

Georgi Melenkov. The foundation of the Cominform was part of this offensive as were indeed such widely scattered events as the Berlin blockade and the Korean war. Stalin was not enthusiastic about Tito's developing a second center of world Communism and when it became evident that the US would in fact provide the royal Greek government with massive assistance, he tried to bring the Yugoslav to account. The determination of the non-Communist Greek majority to preserve their freedom, which Averoff rightly emphasizes as the decisive element in the ultimate triumph of the royal government, thus combined with American aid to precipitate a split in the ranks of the Cominform and to father a dissident and deviationist Yugoslav Communism which, for more than thirty years, has proved a major Western asset. This broader element of democratic success largely escapes our author's attention.

Nor do the domestic sources of Communist strength receive extensive consideration. Averoff does suggest the existence of a correlation between Communist votes and the refugees from Asia Minor and he is unusual in giving due credit to the men on the mountain for their discipline and devotion. But in general, like most Greeks, he tends to understate the domestic strength of the Communist movement. The most notable case involves the Slavophone minority, whose villages were concentrated precisely in the region of Mounts Vitsi and Grammos. During the Axis occupation, Yugoslav Partisan agents organized a resistance movement among this population known as SNOF, which at one point clashed openly with ELAS. This force was placed at the disposition of the Democratic Army, providing it with a disproportionately high percentage of its personnel. At the beginning of 1948 a Communist source estimate the Slavophone component of the guerrilla army at 11,000 men, but the troops in the last action on Vitsi-Grammos were Slavic speakers to perhaps the extent of 80 per cent. Thus the promotion of three Slavophones to key positions in the provisional government in January, 1949, as well as the open allusion to an independent Macedonia, were probably not so much sell-outs to the new Bulgarian patron, as Averoff suggests, as efforts to retain the active loyalty of the Slavophones after Belgrade had ceased to support the Democratic Army.

Averoff was both an eyewitness and a participant in the Greek civil war. Even if his treatment of this epic struggle is somewhat lacking in contextual matters, as military history it is comprehensive, competent objective and, at times, moving.

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Ritta Petrovna Grishina, *Vozniknovenie fashizma v Bolgarii, 1919-1925 g.*, with a foreword by Acad. Dimităr Kosev, Sofia: Izdatelstvo na BAN, 1976, 344 p.

After the intensive discussion on the phenomenon of Bulgarian fascism in the journal *Istoricheski pregled* during 1968, outstanding Bulgarian historians like Ilcho Dimitrov, Velichko Georgiev and Vladimir Migevev published a number of monographs on the period of monarcho-fascism after the coup d'état of May 1934 up to 1939. With few exceptions the initial period of Bulgarian fascism remained still unexplored. The reasons for this are to be sought in the problems of classifying the various governments after the fall of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union's rule. Consensus was only reached in the fact, that the character of Prof. Aleksandăr Tsankov's government of 1923 to 1926 was "military-fascist". More

problematic was the characterization of Andrei Liapchev's (1926-1931), Aleksandăr Ma-linov's and Nikola Mushanov's (1931-1934) government and that of "Zveno" under Kimon Georgiev (1934-1935). So it seems natural, that after the investigation of the immediate pre-war period the focus is on Tsankov's regime.

Ritta P. Grishina is a Soviet historian and so has an advantage over other foreign and even Bulgarian scholars concerning approach to Bulgarian archival materials. Moreover, her book was written under the tutelage of Dimităr Kosev, the doyen of Bulgarian historical science. He also supplied the book with an interesting and critical foreword.

Before turning to the real subject of her study, Grishina surveys some theories on fascism represented in Soviet, East European and Western literature. Unfortunately the cited works in Western languages are somewhat out of date and arbitrarily summarized. For example, Ernst Nolte appears as the authoritative representative of German historiography in this regard. The American inquiries on fascism in Eastern Europe are omitted. It would seem the author inclines to the viewpoint of the Hungarian historian Miklós Lackó.

Covering the period from the revolutionary crisis of the years 1918-19 to the fall of Tsankov's government in the first days of 1926, Grishina subdivides the history of the Bulgarian rightist movements into four parts. The time of confusion after the military catastrophe in september 1918 is followed by a reorganizational phase, until the reaction was strong enough to undertake the putsch of 9 June 1923. The putsch was succeeded by a short period of consolidating the regime against internal and external threat, i.e. the Communist September Uprising and the menace of Yugoslav aggression against Bulgaria. The international aspects of Tsankov's rule are discussed in a separate and very instructive chapter. According to Grishina, one of the most decisive factors for the hasty collapse of Tsankov's government were his failures in the social-economic sphere. This, connected with dissent in external questions within the ruling circles, caused his dismissal after two and a half years of rule.

Grishina stresses the military's significance throughout the whole Tsankov period. Operating behind the scenes, the Military League, and to some extent the "Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization" (IMRO)—an irredentist and terroristic para-military formation—directed the so-called "convent", a kind of second cabinet. It controlled the multi-party coalition, "democratic entente", which enjoyed a monopoly position in Bulgarian politics. The military also exercised its influence on the country's economic reconstruction. In this, it was led by the example of the former "Direction for Economic Supply and Public Planning" which was founded during the last years of the First World War and lasted up to 1921. This latter was a copy of General Groener's "Kriegsamt" in Germany. Influenced by its close entanglement with the revisionist IMRO, the Military League opposed Tsankov's moderate foreign policy towards Yugoslavia. So Tsankov, who demanded IMRO's neutralization, was forced by the chief of the Military League, General Ivan Vulkov, to retire in favour of his rival Liapchev. The latter two acted presumably on agreement with the king.

For her book Grishina used much material from Bulgarian archives, up to now seldomly explored. For example, she had the chance to make use of Tsankov's personal archive and the papers of the 1954 trial against Vulkov, Dimităr Porkov and others. Important in this regard also are the depositions of Petăr Shandanov, then IMRO-member, Georgi Dragnev and Stoicho Moshanov given during this trial. The memoirs of Khristo Stoikov, Georgi Ivanov and P. Khadzhiivanov on "Officer's Conspiracies in Bulgaria" also seem instructive. All these documents are held in the Military-Historical Archive or in the archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In contrast to her Bulgarian colleagues, Grishina makes extensive

use of Yugoslav and Macedonian literature, too. Other important sources are the Bulgarian right press and the parliament protocols.

In Bulgaria this book was well received and widely reviewed. Nevertheless, all reviews criticized one point in Grishina's investigation—the Macedonian problem, of course. The attacks do not blame the author for mentioning or overstressing the significance of the Macedonian organizations like IMRO, but for insufficient investigation of its "social composition, its ideology, the character of the various tendencies within the large Macedonian emigration in Bulgaria, the relations between the legal organizations ('Macedonian Brotherhoods') and IMRO", so Kosev in his foreword. Although the criticism is fully justified, it would not have been possible to undertake such a task within a study on *Bulgarian* fascism. On the other hand, this criticism appears as an indirect self-accusation of Bulgarian post-war historiography, which neglected and neglects the adverse, repelling and inimical subject IMRO.

Although Grishina's study is the first substantial investigation on the initial period of Bulgarian fascism, two questions remain unanswered. The first the author asks herself:

"Why did the military-fascist regime from 1923 to 1926 appear so inconstant and why was the time of its existence extremely short compared to other regimes of similar type that emerged during the same years, and in particular compared to the regimes of M. Horthy in Hungary and Primo de Rivera in Spain?" (p. 335).

Grishina's answer is somewhat evasive:

"The reasons for this are rooted in the complicated entanglement of social-economic and political factors, wherein the latter ones played a very important role not mitigating the effect of the first, but instead sharpening them." (Ibid.).

And the second question is: What happened to Bulgarian fascism after Tsankov's fall?

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Fikret Adanir, *Die Makedonische Frage. Ihre Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1908* (Frankfurter Historische Abhandlungen Bd. 20), Wiesbaden: Frank Steiner Verlag 1979, pp. 283.

In dieser bei Klaus Zernack und Paul Kluge in Frankfurt entstandenen Dissertation macht der Verf. den Versuch, die Anfangsphase des makedonischen Problems nicht aus nationalistisch verengter Perspektive, sondern aus osmanischer, gesamtbalcanischer und europäischer Sicht darzustellen. In bewußter Opposition zur zeitgenössischen nationalgeschichtlichen Historiographie in ihren spezifisch bulgarischen, jugoslawisch-makedonischen und griechischen Varianten stellt sich ihm die "Makedonische Frage" nicht als ein durch ethnopolitische Rivalitäten charakterisierter Krisenherd dar, vielmehr sieht er in der makedonischen national-revolutionären Bewegung und ihren rivalisierenden Fraktionen von den Nationalstaaten des Balkans und den hinter diesen stehenden europäischen Großmächten vornehmlich durch Einflußnahme auf die konfessionell-administrative Struktur des Osmanischen Reiches künstlich geschaffene Hebel, die zum Aufbrechen der europäischen Türkei und somit zur Sicherung des Einflusses im Bereich der Meerengen dienen sollten. Die Behandlung der Wurzeln der makedonischen Problematik unter dem Aspekt des europäischen Imperialismus führt zwangsläufig zu einer harten Kritik an den Vertretern der historischen