The Suez crisis, Cyprus and Greek foreign policy, 1956 : a view from the British archives
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Abstract
The Suez crisis of 1956 coincided with one of the most difficult periods
of the Cyprus issue, the period which followed Archbishop Makarios’s deportation by the British, in March 1956. The rapid deterioration of GrecoBritish relations, after March, the need for Greece to fortify her security and
to secure more allies for the next session of the General Assembly of the
United Nations and her need to expand her trade, led the newly elected Karamanlis government to reform the Greek foreign policy. Athens expanded its
political and economic relations with Eastern Europe and made openings to
the Arabs. Indeed, Egypt, where Colonel Nasser had established his rule, not
only appeared as the leading Arab nation, but was the host of a large Greek
community, which Athens wanted to protect, as far as possible.
As the Suez crisis developed, in Summer 1956, Greece found herself
obliged to make nothing less than a choice: Either to side with Nasser and
thus protect the Greeks of Egypt and secure Arab support for Cyprus at the
United Nations, a course which might alienate Britain, or to side with the
Western powers and alienate Nasser, with damaging consequences to the
Greeks of Egypt and to the Arab attitude on Cyprus at the United Nations.
The crux of the matter was whether Greece would participate in the first
London Conference on Suez, in August 1956. Greece decided that the prospect
of losing Arab support at the United Nations and of endangering the Greeks
of Alexandria was too great. She declined the invitation, despite strong American pressure to accept it. At the same time, Greece communicated to London
proposals leading to the exercise of the right of self-determination of Cyprus,
while her gesture of organising a truce of guerilla activities in Cyprus, met
with no response from the British. The British led themselves to believe that
the EOKA had been defeated. As the crisis in Suez moved to military confrontation, London’s willingness to follow American advice decreased. Thus, an American effort to mediate in the Cyprus issue, in October, was ignored by
the British. The year ended with the British declaration in favour of separate
self-determination of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, a declaration which opened
the way for the Turkish claim for partition of Cyprus. The decision regarding the Suez crisis was not an easy one for Greece. She had to balance the interests of Hellenism in Cyprus and in Egypt (not to mention the fate of the Greek community in Turkey, which had already suffered in September 1955). In the end, it was a decision on which course presented the less dangers, rather than the more benefits.
of the Cyprus issue, the period which followed Archbishop Makarios’s deportation by the British, in March 1956. The rapid deterioration of GrecoBritish relations, after March, the need for Greece to fortify her security and
to secure more allies for the next session of the General Assembly of the
United Nations and her need to expand her trade, led the newly elected Karamanlis government to reform the Greek foreign policy. Athens expanded its
political and economic relations with Eastern Europe and made openings to
the Arabs. Indeed, Egypt, where Colonel Nasser had established his rule, not
only appeared as the leading Arab nation, but was the host of a large Greek
community, which Athens wanted to protect, as far as possible.
As the Suez crisis developed, in Summer 1956, Greece found herself
obliged to make nothing less than a choice: Either to side with Nasser and
thus protect the Greeks of Egypt and secure Arab support for Cyprus at the
United Nations, a course which might alienate Britain, or to side with the
Western powers and alienate Nasser, with damaging consequences to the
Greeks of Egypt and to the Arab attitude on Cyprus at the United Nations.
The crux of the matter was whether Greece would participate in the first
London Conference on Suez, in August 1956. Greece decided that the prospect
of losing Arab support at the United Nations and of endangering the Greeks
of Alexandria was too great. She declined the invitation, despite strong American pressure to accept it. At the same time, Greece communicated to London
proposals leading to the exercise of the right of self-determination of Cyprus,
while her gesture of organising a truce of guerilla activities in Cyprus, met
with no response from the British. The British led themselves to believe that
the EOKA had been defeated. As the crisis in Suez moved to military confrontation, London’s willingness to follow American advice decreased. Thus, an American effort to mediate in the Cyprus issue, in October, was ignored by
the British. The year ended with the British declaration in favour of separate
self-determination of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, a declaration which opened
the way for the Turkish claim for partition of Cyprus. The decision regarding the Suez crisis was not an easy one for Greece. She had to balance the interests of Hellenism in Cyprus and in Egypt (not to mention the fate of the Greek community in Turkey, which had already suffered in September 1955). In the end, it was a decision on which course presented the less dangers, rather than the more benefits.
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