

is accused of having acted under Russian influence; maintaining a repressive government at home; spreading anti-Greek propaganda; and, along with Andreas Papandreou, discrediting the U.S., Britain, and NATO. In contrast, the author praises the "moderation" of the colonels in their dealings with Turkey over Cyprus and the other Greco-Turkish problems, and this moderation is seen as one reason for the U. S. support of the junta. The author clears the U. S. of any complicity in the events in Cyprus, and considers the 1974 coup as a natural reaction to the persecution the coupists had suffered under Makarios. The accounts of violence by the coupists are seen as exaggerations of the press, and those committed by the Turks during the invasion are indirectly equated to atrocities allegedly committed by the Greek Cypriots.

Theodoracopoulos attributes the current wave of anti-Americanism in Greece to Andreas Papandreou who exploits the Greek humiliation over Cyprus, and the belief that the U. S. helped the colonels, in order to polarize Greek politics and undermine the West. He is therefore accused of having done irreparable damage to the relations of Greece with the West. Clearly, Andreas Papandreou is the *bête noire* of this book and this "objective" account of Greek politics spares no words in presenting him as the "most divisive factor" in Greek politics since the schism of the 1920s.

Much like David Holden's *Greece Without Columns* (Lippincott, 1972), which Theodoracopoulos admires, this book is simplistic and inaccurate in its explanations of events in Greece and Cyprus. While totally neglecting available documentary evidence, the author over-powers the reader by his ideological bias and personal antipathies blatantly contradicting his own goal of an objective account of Greek politics. This book is one of the worst to be written about Greece in recent years. And while Greeks should familiarize themselves with the distortions that are being circulated abroad about their country's politics and society, this reviewer would recommend to the non-Greek reader, who is unfamiliar with Greece and wishes to learn about Greece, *not* to read this book.

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Dimitri Kitsikis, *Συγκριτική Ιστορία 'Ελλάδος και Τουρκίας στον 20' αιώνα* (translated from the French ed.), Athens, Estia: 1978, pp. 269.

The author, well known from his earlier work, utilizes a comparative approach to present an "objective study" of Greco-Turkish history. This book, which has been translated ed. from the French, concludes rather abruptly around 1930 with a brief but significant discussion of the Kurdish problem. The author plans to continue this comparative study through 1967 in another volume.

Two controversial concepts are presented in this book. The first is that of the "intermediary region", one developed earlier by Spyros Vryonis and others. Kitsikis defines this region as the space between the East and the West, encompassing areas as the USSR (except the Baltic states), the Balkans (except Croatia), the Arab States (from Morocco to the Arabian peninsula), Ethiopia, Iran, Afghanistan and portions of Pakistan and Turkestan. According to the author, each of the peoples that dominated this region attempted to unify it into one ecumenical empire. These internal conflicts brought interventions by the Western powers, creating what is often called the "Eastern Question". The prologue contains a chart

of the "Western" and "Eastern" factions in the history of Greece and Turkey outlining their social origins, ideological perspectives, and views of the political and economic foundations of their states. This chart simplifies the reading of the first section of the book, where the concepts of the "intermediary region" and "hellenoturkism" are developed.

"Hellenoturkism", a concept coined by the author in 1966, is based on the assumption of (a) the cohabitation and interdependence, since the 11th century, of hellenism and turkism, and (b) the presence of an ideology based on this civilizational/cultural phenomenon aiming to establish an hellenoturkish political entity. The presence of a Byzantino-Ottomanist ecumenism is traced through 1821, but the author argues that the rise of nationalism destroyed the unity and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Events in Greece and Turkey, such as those of 1908-9, marked the failure of the realization of hellenoturkism and culminated in a decade of wars (1912-22) in which both the Megali Idea and the Ottoman Empire died. Because of the rise of nation states, then, the ideal of a hellenoturkish political entity can only be realized in the form of a confederation.

In developing his case for hellenoturkism Kitsikis categorizes the intellectual and political elites of the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey, as "Western" and "Eastern", including in the latter such figures as Georgios Trapezountios, the Phanariots, Ion Dragoumis, Athan. Souliotis, the anti-Venizelists, Ioannis Metaxas, and the recent Junta. They all shared this hellenoturkish ideology, the belief in this common civilization area, and the view that through such unity the Western penetration of the region could be opposed. In contrast, since the 13th century, the advocates of the Megali Idea are linked to Western nationalism and the "Western" party. They rejected the reality of the intermediate region and saw Greece as a Western state.

Kitsikis' attempt at a dispassionate analysis of Greco-Turkish relations is a welcome addition to the literature, given that so much ink has been shed by both sides to advance emotional nationalist claims of questionable historical, legal and political validity. The concepts of the "intermediary region" and "hellenoturkism" are challenging, but the conclusions derived from them and their implications for Greco-Turkish relations are not supported by historical evidence. Clearly, certain common cultural traits may have emerged in the "intermediary region" over the centuries. It is quite apparent, however, that this cultural infrastructure did not prove strong enough to resist either the Western influence or the emergence of nationalism with all its devastating consequences for those inhabiting the region. Further, the concept of hellenoturkism, even in its confederal form, remains far from realizable, let alone desirable or practical. One can even go further and question the existence of this ideal beyond the terms of mere political convenience and expediency for both Greeks and Turks.

Actually, the Greeks still display a split personality toward Western Europe, and the problem of Greek identity remains after years of dominance by "Western" elites and their Western protectors. The problem is even more pronounced in Turkey with the increasing evidence of the rejection of Atatürkism. But this does not imply the validity, the presence, or practicality of a "hellenoturkish" alternative, except for the necessity for peace and cooperation between these two countries.

Despite these reservations this provocative book should be read by all those interested in Greek-Turkish relations.

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