

who noted that "...the realities of postwar politics make the thesis that Tito attempted to build a bloc of socialist states apart from and against the Soviet Union completely untenable and fantastic...and the idea of an outright challenge to Soviet supremacy could not enter the minds of the Yugoslav leaders prior to 1948" (Adam Ulam, *Titoism and the Cominform*, p. 80).

Without firsthand information from the Soviet archives and the archives of the Greek Communist Party, any attempt to explain the motives, the intent, and the degree of Soviet involvement in the Greek Civil War is bound to have limitations. Even a serious and well researched effort, such as the one made by Stavrakis, will be hampered by the reality that it must be based on Western sources or biased revelations made by the participants of that conflict. No matter how objective the approach, it cannot evade all analytical contradictions. Bearing this limitation in mind, Stavrakis has written an admirably good book which will set the tone of discussion and initiate further serious analysis and speculation on an important subject that has hardly been given systematic attention.

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Jon V. Kofas, *Intervention and Underdevelopment: Greece During the Cold War*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989. 215 pp., notes, bibliography, index.

According to this unabashed revisionist work by Jon V. Kofas of Marquette University, the United States intervened in Greece in 1947 to block a mythical attempt by the Soviet Union to establish Communism, and then to spread American capitalism into this underdeveloped economy. The Truman administration thereby launched a global crusade with the Truman Doctrine that became so military in orientation that it led directly to America's disaster in Vietnam and has threatened to do the same in Central America. Further, the American aid program stunted Greece's economic growth, relegating its people to the fate of Third World countries in that its sponsor reaped the benefits while the client wallowed in its own economic and political juices and continued its long train of social injustices. Using an impressive array of economic figures and documentation, Kofas substantiates the already wellknown truth that Greece was hurting socially, politically, and economically by longstanding problems before, during, and after World War II. But then he, not convincingly, attempts to tie much of the blame to the United States. In an unmistakable allusion to America's tragic involvement in Vietnam, he argues that Greece might have developed its own "social democratic regime" (p. xi) had not the United States attempted a military solution to what was essentially an economic and political problem. The Americans' failure to work for a "political compromise" assured the reduction of Greece "to a military satellite and an economic dependency of the United States" (p. 3).

As documentation becomes increasingly available in the United States, the revisionist view of the Truman Doctrine and the Cold War has become an increasingly tired issue. To propound this view, the author must virtually dismiss the impact of the civil war in Greece from 1946 to 1949. The result is a distorted story. Had Kofas used the records of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and State Department, he would have

grasped Washington's intense concern about the ongoing fighting in Greece, and he would have realized how tightly interwoven these military events were with the monumental economic problems then eating away at the country. One cannot consider the Greek economic situation in a vacuum. Yet the reader has only the slightest notion that a war was going on that, as the co-ordinator of the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, George McGhee, insisted, kept blocking economic rehabilitation. And, even though Kofas accurately points out that no conclusive evidence has appeared to demonstrate direct Soviet involvement in Greek affairs, the evidence shows that the Greek guerrillas received Soviet weaponry and material along with substantial military and economic supplies from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, and other countries within the Communist bloc. If there was no direct Soviet activity in Greece, the Truman administration *perceived* the Soviet presence as real if only indirect and acted accordingly. Despite Kofas' claim that "the Truman administration internationalized the Greek civil war by linking it to a bipolar foreign policy and the Soviet-American confrontation" (p. 2), American documents show that the White House made every effort to keep the war localized. The civil war posed an everyday and constant form of pressure that, until stopped, decisively obstructed the reconstruction and rehabilitation objectives of the Truman Doctrine.

There are numerous problems with this work. First and foremost, Kofas does not prove that America's intervention was the cause of Greece's dire condition. The war, not the Truman Doctrine, was a major source of the country's sagging economy. Indeed, one wonders what the country's fate would have been if the United States had turned its back on Greece. So many times the author fails to examine the alternatives to the Truman Doctrine and, without evidence, simply accuses the United States of being the chief culprit in the Greek catastrophe. Second, the Truman Doctrine did not signal an automatic commitment to a global strategy that required the United States to intervene everywhere in the world. Kofas has misread the President's message to Congress in writing that "American unilateral action to demolish (contain) social revolutions necessarily entailed that the United States set a precedent for intervention anywhere it perceived a threat to its interests" (p. 83). The Truman administration considered helping only those peoples considered vital to American interests *and* capable of salvation. It did not establish a rigid, all-encompassing militaristic policy that led inevitably to Vietnam. Third, despite Kofas' assertion that "It was indeed ironic that the administration bypassed the UN" (p. 85), the truth is that that organization did not offer a viable alternative to the Truman Doctrine. The situation in Greece was an emergency of military proportions, and the UN had neither the funds nor the troops necessary to remedy the problem. Fourth, it is highly debatable that the United States might have succeeded in working out a compromise with the USSR that could have established economic cooperation and coexistence and thus prevented a bipolar world. Instead of adhering to Henry Wallace's "prophetic words", Kofas writes, the United States used "containment militarism" that "lasted until the end of the Vietnam War" and "was resurrected by the Reagan administration in 1980" (pp. 85-86).

In all fairness, there is no convincing way to prove motive behind the American intervention in Greece. If one dismisses as mere rhetoric the many public and private warnings against Communism made by American military, diplomatic, political, and economic figures, it becomes possible to argue that the United States intervened out of pure self-interest, both in developing an economic dependency and in using Greece to ward off an imagined or fabricated Soviet menace there and elsewhere. But if one accepts the White House claim that the postwar era was a time of vast devastation for numerous countries—including Greece—

and that such a situation made them vulnerable to totalitarian aggression (i.e., Soviet Communism) as in the period following World War I, then America's perception became America's reality and thus brought about a foreign policy that was based on the best information of the time. If one disregards the impact of the civil war in Greece, it follows that the United States deserves condemnation for using military means to deal with what would have automatically become an economic problem. If one ignores the rightists in Greece and assumes that the various other political groups could have reached an accommodation, then Kofas might be correct in declaring that "A plausible solution to the sociopolitical and economic problems would have required the formation of a centerleft coalition committed to the strengthening of the state, the launching of fundamental social reforms, and the development of agriculture and industry" (p. 167).

Historians, however, cannot ignore the obvious. The Greek situation, though grounded in economic difficulties, had escalated into a military problem that needed resolution *before* economic assistance could have a chance to work. Kofas is correct in arguing that the United States exaggerated the Soviet threat in Greece and that the Truman Doctrine did not resolve the country's economic problems. But he is on extremely shaky ground in declaring that the "tragic Third Round could have been avoided if the United States had been predisposed to accept a political rather than a military solution" (pp. 97-98). The Truman Doctrine was not the catalyst" (p. 98) for the war; the Third Round was a natural followup to the First and Second Rounds that had been fought *before* the U.S. intervention. The American Mission for Aid to Greece, Kofas nonetheless insists, did little for the Greek economy "because it concentrated its efforts on the more exigent military problem" (p. 100). An accurate statement would be that AMAG did little for the Greek economy because it *had* to concentrate its efforts on the country's military problem.

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Yorgos A. Kourvetaris and Betty A. Dobratz, *A Profile of Modern Greece: In Search of Identity*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, ix + 226 p.

This is not a very good book and it is extraordinary that OUP should have published it. As a profile or outline of modern Greece it falls a long way behind McNeill's study, *The Metamorphosis of Greece since World War 2*, now more than a decade old. No overarching interpretation emerges from its pages, and what we are given instead is a loose bundle of assorted facts and other people's theories.

For all the methodological problems associated with the concept, the idea of trying to define the characteristics of a given nation's identity continues to attract us. Rightly, I believe: glancing at what has been done on this subject for, say, France and Germany, we await something of comparable quality for Greece, a country where this subject has a particular resonance. The comments of Kourvetaris and Dobratz, however, on the question of identity are rather disappointing: they quote without comment Ikaris' view that 'modern Greece was reborn after centuries of foreign oppression because the Greek consciousness learned from bitter experience to retain its cultural heritage when barbaric masters were about to snatch it away and destroy it utterly' (p. 178). On page 147 they refer to the 'cultural