

If Cominformism was a Serb heresy and a deviation on the left, Popular Frontism proved to be the rightist deviation peculiar to Croat and Slovene Partisans, a deformation against which Tito and his colleagues had had to struggle particularly during the years of Partisan resistance to Axis military occupation. Popular Frontism embodied the notion that the Partisan struggle aimed not at the seizure of sole power by the CPY but instead at the creation within Yugoslavia of parliamentary government rooted in a market economy, both within the framework of a genuine ethnic federalism. Meanwhile the Partisan movement was to be made up of an association of different entities, e.g. the Croatian Communist Party, the Croatian Peasant Party, the representation of the *prechani* minority, and so on, each unit retaining its internal autonomy in preparation for post-war pluralism. The legitimacy of the Communist movement among the Catholic populations of Yugoslavia depended, in Banac's view, on the acceptability of the Popular Front.

The leader of the Croatian Popular Front was Andrija Hebrang, a man who held that a Federal Yugoslavia and a free Croatia were interdependent elements. To be sure, Hebrang found himself constantly embroiled with the supreme leader, whether he attempted to create a Partisan government in Croatia, or a regular system of courts there, or a separate Croatian news agency. In 1944, on the eve of final Partisan victory, Tito replaced Hebrang with the Party loyalist Vladimir Bakarić and, in 1948, with the final exchange of correspondence between Moscow and Belgrade he had Hebrang arrested as a traitor. The Croatian died in prison in 1949, under mysterious circumstances.

As the reader will have divined from these two key examples, *With Stalin, Against Tito* is a formidable work of scholarship. The bibliography is 15 pages in length. While the bulk of the sources are in Serbo-Croatian, of which Professor Banac is a native speaker, the footnotes are also home to works in Slovene, Slavo-Macedonian, Bulgarian and Russian, not to mention such non-Slavic tongues as Albanian. The Yugoslav government statistics on the strength and distribution of the Cominformists which Banac has dug up are astonishing. Striking also is his ability to exploit popular literature dealing with Party matters prior to 1952 as a reliable additional source: what could not be published as history was passed by the censors in novels and short stories.

Had this reviewer been asked beforehand, he would have thought such a work as *With Stalin, Against Tito* could not have been written in the reviewer's lifetime. Future research may modify this feature or that of the Banac presentation but the analysis as a whole represents a unique accomplishment which will stand on its own.

Wayne State University Emeritus

R. V. BURKS

Amikam Nachmani, *Israel, Turkey and Greece. Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean*. Totowa, N. J.: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1987. x, 124 pp., index.

Nachmani's book begins with the premise that despite certain common characteristics shared by the three countries, a "triangle" does not exist in the region in the absence of common policies among the three states. Relations among them tend to be of the bilateral variety, involving attempts by two states to cooperate against the third. The conflict between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean and Cyprus, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Greek

and Turkish attempts to court the Arabs, negate any possibility of long term cooperation among the three states. Thus, unless these problems are resolved, they will continue to complicate the relations of these three states.

Most of the book is devoted to the role of Eliyahu Sasson and the first Israeli legation in Ankara from 1949-1952, as well as to an overall assessment of Turkish-Israeli relations from 1948 to 1958. Nachmani discusses how the Israeli legation in Ankara became the center of contacts with other Middle Eastern countries, and for gathering strategic and other security related intelligence. There were other reasons for Israel's interest in Turkey in that time period. Turkey was a moslem but non-Arab state. It had an important strategic and international position that was valued by both superpowers, and participated in three major Western alliances. Turkey was concerned from early on about infringements of her sovereignty by Israel, and was suspicious of Israel's neutral attitude toward the USSR during the cold war. However, Turkey believed that close ties with Israel would bring the support of the Israeli lobby in the U.S. and of the U.S. media on behalf of Turkey's economic, political and strategic interests. Israel did not try to change this Turkish perception.

The two chapters devoted to Turkey provide fascinating perspectives on the roots of Israel's Middle East policy, and on the question of whether peace with the Arabs could be achieved through a balance of force or negotiation. The former school appears to have prevailed. These observations as to the internal policy debates in Israel have relevance to the situation today. The book also provides some tantalizing insights on U.S. - Israeli relations, and insightful assessments by Israeli diplomats of Turkish and Greek diplomatic and negotiating behavior. Israel's tilting towards Turkey in the Cyprus problem is attributed by Nachmani to the "Turkish heritage" of many members of the Israeli policy establishment; to Israel's assessment of Turkey's importance, and to the chilly relations Israel maintained with Greece. In the case of Cyprus the Israeli policy establishment debated in the early 1950's Israel's commitment to self-determination and its moral obligations toward the Cypriots for all the help they had extended to Jews as they prepared for independence. Realpolitik however prevailed at the end.

"So near and yet so far" is the title of the chapter devoted to Israel's relations with Greece, a title accurately describing Israeli-Greek relations to this day. The author stresses that relations between the two states are characterized by aloofness verging on enmity since 1949. This basic pattern has undergone no change, either for the better or for the worse, despite the absence of substantial grounds for discord, and the presence of many common elements such as their democratic aspirations, their western cultural and political systems and geographic proximity. Israel attributes its problems with Greece since 1949 to the Greek ignorance of the Middle East, and to the absence of concrete interests in the area on the part of Greece, other than the concern over the Orthodox Church in Palestine and the Greek minority in Egypt.

Nachmani provides various examples of Greek "hostile" actions since the late 1940's. He also briefly touches on some interesting examples of early attempts at cooperation between the Greek and the Jewish lobbies in the U.S. However, Israel's efforts to gain Greece's diplomatic recognition through U.S. influence on Athens ultimately failed. Thus, Israel's disappointment has led to a scaling down of relations, often reaching a level of outspoken antagonism. By 1952, Israel considered Greece as an "enemy", and put the burden on any improvement in their bilateral relations on Greece. The Israeli attempt to barter favors with Greece over Cyprus, i.e. support for Cyprus v. recognition, failed in view of the strength of

the Arabs at the U.N. and Israel's tilt toward Turkey. Even though since the early 1950's, Greece maintains that *de jure* recognition is only a formality, relations have yet to be normalized. During the last two years of the Papandreou administration, Greece, under European Community pressure, came close to a *de jure* recognition of Israel. The formal decision was once more postponed because of the intifadah.

This insightful book is based primarily on Israeli archival material, because no access is possible to Greek and Turkish archives of the period. The book appears to be a combination of separate papers written by the author, and this is evident in the overlap in the two chapters devoted to Turkish-Israeli relations. The book's main problem is its poor editing. A good editor would have insisted on a brief conclusion along the lines of the introduction, which should have included some of Nachmani's projections on the relations of the three states after 1958. A conclusion would have been useful to integrate the material in this book. There is a sprinkling of additional information on post-1958 events that does not add to the coherence of the book. Again, this is primarily an editorial problem that undermines what essentially is a serious contribution to a long neglected area in the foreign policies of Greece, Turkey and Israel. Despite this weakness, the book should be read by anyone interested in the region.

*Indiana University-Purdue University*

VAN COUFOUDAKIS