United States, Great Britain and the Greek-Yugoslav rapprochement, 1949-1950
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Abstract
The poccess of the normalisation of the Greek-Yugoslav relations, which
covered a period of roughly two and a half years, could be regarded as consisting of two phases, distinguished from each other on account of two main
factors: the degree of the Yugoslav leadership’s determination to go ahead
with a reversal of its antagonising, if not hostile, post-war attitude towards
the Greek governments; and the extend to which both the American and the
British governments were prepared to impress upon both Belgrade and Athens
the need for better relations between them. The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in the summer of 1948 was instrumental in creating an inclination among the Yugoslav government to reconsider its policy towards Greece. Until early in 1950 there were signs of a change of heart in Belgrade, with most characteristic example the phasing out of the Yugoslav assistance to the Greek communist insurgents. The Greek governments showed an early interest in an improvement of relations with Greece’s former friend and ally, but the Yugoslavs, being sensitive to Cominform castigations and internal communist party susceptibilities, opted for a cautious and often contradictory approach. The U.S. and the U.K. for their part, although extremely interested in a Greek-Ytigoslav rapprochement, they were even more anxious not to trouble Tito’s first steps away from Eastern bloc orthodoxy. Therefore, their initial policy was to avoid to exert undue pressure on Belgrade regarding the improvement of relations with Greece. However, as the Yugoslavs were becoming increasingly dependent on Western aid to keep their economy afloat, the American and the British had less and less qualms to press the matter with the Yugoslav leaders.
After the formation of the Plastiras government in April 1950, the Yugoslavs seemed determined to re-establish normal diplomatic relations withGreece.
This time, however, it was the Greek government that decided to have any
improvement of relations deferred on account of the Yugoslavs’ insistence on
raising the issue of the “minority rights” of the Slav-speaking element in
Greek Macedonia. Furthermore, the lack of progress in the matter of the return to Greece of the Greek children that were taken to Yugoslavia by the
Greek insurgents, was a constant obstacle to the normilisation of relations
between the two countries. The persistent efforts of both the Americans
and the British failed to prevent the collapse of the rapprochement initiative
that followed the hardening of the Greek attitude. The eventual breakthrough
came in November 1950, when, under the strains imposed by the worsening
international situation following the communist invasion of South Korea
and the serious deterioration experienced by the Yugoslav economy, the
Yugoslav leaders seemed rather anxious to see the rapprochement finally
effected. Acting on the strong advice of the Americans and the British and
after some practical evidence of Belgrade’s good will, Venizelos’ government
proceeded to the re-establishment of normal relations with Belgrade, a development that at the height of the Cold War seemed to improve considerably the position of the Western powers in the sensitive area of the Balkans and the
Eastern Mediterranean.
covered a period of roughly two and a half years, could be regarded as consisting of two phases, distinguished from each other on account of two main
factors: the degree of the Yugoslav leadership’s determination to go ahead
with a reversal of its antagonising, if not hostile, post-war attitude towards
the Greek governments; and the extend to which both the American and the
British governments were prepared to impress upon both Belgrade and Athens
the need for better relations between them. The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in the summer of 1948 was instrumental in creating an inclination among the Yugoslav government to reconsider its policy towards Greece. Until early in 1950 there were signs of a change of heart in Belgrade, with most characteristic example the phasing out of the Yugoslav assistance to the Greek communist insurgents. The Greek governments showed an early interest in an improvement of relations with Greece’s former friend and ally, but the Yugoslavs, being sensitive to Cominform castigations and internal communist party susceptibilities, opted for a cautious and often contradictory approach. The U.S. and the U.K. for their part, although extremely interested in a Greek-Ytigoslav rapprochement, they were even more anxious not to trouble Tito’s first steps away from Eastern bloc orthodoxy. Therefore, their initial policy was to avoid to exert undue pressure on Belgrade regarding the improvement of relations with Greece. However, as the Yugoslavs were becoming increasingly dependent on Western aid to keep their economy afloat, the American and the British had less and less qualms to press the matter with the Yugoslav leaders.
After the formation of the Plastiras government in April 1950, the Yugoslavs seemed determined to re-establish normal diplomatic relations withGreece.
This time, however, it was the Greek government that decided to have any
improvement of relations deferred on account of the Yugoslavs’ insistence on
raising the issue of the “minority rights” of the Slav-speaking element in
Greek Macedonia. Furthermore, the lack of progress in the matter of the return to Greece of the Greek children that were taken to Yugoslavia by the
Greek insurgents, was a constant obstacle to the normilisation of relations
between the two countries. The persistent efforts of both the Americans
and the British failed to prevent the collapse of the rapprochement initiative
that followed the hardening of the Greek attitude. The eventual breakthrough
came in November 1950, when, under the strains imposed by the worsening
international situation following the communist invasion of South Korea
and the serious deterioration experienced by the Yugoslav economy, the
Yugoslav leaders seemed rather anxious to see the rapprochement finally
effected. Acting on the strong advice of the Americans and the British and
after some practical evidence of Belgrade’s good will, Venizelos’ government
proceeded to the re-establishment of normal relations with Belgrade, a development that at the height of the Cold War seemed to improve considerably the position of the Western powers in the sensitive area of the Balkans and the
Eastern Mediterranean.
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