

of Moldavia and Wallachia, which technically were under the Sultan's suzerainty. Finally, a more penetrating analysis of the activities—and motivations behind them—of the non-Muslim members of the shortlived Chamber of Deputies elected under the Midhat Constitution, might have been in order. Lumping together all Christians in one group, for example, tends to obscure the differences existing between the Greek Orthodox, the American Gregorians, the Roman Catholics, and the Maronite Catholics who lived in various regions of the Ottoman Empire—differences which explain certain inter-Christian disagreements that arose in debates in the Chamber of Deputies, for example over the draft of the Provincial Administration Law's provision for a 50/50 representation of Muslims and non-Muslims on the communal administrative councils.

It should be added that, although the author has used for this interesting study the relevant archives of the Department of State, he was not able to study also the Foreign Office Archives for unpublished materials which are available to scholars. This is a pity. For research in the British archives would surely have shed more light on the role of Britain in this constitutional experiment which the Young Turks would revive in 1908.

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Alexis Kyrrou, *Oi Balkanikoí γείτονές μας [Our Balkan neighbours]*, Athens 1962, pp. 248.

Ambassador Alexis Kyrrou is not only one of the most brilliant Greek diplomats, but also the author of valuable historical works, which are a successful combination of deep historical knowledge and great political experience. The present extremely interesting book deals with developments in Albania, in Bulgaria and in Yugoslavia. That means that Turkey is not included which is justified by the limited Turkish interests in the Balkans.

Developments within foreign countries concern Greece only as far as they influence her foreign policy. Bulgaria may be considered as the nation with which Greece had to fight more often than with any other country except of Turkey. On the other hand the relations between Greece and Serbia and now with Yugoslavia have nearly never led to an open war. Of course this does not mean that relations between the two countries have always been cloudless. As a matter of fact Ambassador Alexis Kyrrou who was for nearly four years with the Greek legation in Belgrade, stresses these often strained relations comprehensively, objectively and friendly. They were very unfavourably affected for a time by Yugoslav claims for a "Macedonian minority" in Greece. Everybody knows that there is no Macedonian nationality, but only an area, called Macedonia, which following the Balkan wars has been divided among Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. In the statistics

either of the Ottoman Empire, or of any objective historian, no mention is ever made of a Macedonian nationality. This "nationality" was made up by Bulgaria, when after succeeding in the annexation of Eastern Roumelia in 1885 she tried to repeat the same experiment with Macedonia. This area was to become "autonomus" and then to be annexed by Bulgaria. The heroic Greek fighting in the years 1903-1908 all over Macedonia prevented the realisation of this shameless plot.

Ambassador Alexis Kyrrou gives a very satisfactory outline of these developments. He reminds the reader that neither the Albanians, nor the Bulgarians ever fought, as the Serbians and the Greeks did, in order to secure their freedom. He does not omit to mention all the attacks Greece suffered from these two countries but he does not exclude friendly coexistence, if their leaders understand that their policy as well as that of their predecessors does not pay and that Greece knows how to protect herself. As far as Yugoslavia is concerned the author reproduces official Yugoslav statements about their desire to incorporate Greek Macedonia in the so-called "autonomous republic of Macedonia," about their support of Bulgarian claims on Western Thrace and about their concern for a minority which was created *ad hoc*. Ambassador A. Kyrrou draws the right conclusions on the policy Greece has to follow in this connection.

We owe the defeat of the communists to our own ability, to our own courage and to our decision to face the danger in our own way and not according to the recommendations of others. We were also well aware that defeat could have led to total annihilation of our nation. It seems, however, that some people in Yugoslavia believe, of course quite wrongly, that Greece may accept anything. It is the duty of the Greek foreign policy to dispel this baseless belief. It is useless to remind that in prewar Yugoslavia the same wrong belief prevailed about the strength and the fighting ability of the Greek army whose splendid achievements in the years 1940-49 cannot of course be compared with those of the Royal Yugoslav Army in 1941.

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Dominik, Mandić, *Bosna i Hercegovina*. Chicago, Ill.: The Croatian Historical Institute, 1960. 487 pp. *Bogomilska Crkva Bosanskih Krstjana*. Same publisher, 1962. 509 pp.

These are the first two volumes of the work *Bosnia and Herzegovina* written by a noted Croatian historian, a Franciscan who was born in Herzegovina in 1889, and now lives in Chicago. Before he came to America, the author spent twelve years in Rome where he made ample use of the Vatican archives and library for the studies he is now publishing.

In 1957 the Croatian Historical Institute, an association of the Croatian scholars in America, published Father Mandić's *Crvena Hrvatska u Svijetlu Povjesnih Izvora* (*Red Croatia in the Light of His-*