded by enemies on all sides, the Byzantines had to excel in order to survive. Despite the predominance of a conservative mood (in itself an aspect of church-dominated Medieval Europe), there was a decisive trend towards evolution — as is shown by the great iconoclastic struggle (Europe's earliest Reformation, which missed success by a narrow margin); the progressive humanism (or Christianization) of Roman law; the brilliant Macedonian Renaissance, with the revival of interest in the Classics; the unmatched development of industry and commerce under the state during the long period when Constantinople was supreme; and the flowering of art in the era of the Comneni and the Palaeologi (a true prelude to the Renaissance of the West). Finally, lest we forget it, Byzantium had sole and undisputed possession of "Greek fire" — the dreaded weapon that corresponds to the atom bomb of our time.

There is no question that during the last two centuries, or more, of the Byzantine Empire, Western Europe made greater and more rapid progress in practically all aspects of life. But conservatism — as much of it as there was — was by no means the only, nor the main, cause of Byzantium's decline. The hostility of the West must not be underestimated.

Doubtless the most serious blow to Byzantium's power was given by the West in 1204.

In its better days, for several centuries, Byzantium, standing at the crossroads of East and West, defended Europe from Islam, which was a threat from the East and in fact represented the apogee of the Eastern world. Thus Byzantium, acting as a shield, gave the West an opportunity to develop its Christian and national institutions. To Western Europe Byzantium offered all it safely could during those formative centuries. The Byzantine's attitude to Western Europe, though not especially cordial or enthusiastic, was never the same as his attitude to the East. Up until the time of the Crusades, Byzantium was emotionally closer to the West than to the Islamic Orient. As the greatest Christian state, Byzantium was aware of its kinship to Europe. It was, in fact, the champion of Western civilization.¹² The Modern Greeks, who can identify themselves as Byzantium's direct cultural successors but do not care to be called Easterners, are inclined to attribute to Byzantium a special role between East and West, a dual or composite character, in which, more often than not, the West is more conspicuous than the East.

Professor Jenkins' view of Byzantium as Eastern assigns Modern Greece to the Eastern world. This is a very debatable proposition. The discussion of this subject leads us to the second lecture — "Byzantinism and Its Survival in the Nineteenth Century."

In their awareness of cultural continuity, the Modern Greeks, as we noted above, accept the Byzantine Empire as their immediate predecessor in the realm of culture — their kith and kin on account of religion, language, and customs, all contrasting with those of the Ottoman Empire, which was alien — but they also trace the roots of their cultural entity to Ancient Greece, which gave them their language, alphabet, and much of

12. Concluding his three-volume work, *Le monde byzantin*, Louis Bréhier, *La civilisation byzantine* (Paris, 1950), pp. 571 - 574, weighs Eastern and Western influences over Byzantium and respective relations with it and finds that it inclines more towards the West than the East. A stimulating book in this connection, despite its drawbacks, is Jack Lindsay, *Byzantium into Europe - The Story of Byzantium as the First Europe and Its Further Contribution till 1453 A. D.* (London, 1952). Edward Foord, more than fifty years ago, chose an appropriate subtitle for his book — *The Byzantine Empire - The Rearguard of European Civilization* (London, 1911). After finishing this article, I had the chance to read D. A. Zakythenos, "Byzantium between East and West" (in Greek), *Epelêris Hetaerias Byzantinôn Spoudôn*, XXVIII (1958), 367 - 400, which is an interesting account of Byzantium's preponderant association with the West.

their folklore. This continuity of cultural tradition — not continuity of blood relationship — is the keynote of Modern Greek historiography.

At the same time, one need hardly point out, in the realm of politics Modern Greece never claimed the right to control the various non-Greek peoples (Kurds, Armenians, Syrians, non-Greek Anatolians, Slavs, Bulgarians, Albanians, and others) that had been subjects of the Byzantine Emperors. Accordingly, in its essence, the *Megalē Idea* (the Great Idea) of Modern Greece was not — to use Professor Jenkins' words — "a longed-for return to the Empire of Medieval Byzantium" (p. 37); it was rather the urge to achieve independence and unification of the Greek people. The primary incentive for independent statehood was provided by Modern nationalism, not by Byzantine imperialism (the term is used in the traditional sense). The Greeks of the nineteenth century fought no more for the restoration of the Byzantine Empire than their Italian contemporaries did for the revival of the Roman Empire. It would be a mistake to see too much of Byzantium in Modern Greece, in the same way as it would be a mistake to see too great a similarity between Byzantine Christianity and Medieval Islam.

Modern Greek culture — in its broadest description — stems from two sources: first, the Hellenic heritage, brought to a focus during the Eras of Enlightenment and Nationalism; and second, the Byzantine Christian tradition that survived under the aegis of the Eastern Orthodox Church during the four or five hundred years of Ottoman domination. Submerged in the *Megalē Idea* was the recollection of the medieval struggle between the Cross and the Crescent. "For Christ's holy faith / And for the freedom of the Fatherland, / For these two I fight ..." ran the warrior's song in the nineteenth century. One of the contents of Modern Greek nationalism was doubtless the Christian faith, especially intense when the national struggle was directed against the Turks. But one must be careful to draw the line that distinguishes faith or loyalty to the Church, on one hand, and a concept of Orthodox "Romanism," on the other hand. The latter carries with it mystical connotations, such as found expression in nineteenth (and shall we add — twentieth?) century Russia. So far as Greece is concerned, throughout the nineteenth, and even more so during the twentieth century, nationalism has placed emphasis on Hellenism, and from its beginnings Greek nationalism has been almost entirely secular.

Adamantios Korais, after whom Professor Jenkins' chair at the University of London was named, sought to revive something of the spirit of Plethon which was smoldering under the ruins of Mistra, the successor city of Sparta. Korais, the enlightened champion of Greek nationalism

in the pre-1821 period, never preached a restoration of the Byzantine Empire, for which he, as a classicist, had but little respect. Very similar, though somewhat more cosmopolitan, was the attitude of Rhigas, product of the French Revolution, who died the death of a national martyr in the fortress of Belgrade in 1798. There was an invigorating, as well as a humanizing, quality in the Hellenism of the Greek people, and the klephts had something from the character of Homeric heroes. Such a spirit of resistance has rarely been identified with "Byzantinism." Nor can one discover any traces of "Byzantinism" in the speeches or actions of the leaders of the Greek Revolution, including the Phanariote Ypsilantis Brothers and old Colocotronis, the future leader of the "Russian" Party, who rallied his men to action with the cry: "Hellenes!"

The Greek Revolution marked the final attempt of the Greeks to abandon the name "Roman" or Graikos" for that of Hellene.¹³ Other attempts had been made, spontaneously and sporadically, by the Lascarids of Nicaea and under the last Palaeologi at Mistra and Constantinople.¹⁴ With the ascendancy of the Hellenic Idea during the time of the Revolution, "Byzantion" began to serve as a mere synonym for "the capital of the Ottoman Empire." Thus we read in the annals of the Revolution that "the Byzantine Fleet," under the Kapudan Pasha, came out of the Straits, descended on the Aegean Islands, etc. Also important is the fact that after Athens became the capital of Greece and a university was founded there, the curriculum in the Humanities was confined to classical studies to the exclusion of Byzantine. Byzantine studies were not introduced until after German universities began to show an interest in the subject. The curriculum of the University of Athens indicated the trend in the entire educational system of the country and in public opinion. There was a noticeable tendency, during the first half of the nineteenth century, to play down the Byzantine heritage for the benefit of the classical past. In this regard, Greece followed the pattern of Western Europe and responded to the romantic philhellenism of Goethe, Schiller, Byron, Shelley, Chateaubriand, Victor Hugo and other poets and thinkers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.¹⁵

13. See John Th. Kakridis, "The Ancient Greeks and the Greeks of the War of Independence," in *Balkan Studies* 4 (1963), 251 - 264.

14. See Steven Runciman, "Byzantine and Hellene in the fourteenth Century" in *Tomos Armenopoulou* (Thessaloniki 1952) pp. 27 - 31, and Vakalopoulos, *op. cit.*, pp. 66 - 77.

15. Several of the leading contemporary intellectuals of Greece criticise the education of their country as being too much under the impact of the Classical

To Europe's romantic interest in Classical Greece Professor Jenkins attributes the revival of Hellenism in Modern Greece. This is correct only to a certain extent; interest in Ancient Greece, though not of a scholarly type, never ceased to exist among the people. For through the centuries, numerous monuments, all over the country, spoke their silent language. At the academic level this interest was cultivated as far back as the 1580's at the Patriarchal School of Constantinople, and since then there were centers of classical learning in various parts of the Greek-speaking area and in the Danubian Principalities, all before the outbreak of the Greek Revolution.¹⁶ But Professor Jenkins is right in stressing the influence of the West in the development of Modern Greece — and we understand that this influence was not only in the field of education but it entered every aspect of national life. Politically, too, the Hellenic Kingdom preferred to associate itself with the constitutional monarchies of Western Europe rather than with the autocracy of the czars.¹⁷ The marriage of King George I to Olga, a Russian princess, had no significant effects on the orientation of Greece. Western Europe evoked liberal ideas, and one aspect of liberalism was philhellenism. Ancient Greece, in Greek eyes, too, was the cradle of European civilization. Hence Greece's desire to identify herself with the West.

It was primarily from Western Europe that the Greek nation-state — somewhat unrealistically, to be sure — expected a sympathetic interest in the great cause of national unification. However, Greece's national aspirations were not relegated to the limbo of wishful thinking, nor did the country undergo any emotional crisis that could be named *progonopléxia*, or "ancestoritis" — to use Professor Jenkins' colorful term (p. 38). The

tradition and they recommend a more intensified study of the Byzantine heritage, unduly neglected so far. See George Theotocas, "the finest of Modern Greek prose-writers," (to quote Jenkins, p. 38) in his book *Pneumatiki Poreia* (Athens 1961), Photis Contoglou in most of his publications, Basil Laourdas in his book *Helliniki Paideia* (Washington D. C. 1953) and Costis Bastias in his books *Papoulakos* (New York 1953) and *O Papadiamantis* (Athens 1962).

16. For the study of Aristotle by the Greeks during the Turkish occupation See Cl. Tsourkas, *Les débuts de l'enseignement philosophique et de la libre pensée dans les Balkans. La vie et l'oeuvre de Theophile Corydalée* (Bucarest 1948) and for the study of Plato, Alkis Angelou, *Πλάτωνος τύχαι* [*Plato's fate*] (Athens 1963).

17. The very meager influence of Russia on Greece was once again noticed in a recent study of Cyril E. Black, "Russia and the Modernization of the Balkans," in Charles and Barbara Jelavich, eds., *The Balkans in Transition* (University of California Press, 1963), pp. 145-183. For the comparatively more potent influence of the West on Greece, see L. S. Stavrianos, *ibid.*, pp. 184-226.

term, as used by the Greeks themselves, indicates no more than the impatience of patriotic intellectuals at the mediocrity of the Greek state and expresses their desire to spur the people to more drastic action for self-improvement and for the national cause. There is a basic unfairness in Professor Jenkins' statement: " 'We civilized Europe,' was the common cry and this was made the excuse for sitting back and waiting for the living which the world so obviously owed to Hellas" (p. 38).

However, the facts speak for themselves. After an exhausting Independence War (1821-29), British policy succeeded in establishing a Lilliputian Greek State, so weak that it could not threaten the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and could not be used by Russia in her imperialist ventures in the Mediterranean. Against overwhelming odds, the Greeks continued their struggle. Palmerston's foreign policy, followed by Disraeli's, Britain's unswerving determination to uphold the Ottoman Empire, repeated interventions in Greek affairs to prevent any attempt to implement the Great Idea, the foreign occupation of Cyprus in 1878 and of Rhodes in 1912, and many other deeds of similar intent, did not make the Greeks abandon their national cause; nor did they throw themselves into Russia's arms. Except for the brief period of the Crimean War, Greece did not align her interests with those of Russia, and even then the Anglo-French landing at the Piraeus solved the problem.

With no help from the East, or from the West, Greece's national struggle, directed against a vast Oriental Empire, had a tragic quality. No other country in the Near East or in Eastern Europe paid more dearly for her freedom. The struggle of Crete—to mention the best known phase—was watched with admiration in Europe and in America. Arcadi (1866) is in every way comparable with Mesolonghi (1826). When the three-year Cretan War left behind it numerous villages in ruins and thousands of victims, the Greeks took up arms again, in Crete and in Macedonia. In the twentieth century, in one person's lifetime, they fought in seven wars, for themselves and for their Allies, but the equally heroic struggle of Cyprus, the last phase of the Great Idea (in the sense outlined above), ended in disappointment.

It is easy—at times it becomes even fashionable—to demolish a people's pantheon and re-write its history in a deliberately unheroic style. Yet there is no historical basis on which one could stand if he set out to disparage Greece's national struggle, the liberation of *Grecia irredenta*. Brigands existed here and there, usually products of poverty and frustration, particularly so in Greece, and some of them (how many?) went to fight in Crete or in the northern frontier. No Greek historian made heroes

of former brigands. But professor Jenkins, writing history and not fiction, a hundred years after About's *Le roi des montagnes*, plays up the "brigand theme," in his recent book, *The Dilessi Murders* (London, 1961). The same tendency to view Greece's national struggle with an attitude that is the opposite of admiration, but also with misplaced emphasis or sheer prejudice, is evident in the lecture entitled "Byzantinism and Its survival in the Nineteenth Century."

Now to return to the subject of Slavic settlements in the Peloponnesus—i. e. to the antiquated Fallmerayer thesis, which concerns both lectures. Greek historians, worthy votaries of the Muse Clio, did not deny that Slavs and Albanians settled in Greece in the Middle Ages and later. But all scholarly tradition collaborates to prove that the new settlers (with a few exceptions, mainly remnants of eighteenth-century Albanian arrivals) were hellenized in medieval and early modern times. The chief agent in the process of hellenization in the South was not the imperial (Byzantine) government at Constantinople, but the Greek population of Peloponnesus. The native Greek element never disappeared from the peninsula in the sixth, seventh and eighth centuries. With the help of the imperial government it acquired a new impetus in the beginning of the ninth century, when the power of the unassimilated Slavs was crushed militarily.

Linguistically, the medium of hellenization was the spoken (demotic) Greek, with its dialectic idiosyncrasies, and not, as Professor Jenkins contends, the semi-artificial language of Constantinopolitan bureaucracy.¹⁸ That language, truly the pride of the *élite*, but nonetheless a written and not a spoken language, lacked the power to assimilate an alien group especially when literacy was far from widespread and the foreign group happened to be numerous. Classical, stylized Byzantine Greek was hard to learn. Even demotic Greek is not such an easy language. Greek, on the whole, compares unfavorably with the languages of Greece's northern neighbors—Bulgarian, Macedono-Slavic, Serbian, and Albanian—so far as learning facility is concerned. Prof. N. P. Andriotis, an authority on Modern Greek linguistics, observed in a recent study¹⁹ that whenever Greek had

18. "The population, whatever its racial origins, became absolutely Byzantine, in language and religion, in tradition and outlook. And nowhere is this evangelization more remarkable than in the virtual extinction of the Slav language and its substitution by Byzantine Greek" (p. 31). Jenkins' statement is as enigmatic as Fallmerayer's assertion that the Slavs of the Peloponnesus adopted the Greek alphabet and language upon their baptism.

19. Andriotis, *Γλώσσα και έθνος* [*Language and Nation*] (Thessaloniki 1963) p. 13.

to compete with any of the languages just mentioned, it was with great difficulty that it could hold its own, even though in our time government agencies, the church, and the school system lent their support to it. It was even noticed that in some villages of Greece's Slav-speaking enclaves, Greek refugees from Asia Minor, speaking Turkish till the 1920's, picked up the neighboring Slavic language and failed to learn their Greek.²⁰ Under these circumstances, the hellenization of the Slavs in the Peloponnesus and elsewhere in Greece would have been impossible unless large numbers of native Greeks retained their language during and after the period of Slavic and Albanian penetration. Hence no doubt can arise as to the widespread and continuous use of the Greek language and its local dialects, together with the writing of the Greek alphabet among the small literate class. If it were not for the native Greek speakers, and particularly for the women of the areas invaded, no number of teachers or missionaries, sent by the imperial government, would have sufficed to bring to life, among Slavs and Albanians, a language that was "extinct" (according to Fallmerayer and Jenkins), and moreover to achieve this through the medium of an archaic and not a vernacular language. If, for the sake of argument, we assumed that this was possible, the study of Peloponnesian Greek texts would reveal archaism and the rigid style of the purist speech. It is evident, however, that Greek in the Peloponnesus developed as naturally and as smoothly as elsewhere, through the centuries, and *inter alia* the Tzakonian dialect survived to put the stamp of the genuine on the process of linguistic evolution. (The name of Tzakones, incidentally, is derived from *Exō Lacones*, or Outer Laconians). Dialects were not taught by teachers but were perpetuated from parents to children, even through the times of trouble.

During the times of trouble, which were not of the same extent everywhere, Athens already was in a state of decay;²¹ Corinth may have been captured by Slavs or Onugurs;²² Thessaloniki was threatened by Avaro-Slavic raids;²³ Patras may have been conquered and its population may have escaped abroad to return in 805.²⁴ But all along, enough Greeks survived. Here are some significant facts: Two Metropolitans of Corinth carried on correspondence with Pope Gregory the Great at the close of

20. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

21. Homer A. Thompson, "Athenian Twilight, A. D. 267-600," *Journal of Roman Studies*, XLIX (1959), pp. 61-72.

22. See the Charanis-Setton debate, referred to in note 2.

23. Vasiliev, *op. cit.*, p. 240. Vakalopoulos, *A History of Thessaloniki*, pp. 27-32.

24. Charanis, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, V, 153.

the sixth century and two others took part in the sixth and Eighth Ecumenical Councils in the year 680 and 843 respectively;²⁵ according to one report thirty-two bishoprics were mentioned in the Peloponnesus in the eighth century;²⁶ a Byzantine empress, Irene, was born at Athens, ca. 753; the see of Patras was elevated to an autocephalous archbishopric in the Seventh Ecumenical Council (787);²⁷ a rich widow in Patras, Danielis by name, befriended Basil, the future emperor, around the middle of the ninth century;²⁸ at about the same time, Arethas, who became a distinguished ecclesiastic and classical scholar, was born at Patras;²⁹ during the early stage of the iconoclastic controversy, the people of Hellas (in this instance the term applies to Southern Greece), obviously Christians and iconophiles, participated in the rebellion against Leo III in 727;³⁰ and in Thessaloniki business went on as usual, though Slavs had settled here and there in the Lower Vardar region.³¹

The uninterrupted life of Greek society accounts for the survival not only of the language but also of folklore. If Professor Jenkins' idea was sound—namely, that Modern Greek folklore, with its recollections of pagan Greek religion and mythology, owes its survival to “the Byzantine learned literature of the high Middle Ages” (p. 32), we would be attributing the task of a miracle worker to the small educated class of Byzantium in the ninth and tenth centuries. For, if the memories of Greek paganism were wiped out by an avalanche of Slavic immigration—as Professor Jenkins would have us believe,—no revival of interest in the Classics, no matter how genuine, and no amount of book learning would be enough to disseminate, among an “alien” people, beliefs that had to do with Nereids, Gorgons, Giants, the gruesome Charon, spirits of the dead and feasts for the dead, and the multifarious attributes of pagan deities now perpetuated in the worship of Christian saints. Folklore is not taught in one or two generations; it has its roots in the distant past. Even if we were to assume that a Byzantine aristocracy with clas-

25. Zakythenos, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45. The author states that though the document's authenticity has been held in doubt, the report does have historical importance. Cf. Bon, *Le Péloponnèse byzantin*, p. 22.

27. Zakythenos, *op. cit.*, p. 45, citing G. J. Konidaris.

28. Charles Diehl, *Figures byzantines*, 1ère série (Paris, 1948), pp. 160-163.

29. Socrates Kougheas, *Ὁ Καισαρείας Ἀρέθας καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ* [*Arethas of Caesarea and his Work*] (Athens 1913), 2-3.

30. Ostrogorsky, *op. cit.*, p. 144. Amantos, *History*, I, 352.

31. Ostrogorsky, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

sical tastes, coming to settle in the peninsula, popularized its knowledge of mythology, how can we imagine that the Slavs would accept a corps of strange, outdated, and unprofitable beliefs, so many of them sheer nonsense to the unschooled minds of peasants and shepherds? Would they not feel antagonistic to it, because its source was the aristocracy of a hostile power? The answer is obvious: Unknown to the Slav immigrants or settlers, and rejected by the Christian Church as vestiges of idolatry, a whole body of beliefs, fables, customs, and superstitions—all of which originally had no relation to Christianity but bore a striking resemblance to Roman, Hellenistic, and Classical prototypes—survived down to the present time only because an important segment of the Ancient Greek people, and its descendants from Hellenistic and Roman times, was able to live, despite war, devastation, and pestilence, and so (admittedly with Slavic and Albanian admixtures) to father the Modern Greek nation. Very important in this respect was the role of native Greek women, who, true to their sex, were able to survive in larger numbers than the men.

The monumental work of Nicholas Politis, George Hadjidakis, and Phaedon Koukoules, continued by the dean of the scholars of Northern Greece, Prof. Stilpon P. Kyriakides, leaves no doubt as to the unity of the cultural heritage of the Greeks. One main stream receives Ancient, Medieval, and Modern elements and combines them into a harmonious whole, rendered mellow with the passing of time—thus forming the oldest existing cultural tradition in the Western world.³² In English we are fortunate to have a remarkable book by John C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion—A Study in Survivals* (Cambridge University Press, 1910). Its objectivity will impress the reader and its value remains the same, half a century after the date of its publication. Professor Jenkins, however, will find it extremely unsuitable for the defense of his thesis.

Professor Jenkins did not mention anything about the Slavic toponymics in Greece³³ and the Slavic loan words that have entered the Greek

32. See the comprehensive study of S. P. Kyriakides, *Γλώσσα και λαϊκός πολιτισμός των νεωτέρων Ελλήνων* [*Language and Folk - Culture of the Modern Greeks*] (Athens 1946).

33. He also did not mention that a large number of Classical toponymics have survived until the present, either in their original or in modern dialectical forms. Some good examples have been collected by I. A. Thomopoulos, *Τὰ τοπωνύμια μας, ἡ ἀξία καὶ τὰ προβλήματα τὸς* [*Our Toponymics, their Value and their Problems*] (Thessaloniki 1938). Detailed bibliography in D. V. Vayiakakos, in *Athena* 62 (1962), 321 - 327.

dictionary. Professor Zakythenos³⁴ cites Gustav Meyer's estimate that Greek has borrowed 274 words from various Slavic tongues. Many of them come from the kingdoms of plants and animals and from pastoral and agricultural pursuits. A smaller number has to do with the human body, special kinds of clothes, foods, and weapons. The greatest number of Slavic words appear in the speech of Epirus, which, according to Professor Zakythenos, may indicate that they entered Greek through Albanian or Vlach. The smallest number, oddly enough, is in Thrace. All Slavic loan words are listed in Professor Andriotis' *Etymological Dictionary of Common Modern Greek*.³⁵ The book does not include any statistical tables as to foreign etymologies and their distribution over the Greek-speaking area.

As to place names, many of them exist to this day in Greece and they have been listed by Max Vasmer. Their large number has doubtless something to do with their meaning and also with the character of these who used them: their meaning is very often descriptive of the territory or just a plain reference to a geographical feature; and they reflect the migratory temperament of the Slavs.³⁶ Slav toponymics usually appear in mountainous regions. They are more numerous in Western Greece than in Eastern. Some typical Slavic place names are the following: *Gora* (in various forms and mispronunciations) — mountain; *Nezero* — lake; *Zagora* — beyond the mountain; *Zatuna* — bay; *Preveza* — ford or passage; *Arakhova* — place with walnut-trees; *Ostrovo* — island; *Khelmos* — mountain-top; *Vodena* — town with waters; and *Podogora* — locality on the foothills.³⁷ The nature of these toponymics is such as to indicate nothing about the Slavic settlements, their customs and social life, or even the origin of the settlers and the period of their arrival.

Archeology would have been much more instructive had there been any archeological evidence in existence. Here we have a complete void. No tombstones, no houses, no temples, no inscriptions have been noticed at any time — a fact that bespeaks the very low order of civilization of the Slavs who entered Greece. For a while it appeared that there might be one exception to this rule: in Corinthian graves American archeologists found

34. *Op. cit.*, pp. 70 - 72.

35. *Ετυμολογικό Λεξικό τῆς Κοινῆς Νεοελληνικῆς* (Athens, 1951).

36. Amantos, *Byzantinisch-neugriechische Jahrbücher*, XVII, 213.

37. This is a selection from the list given by Zakythenos for illustrative purposes, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

a number of buckles that have been described as Avaro-Slavic.³⁸ But recently the Greek archeologist Demetrios J. Pallas,³⁹ who made a thorough study of the subject, proved that they are of Byzantine workmanship and had been compared with similar buckles that had been made in Hungary under Byzantine influence. According to Mr. Pallas, the Corinthian ones were produced in Southern Greece, not in the sixth century but much later — between the ninth and the twelfth centuries.

In rejecting the Fallmerayer's theory, the Greeks of the nineteenth century have shown an indignation that Professor Jenkins describes in vivid colors but does not try to explain. We should recall that those were the days when Russian expansionism toward the Mediterranean came very near to realization (1829, 1877). The Greeks became alarmed over the fact that their homeland stood at the tip of a vast Slavic subcontinent, extending from Macedonia and Thrace to Archangel and from the Vistula (now from the Oder) to Vladivostok. Russia's historians worked hard to discover Medieval Slavic settlements in various parts of the Ottoman Empire, in its Asiatic provinces as well as its European, and Fallmerayer had tried to do the same thing as regards the Peloponnesus, the bulwark of Hellenism. Racist theories were in the air. With Constantinople within easy reach, the Russian aspired to the heritage of the Byzantine Empire. If the Greeks were proven to be descendants of Slavs, and the Slavs the motive power within the Byzantine Empire, the whole scheme would appear to be much easier to carry out. Bulgaria, which began an undeclared war on the outposts of Hellenism, became Russia's favorite protégé in the 1870's. During most of the nineteenth century one cannot blame the Greeks for suspecting insidious propaganda in Fallmerayer's theory concerning the so-called slavization of Greece.

In our days an attempt was made, by the Nazis, to revive Fallmerayer's theory when a large part of Northern Greece was taken by Bulgaria and Northwestern Greece, including the Ionian Islands, was annexed by Italy, while the rest of the country was under a harsh German and Italian occupation. It was then that Max Vasmer, Germany's leading Slavist, led

38. Gladys R. Davidson, "The Avar Invasion of Corinth," *Hesperia*, VI (1937), 227 - 240.

39. "The Barbarian Buckles of Corinth" (in Greek), *Pepragmena* of the IX Byzantinological Congress of Thessaloniki, I (Athens, 1954), pp. 340 - 396. "Archeological Evidence of the Descent of Barbarians into Greece" (in Greek), *Hellenica*, XIV (Thessaloniki, 1955), 87 - 105.

the way with his study of Slav toponymics in Greece.⁴⁰ Other authors followed suite and enemy propaganda proclaimed Greece to be a part of the vast Slav world that the Third Reich was in the process of conquering.

Shortly after the liberation of Greece, Professor Zakythenos published his book, which was a brief but eloquent answer to Hitler's propagandists. In his preface he said that he had written the book "during the long and sad nights of the winter of 1941-42." That was the time when the people of Athens faced extinction from a famine that was a direct result of the war.

At the same time and with the same motivation a distinguished classical archeologist, Antonios Keramopoulos, entered the Byzantine field, at an advanced age, and studied the Slavs with special reference to his native Macedonia. The results of his labors came out in a volume entitled *The Greeks and their Northern Neighbors*.⁴¹

Macedonia — or more precisely, the eastern part of it — was presented in a scholarly work by Prof. Paul Lemerle, of the University of Paris. *Philippe et la Macédoine Orientale à l'époque chrétienne et byzantine* (Paris, 1945) supports views that are not too far from the position taken by the scholars of Greece in the interwar and postwar periods.

After these three books, Alexander Diomedes, president of Greece's National Bank, economist, historian, and later prime minister, published his work *On the Slavic Invasions and the Policy of Byzantium*,⁴² which he, too, had written during the Axis Occupation. He offered a useful digest of the literature accumulated until then, endorsed the thesis of Paparrhegopoulos, and gave new interesting insights.

The next book came from Macedonia in the following year. Professor Kyriakides, with his *Slavs in the Peloponnesus*,⁴³ made a noteworthy contribution in which he rejected the early date of the Slavic invasion on the basis of a new interpretation of the documents. The keynote of his thesis was the questionable validity of the Chronicle of Monemvasia. According to Professor Kyriakides, the Chronicle and the scholium of Arethas were both derived from a forged document dating from the reign of Leo VI (886-912 A.D.). The author of this forgery sought to establish the tradition that St. Andrew, patron saint of Patras, performed an un-

40. For the bibliographical reference see note 2, above.

41. *Oi Ἕλληνες καὶ οἱ Βόρειοι Γείτονες* (Athens, 1945), mainly against G. Stadtmüller's chapter in the book *Der Peloponnes, von Soldaten für Soldaten, herausgegeben von einem Generalkommando* (Athens 1944).

42. *Βυζαντινὰ Μελέται*, Β': *Αἱ σλαβικαὶ ἐπιδρομαὶ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ τοῦ Βυζαντίου* (Athens, 1946).

43. For the bibliographical reference see note 2, above.

usually great miracle when he helped the Byzantines defeat the Slavs, after the latter held sway over the peninsula (allegedly) for 218 years. The immediate impression from Professor Kyriakides's book was that the question of the authenticity of the Chronicle, about which neither Lampros⁴⁴ nor Bees⁴⁵ had raised any serious doubts, was now a closed matter. But it was not long before Professor Charanis, who had previously written that the Slavs entered the Peloponnesus in the reign of Maurice (582 - 602), answered Professor Kyriakides with a new article.⁴⁶

The Chronicle of Monemvasia became the subject of research by Dr. Epaminondas Chrysanthopoulos.⁴⁷ He concluded that the document is much older than Bees or Lampros thought it was but it was not authentic in its entirety. More specifically, sections which were traditionally understood to pertain to the Peloponnesus were taken from the work of the sixth-century historian Procopius and referred to the northern provinces of the Byzantine Empire — i. e. the Danube area.

The same chronicle was studied again by Dr. S. A. Pagoulatos, with reference to the Tzakonians.⁴⁸ His conclusions are that the document is not altogether a forgery; that it contains important elements of truth; that the Slavs settled in the Peloponnesus in the eighth century; that the so-called Slavic domination of 218 years was a myth that took shape in the ninth century, and finally that the Tzakonians are descended from the Greek population of the period prior to the Slavic inroads.

The Melingi Slavs of Laconia were discussed in a paper by Prof. Socrates Kougeas,⁴⁹ who prior to the First World War had written a

44. Spyridon P. Lampros, *Ἱστορικά Μελετήματα* [Historical Studies] (Athens, 1884), pp. 97 - 128.

45. Nikos A. Bees (Βέης), "The Chronicle Concerning the Establishment of Monemvasia: Its Sources and Its Historical Importance" (in Greek), *Byzantis*, I (Athens, 1909), 57 - 105.

46. Charanis, "On the Question of the Slavonic Settlements in Greece during the Middle Ages," *Byzantinoslavica*, X (1949), 254 - 259.

47. Articles in the *Epetéris Hetaerías Byzantinôn Spoudôn*, XXI (1951) 238 - 253, and the *Praktika* of the Academy of Athens, XXVI (1951), 166 - 171.

48. *Οἱ Τσάκωνες καὶ τὸ Περὶ τῆς Κτίσεως τῆς Μονεμβασίας Χρονικὸν* [The Tzakonians and the Chronicle Concerning the Establishment of Monemvasia] (Athens, 1947). After the publication of Kyriakides' work, mentioned above, Pagoulatos wrote a historical essay entitled *Οἱ Σλάβοι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ μέχρι τοῦ Νικηφόρου Α'* [The Slavs in the Peloponnesus till (the Reign of) Nicephorus I] (Athens, 1948). The author reached the conclusion that the Peloponnesus submitted to the Slavs during the years 746 - 783.

49. "Concerning the Melingi of Taygetus" (in Greek), *Pragmatiae* of the Academy of Athens, XV (1950), No. 3, pp. 1 - 34.

definitive monograph on Arethas. Prof. D. J. Georgacas entered the same subject from the point of view of linguistics and he also discussed (and rejected) what might have been regarded as linguistic evidence of the existence of Slavs in Cyprus.⁵⁰

Finally, several scholars whose home is the city of Thessaloniki, research associates of the Institute for Balkan Studies, or the Society of Macedonian Studies, in their postwar publications on the history of Macedonia dealt with the question of the Slavs in Greece with reference to various provinces and periods. Greek scholars, as a rule, are aware of the variable nature of Medieval Greek geographic terms. For example, the term "Hellas," as used by the Byzantines, at times designated the whole Balkan Peninsula, at other times Thrace and Macedonia, and still at other times, Thessaly and Attica. The term Thessaly at times expands to include a large part of Macedonia, and Macedonia moves eastward to embrace Thrace.⁵¹ There has also been much discussion about the word ἐσθλαβώθη, used by Constantine Porphyrogenetus (*De Thematibus*, II, 6) with reference to the Peloponnesus: does it mean "it was slavized" or "it was conquered or subjugated?"⁵² A vital contribution to the subject of Greece's medieval history has been made by Greeks, who, quite naturally, know the language and the geography of their land better than outsiders.

In fact, for the Greeks Byzantine historical studies are quite as important as Modern Greek history. This is easy to understand, especially as regards the Greeks of the North. The memory of the Bulgarian Occupation of Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia (1941-44) is still fresh, and so is the attempt to "prove" that the Greeks of those provinces were originally Bulgarians. This, of course, was a sad phase of the Second World War and the Bulgarians of the postwar period denounced those methods as Nazi and Fascist.

As we have already noted, theories about a nation's descent are regarded as outdated after the destruction of Nazism and Fascism. Yet they are not entirely dead. To cite only two examples: Those who were opposed

50. "The Medieval Names *Melingi* and *Ezeritae* of Slavic Groups in the Peloponnesus," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XLIII (1950), 301-335, and "Slavs in Cyprus?" *Kypriakai Spoudai*, XV (1950), offprint. The author had contributed an article in the form of a critique to Vasmer's work mentioned in note 2 — "Beiträge zur Deutung als slavisch erklärter Ortsnamen," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XLII (1941), 351-381.

51. N. Andriotes, History of the name "Macedonia," *Balkan Studies* 1 (1960) 143-148.

52. See Bon, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-30.

to the union of Cyprus with Greece in the 1950's borrowed a page from Fallmerayer's methods and asserted that the Cypriotes are not Greeks but Phoenicians! And Albanian propagandists in 1945 and 1946, hoping to take the corner of Southern Epirus that they held under the Italians during the war and not to give up North Epirus claimed by Greece, spoke of Greece's indebtedness to the Albanians—the "liberators"—in much the same tone as Professor Jenkins (p. 35).

Professor Jenkins' closing remarks about Greece's progress and westernization in the last fifty years might be a tardy but welcome relief to the Greeks. It would be hard to disagree with him here, except in so far as to hint that his audience is not prepared for such sweeping generous statements, whose accuracy cannot be appreciated in the light of what he said in the two lectures.

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