

NIKOLAOS J. PANTAZOPOULOS

**TRIKERI: THE PIRATE REGIME OF THESSALY AND MAGNESIA:
COLLECTIVE IMPASSES AND PERSONAL DILEMMAS IN THE
CONTEXT OF AUTONOMY AND DEPENDENCE**

Introduction

Collective impasses and personal dilemmas are complex psychological states caused by mixed experiences of fear, stress, and insecurity. They are attended by more far-reaching cultural consequences and have a considerable influence on the fundamental structures upon which the community's internal structure and external policy are based. In other words, we are talking about the individual and collective behaviour of the group towards centres of power which offer support and are of the same kind (other communities), or which are superior and either of a different kind (the Ottoman State) or of the same kind (the Ecumenical Patriarchate).

Both these psychological states follow a dialectical course. Collective impasses are engendered chiefly by external factors, which give rise to socio-political diversification, leading to upheaval and reorganisation, on even the decline and dissolution of the group. Personal dilemmas spring from intra-communal, religious, or family causes, which slowly undermine the group's cohesion and provoke intracommunal dysfunction. In both cases, the values which hold together and co-ordinate the life of the group — such as, for instance, the general precepts of self-sufficiency and autonomy, solidarity, or the common interest — are weakened or cease to be effective.

For the reasons outlined above, collective experiences and personal dilemmas are closely interdependent and may:

- i. be identical or follow a mainly parallel course, in which case a fully integrated collective consciousness of identity develops;
- ii. diversity or diverge, in which case they provoke situations which ferment and tend to consolidate and co-ordinate the conflicting factors.

Trikeri is a place which, because of the constant challenges it had to face from its earliest days as a community, was forced to muster its own forces and seek enterprising solutions on both levels. Since it was totally dependent

on the sea, from the very outset it found itself involved in the pirate network, perpetrator and at the same time victim of a way of life based on a black economy which was particularly suited to the geographical situation of the Mediterranean region. It thus gives us an opportunity, using the sources as a basis, to carry out an in-depth investigation of social modification under specific circumstances in a specific place at a specific time¹.

*Historical Retrospect
Piracy as a Formative Factor in Time*

In the sixth century BC, in the context of the restructuring of the Athenian polity from an agrarian oligarchy to a merchant trading democracy¹, Solon's legislation recognised piracy and trading alike as lawful means of enrichment. They were practised by "those who made their living from plunder or trading", by corporations, i.e., associations of seamen, both pirates and merchants, working in collaboration, and more or less, in fact, indistinguishable one from the other².

In more modern times, pirates on the high seas, like the *klefts* and *armatoli* on the land, subsisted by the economic exploitation of a permanent or irregular clientèle (the inhabitants of the areas in which they lived) and created the right conditions (smuggling) to enable them to exploit this clientèle at regular intervals without destroying its economic productivity.

Both Plato³ and Aristotle⁴ discussed the question of enrichment by plundering the property of others (robbery and piracy), and the latter included piracy, in combination with commerce, amongst the recognised means of social co-existence. Piracy was a favourite pastime of the young people of

1. This study evaluates the known archive material and is based to a considerable extent on unpublished sources. Consequently, in addition to published and unpublished diagnostic sources, reference is also made to any works which materially assist an understanding of the subject. Reference to the toponym Trikeri or repetition of well-known views is not considered sufficient reason for weighing the text down with bibliographical references of only indirect usefulness.

2. See my studies: *Αἱ Ελληνικαὶ “Κοινωνίαι”*: *Προλεγόμενα εἰς τοὺς αττικὸν σωματειακὸν δίκαιον* (Athens, 1946), pp. 26f.; *Ιστορική Εισαγωγή εἰς τὰς πηγάς του Ελληνικού Δικαίου* (Athens, 1953), pp. 97-110; republished in *Επιστ. Επετ. Σχ. NOE, ΙΘ’*: *Αντιχάρτημα στον Νικόλαο Πανταζόπουλο, Α'* (Thessaloniki, 1986), pp. 261ff. and 79ff. respectively.

3. Plato, *Laws*, 8, 823e.

4. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1256a-b.

fourth-century Athens⁵. The concepts of “merchant” and “pirate” continued to be interchangeable in the post-Classical period too⁶.

In the Middle Ages, under the religious pretext of the liberation of the Holy Land, piracy brought about the collapse of the Byzantine Empire; while in more modern times, privateering⁷ served the fulfilment of the imperialist and colonialist policies of such nations as Spain and England, whose empires were based on legitimised forms of piracy and privateering. During the Greek War of Independence, privateering continued to be an internationally acceptable form of warfare.

Piracy as a Formative Factor in Time Piracy and Privateering

Although they issued their own nationals with letters of marque, the European powers were strong enough to be able to interpret the situation in the light of their own interests. They thus regarded the Greek privateers as pirates and would demand indemnity from the Greek Government even when the incident at issue had taken place in accordance with international law⁸.

Privateering as an internationally acceptable form of warfare was abolished by the first article of the Paris Declaration of 16 April 1856⁹.

It was the threat to trade posed by privateering which forced the Great Powers to intervene and bring the war with Turkey to an end. All the same, the victorious action of the Greek navy during the War of Independence was due in large part to the experience the crews of the merchants ships had gained by taking part in the competitive smuggling and piracy network, which had prevailed and been backed up by the privateering system in the Mediterranean.

5. Aeschylus, 1, 191.

6. Diodorus, 20, 82, 5.

7. A form of piracy practised in time of war by private vessels with official state authorisation (letters of marque) to plunder enemy property. See N. I. Saripolos, *Ta των εθνών εν εισήγη και εν πολέμῳ Νόμιμα*, 2 (Athens, 1860), pp. 413ff.; D. Zakythinos, “Corsaires et pirates dans les mers grecques au temps de la domination turque”, *L’Hellénisme Contemporain*, 3 (1933); T. Mitsiadis, “Consolato del Mare: The Medieval Maritime Code and its Contribution to the Development of International Law”, *Rev. Hell. Dr. Intern.*, 22, issues 3-4 (1969), pp. 105ff.

8. See H. W. V. Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning (1822-1827)* (London, 1926), p. 326; C. W. Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1839* (Cambridge, 1930), pp. 27ff.

9. See S. Seferiadis, *Μαθήματα Δημοσίου Διεθνούς Δικαίου*, B' (Athens, 1928), p. 491.

The War of Independence

From the Greek point of view, the Revolutionary Governments tolerated piracy because they themselves gained revenue from the dues they levied on the plunder, while the fleet's crews lived off it.

A distinction was established between lawful and unlawful privateering by the Proclamation issued by the Administrative Committee of Greece on 2 May 1826¹⁰. In order to pacify “the indignation of the neutral powers and the hatred of the other nations aroused by the damage done to their trade by the unpardonable excesses and ruthless piracy of certain deplorable individuals unworthy to be called Greeks”, it laid down strong measures against piracy:

- i. Henceforth all ships which sail without regular letters of marque shall be deemed to be merely pirate ships (art. III §§ 1 & 2);
- ii. All armed vessels (such as rowing boats, two-masters, or the fast skiffs known as *kleftronia*) engaging in piracy shall be pursued and scuttled, and if apprehended shall be fired (art. III § 3 and art. IV);
- iii. Article V prohibited the construction of “boats for the manifest purpose of piracy” and held the communities of the islands or coast where they were constructed jointly and severally responsible. Offenders were threatened with imprisonment and a fine, of unspecified respective duration and magnitude.

Even after thus regulating the matter, the Government continued to regard piracy as a wealth-producing resources. By Law No 55 of 30 July 1827 concerning the taxation of maritime plunder¹¹, it increased the tax on plunder from 15% to 25% without making any distinction between lawful and unlawful activity and without specifying the proportion of the plunder due to the captain and the members of the crew. In other words, the Government in a way acknowledged customary practice in cases of piracy.

The Committee Acting for the Governor (*Antikyvernitiki Epitropi*), unable to stamp out or at least to curtail piracy and obedient to the recommendation of the British Admiral, Sir Edward Codrington¹², began to issue

10. *Γενική Εφημερίς της Ελλάδος του 1825*, No f. 61 (25 May 1826) (photocopy reprint Athens 1969, pp. 242-3).

11. G. Dimakopoulos, «Ο Κώδιξ των Νόμων της Ελληνικής Επαναστάσεως», off-print from *Επετ. Κέντρ. Ερ. Ιστ. Ελλ. Δικ. της Ακαδημίας Αθηνών*, 10 (1966), pp. 197-8.

12. N. Spiliadis, *Απομνημονεύματα*, ed. C. N. Filadelfis, vol. 3 (Athens, 1875), p. 399. See also D. Themeli-Katifori, *Η δίωξις της πειρατείας και το Θαλάσσιο Δικαστήριον κατά την πρώτη Καποδιστριακήν περίοδον 1828-1829*, vol. I. *Η δίωξις της πειρατείας* (Athens, 1973), pp. 14ff., incl., references to sources and bibliography.

letters of marque “to all applicants” in the hope that this would bring the situation under control. Their reasoning was that privateering was one of their most powerful weapons against the enemy and that the absence of regular privateers played a considerable part in the increase of piracy and smuggling on behalf of the Turks. Economic reasons also advocated the issuing of letters of marque, for the Committee, “embarrassed by lack of money, thought to find a source of revenue in plunder”. The decision proved disastrous. Under the cloak of legitimacy, the pirates grew bold, and those who had hesitated now hastened to acquire the means to practice piracy unimpeded.

Effective measures against piracy were eventually implemented under Capodistrias, who, on 23 January 1828¹³, ordered Admiral Andreas Miaoulis to make with all speed for the islands of Skopelos, Skiathos, Skyros, and Iliodromia, which were suffering dreadful oppression and abuse at the hands of the troops temporarily billeted there. He was to take whatever steps his wisdom and experience dictated so that the inhabitants’ tribulations might cease once and for all and order be restored in the islands.

Immediately afterwards, Capodistrias issued resolution No 8 of 3 February 1828 concerning navigation¹⁴. According to article 29 and 30, all ships not equipped with the requisite certificates were considered to be pirate ships and as such subject to the penalty of seizure and payment of indemnity.

The situation regarding plunder was regulated in greater detail by resolution No 22 of 8 February 1829¹⁵ “concerning plunder and its distribution”, articles 1-3, in which a clear distinction was drawn between plunder which was legally substantiated and plunder which was not, or in other words between privateering and piracy. In the first case, “the clear profit of the plunder minus expenses is divided into three parts. One belongs to the Government, one to the ship which conducts the seizure, and the third to its crew”. Thus the terms of the collaboration between the Government and the legitimate privateer were properly defined, and “lawful” piracy continued to be a wealth-producing source for the state.

After Liberation, the situation regarding piracy was regulated by a decree passed on 27 March/8 April 1835¹⁶.

13. General State Archive, General Secretariat, file No 3, in Themeli-Katifori, *H διώξις*, pp. 216-17, No 3.

14. G. Dimakopoulos, «Ο Κώδιξ των Ψηφισμάτων της Ελληνικής Πολιτείας, Α', 1828-1829», offprint from *Επετ. Κέντρ. Εργ. Ιστ. Ελλ. Δικ. της Ακαδημίας Αθηνών*, 14 (1967) (Athens, 1970). p. 33.

15. Dimakopoulos, «Ο Κώδιξ των Ψηφισμάτων», p. 142.

16. Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως του Βασιλείου της Ελλάδος, file No 11, 4/16 April

Piracy as a Martial Virtue

Since an evaluation of the case of Trikeri would be inadequate without an investigation of the way of life in the surrounding area, so profoundly marked by experience of piracy, it seems advisable to look at it from both a collective and an individual point of view. We shall thus gain a better understanding of Trikeri's position amongst the other communities of Pelion, for, although geographically speaking it was one of them, it was nonetheless different and isolated from them.

Pouqueville describes the Trikeriots as unruly, reckless sailors, who, unlike their compatriots on the land, who engaged in "useful occupations", devoted themselves exclusively to piracy, considering it a nobler career for men of courage. "Lacking a homeland and laws, they become adventurers at sea"¹⁷.

This appraisal of Pouqueville's in fact reflected the mentality not only of the Trikeriots, but of all the sea-farers of pre-revolutionary Greece, for whom *levendia*, the spirit of dashing bravery which expressed the militant spirit pf resistance to tyranny, was an absolute value, irrespective of how it was practised, even when it involved the negative factor of high-handedness.

Just as communal virtue determined the collective defensive behaviour of the political associations, so *levendia* governed the aggressive policy of the military corporations (the *amatoli* and *klefts* and the corsairs). *Levendia* was the martial virtue of the brave and rebellious; its practitioner, the *levendis*, risked his life in the process.

It is in the light of this conception that we must evaluate the Trikeriots' behaviour on the occasions when it differed from that of the other inhabitants of Pelion engaged in such "useful occupations" as agriculture, stock-breeding, craft trades, and commerce.

The Trikeriots were involved with the sea from their earliest days¹⁸. They

1835, pp. 67-8, art. 1: "Any commercial ship or boat, coming from Trikeri, Volos, or anywhere on the Macedonian coast, and without urgent or proven necessity, which shall drop anchor in one of the harbours of Euboea, in the bay of Atalandi or Lamia or in the Sporades, in any place or location where there are no appointed authorities, shall, on suspicion of piracy, be seized by the royal ships of that squadron and arraigned before the criminal court". Cf. Penal Law, No 364 § 4: "Pirates of all kinds shall be punished by death".

17. See F. C. H. Pouqueville, *Voyage dans la Grèce*, 3 (Paris, 1820), pp. 67, 69. Piracy as a pre-capitalist means of acquiring capital has not yet been systematically studied. Little of what we know about it, on the basis of travellers' accounts, can provide an accurate picture: see G. V. Leon, "Ελληνική Εμπορική Ναυτιλία", in the volume of the same title published by ETE (Athens, 1972), pp. 19-46.

18. Argyris Filippidis, *Τεωγχαρία Μεσική*, in Theodosis K. Sperantsas, *Ta περισω-*

had originally settled at Palia (Old) Trikeri, a tiny island at the entrance to the Pagasic Gulf; precisely when, no-one knows, but it was certainly colonised before Pelion at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Small and treeless, the island was a target for pirate raids on the side facing Euboea, and their inability to escape in this restricted space made the inhabitants very insecure. They were therefore obliged to retreat to a safer place, whence they could control, rather than be controlled by, the sea. For the sum of 700 piastres a year, they rented a barren area of land from their neighbours in Argalasti and built their village on an arid hill 300 metres above sea level. Access to the sea was provided by two harbours, Kotes and Ayia Kyriaki.

Yet nor did their new refuge prove safe: when they were not being assaulted by pirates, they were enduring the raids of privateers from the warring fleets in the Aegean. In June 1798, a small fleet flying the Russian flag sailed through the Pagasic Gulf and called at Trikeri: It captured one Turkish and three brand new Trikeriot ships¹⁹. The following year, the village was attacked first by Albanian pirates, who were successfully repulsed²⁰, and then by a band of Greek corsairs led by Midzanas, who was Androutsos's cousin²¹. This assault too was repulsed and, according to one source, the leader was killed²². But the Trikeriots paid dearly for this victory the following year. Androutsos and 200 supporters, travelling in fifteen pirate ships, arrived in Trikeri on Easter Monday (25 March).

The villagers had all gathered in the church for the Liturgy, which was being conducted by the Bishop of Skopelos, Matthaios. The pirates surrounded them, seized from the church and the congregation everything they could find of any value, ransacked the houses, and took hostage the most important members of the community and the Bishop, for whom they demanded exorbitant ransoms.

θέντα ἔργα του Αργίων Φιλιππίδη: *Μερική Γεωγραφία - Βιβλίον Ηθικόν*, ed. Archimandrite F. Vitalis (Athens, 1918), pp. 88-9.

19. Note by Patriarch Kallinikos III in MS 101 in the Zagora Library, 7b, in V. Skouvaras, *To παλιότερο Αρματολίκι του Πηλίου κι οι Αρβανίτες στη Θεσσαλομαγνησία, 1750-1790* (Volos, 1960), p. 121.

20. As well as from Kallinikos III's eyewitness account, information about Pelion at the end of the eighteenth century is also to be found in Daniel Filippidis and Grigoris Konstantas's *Νεωτερική Γεωγραφία* (Vienna, 1791). References henceforth are to the edition: Daniil Filippidis and Grigoris Konstantas, *Γεωγραφία Νεωτερική*, ed. A. Koumarianou, (Ermis, Athens, 1988), p. 188. See also Kallinikos's note in MS 122 in the Zagora Library, p. 61: Skouvaras, *To παλιότερο Αρματολίκι*, p. 122.

21. See Argyris Filippidis, *Γεωγραφία Μερική*, p. 91.

22. Kallinikos's note in MS 101 in the Zagora Library, p. 579: Skouvaras, *To παλιότερο Αρματολίκι*, pp. 123-4.

tant ransoms: a hundred purses for the richer hostages and sixty for the rest.

Androutsos stayed in the village for a whole week, at the end of which time, having looted a Trikeriot ship which dropped anchor in the harbour, he made off with his little fleet for Skiathos and the Thermaic Gulf. Before leaving, he gave the villagers a time-limit of three weeks in which to pay the ransoms; otherwise the hostages would be sold into slavery²³.

This incident illustrates the conflicting attitudes of Androutsos's contemporaries on Pelion. Whereas the conservative exponents of the "purist" tradition deplored it, and the former Patriarch Kallinikos IV (1757), a native of Zagora, railed against the "accursed" culprits, the popular muse, impressed by the audacious pirate's *levendia*, sang his praises and presented him as bragging about his exploit:

"Here's the famous Androutsos, Androutsos the renowned! The King knows me, the whole world knows me, The Trikeriots know me too, for I've scorched them well!"²⁴

As we have seen, Argyris Filippidis too described Androutsos as "a brigand chief, but at the same time a contemporary hero".

Attempts were made to suppress piracy every now and then, but with no satisfactory result. On 24 April 1812, the Dragoman of the Fleet, Konstantinos Mavrogenis, gave orders that the inhabitants of the islands of Skopelos, Skiathos, Alonisos, Skyros, and Psara, as also the Trikeriots, were to man a frigate built by the Skopelots²⁵ with a suitable crew, accompanied by a little fleet of two or three caiques, and hunt down the pirates who were operating in the region²⁶.

In the aftermath of one of the best organised pirate raids on south-east

23. Kallinikos's note, *op. cit.*, pp. 557-9; Skouvaras, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-9. Argyris Filippidis describes this raid differently twenty-five years later: "In the time of *manqior-Lambros* [Katsonis], that chief of brigands, that erstwhile hero, Andreitzos, was sent from [his] fleet with three ships and with fighting men, and he arrived on Easter Day; and he entered this village and wrought great havoc to avenge his brother Mitzanas, who was deceitfully murdered by his own soldiers". As one can see, here too the concepts of privateering and piracy are confused.

24. See Skouvaras, *op. cit.*, with reference to Passow.

25. See N. Inglesis, *Ta αρματολίκια και ο γέως Νικοτσάρας*, vol. I (Athens, 1881), pp. 39-41. Eight sailors from Trikeri took part in this operation: see V. Sfyroeras, *Tα Ελληνικά Πληρώματα του Τουρκικού Στόλου*, (Athens, 1968), p. 72.

26. The Northern Sporades were delivered from the scourge of pirates to a considerable extent, but only for a short time, by the Kapudan Pasha's mopping-up operations in 1815-16. See the relevant *buyurdi* of 5 June 1816 in K. Nikodimos, *Υπόμνημα της νήσου Ψαράς*, vol. I (Athens, 1862), pp. 52-3 (photocopy reprint by D. N. Karavias, Athens, 1982).

Pelion, in October 1814 the elders of Argalasti and Lafko appealed to the notables of Trikeri to help them drive out the pirates, who were still tyrannising Pelion and holding forty-four hostages from the Syki district of Argalasti against a ransom of seventy purses²⁷.

The pirates were led by Nikolas Tselios and a man named Stergios, whose surname is unknown. One group consisted of eighty-five men, of whom five were killed in the engagements with the locals. Another band of 300 pirates arrived in fourteen caiques and landed in Damouchari Bay, a haven belonging to Mouresi. They were met by groups of armed men from the villages of Milies and Lafko, led by Thanasis Basdekis²⁸.

The Trikeriots suggested that the pirates assaults be repelled by creating a diversion from the sea with a “gendarme ship”, which they themselves were prepared to provide. The elders of Argalasti and Lafko agreed and asked for a “notable man” to be sent to make the necessary arrangements in Lafko, which was apparently the headquarters for the operations against the pirates²⁹.

As we can see, on rare occasions there was a certain solidarity between Trikeri and the neighbouring communities, when it was in their mutual interest to avert a threat to Pelion’s intercommunal equilibrium.

The frequent pirate raids forced the Trikeriots to improve their defences. When Argyris Filippidis visited the village in 1815, he found it surrounded by fortifications, which, together with some of the houses, formed a wall around the village³⁰.

The following year, a naval force of six frigates and eleven other vessels, under the command of Topal Pasha, managed to clear the pirates out of the northern Sporades for a short time³¹.

27. A document relating to this incident is reproduced in my study, “Κοινοτικός βίος εις την Θετταλομαγνησίαν”, offprint from *Επιστ. Επετ. Σχολής Ν.Ο.Ε.*, ΙΔ', γ' (Thessaloniki, 1967), pp. 75-6; republished *op. cit.*, ΙΘ', γ' (Thessaloniki, 1986), pp. 421-2.

28. His existence is attested in a founder’s inscription in the wall of an outpost near the Volos-Zagora road, dating from 1804: see D. Tsopotos, “Η Θετταλομαγνησία (Πήλιον) και το φρούριον του Βόλου κατά την Επανάστασιν του 1821”, *Θεσσαλικά Χρονικά*, 1 (1930), p. 26.

29. Pantazopoulos, “Κοινοτικός βίος”, *op. cit.*

30. “Their houses are many and very close together. And at the edge of the village there is a secure enclosure which runs from house to house and is like a fortress”: Argyris Filippidis, *Μερική Γεωγραφία*, p. 87.

31. The pirate fleet of Psara, Kasos, and Karpathos played havoc with the enemy during the Struggle. Ships from Hydra and Spetses were also engaged in piracy. We know about their activity along general lines, but little was known hitherto about the parallel activity of the Trikeriots, who operated separately from, or rather more autonomously than,

This somewhat lengthy account of the surrounding area and the various side-issues is intended to portray the particular climate in which the Trikeriots acted, either positively or negatively, in their quest for solutions to the collective impasses and personal dilemmas with which they were faced. These situations could be described from a conceptual point of view as states of intracommunal inertia.

When the 1821 Revolution broke out, piracy was the scourge of the East Mediterranean, and indeed it was then increased by the active participation of Greek ships. Piracy was detrimental to the Great Powers commercial interests in the Mediterranean, and therefore steps had to be taken to deal with it. One of the motives behind the Great Powers' intervention to put an end to the hostilities between the Greeks and the Turks was the eradication of piracy. This was achieved immediately after Capodistrias had been elected Governor of Greece, when a special squadron was set up under the command of the former pirate and now Admiral of the Greek Fleet, Andreas Miaoulis. He scattered the small pirate fleets which were operating in and around the Trikeriots' living space, and particularly in the waters of the North Sporades, which were known at the time as the Diavolonia or "Devil Islands". The Great Powers dispatched commercial representatives to Greece as soon as they had ascertained that Capodistrias's concerted efforts had ensured freedom of shipping in the dangerous areas³².

After the uprising in Northern Greece had failed, the revolution which broke out in Thessaly and Magnesia in May 1821 was doomed, in the opinion of certain Peloponnesian leaders³³. Unfortunately, this pessimistic forecast was borne out by events. The Turks counteracted in two phases. During the first, having easily shashed up the camp to which the Greeks had withdrawn at Velestino, Dramalis pounced upon the villages of Pelion and drowned the revolution in its own blood. Four shiploads of Trikeriots played a part in this phase and collaborated with the people of Limni temporarily to extend the Revolution into Euboea. All the villages of Pelion submitted at this time, with the exception of four: Argalasti³⁴, Lafko, Promyri, and Trikeri. Even they

the other naval powers. It seems, however, from unpublished documents at my disposal, that, particularly during the first two years of the War of Independence, the Trikeriots' activities aroused the protests of the Supreme Court, the regular governing body, that is, of Eastern Mainland Greece, which was based on the island of Lithades and thus in the very centre of the pirate activities.

32. Themeli-Katifori, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

33. Christoforos Perraivos, *Απομνημονεύματα Πολεμικά*, vol. II (Athens, 1836), pp. 14-15.

34. A decree issued by Reshid Mehmet Pasha (Kiutahi) on 1 August 1823, granting

were eventually forced to bend the knee after the conclusion of the treaty of May 1823 with Reshid Mehmet (Kiutahi) Pasha³⁵.

After the Revolution had been crushed on Pelion, most of those who had escaped slaughter and enslavement sought refuge in Trikeri, while it was still free³⁶.

As they retreated, the armed revolutionary forces seized Lefokastro, a strategic point on the isthmus between Pelion itself and the Trikeri peninsula, and entrenched themselves there. In view of the importance of Thessaly and Magnesia for the belligerents, both sides felt the need to settle the situation one way or another. For the Turks this meant capturing the last free bastion, Trikeri; while the Greeks felt they had to maintain and reinforce it as a bridgehead for recovering Thessaly.

One of our basic sources of information about the events of spring 1822 is Perraivos³⁷, who took part in the operations at the head of an expeditionary force of 200 men in his capacity of Minister for War. Zosimas Efigmenitis, too, published quite a number of ordinances issued by the Regional Government (*Areios Pagos*), with a view to suppressing piracy by the Trikeriots while the war operations were going on³⁸. These data were republished by Giannis Kordatos, whose books included and commented on as much archival and historiographical material as he was able to collect³⁹. He used the material to describe the events of the war and comment on the internal rivalry between the leaders of the campaign. Thus, the phenomenon of piracy has not received the attention it deserves, with regard either to the factors which nurtured it or to its special importance for the Trikeriots as a collectively organised way of life.

an amnesty to Argalasti and its small districts, is to be found in my study, "Κοινωνικός βίος", pp. 86-7 and 432-3 respectively.

35. I. Filimon, *Δοκίμιον Ιστορ. π.τ. Ελλ. Επαναστάσεως* (1860) 3, pp. 382-3; S. Trikoupis, *Ιστορία της Ελλ. Επαναστάσεως*, 3rd ed. I (Athens, 1888), pp. 144-5.

36. "They flocked to Trikeri and, to a certain extent, to the islands nearby" (Skiathos, Skopelos, and Alonisos, writes Filemon, *op. cit.*, 3, p. 382). A report submitted to the Government on 26 May 1823 by the refugees who had fled to Trikeri complains: "The forces under Karatasos, the Greek army, numbers 3.000 men up in Trikeri and they are fed by the Trikeriots; whereas we, who have sought refuge here, find ourselves deprived and stripped of all we possess". The document is signed by thirty-three notables, including Argyris N. Filippidis, from the villages of Pelion which had submitted. See G. Thomas (in collaboration with A. K. Damtsas), *O Ηγλιορείτης Οπλαρχηγός Γεώργης Ζορμπάς* (Volos, 1983), pp. 68-71.

37. See Perraivos, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-27.

38. *Προμηθεύς* (monthly periodical), I (Volos, 1889), pp. 30-2, 52-4, 58-60, 72, 113, 128.

39. *Η Επανάσταση της Θεσσαλομαγνησίας στο 1821*, (Athens, 1934), and *Ιστορία της Επαρχίας Βόλου και Αγιάς* (Athens, 1960), pp. 702ff.

Legislative measures to curb piracy

Naturally enough, the speedy suppression of the Revolution on Pelion, which brought to heel the three villages (Argalasti, Lafko, and Promyri) which had temporarily retained their freedom, disturbed the elected magistrates of Trikeri, and they submitted a report to the “Supreme Administration” on 9 February 1822, to the effect that, having submitted to the Ottomans, the Greek co-nationals of these villages (or rather “anti-Greeks”, as they termed them) were preparing to attack Trikeri with the enemy. The magistrates also observed that the people of Skopelos and Skiathos were supplying the defeated villages with wheat, and requested matériel⁴⁰.

In order to prevent supplies reaching the Turkish-held areas, the Regional Government ordered a blockade of the Pagasic Gulf and instructed the Trikeriots to patrol not only the Pagasic Gulf, but also the east Aegean and the north of the Gulf of Euboea⁴¹. But instead of helping the situation, this measure had the opposite effect, because, in the pretext of effecting a blockade, the Trikeriot ships began systematically to violate it. They levied arbitrary tariffs of up to 20% on the merchandise being transported and, confusing privateering with piracy, proceeded to seize ships and cargoes, thus creating the appropriate conditions for a black market to develop through smuggling. The Regional Government made various unavailing efforts to limit the damage that was being done; and after three months, it decided to lift the blockade, though, again, without any effective result.

In order to investigate the internal conditions underlying this external description of events, in what follows I shall make use of unpublished archival matériel⁴² which was not available to me in 1967 when I wrote my study “Κοινωνικός βίος εις την Θετταλομαγνησίαν επί Τουρκοκρατίας” (Community Life in Thessaly and Magnesia during the Ottoman Period). I thus hope to be able to complete the global picture I am endeavouring to present.

40. *Αρχεία της Ελληνικής Παλιγγενεσίας μέχρι της εγκαταστάσεως της Βασιλείας*, I (Athens, 1857; republished 1971), p. 414.

41. On his orders, issued on 12 March 1822, the Trikeriot ships were commanded to patrol the Zagora coastline and sequestrate fodder and matériel intended for the villages which had submitted to the Turks: see D. Papakonstantinou, “Λαογραφικά κλπ. εκ Τρικέρων”, *Θεσσαλικά Χρονικά*, 3 (1932), p. 184.

42. - 43. - 44. Most of the unpublished documents from which I quote here are from papers written by the lawyer Georgios Ganotis, a former student of mine. I am sincerely grateful to him, for without his co-operation this study would have been incomplete.

The actual circumstances

Let us look, then, at the actual circumstances. In its ordinance of 6 April 1822, the Regional Government upbraided the Trikeriots because: “under the pretext of a blockade their intention is both to discredit the government and to strip people of all they possess, without pausing to consider ... that the nation has taken up arms in order to liberate itself from tyranny, not to fall into Trikeriot bondage”⁴³.

There is an explanation for the Trikeriots behaviour. As I have already pointed out, it arose out of a confusion of the concepts of piracy, privateering, and trade. This is precisely what the Regional Government meant when it wrote:

“Apparently you have not understood the significance of the blockade, which was intended ... to halt the to-ing and fro-ing of suspicious people, traitors, and also known Christian brethren of your own, to rob whom without cause is, after all, against both laws and humanity”⁴⁴.

With this document, the Regional Government ordered the Trikeriots to dispatch to its seat in Lithada “immediately, imperatively, and without excuse ... all the caiques, with their cargoes, which have been seized during the [three-month] period of the blockade”. It also announced the end of the blockade and threatened them, albeit in vague terms, with severe sanctions should they recommence piratical activities⁴⁵.

It seems, however, that the Trikeriots piracy had taken on epidemic proportions, with disagreeable consequences. A document issued by the Regional Government on 9 April 1822 (to which further reference will be made below) clearly reveals the central authority’s consternation at being unable to assert its authority⁴⁶. This time, both the perpetrator and the victims of the piracy

45. A document issued by the Supreme Court on 15 May 1822, *Προμηθεύς*, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-2) reveals that the Trikeriots did not obey this order and had begun seizing ships and distributing the plunder before the blockade of the Gulf of Volos was declared. In accordance with the “irreversible decision of the Supreme Court, the distribution should have been preceded, in the presence of representatives of the Supreme Court, by a precise sorting out, otherwise the plunder is not legitimate”. The Supreme Court therefore ordered that “all the caiques (but one) be given to their owners with all their contents entire and untouched”, and issued a summons to the five ships captains who had unlawfully seized them. Those called to account were Messrs Konstantinos Kapetanakis, Nikolis Koutbanis, Angelakis, Nikolis Blouchakis, and Nikolaras (*op. cit.*, p. 32).

46. According to an unpublished document of 9 April 1822, written and signed by the President of the Supreme Court, Neofytos Metaxas, Bishop of Talantio.

are mentioned by name: the culprit is Captain Konstantinos Vriniotis, who encountered an armed caïque from Skopelos and seized it. The representative of the shippers, who are referred to as master mariners from Limni on Euboea⁴⁷, turned to the Regional Government and denounced the incident, demanding the restitution of both boat and cargo.

This document clearly reflects the utter inability of the Regional Government of Eastern Mainland Greece to enforce law and order in its own area of jurisdiction. The conflict between practice (piracy) and law (the blockade), was unquestionably won by the time-honoured net-work of piracy, privateering, and smuggling, which the Trikeriots practised at their leisure in the full conviction that they were not breaking the law⁴⁸. It was a question not of isolated incidents, but of the whole community's systematic, collective practice of piracy as an "apparently lawful" way of life.

Collective impasses

In the course of this discussion, we shall shortly encounter an instance in which, in a proven case of piracy, the delegates of Trikeri refused to issue the relevant certification which would set in train the process of compensation.

The document issued on 9 April 1822 makes more serious accusations, no longer against individuals but against the collective leadership, which, heedless of protests and ordinances, covered up their activities and merely issued threats of future sanctions. Quite clearly, the Trikeriots had established their own parastate, scorning the ordinances issued by the local authority⁴⁹.

The second stage of the war operations around Trikeri is described by Perraivos in his War Memoirs⁵⁰. When Kiutahi launched his campaign against

47. Merchant shipowners, probably from Limni on Euboea.

48. Needless to say, this was not the first time local people had shown themselves unprepared to comprehend and accept the new modes of conduct which were evolving just outside their immediate sphere. One of a number of similar examples was the behaviour of the people of Mani, which had much in common with that of the Trikeriots.

49. The document was written and signed by the President of the Supreme Court, Neofytos Metaxas, Bishop of Talantio, and describes, from the government's point of view, the situation brought about by the Trikeriots' conduct: "We have issued you with so many injunctions which you have not obeyed; please know that, by the universally praised God of the Trinity, many people shall disappear from your village, and many of those who are considered honourable shall be sentenced to prison and compensation by the Government, and if you continue to behave like children and your only guiding thought be rapine and injustice, you know full well that soon, to be brief, disaster shall fall and the cunning and wicked shall be wiped out and receive the opprobrium of the whole Greek nation".

50. *Op. cit.*

Thessaly and Magnesia in May 1823, the Trikeriots placed the defence of their area in the hands of a mercenary force of 2.000 men led by Karatasos and other Macedonian chieftains. The crushing of the uprising on Euboea foreshadowed the failure of the Revolution on Pelion, where, after a number of successes, the fighters found themselves facing urgent problems in obtaining supplies of food and matériel⁵¹.

In order to liberate members of his family whom Kiutahi was holding hostage, Karatasos offered a conditional surrender⁵². He left the “wretched Trikeriots” to their fate and, having first extorted 40.000 piastres from them under various pretexts, he then moved on with his supporters to Skiathos, where he continued his marauding⁵³. Under these circumstances, the Trikeriots were forced to “bend the knee”, and the Turks took Trikeri in August 1823 and appointed Tahir Konitsa garrison commander there.

51. *Op. cit.*

52. A. Orlando gives the terms of the surrender in *Ναυτικά*, vol. I (Athens, 1869), pp. 374-5: a. the Turks must leave the villages of Thessaly and Magnesia; b. the families of Karatasos and Gatzos, who are being held hostage, must be freed within twenty-one days; c. Trikeri must be placed under Turkish protection; d. the region's *armatolikia* should be allocated to Mitros Basdekitis (Pelion), Yannis Velentzas (Almyros), Mitros Liakopoulos (Ayia and Rapsani), and Karatasos (Euboea). It is doubtful whether, or how far, these terms were honoured. In a report to the Government on 15 November 1823 (i.e. three months later), K. Nikodimos of Psara (*op. cit.*, pp. 305-6) writes: “Trikeri, having long since unlawfully submitted to the enemy, has received almost 300 [Turkish] soldiers and is expecting many more from Larisa”. They rejected the proposal that the Psarians should take them by ship to other areas of their choice; which refusal compelled the Council of Psara to order its ships captains “to seize all their ships, as also those of the coast of the subjugated areas, in order to deprive them of all means of submitting”. Perraivos, who failed to prevent Karatasos from surrendering and does not mention that a Turkish garrison was stationed at Trikeri, relates (*op. cit.*, p. 21) that the main purpose of the surrender — the release of the hostages — was not achieved. He adds that Karatasos “without ever benefiting from the promises and from the hopes he had been nurturing for seven years in Nafplio, abandoned the unfortunate Trikeriots without any armed protection”. They, despairing “of being able to avoid any prospective inevitable raid by the Ottomans”, submitted in 1823 “and are still [in 1836] Ottoman subjects”. A further example of the crucial role played by the personal dilemmas which their collective impasses caused the Trikeriots.

53. Perraivos, who condemns Karatasos (*op. cit.*, pp. 21-2) for his conduct “as an enemy of his own repute and of the common interest”, acknowledges “on the other hand” that “he is valiant and esteemed in the art of war” and that his conduct was due “to the despair and indigence which provoked his supporters to all sorts of irregular behaviour”. See G. Chionidis, «Σχεδίασμα περί του Γερο-Καρατάσου και της οικογένειας του», *Μακεδονικά*, 9 (1969), pp. 300f.; K. Liapis, «Ο γερο-Καρατάσος στη Θεσσαλομαγνησία», *Αρχείον Θεσσαλικών Μελετών*, IV (Volos, 1976), pp. 39-64.

Having abandoned Pelion and fled to the larger islands, the unruly mobs of Thessalian and Macedonian irregulars proceeded to make life hell for the inhabitants of the North Aegean islands and coastline. While the indigenous population shut themselves up in the fortresses, the occupiers ravaged the countryside⁵⁴. The sense of insecurity inspired by the central government's inability to protect them was so overwhelming that, not knowing what else to do, the people of Skopelos asked the Committee Acting for the Governor to allot them "a small piece of Greek land to which they could transfer their hapless and miserable families"^{54a}.

"Having doubts about their own safety", in August 1823 the people of Skiathos sought the protection of the Kapudan Pasha, Topal, "accepted a governor in the fortress, and at the same time begged the Admiral to rid them of a number of criminal elements in the Greek Administration who had unlawfully seized their village beside the harbour and taken the produce of their fields"⁵⁵. Another "Olympic" chieftain, K. Doumbiotis, at the head of 200 of his supporters, had taken over the village of Glossa on Skopelos, where he was comporting himself like a king and arbitrarily levying harbour dues on the island⁵⁶.

The piracy of the Thessalian and Macedonian irregulars brought about the same situation — disruption of the official state and imposition of a piratical parastate — in other North Aegean islands too, such as Skyros, Thasos, and Imbros. Despite their compulsory annual contribution of 250.000 and 500.000 piastres respectively, the inhabitants of the latter two islands were

54. In a detailed report to the War Ministry dated 20 July 1823, Karatasos tragically describes the dramatic pass to which his men had come: without pay, food, or water, they were compelled to protect a place which it was not in their interests to protect and where the enemies stratagems were carried out by the local people themselves, who had submitted to the Turks. This was written three weeks before Karatasos himself surrendered to the enemy and abandoned his comrades-in-arms to their fate (see Perraivos, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 15-19; S. Trikoupis, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 36-7).

54a. General State Archives of the War Ministry, file 96, doc. dated 8 July 1827: Themeli-Katifori, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

55. Perraivos, *op. cit.*, pp. 87f., who goes on to describe how the island's occupation by the Turks was avoided.

56. General State Archives of the Maritime Court, file 84, decision of 15 June 1828, and General State Archives of the General Secretariat, Themeli-Katifori, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-9. On the basis of the sources, T. Stamatopoulos describes the predatory conduct of Doumbiotis, whom the Supreme Court had appointed commander of Euboea instead of Odysseas Androutsos: *O εσωτερικός αγώνας κατά την Επανάστασην του 1821*, II (Athens, 1964), pp. 109-22. Concerning the Supreme Court's hostility towards Androutsos and its consequent machinations, see *op. cit.*, pp. 40-5, 53-7, 88-95.

obliged to engage forces of Turkish mercenaries to protect them⁵⁷.

This, then, was the situation prevailing in and around Trikeri when the third phase of war operations broke out in the region in November 1827.

The Committee Acting for the Governor had for some time been planning to establish a diversionary bridgehead somewhere in Thessaly and Magnesia⁵⁸, using a force of 4.000 men led by the Thessalian and Macedonian chieftains⁵⁹. The latter had been making preparations since the previous May for a raid on Thessaly⁶⁰. The operation was never carried out, however, for in September 1827 Trikeri was again attacked, this time by Greeks. A naval squadron under Captain Andreas Kefalas, which also included an expeditionary force led by Adam Doukas and N. Kriezotis, was ordered to attempt a landing on Euboea. But, instead of putting their men ashore on Euboea, the leaders “dropped anchor at Kotes [Trikeri’s harbour], where the officers and men disembarked” and set off for nearby Trikeri, as K. Nikodimos recounts. They engaged with the Turks, but were repulsed. We shall see farther on who actually defended Trikeri. A few days later, Kriezotis made a surprise attack and this time was successful: “Invading one evening [in September 1827] the shore of Trikeri’s harbour [i.e. Ayia Kyriaki], he captured the canon emplacement and the magazines and summoned the ships of his little fleet into the harbour of Ayia Kyriaki to receive the booty ... They then returned to Kottes, where the force that was besieging Trikeri was stationed, and moored there”⁶¹.

The Turks had apparently kept the promise they had made after the capitulation of August 1823 and had not established a garrison of their own at Trikeri, but simply appointed Tahir Konitsa garrison commander. This is evident from an unpublished document issued, in Greek, by the Vizier of Ioannina on 23 February 1828 and sent to a notable of Trikeri named Anagnostis Hadzi Nikolas⁶². Having saluted Hadzi Nikolas, the vizier informs him that, in recognition of his loyalty and personal bravery in leading his

57. Themeli-Katifori, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

58. General State Archives of the Committee Acting for the Governor, file 240, doc. dated 11 September 1827: see G. Thomas - A. Damtsas, *Ο Πηλιορείτης Οπλαρχηγός Γιώργης Ζωρμπάς (1788-1856)* (Volos, 1983), p. 170.

59. General State Archives, Mavrokordatos Archive, file 13, No 3771: Themeli-Katifori, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

60-61. Karatasos, Gatzos, Doumbiotis, Liakopoulos, Binos, Kalamideoi, Zorbas, Venetzas, et al., *op. cit.*

62. This is doc. No 96 in the small but important collection which was kept, before the earthquake, in the Almyros Museum. I photographed some of the documents when I was collecting archive material for my study *Kοινωνικός Βίος εις την Θετταλομαγνησίαν* before 1967.

fellow villagers against the “rebels”, his name is to be inscribed in a roll of “outstanding pojas” and he is to be exempted from all taxes, including the capitulation⁶³.

This document is of special interest in the context of this study in that it indicates that, after the capitulation of August 1823, the people of Trikeri exploited to the hilt whatever scope for autonomy remained to them and, under the leadership of Anagnostis Hadzi Nikolas, took the initiative effectively to resist the assaults of the Thessalian and Macedonian marauders.

Once again, however, the price was a heavy one, for during the raiders’ landing operation, the Trikeriot fleet of sixty boats was almost entirely destroyed⁶⁴. This vital blow shattered Trikeri’s marine at a time of reconstruction when, as we shall see, efforts were being made to modernise it as a merchant fleet. It was a blow from which Trikeri could not recover, and, naturally, helped to cut the village off completely from the surrounding region, for its scope was now drastically reduced at a time when the marines of other maritime centres were taking advantage of the new circumstances which arose after the end of the war with Turkey⁶⁵.

The document deserves our attention for another reason too. It was issued by the Vizier of Ioannina, who was thus interfering in the Kapudan Pasha’s sphere of jurisdiction⁶⁶. Essentially, Trikeri was removed from the

63. Some of the Turkish words can be translated only approximately. See E. Bogas, *Τουρκικές λέξεις σε παλιότερα ελληνικά κείμενα* (Athens, 1958): *Hair douajides* = “beloved congratulators” in the sense of “loyal subjects”; *senedi, sadokat, qafseti* = “zeal manifested in the fulfilment of the terms of allegiance” (the reference here is to the declaration of allegiance to Kiutahi); *reayaliki* = “loyal conduct on the part of the subjects”. I have not been able to ascertain the meaning of the word *poja*; it may denote a category or catalogue of favoured individuals.

64. According to information provided by N. Magnis, *Περιήγησις ἡ Τοπογραφία της Θεσσαλίας και Θετταλικής Μαγνησίας* (Athens, 1866), pp. 76-7, which appears to be an accurate reflection of the facts.

65. The laws prohibiting the export of grain favoured the growth of smuggling. The region of Volos and Trikeri was one of the main markets for grain and it thrived as long as the Greeks had the monopoly on its distribution during the Napoleonic Wars. From the second decade of the nineteenth century, when freedom of movement was restored in the Mediterranean and piracy reduced, all the maritime centres which had grown rich from the grain trade took a nose-dive. See G. V. Leon (Leondaritis), “Ελληνική Εμπορία και Ναυτιλία (1453-1850)”, *ETE* (Athens, 1972), p. 32; republished by EMNE - Μνήμων (Athens, 1981), pp. 33f.

66. In his book *Θεσσαλία* (Athens, 1820), written just a year before Thessaly was incorporated, N. Georgiadis summarises the information given by his predecessors and notes that Trikeri “numbers in the region of 2.000 inhabitants, who, being without cultivable land, earn

has of the Kapudan Pasha and became part of the *sanjak* of Ioannina, before being brought, together with the other villages of Pelion, under the unified administration of the Kaimakam of Volos. It was a foretaste of the policy of centralisation which was brought to completion in the middle of the nineteenth century with the passing of the Law concerning *Vilayets* in 1856⁶⁷.

Mixed impasses

Apart from collective impasses, the people of Trikeri also found themselves faced with other problems, which one might well describe as “mixed” impasses, since they were both personal and collective in character. They arose when the elected delegates were obliged each year to select a certain number of seamen (*mellachides*) to serve in the “invincible imperial fleet”. The process of selection was a problem not only for the community’s official representatives, who necessarily incurred the displeasure both of the men they selected and of the men’s families. When the selected men deserted, the repercussions were both personal and collective, for the whole community was jointly and severally bound to pay the Turkish authorities these individuals taxes within the stipulated time, either in cash or in kind. In these cases, the deserters’ property was put up for public auction, which was a further source of friction and dysfunction on both an individual and a collective level. One such case is the subject of a decision issued by the village of Trikeri on 23 August 1811.

On the order of the Kapudan Pasha, the whole community, both young and old, decided to auction the property of some of its members who had refused to enter the service of the fleet as *daifas* (crew). If the money raised by the auction did not cover the sum which the Kapudan Pasha’s representative had fixed as being payable in lieu of service, the shortfall would be made up by the members of the community, who were jointly and severally liable for its payment. Should some member of the community not comply with the decision, “all pledged to turn against him in a body and sell off his effects also”⁶⁸.

their living for the most part from sponge fishing, which they pursue by means of the modern fishing devices which the French call *scaphandres*. They also have some small boats, with which they coast between the ports of Pelion and those of Asia Minor” (*op. cit.*, p. 169).

67. See my study «Η Κοινωτική δικαιοτάξια στη Μακεδονία. Κρατικές παρεμβάσεις και νοθεύσεις», in the proceedings of the Symposium *Η διαχρονική πορεία του Κοινωνισμού στη Μακεδονία*, published by the Thessaloniki Historical Centre (Thessaloniki, 1991), pp. 433-73.

68. See my study “Κοινωτικός βίος”, *Επιστ. Επετ. Σχ. NOE, ΙΘ'*, γ' (1986), pp. 426-7 (unpublished document of 25 Feb. 1817, No 10, cols 10-11).

Similar impasses faced the community elders bidden to collect the lump sum known as the *maktu*; once again the burden was shared out amongst the whole community, and they were forced to auction the property of any who did not pay.

As has already been mentioned, the fact that the Turkish authorities assigned the collection of the *maktu* to the community's elected representatives reduced the cohesion of the community as a whole, on account of the elders' increased jurisdiction in the exercise of their authority.

The foregoing discussion reveals the full extent of the collective impasses which the Trikeriots had to face during the various stages of their life as a community, and which were provoked by external factors. Their fleet was destroyed before it had had time to develop, their area was ravaged, their numbers were decimated, their incorporation into the modern Greek State was frustrated, and their forcible inclusion within the Turkish sphere of influence brought about decline and stagnation⁶⁹. More specifically:

The destruction of Trikeri's fleet in November 1827, the curbing of piracy during Capodistrias's time, and the gradual supersession of sail by steam all combined to check the originally rapid development of Trikeri's merchant marine; for once it had lost its monopoly on the transport of grain from Volos to Constantinople it had no chance of survival. Because of all this, the Trikeriots were unable to continue the process of modernising Trikeri and turning it into a merchant marine entrepot, which, as we have seen, at one stage in their lives they were trying to do. These impasses forced them to restrict themselves to their original bread-winning occupations of seafaring (as simple sailors rather than shipowners) and sponge and octopus fishing⁷⁰.

Procedural issues

In the pre-revolutionary period, the secondary centres of power, as were the communities in the context of the jurisdiction they exercised by order and tolerance of the Turkish authorities, developed a flexible procedural system for resolving differences in accordance with written and unwritten rules of popular law. Disputes relating to family law and hereditary rights, however, were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church.

The local councils of elders wielded whatever authority was connected with agronomical competence, particularly that relating to the proper func-

69. See n. 66 above.

70. See V. Sfyroeras, *Oι δραγονυμάνοι του στόλου* (Athens, 1965), pp. 66f.

tioning of the machinery of tax collection. They also resolved any differences which did not fall within the exclusive (penal) or parallel (transfer of land ownership) jurisdiction of the Turkish religious courts. They also re-examined those decisions which were referred back to them by the Dragoman of the Fleet, who functioned on a secondary level as a valve for resolving the conflicts between Ottoman and popular law⁷¹.

The general precepts of arbitration and equity played a constructive part in the procedural sphere, given that, in the context of the community members collective conduct, which was based on the general precepts of solidarity and common interest, they provided the most effective means of smoothing out the trouble caused by protracted litigation. The latter was avoided, because it gave the officials of the external (i.e. the Ottoman) legal system an excuse to intervene, which entailed a further economic burden both for the individuals concerned and for the community⁷².

All the same, the competence of the organs of justice, which functioned either side by side or in succession, was fluid, for each legal system infiltrated the inert areas of the other in an effort to gain partial or total ascendancy.

The choice between internal and external jurisdiction was unquestionably one of the most excruciating dilemmas the *raya* had to face, particularly when his own interests were better and quicker served by a settlement under Ottoman law. In this case, however, Greek popular law had two effective means of disuasion and self-defence: the litigant lost his membership of the community⁷³ and suffered religious excommunication. This latter “knife of the Church”⁷⁴ remained hanging over the renegade’s head and, by virtue of its correlation with the religious factor (faith = fatherland), effectively intensified the psychological strain of his dilemma.

71. See my studies, «Ο Καποδίστριας και ο κοινωνικοπολιτικός πλουραλισμός της εποχής του», *Επιστ. Επετ. Σχ. NOE, ΙΘ', γ'* (Thessaloniki, 1986), sp. 230ff., and «Ο Ελληνικός Κοινωνισμός και Ελληνική Κοινωνική Παράδοση», *op. cit.*, pp. 579-614.

72. See above.

73. The report contains no information about either the cargo or the reasons why the 1.015 piastres were paid. I presume that the sum was paid as duty, for we know that the Trikeriots used the blockade as a pretext for imposing arbitrary duties of up to 20% of the value of the cargo.

74. The wording of the report to the effect that “the merchants obstructed [the ship’s departure] without answering to the court” suggests two possibilities: a. The court issued a decision, but the delegates would not allow it to be implemented; b. In an attempt to take in hand the hearing of the dispute, the court addressed itself to the delegates, who turned a deaf ear. It seems likely that, in their capacity of magistrates, the delegates were simply being obstructive.

At this point, one might say that the general precepts of solidarity and common interest were diverted from the endogenous, or internal, to the exogenous, or external, legal system, insofar as the similarity or identity of the two systems acted as a differentiating factor on individual and collective conduct.

With the outbreak of the Revolution, what might previously have been described as a rather dubious equilibrium, which had been achieved through the exercise of jurisdiction by the pluralistic centres of power operating side by side or in succession (the Ottoman State, the Church, and the Communities), was upset, and highhandedness replaced the delicate balance which had been maintained by the general precepts of arbitration and conciliation.

The uncertain situation to which the Revolution gave rise in the field of local self-administration was still at a crucial experimental stage. It was being further complicated by an emerging tendency towards the formation of a federal form of government as an intermediary stage on the way to the establishment of a centralised state. The local community administrations were not prepared to relinquish jurisdictional powers which they had fought hard to obtain and hand them over to centres of power which had not yet proved themselves, or were not functioning properly, or did not serve local collective interests.

We have already seen the results of the fruitless efforts of the Regional Government of Eastern Mainland Greece to bring pirate activity in its area under control. On 21 July 1822, a shipowner named Nikolaos Dimou submitted a report to the above-mentioned Government, which enables us to assess the reaction of the merchant seamen who were suffering the consequences of the Trikeriots high-handed conduct. This unpublished document vividly portrays the frustration aroused by the lack of legal protection in the region; a region, moreover, which was only a few miles away from the administrative centre of Eastern Mainland Greece. See above, Notes 73-74.

In November 1821, the Constitutional Act of the Regional Government of Eastern Mainland Greece had made provision for the administration of justice and had set up three courts for the purpose:

i. A local tribunal consisting of one or two members elected from amongst the villagers, their competence on a par with that of the notables⁷⁵. In other words, the communities' judicial autonomy was recognised at the level of primary jurisdiction;

75. Sect. II, chap. III, § X: II. Kyriakopoulos, *Ta Συντάγματα της Ελλάδος* (Athens, 1960), p. 651.

- ii. A General District Tribunal with five members⁷⁶;
- iii. The Supreme Court of the *Areios Pagos* with seven members⁷⁷.

From Nikolaos Dimou's report, we learn that a ship's captain named Andreas Popovich had appealed in good time to the local tribunal, the council of elders, but that the latter, without putting in a plea of incompetence, detained the ship for a whole month, together with 1,015 piastres which had been paid.

In view of the Trikeri delegates' obstructive attitude to the issue, and having realised that the Supreme Court could not effectively intervene and that he himself could not have recourse to the non-existent District Tribunal, Popovich sought justice from the National Assembly and the Naval Ministry. We do not know the eventual outcome of this affair. However, the document of 21 July 1822 shows on the one hand the suspect conduct of the local tribunal and on the other a lack of judicial protection from high-handedness. Knowing that the *Areios Pagos*, the highest administrative and judicial authority in Eastern Greece, was unable to enforce compliance with its own stipulations, one can appreciate the circumstances which fuelled the uncontrolled practice of piracy in the area.

One might perhaps argue that this case was an exceptional one; but we know that, despite the threats and imprecations the *Areios Pagos* hurled at the pirates and smugglers, it was in no position to impose sanctions or, consequently, to maintain law and order. This situation created wide-ranging insecurity and dilemmas, which were intensified by the choices enforced by collective impasses.

Internal inertia

The external provocations which gave rise to the impasses described above functioned on three levels, relating to the *space*, the *time*, and the *manner* in which collective life was organised. We have already looked at some special cases. These mutable circumstances were characterised to a considerable extent by the identification of the collective impasses with the personal dilemmas, to the point where Trikeri was set apart from the other mountain and lowland villages of Thessaly and Magnesia not only by its geographical position and its maritime character (space), but also by other factors relating to the

76. Sect. II, chap. III, § IX, *op. cit.*, p. 651.

77. Sect. II, chaps II-III, §§ I-VI, *op. cit.*, pp. 645, 651.

time and the manner in which collective life was organised⁷⁸.

If, in the course of this in-depth investigation of the Trikeri phenomenon, we ignore the parameters of space and time, we risk misinterpreting the result, which focuses on the manner in which collective conduct was regulated, and arriving at one-sided conclusions. These may, individually, seem correct, but basically they will not have been fully examined and therefore will not be a true reflection of the historical reality prevailing in that place and at that time.

Taking this as our basis, then, let us try to examine in a uniform light — for essentially we are talking about interwoven and overlapping situations — the separate consequences of collective impasses and personal dilemmas as they were manifested in Trikeri. In each case, our in-depth investigation will focus on the space, the time, and finally the manner in which these consequences were dealt with. An examination of each of these parameters not only does not exclude, but on the contrary demands, a parallel comparative evaluation of the others.

Space

Although geographically Trikeri was in the region of Thessaly and Magnesia, it was administratively, economically, and ecclesiastically cut off from it.

i. It was part of the *sanjak* of the Kapudan Pasha of the time⁷⁹;

78. "The Trikeriots are very different from the villages of Thessaly and Magnesia. They have a philanthropic tendency (they give asylum to the persecuted) and they would rather die than hand over one who had fled to their village with a grievance. This is why they sometimes suffer considerable detriment at the hands of their neighbours. Indeed, they cannot produce their own bread and must bring it in from outside; wherefore their neighbours frequently refuse to supply them". See Argyris Filippidis, *Μερική Γεωγραφία*, pp. 90-1.

79. My friend and colleague Vasilis Dimitriadis has been kind enough to assist me in my research by translating any of the Trikeriot documents I have collected which are in Turkish Arabic script. These documents provide valuable information about Trikeri's occasional subjugation to the various centres of power. According to a *buyurdi* of 1822 issued by the Kapudan Pasha Gaili, Trikeri (known as Bilbidce) belonged to the *has* of the Kapudan Pasha from 1743 onwards (see my Study "Κοινοτικός βίος", *Επιστ. Επετ. Σχ. NOE, ΙΘ', γ'*, p. 375). In 1723 it had belonged to the *kaza* of Iskendez (Skianthos), which was part of the administrative district of Cataltzza (Farsala). The *buyurdi* quoted above reveals that in 1828 Trikeri was under the jurisdiction of the Vizier of Ioannina, in 1857 of the Royal Naval Port, and in 1871, of the *sanjak* of Trikala in the *vilayet* of Epirus and Thessaly with Ioannina as its capital [see also D. Nikolaidis, *Οθωμανικοί κώδικες* (Constantinople, 1869), p. 90]. It was common for one area to come under the jurisdiction of various centres of power at the same time in the Turkish administrative system (see my study, "Κοινοτικός βίος", *op. cit.*, p. 385).

ii. It was outside the authority of the Archbishop of Dimitrias, because it was an exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate⁸⁰;

iii. It was outside the federal community system of the other Pelion villages and did not take part in their collective démarches⁸¹.

It would be no exaggeration, then, to say that Trikeri developed in isola-

80. "Trikeri is not under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Metropolitan of Dimitrias, but a patriarchal exarchate, its exarch elected by the inhabitants and approved by the Patriarch. It pays the Patriarchate one hundred piastres annually in token of canonical allegiance". See Dorotheos Scholarios, ex Metropolitan of Larissa, *'Εργα και Ημέραι* (Athens, 1877), p. 217; Chrysostomos Themelis, «Ιστορικοί σελίδες της Ιεράς Μητροπόλεως Δημητριάδος: Πατριαρχική Εξαρχία Τρικέρων», *Εκκλησία*, XLI (1964), pp. 528-9 (Communication Presbyter K. Kallianos); See also G. Rallis and M. Potlis, *Σύνταγμα των θείων και ιερών κανόνων*, 5 (1855), pp. 110 and 579-86, incl. examples of the relevant letters.

The appointment of a patriarchal exarch was an age-old ecclesiastical custom, somewhat similar to that of bestowing the title of exarch upon the administrators of distant parts of the Byzantine Empire (such as Ravenna or Africa). Consequently, it was connected with the concept of administrative autonomy, which appertained to Trikeri. Apart from that of Trikeri, Themelis (*op. cit.*, 585-6) mentions a further nine exarchates, which were abolished in 1863. Patriarchal exarchs of Trikeri are mentioned in contemporary chronicles and official documents: i. Oeconomos Dimitrios Orfanos 1825; 1831: Patriarchal decision of 6 May by the Ecumenical Patriarch Constantine I of Sinai (see Themelis, *op. cit.*, p. 584); ii. Papa-konstantinos, Oeconomos and Exarch of Trikeri (23 August 1857); iii. Priest-monk Neofytos, who signs documents written by himself as Ieroneofytos (15 August 1860 - 15 February 1868); iv. Oeconomos *kyr* Konstantinos, delegate and Exarch of the Patriarchal Exarchy, who, according to a letter written by the Ecumenical Patriarch Joachim, was appointed on 29 May 1881 "in accordance with the age-old ecclesiastical order". Patriarchal documents of 23 January 1865 and 27 June 1869 indicate that this order had been disturbed by the community of Trikeri's temporary subjugation to "the spiritual jurisdiction" of the Metropolitan of Dimitrias Grigoris, who had probably taken active steps to secure it. The Trikeriots protested repeatedly, expressing their "extreme displeasure and sorrow" and asking to be "restored to their former, original situation according to the previously issued ecclesiastical letters and the high royal privileges especially proclaimed for their native village".

Themeli (*op. cit.*, pp. 586-8) reports that the Exarchy of Trikeri was amalgamated with the see of Dimitrias in the time of Dorotheos Scholarios (1858-70) and that the institution of the patriarchal exarchates was abolished by two patriarchal letters issued by Patriarch Joachim II in May 1863. However, the evidence presented here indicates that the Exarchy of Trikeri continued to subsist irregularly at least until 29 May 1881, when "the Reverend Oeconomos *kyr* Konstantinos was appointed, by a letter of the Ecumenical Patriarch Joachim, delegate and Exarch of our Exarchy of Trikeri". Special research is therefore required to clarify the sources which contradict each other.

81. Trikeri played no part in the reportes submitted to the Turkish authorities by the federally organised communities of Pelion. This is attested by, *inter alia*, an unpublished joint application by twenty-nine villages of the *kaza* of Volos to the Vizier of Ioannina (?), in which Trikeri does not appear (Communication of D. Sapounas).

tion from the secondary communal centres of power on Pelion, in a neutral or minimally friendly environment. It was thus compelled to close in on itself, and this took the form of introversion and conservatism on the part of the women, and extroversion and progressiveness on the part of the men.

iv. In contrast to the rest of the communities of Thessaly and Magnesia, since it did not have sufficient agricultural land for its own needs, Trikeri does not seem to have passed to the same extent through the stage of change-over from farming and stock-breeding to an economic system based on commerce and craft industry. Its exclusive orientation towards the sea limited its ability to draw supplementary revenue from agriculture and stock-breeding; nor did the Trikeriots show any activity in the sphere of handicrafts nor any tendency to emigrate, as did the other villagers of Pelion.

Trikeri's economic autarky and autonomy were based on the sea. Descriptions offered by travellers and geographers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century enable us to reconstruct the three basic stages of its development: from fishermen and pirates, the Trikeriots evolved into pirates and smugglers, and finally became shipowners and merchants. They continued to equate trade with smuggling and piracy, however, for the great wealth they had acquired by the beginning of the nineteenth century was due to "their [illicit] trading adventure and their various traffic"⁸².

Although we have no direct written sources, if we bear in mind the fact that the sponge-fishers were definitely organised into a guild, we may safely conclude that in the related sphere of shipping the sailors were partners in the enterprise and had a share in the profits.

N. Magnis's statement to the effect that "this large village controls approximately one [square] mile of surrounding land"⁸³ may be an exaggeration, but it is not far from the truth. He did not take into account the three tiny islands of Palaia Trikeri, Alata, and Prasouda, on which the Trikeriots maintained olive groves; but the harvest from these apparently only just met the needs of the villagers themselves. In any case, cultivable land was limited, and this is why the geographers do not mention any of the products of agriculture or craft industry produced and exported by the other villages of Pelion: olives, oil, fruit, silk, wine, clothing (chiefly capes), and leather. But nor was Trikeri self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs such as grain.

82. See H. Holland, *Travels in the Ionian Isles, Albania, Thessaly, Macedonia during the Years 1812 and 1813*; Greek translation by G. Karavelis, with a foreword by Tasos Vournas, *Ταξίδι στη Μακεδονία και Θεσσαλία (1812-1813)*, Tolidis Bros (Athens, 1989), p. 233.

83. *Περιήγησις ή Τοπογραφία της Θετταλικής Μαγνησίας*, p. 77.

A firman of 1868⁸⁴, one of the last official sources prior to the annexation of Thessaly, gives a vivid picture of the situation in Trikeri at that time: "Since the inhabitants of the above-mentioned island, being few in number, are unable to engage in agriculture and their means of revenue are restricted to rowing and shipping, therefore, according to the Nizam [régime], no excise shall be levied upon clothing and victuals transported from areas belonging to the *kaza* [Volos] for [the villagers'] own use".

The firman makes no mention of stock-breeding, evidently because it was not considered a significant source of state revenue. All the same, a *bucyrdi* of 1807 gives some interesting information⁸⁵. In connection with the sheep-tax, in that year the Trikeriots had to pay the sum of 840 piastres (a reduction of 20%), in lieu of the 210 sheep which were their share of the total of 7.000 sheep to be paid by the *sanjak* of the Kapudan Pasha. Bearing in mind that this tax in fact amounted to 10% of the actual number of sheep, we can estimate that Trikeri was supplementing its economy with stock-breeding and possessed 2.100 sheep.

Time

By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the community's structure and social stratification were complete. The authors of the *Modern Geography* give a laconic description of the community in this second stage of its development⁸⁶:

"Trikeri is situated upon an arid hill almost bare of large trees and waterless; there are approximately 300 houses, and some 1200 inhabitants. Having no cultivable land, the Trikeriots all make their living from the sea: the members of the first and second classes own caiques and do business in the town; those of the third class dive for sponges and catch octopus. They are organised and many of them are wealthy. I hear lately that they have also built ships. They are all therefore seafarers, except for the women and children. Last Easter the brigands who were in the Mediterranean raided Trikeri".

84. It survives in translation and is addressed to the Moutasherif of Trikala, Tanip Pasha, the Kaimakam Bey Zahir Pasha, naipidas, muftis, and other members of the Council and was issued on the tenth day of the month of Rejep in the year 1285 (1868) (Communication G. Ganotis).

85. It was issued by the Gazi Seyidi Ali Pasha, Vizier and Kapudan Pasha, in December 1807 (translated by Prof. Vasilis Dimitriadis).

86. *Op. cit.*, p. 188.

Twenty years after this second stage in its development, the community of Trikeri boasted a fleet of thirty ships and fifty small caïques.

The third stage, which was Trikeri's heyday, is described in 1815 by Argyris Filippidis, who looks back briefly over the village's past:

"Forty years ago [1775], the Trikeriots were unknown in other places, because they had no ships nor large caïques and undertook their voyages mostly by the power of oars, and this is why they were not so well known. Now, however, they have acquired ... ships and, being skilful sailors, have travelled east and west and are known everywhere"⁸⁷.

As we have already seen, Trikeri's fleet developed rapidly. Argyris Filippidis's personal evidence to the effect that in the space of twenty-five years (1791-1815) it came to number thirty ships and fifty small caïques is confirmed by Henry Holland, whose book had been published in London two years earlier:

"Many of the Greek merchants of the place [Trikeri] are possessed of considerable wealth derived from their trading adventure [smuggling?]: they are became extensive shipowners, and employ their capital actively in the furtherance of their various traffic"⁸⁸.

The first edition of Pouqueville's six-volume account of his travels in Greece (1820-2) was published seven years or so later. In his list of the Greek merchant fleet, he assigns to Trikeri and Volos together a mere twelve ships with a total displacement of 2.160 tons. The list does not mention the ships of Palaia Midzela, which played an active part in the armed struggle a few years later⁸⁹.

With particular reference to Zagora, it is worth noting that, according to an official register of three-masted ships in the Mediterranean, which was drawn up by Eseït Ishak, the Customs Inspector at Constantinople, in 1748-50, Zagora had seven vessels (*saikes*) with a capacity of about 7.000 kilos each and one three-master of about 12.000 kilos⁹⁰.

The British valued Trikeri as a centre of maritime trade and appointed

87. *Μερική Γεωγραφία*, p. 90.

88. *Op. cit.*, pp. 232-3.

89. See F. C. H. L. Pouqueville, *Voyage dans la Grèce*, second edition (Paris, 1826-7), vol. VI, pp. 294-7.

90. See N. Stavrinidis, *Μεταφράσεις τουρκικών ιστορικών εγγράφων*, 4 (Heraklion, Crete), pp. 331-2.

George Christian Gropius consul there in 1810. He made a name for himself through illicit trade in antiquities. Well aware of “Trikeri’s substantial importance as the seat of an English diplomatic representative”, Holland made no secret of his dislike of Gropius. His feelings were evidently shared by Trikeri’s merchants, who, “owing to commercial rivalry or some other disagreement”, reacted strenuously against Gropius’s appointment, and “after a brief sojourn there, the occasions for strife had multiplied and become so personal that this gentleman was forced to depart from the town never to return”⁹¹.

This did not prevent Gropius from becoming Austria’s consul (in 1816) and later ambassador (in 1840) to Athens⁹².

Manner

To complete our picture of Trikeri, it remains for us to look into the manner in which the experiences which created the personal and collective impasses developed.

We have already discussed the circumstances which forced the Trikeriots to move from a vulnerable island to the arid and barren, but strong, hill opposite. Even though the village was fortified, it was raided by pirates on at least two occasions.

When in 1810 the Russian fleet, commanded by Semievin, blockaded the ports of the Northern Aegean and tried to take Trikeri too, it failed because “the Trikeriots were sound and fought them”⁹³. It may have been then that the community was granted the right to farm the annual tax (*maktu*), which had previously been the privilege of the Turkish officials⁹⁴. Despite the

91. See Holland, *op. cit.*

92. See E. Protopsaltis, *Ο Γεώργιος Χριστιανός Γκρόπιους και η δράσης αυτού εν Ελλάδι* (Athens, 1947); Wolf Seidl, *Βαναροί στην Ελλάδα*, Elliniki Evroekdotiki (Athens, 1981), pp. 36, 320.

93. Privileged transport of the corn cargo from Volos to Constantinople. See Argyris Filippidis, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

94. This is mentioned in the *buyurdi* of the Kapudan Pasha Abdullah of 1 March 1820: “Elders and delegates and all the common *rayas* of the island of Trikeri, we herewith make known to all of you that, in accordance with your earnest request, we have given *maktou* to your common *iltijami* [the proceeds of the annual farming out of income tax collection] for one whole year. We order you to appoint honest and loyal delegates to compile your usual local duties”. See the whole bilingual text of the edict in N. Pantazopoulos, *Κοινωνικός βίος*, pp. 84-5, No 13.

economic advantages it entailed, the active participation of community representatives in the Kapudan Pasha's tax machinery unsettled the community's internal structures. "They are not so attentive to its democracy" because those commissioned to levy the tax "come in with authoritative orders [i.e. they were appointed by the Kapudan Pasha] and the others resent and harass them"⁹⁵.

The village's unity, then, was disturbed, because the general precepts of solidarity and common interest were affected by the change in circumstances, with friction and impasses as the result.

Personal dilemmas

Both friends and foes brought ruination upon the Trikeriots during the War of Independence. The consequences of this, on a personal level⁹⁶, are recounted in tragic tones in a report to the Government (22 October 1828) by Angelakis Hadzilemonis⁹⁷, a typical jack-of-all-trades from Trikeri. Having started out as a smuggler⁹⁸, he then became a shipmaster, a privateer⁹⁹, a

95. See Argyris Filippidis, *op. cit.*

96. A considerable number of unpublished documents (some of them from the personal archive of Angelakis Lemonis), which were kindly photocopied by my friend, the lawyer Georgios Ganotis, reveal hitherto unknown facts and thus shed light on research into the period in question. Excerpts from these documents, which will be given further on, reveal the multifaceted personality of this typical Trikeriot, as seen at the forefront of the events which unfolded in the individual and collective sphere of Trikeri.

97. "I have deprived my partial homeland, I have deprived my family, the latest expedition which went to Trikeri without orders [he means the raid of November 1827] stripped and burnt two of my shops and two workshops and a horse-mill and more than 2.000 olive trees, even though I have never yet ceased to slave for the nation ... We have suffered for the nation and are left occupied, killed, and stripped, deprived of everything, even our daily bread" (unpubl. paper by G. Ganotis).

98. On 5 May, Tsamados's squadron, to which the "blockade" of the Gulf of Volos had been opposed, found Captain Angelakis Trikeriotis's brig loaded with barley and riding at anchor at Vromidi. They carried out a search and found that the helm was missing. The Captain maintained that he had sent it to be repaired in the village, but it had sunk on the way. Tsamados's men were not convinced, "they left the brig and took the captain with them". See *Ημερολόγιον Τσαμαδού*, 15. The barley, "as the elders of Trikeri admitted [was] indeed Turkish stolen goods", which Captain Angelis, had not purchased. However, they did not wish to issue written confirmation of this matter. After this, the captains of the squadron sent a strict order to Captain Angelakis Trikeriotis to hand over 500 kilos of barley at once to the armed forces besieging the fortress of Volos. See *Ημερολόγιον Τσαμαδού*, pp. 26-7.

On 7/20 May, Angelakis Hadzilemonis was in Trikeri, whence he sent to the Spetsiot

reformer¹⁰⁰, and, according to his passport, ended up as a pedlar¹⁰¹. One of the parameters of Trikeri's isolationist autarky and autonomy was the system of endogamy which they practised. Within the context of their collective organisation, this created personal dilemmas both for parents with unmarried daughters and for women who had not married or were unable to bear children¹⁰². This was because the majority of the male population was away for long periods of time, and the marriage of spinsters depended on the intercession of friends or relations who were professional matchmakers.

The personal dilemmas in these cases were engendered by two customs:

a. The *trachoma*, a sum of money, separate from the dowry, which the bride's father paid in order to secure the groom's consent to the marriage. In the event of the woman's death, this sum remained in the man's possession¹⁰³.

squadron fifty okas of gunpowder in a three-masted caïque: see *Ημερολόγιον Τσαμαδού*, pp. 21, 23.

99. He was the owner of the two-masted vessel *Xerxes*, a well-rigged ship which, provided with a letter of marque issued by the Supreme Court Justice Anthimos Gazis at Leithada, Euboea, on 31 March 1822, was dispatched to spy on the enemy's movements along the Macedonian coast as far as Samothraki and the Dardanelles, and to pursue the brigands who, lurking on the small islands (the Diavolonia in the Northern Sporades), were wreaking havoc on the eastern coast of Euboea (unpubl. paper by G. Ganotis).

100. He played a pioneering part in Trikeri's modernisation and transition from a pirate and smuggling centre to a merchant trading centre when the port of Ayia Kyriaki was established at the entrance to the Pagasic Gulf. From here the Trikeriots could control commercial communications between three gulfs (the Thermaic, the Pagasic, and the Maliakos). "Thirty years ago", relates Argyris Filippidis in 1815 (*op. cit.*, p.88), "this port was nothing, on account of the fact that it had no dwellings. Then one Hadzi Leimonis thought, with two others, that it would be a good idea to build three houses with vaulted roofs, and before they finished them they started to harass them. This port is now renowned everywhere. Travellers find that it offers good bed and board. And, as I have said, it grows constantly ... quite soon the cliffs on either side will be filled with stores. The public, or I should say the village, sells by the inch this area where they build them". Concerning the little ports of the Pagasic Gulf, see N. Tzamtzis, *Η ναυτιλία των Πηλίων στην Τουρκοκρατία* (1968) pp. 46f.

101. On 26 October 1857, the Kapudan Pasha's private secretary, Mustafa, issued him with a passport bearing the following details: Profession: pedlar; age: 57; height: tall; name: Leimonis; moustache: grey; eyes: blue (light). From this document we learn that when Captain Angelakis Leimonis began privateering with his ship *Xerxes* in 1822 he was just twenty-two years old.

102. See Ioanna Beopoulos, «Τρίκερι: Κινητικότητα και σχέσεις ένταξης», *EKKE: Διαδικασίες κοινωνικού μετασχηματισμού στην αρχοτική Ελλάδα*, edited and with an introduction by S. Damianakos, foreword by V. Filias (Athens, 1987), pp. 273-95.

103. I have discussed the multi-dimensional significance of the popular institution of the *trachoma* in the eighteenth century (a crucial period of social readjustment), its wide

In vain did Patriarch Samuel Chandzeris pass a special ruling, expressed in Demotic (1767)¹⁰⁴, exhorting young men not to allow themselves to be bought in this way by the highest bidder: they should not “disdain spiritual

spread, its essential substance, its successive variations, the Church’s legislative intervention against it, and its consequences in my 1963 monograph “Εκκλησία και Δίκαιοντες την Χερσόνησον του Αίμου επί Τουρκοκρατίας”, offspring from *Επιστ. Επ. Σχ. NOE, Θ', Μνημονιών Περικλέους Βιζυανίδον* (Thessaloniki, 1960-63), pp. 685-775. Republished in the above year-book, No IΘ', γ' (Thessaloniki, 1986), pp. 139-235. I have returned to this subject, with an evaluation of unpublished material, in my latest study, “Νομοθετική πολιτική της Εκκλησίας και λαϊκοί θεσμοί” (in the press). See also E. Kyrtsi-Nakou, “Αἱ περὶ προικοδοσιῶν νομοθετικά ρυθμίσεις βάσει των Κανονικών Διατάξεων του Οικουμ. Πατριαρχείου (1701-1844)”, *Επετ. Δικηγ. Συλλ. Θεσσαλονίκης*, 1 (1980); eadēm, “Διερεύνηση των θεσμών ‘ξενίου’, ‘τραχώματος’, και ‘νάχτη’”, offspring from *Αφιέρωμα προς Κωνσταντίνον Βαβούσκον*, I (Thessaloniki, 1982), pp. 235-51.

104. Unlike in other areas, where, after the marriage ceremony, the *trachoma* remained in the groom’s possession, such was not the case here, nor was it returned, unless the groom died before the marriage, *op. cit.*

Another special feature of the Trikeriot *trachoma* was that, without any specific arrangement being reached, it was paid in between two and four installments, at varying intervals. Part was paid before and the rest at the wedding, though it was not unknown for the remainder to be paid after the ceremony.

In almost all the Trikeriot marriage contracts the institutions of the dowry and the *trachoma* co-exist or indeed are interlinked, to such an extent that it is not a question of “either or” but rather of the two combined. This is explained by the singularity of Trikeri’s institutions. Its administrative and economic isolation denied it any possibility of acquiring capital from the interior, while its autonomy from the Church enabled it to follow a self-reliant and independent policy with regard to family law relations.

It would be no exaggeration, therefore, to say that the institution of the *trachoma* had a dual purpose: on the one hand, the woman and her family purchased the fulfilment of their hopes; and on the other the man acquired capital through marriage, which latter institution, in the context of the endogamy obtaining in Trikeri, served the common interest of both the contracting parties on the basis of good faith (there are no records of divorce in Trikeri).

Before assuming the responsibilities of marriage, the groom was able to invest the *trachoma* (advanced to him in cash, without interest) in shipping or commercial enterprises; while his future father-in-law was able to pay the *trachoma* in installments and thus earn interest on the money until it was fully paid off, an event which was directly connected with the wedding.

Paying the *trachoma* in installments was a way of getting round the official law, which, according to the holy canons, required that the whole sum be paid “at the wedding or shortly before”.

The *trachoma*, in other words, was one more way of improving the groom’s social status, for it gave him the initial capital to enable him to rise from simple sailor to merchant or joint shipowner. It also provided a means of democratic renewal of social stratification, unlike the established system which the Church followed with regard to the institution of marriage. The Church ranked the faithful in social classes based on their financial situation

beauty, but should wed girls of ripe physical beauty but even riper spiritual beauty, who are prepared to work for them as they wish and desire".

b. Civil marriage, which, when it was not contracted under Ottoman law was covered by the custom of sanctified betrothal. The purpose of the latter, which permitted marital relations to commence immediately, was to establish whether or not the woman was able to bear children, for this was of primary importance for the perpetuation of the group and the preservation of its identity¹⁰⁵.

Patriarch Gregory V, in turn, was unsuccessful when he issued a Synodical Letter in April 1798 threatening to excommunicate those men who paid their sons-in-law the dowry, not at the time of the marriage ceremony, as the sacred canons ordained, but "directly upon betrothal, in order that the son-in-law may increase [the money] through trade and business dealings ... The betrothed couple then living together without constraint and ... dwelling with the bride's family"^{106,107}.

(*'Οροι καὶ Κανόνες περὶ προικοδοσιῶν*: "It is essential that the dowry be commensurate with the class"), such that it was not easy to improve one's financial position through marriage, since one was supposed to marry someone of the same social class.

These, I think, were the reasons why Patriarch Samuel Chandzeris condemned the *trachoma* and tried to abolish it with his Marriage Commandments (*Διατάγαι Γάμων, Κωνσταντινούπολις, εν ἑτει σωτηρίω αωξέν εν μηνί Φεβρουαρίω*, republished by G. Valetas as *Λόγοι πατρωτικοί Σαμονήλ Χαντζερή* (Athens, 1948). See the text of the regulation in M. Gedeon, *Κανονικαὶ Διατάξεις*, I (Constantinople, 1888), pp. 257-61. For a discussion of the whole subject, see my study, *Εκκλησία καὶ Δίκαιον, op. cit.*). He describes a man who demands or accepts aspers, the "so-called *trachomata*", as a prerequisite for his consent to marriage as "a bought man" lacking the manly pride which should characterise the up-standing Greek youth.

The middle class of Trikeri was of a different collective opinion, however, for it regarded the *trachoma* as a means of improving its social status, and thus, despite the Church's opposition, its acquiescence helped to cover up the social changes to which the institution conduced.

Should the groom attempt to retract, there was no need for recourse to spiritual sanctions (such as excommunication) by the Church, for the situation was dealt with by popular law, under which a penal clause (*peismanlik*) was stipulated "against anyone who tried to renege on the agreement". The fine, which could amount to as much as twice the *trachoma*, was awarded either to the innocent party or to the Kapudan Pasha.

105. See above, notes 103-104.

106. See Gedeon, *op. cit.*, pp. 311-13. Another decree, issued by the Ecumenical Patriarch Gregory V in 1798 (see Gedeon, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-10), repealed Patriarch Samuel's restrictive provisions relating to the *trachoma* and permitted "each person to make such marriage settlement as he wishes and as he may, without fear of suspicion or hesitation". The two Acts of 1798 were apparently instigated by the conservative elements in Trikeri, who were disturbed by the initiatives of the progressive elements. While improving their own financial

The inevitable lacunae which appeared in the community members private lives (which we have termed “personal dilemmas”) were filled by the collective consensus of the group, which tended to overcome the intervening inertia and friction. The social control — that is, the manifest or latent workings of the popular collective conscience — was so effective that when a married woman realised that she and her husband were unable to have children, she would cede her place to a younger woman who was suitable for the purpose; she did not, however, leave the family.

Childlessness was a frequent source of inertia and dysfunction within the family, as a nucleus of the group. The mechanisms by which they were dealt with, through collective consensus, are most interesting. Since a second

position, the latter at the same time prejudiced certain economic considerations of the former, who trafficked in the disposable capital by lending money, with interest, and issuing bills of exchange, thus controlling the whole sphere of financial activity. “Those of the first class play the businessman and money-changer, taking bills of exchange from here and there; while those of the second class are sailors and ships’ captains” (see A. Filippidis, *op. cit.*, p. 87).

I do not think we need to analyse or evaluate the institution of the *trachoma* any further. Let us simply note its influence in dealing with personal dilemmas, which found numerous outlets, one of which was the liberation of women from the bonds of the oriental mentality, which required them to be unconditionally subordinated to men.

The family and the social structure were unquestionably being reorganised in accordance with the evolving perceptions of popular law, as these were being shaped by the independent experience and practice of everyday life in Trikeri.

107. a. According to the terms of an undated marriage contract of 1804, of an agreed *trachoma* of 1000 piastres the groom was to receive 740 piastres before the wedding (on 16 February 1807) and a further 185 piastres “upon his marriage” three years later (9 March 1810). A later contract concerns a *trachoma* of 600 piastres, of which the groom was to receive 280 before the wedding (on 5 July 1827) and the remaining 320 after the wedding (5 October 1833).

b. The term *trachoma* was used instead of “dowry” when the latter consisted exclusively of money (marriage contract of 1 August 1805).

c. The term *trachoma* is used of a pre-marriage gift to both partners in a marriage contract of 23 October 1817: “we give them the *trachoma* of her dowry settlement”.

d. The *trachoma* was also a gift to the bride; but the money was actually received by the groom. In a marriage contract of 15 November 1811, of a total *trachoma* of 250 piastres, the groom received 150 piastres on 17 October 1812 and a further 100 five years later (20 July 1817).

e. The most common situation is that encountered in later marriage contracts of 1840, 1842, 1864, 1879, and 1881, in which the *trachoma* represents the financial part of the dowry, as opposed to property and chattels. Here the concepts of *trachoma* and dowry overlap, while in an earlier contract of 14 July 1829, in addition to the synonymous *trachoma* and dowry, we find a quaint reference to “the girl’s parapheinalia”.

marriage could not be contracted unless the existing one were dissolved by the Church, the first, barren, wife would become either the mother of her (former) husband, or the “step-mother-in-law” of the second wife. Specifically:

- i. In the first case, she would adopt her husband by means of a will — which official law allowed her to do — and leave him free to marry the woman of his choice¹⁰⁸. In this way the prohibitions of official law were skirted.
- ii. In the second case, she would adopt her former husband’s new wife and dower her with her own property by means of a marriage settlement — which was recognised by official law — thus substituting for the second wife’s own parents, who were officially required to dower her¹⁰⁹.
- iii. These arrangements contravened official Byzantine law as applied by the Church. Under normal circumstances, transgressors should have been punished with excommunication and anathema. However, in these cases no sanctions were imposed, because Trikeri’s ecclesiastical autonomy as a patriarchal exarchate meant that certain customs, although they were against the official laws, were tacitly tolerated because they expressed the collective juridical conscience. Indeed, social control was so powerful that even the

108. In a will drawn up in Trikeri on 16 November 1824, we read: “I hereby declare that I, Ourania Chatzigeorgaki, of my own free will give my former husband, Nikolos Dalikas, the freedom to marry, since we are childless, whenever he wishes. Therefore, from this day forth I declare him to be my adopted son and master of all my maternal and paternal property, both estate and chattels. Nikolos himself shall take care of me and protect me as his mother, and I shall live in his house until my death ... Should Nikolos break his word, I shall be mistress of all my affairs and Nikolos estranged ... May anyone who tries to violate this my will receive the ... malediction of our Church, and may this will be valid and effective in any court of law”. See Δελτίον της εν Αλμυρώ Φιλαρχαίου Εταιρείας της Ορθούσ, No 3 (Athens, 1900), pp. 11-12.

109. That the second wife was admitted with her parents’ consent is revealed by a marriage contract drawn up in Trikeri on 12 February 1881: “Kostas Drosoulis and his wife Marigo, having a daughter named Garoufalo of the age of consent, give her in marriage to a lawful man, Georgios Chatzis, barber, *en secondes noces*, and he takes her as his lawful wife”. Elsewhere in the contract we learn that the first wife, presented as the “stepmother-in-law” (σύγγρια), dowers the second wife, whom she refers to as her daughter-in-law: “I, Eleni, wife of Georgios Barberis, give to my daughter-in-law Garyfalo, that she may look after me in my old age, the small garden with the hut in Upper Drepanon for her nuptial effects and her clothes, according to local custom and according to my power” (unpublished document from the archive of I. Chatzimanolis, Trikeri, G. Ganotis). See also my study, “Μηχανισμοί συγκαλύψεως των πηγών Δικαίου”, in *Τιμητικός Τόμος Γεωργίου Δασκαλάκη*.

clergy co-operated by drawing up or witnessing documents relating to arrangements which were contrary to official law.

This specific instance in fact boils down to the disguised dissolution of marriage through divorce by mutual agreement, a custom which was widespread during the Turkish period since it enabled the parties concerned to dissolve the marriage without having to resort to Ottoman law through a decision by the local *kadi*. For its own reasons, the Church saved face by sanctioning the offence, fearing the lurking danger of Islamisation.

It was so vital that nuclei should exist in which the solidarity and common interest of the members could be cultivated that the purpose of other customs too, such as blood-brotherhood and adoption, was to restore or at least to strengthen blood ties with fictitious family ties¹¹⁰.

In the event of the dissolution of a marriage by means of adoption, the new couple undertook to look after the first, lawful, wife "until the end of her days". Other contracts reveal that she had the right to occupy her corner of the hearth and remain an active member of the family for the rest of her life. Apart from safeguarding the process of reproduction, the fact that the will and the marriage settlement were drawn up in written form had another, more socially-orientated, purpose: it safeguarded her right to bed and board. If these were not forthcoming, the "endowment" was revoked by reason of ingratitude.

These arrangements satisfactorily served the need to reproduce the dynamic elements of the group on the one hand, and ensured the care of the weaker elements on the other.

Furthermore, the customs under investigation here, and particularly the *trachoma*¹¹¹ and the sanctified betrothal or civil marriage, served temporary cultural expediencies and ceased to be practised when the need for them had disappeared of its own accord when, that is, the reasons for their introduction no longer existed. What the rigour of the Church had failed to achieve was achieved when social circumstances developed and there was no longer any need for mechanisms designed to cover the inertia of official law;

110. An unpublished document, drawn up in Trikeri by one Stamos Efstathiou on 17 May 1771 and signed by six witnesses, reads as follows: "Today by this dowry settlement, I, Magdalini Lianodimou, declare and avow that I have taken G. P. as my adopted son and my niece Kyratza as my adopted daughter and have made them husband and wife ... All, that I possess, landed property and chattels, is theirs, and I give half to Georgakis and the other half to my niece. They have promised to look after me until I die and attend to all my needs, and if they do not look after me then everything shall be mine".

111. See above, notes 103-104.

inertia which arose from the latter's opposition to popular and Ottoman law¹¹².

Conclusions

It has been necessary, I think, to undertake the above analyses in order to form an objective view of the Trikeriots' collective and individual conduct, which were the two basic factors in the sociopolitical processes in the form in which we have encountered them in this investigation. A one-sided view of the Trikeriots' collective conduct, without correlating it with the general circumstances which caused and fuelled it, has led in the past to biased conclusions. Their conduct has been regarded as unpatriotic or pro-Turkish, and this has contributed to their further alienation from the rest of the communities on Pelion¹¹³.

The facts are otherwise.

From a collective point of view, the Trikeriots' behaviour was no different from that of other communities on Pellion, which also endured the painful ethical consequences of the war operations. The difference was that the linchpin of the Trikeriots' collective activity was piracy and smuggling, whereas in the other communities the ancillary, or rather the main, sources of energy (agriculture, craft trades, commerce) offered them a means of escape from the

112. See my studies, «Αγραφος Γάμος - Παλλακεία», *op. cit.*, vol. ΙΘ', No β', pp. 13-46, and Κεπήνιον "Συμβολή εις την έρευναν του πολιτικού γάμου επί Τουρκοκρατίας", *op. cit.*, vol. ΙΘ', Part γ', pp. 489-520.

113. See Perraivos, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-2. According to Kordatos, *op. cit.*, pp. 677, 703, the refugees "did not receive a warm welcome from the Turk-loving Triceriots", and "the inhuman Trikeriots behaved in a most predatory fashion towards those of our people who fled to their area". See *'Αρχεῖα Ἑλληνικῆς Παλιγγενεσίας*, 1, pp. 11-12. A harsher opinion is expressed by the Swedes traveller Goss, who calls the chieftains Karatasos, Kriezotis, and Vasos, who had teamed up together, "accomplished marauders", and Spiliadis, who declares that "the landing operation [of December 1827] developed into looting and plundering by the irregulars". See O. Dimitrakopoulos, *Ιστορία των Ελληνικού Εθνους*, XII, Ekdotiki Athinon, pp. 471-2. Argyris Filippidis, however, was impressed by the philanthropy shown by the Trikeriots, "who behave most charitably towards those who are being pursued by others who wish to harm or kill them ... They would rather die than hand over one who had fled to their village with a grievance. This is why they sometimes suffer considerable detriment at the hands of their neighbours. Indeed, they cannot produce their own bread and must bring it in from outside; wherefore their neighbours frequently refuse to supply them ... In short, they are charitable people in the very image of God", *op. cit.*, pp. 90-1. See also above, p. 28, Note 78.

impasses and thus absorbed or neutralised their side effects.

The criterion of the Trikeriots' behaviour worked unfairly against them, for no-one took into account the fact that their attitude arose out of both endogenous and exogenous factors, which, at that stage in their collective life, it was objectively impossible for them to avoid or overcome. One characteristic aspect of the Trikeriots' conduct is the fact that, outside the context of their democratic community, there were none of the partisan confrontations that were a permanent feature of the other communities of Pelion, such as Makrynitsa, Milies, or Zagora¹¹⁴. Displeasure was expressed, as we have seen¹¹⁵, for instance, when the Kapudan Pasha appointed the community's leaders and representatives as tax collectors. But these instances of friction never developed into organised confrontations within the community. On the contrary, wider scope developed for the exercise of personal freedom and initiative within the framework of collective solidarity. The latter manifested itself particularly in the fact that the community's representatives would cover up the piratical activities of certain individuals¹¹⁶.

This behaviour could, of course, be seen as being motivated by individual material considerations, such as, for instance, the community's delegates' sharing the organisation and profits of the pirate operations. In my view, however, a more convincing interpretation of the specific cases we have examined is that the Trikeriots' individual and collective conduct was conditioned by a sense of a shared fate and destiny (that is, the piratical way of life).

At all events, in the final analysis, their collective conduct was less damaging to society as a whole than was that of the Thessalian and Macedonian chieftains and their followers, who dealt with the problems arising from their expatriation by arbitrarily burdening the North Aegean islanders with compulsory contributions. They thus ensured the survival of their own families by violating the islanders' autonomy and forcing them to seek the protection of their enemies in order to escape the stifling embrace of their own consanguineous allies.

Furthermore, in the individual sphere, the piratical activity of other

114. See my study, *Kοινωνικός βίος, op. cit.*

115. Dimitreis, *op. cit.*, pp. 176, 179, 182f. L. Koutsonikas, *Γενική Ιστορία της Επαναστάσεως*, 2 (Athens, 1864), p. 22: "In Thessaly and Magnesia ... although the elders are elected by the people, they win by resorting to violence". Dorotheos Scholarios, *op. cit.*, pp. 155f.; Georgiadis, *op. cit.*, p. 166; Kordatos, *Ιστορία της Επαρχίας Βόλου και Αγιάς*, pp. 226-9. Concerning the community disputes, known as *tarasfilikia*, see *Kοινωνικός βίος, op. cit.*, pp. 56f., 388, 392f.

116. See Themeli-Katifori, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-31.

inhabitants of Pelion was regarded as a heroic contribution to the common revolutionary effort, whereas that of the Trikeriots was condemned as subversive. The piratical activity of certain people of Pelion, such as Dimitris Kalamidas, his four sons Apostolis, Gogos, Alexis, and Stefanos, and his son-in-law Georgis Grizanos¹¹⁷, all of whom came from Palia Mitzela, Georgis Zorbas from Promyri¹¹⁸, and Karpouzis from Zagora, provoked favourable comments in some respects not undeservedly. The collective piratical way of life which had always characterised Trikeriot society, from both a local (as a feature which differentiated it from the other agricultural and commercial communities of Pelion) and a more general point of view, was not evaluated in the same terms. This more general point of view is highlighted when one considers that Trikeri shared the same fate as the other maritime centres (Hydra, Spetses, Psara, Skopelos, Galaxidi), which, although they developed with the considerable help of piracy and smuggling, owing to the rapidly changing circumstances (the crackdown on piracy, the abolition of privateering, the decline of the sailors' guilds, the superseding of sail by steam, the habituation to a particular way of life) were unable subsequently to exploit the transient achievements of their heyday. Their achievements were used up in the waging of the Struggle, while the centres themselves were superseded by more up-to-date commercial centres, such as Ermoupolis and Chios, which, though they had not themselves practised it, managed, thanks to piracy, to amass capital, which they invested in commercial and shipping businesses¹¹⁹.

The destruction of Trikeri's fleet, which was a hostile act by their natural allies, was a determining factor in the abandonment of their endeavour, between 1815 and 1827, to turn Trikeri from a centre of piracy and smuggling into a maritime commercial centre. Thus, after the cessation of the hostilities (during which time it had in one way or another been drawing its sources

117. See Anonymous, "Θεσσαλικόν Ηρών", *Θεσσαλικά Χρονικά*, 1 (1930), p. 60; Th. Malavetas, "Δύο επιστολαί Στεφάνου Καλαμίδα", *op. cit.*, pp. 100-10.

118. See G. Thomas, *Ο Πηλευούτης Οπλαρχηγός Γιώργης Ζορμπάς (1788-1856)*, in association with A. Darntsas (Volos, 1983), pp. 46f.

119. Some of the earliest evidence of commercial activity is provided by a bottomry agreement drawn up in Trikeri on 23 October 1787, in which the captain, Vangelis Vriniotis, and four joint owners of a ship whose name is not mentioned jointly borrow from Chatzi Stamatis Ioannou of Skiathos the sum of 1669 piastres in order to "travel [i.e. trade] wherever God might wish to guide them". Since the contracting parties are illiterate, the document is drawn up before witnesses by the "clerk" Giannis Chatzinikos, who "writes and witnesses" (Archive of the Monastery of the Annunciation, Skiathos, Communication Presbyter Konstantinos Kallianos).

of energy from piracy), Trikeri was left dangling in the situation which followed the change of the prevailing conditions and the restoration of normality.

Under these circumstances, its forced entry into the Turkish state, which precluded its incorporation into the modern Greek state, naturally created new personal and collective impasses.

The circumstances described above, which led to a rapid rise and abrupt decline, were for a long time unknown or had not been marshalled into a coherent whole. But it was essential to assess them in order to form an idea of the political identity of the region of Thessaly and Magnesia, which was lagging behind the rest. I realised this when I was writing my 1967 study of social life in Thessaly and Magnesia in the Turkish period, because the nautical element was missing. It was a fundamental factor in the area and at the same time a practical proof of the pluralistic character of the community system in Thessaly and Magnesia.

It is clear, then, that the dual dimension of these cultural factors, which I have observed in previous studies, also has to be taken into account in a critical assessment of the individual and collective conduct of the community as a whole. Behind this duality lies the constant juxtaposition of the two ideologies which emerged during the Revolution and the modern Greek period: decentralisation on the one hand and centralisation on the other. This juxtaposition also manifested itself in the form of a dialectical conflict between autonomy and dependence, an extreme example of which, for the reasons outlined above, may be seen in Trikeri and the general area of its living space.

The end of the war between Greece and Turkey did not create any particularly favourable circumstances for reorganising the conditions and way of life in Trikeri. Piracy continued as an inevitable consequence of the personal and collective impasses. The reduction of Trikeri's naval strength in terms of large ships and available commercial capital meant that the Trikeriots' professional activity was necessarily restricted to coasting, fishing, and particularly spongediving¹²⁰. This last case offered possibilities for readjustment owing to the spirit of comradely solidarity which informed the institution of the sailors' partnership with the shipowners. Listing Trikeri's sources of

120. An unpublished report to the Kaimakam of Volos dated 26 June 1865 states that Trikeri is not a place of commerce; it is a poor place, where ships are neither chartered nor loaded.

A lullaby, "I long to see him at the prow directing the *yali* at the octopus", reflects a mother's hope of seeing her son successful in his chosen profession. The *yali* ("glass") is the instrument with which the octopus fisherman, standing in a special round opening in the deck at the prow, surveys the seabed, ready to spear his prey (Commun. Nikos Filaretos).

energy a year before Thessaly was incorporated into Greece, N. Georgiadis relates that the Trikeriot sponge-fishers were using French diving suits (*scaphandres*).

The inherent dangers of this profession intensified the solidarity between the shareholders (the divers themselves) in the sponge-fishing business. Unpublished contemporary sponge-fishing contracts reveal that the rules regulating labour relations between ship-owners or captains and divers, when uniformly implemented, comprised a special branch of popular maritime law. They were characterised by a strong sense of professional solidarity and made provision for those who might require attention in the event of illness or accident, thus implementing a system of self-insurance¹²¹.

Another bread-winning occupation, according to Georgiadis¹²², was coasting in small vessels between the various ports of the Paganitic Gulf, whence the produce of Pelion was exported, and of Asia Minor. It may be that the small boats which Georgiadis (p. 169) describes as anchoring in the bays of Agria, Gatsea, Kala Nera, Afisos, and Milina belonged to the Trikeriots.

The in-depth approach of the present study is also interesting from another point of view: it assists an understanding of the internal processes which the community of Trikeri experienced in its endeavour to rise to the challenges posed by the evolving external environment. It also reveals something which has not hitherto been appreciated with respect to the female element's decisive contribution, as an inward-looking element in the dialectical relationship between conservatism and development, which is the basis of the evolution of cultural reality in particular.

Given that the community members all participated in the internal pro-

121. A document of 21 May 1874 may be considered a typical example of a sponge-fishing contract (G. Ganotis). The terms of the contract include: double pay for specialised divers for their "diving skill"; and social insurance ("if any of the workers falls ill, the rest must look after him until he recovers, as charity requires").

Another unpublished document, of 27 May 1867, reveals that the sponge-fishers were organised in a guild. Because the Kaimakam of Volos had requested "one tenth of the sponges", the members of the guild decided to send two representatives to Ioannina to show a relevant firman and ask the Vali to safeguard their privilege of exemption. Concerning sponge fishing, see M. Caravocyro, *Étude sur le pêche des éponges: Les pays spongiers de l'Empire et le scaphandre* (Constantinople, 1895); I. Vardakoulas, "Η συμμετοχή των αλιεργατών και δυτών εις τας συναφείς επιχειρήσεις και η Ελληνική καταγωγή του θεσμού", offspring from *Μητριαίο Δελτίο Εμπ. και Βιομ. Επιμελητηρίου Θεσσαλονίκης* (Thessaloniki, 1975).

122. *Op. cit.*, p. 169.

cesses, regardless of their sex, and that, in this respect, they were all formative factors in collective conduct and agents of social perceptions, one could argue that the personal dilemmas, charged with experiences of insecurity, anxiety, and fear, took shape in the collective impasses, which subsequently found an outlet in the selfreliant processes discussed above.

These operations reveal the dialectical relationship between the unit and the group and the enormous importance of the general precepts of solidarity, common interest, and tolerance, since individual conduct did not reflect only individual interests, but determined the very structure of the social group to which the individual belonged.

They also reveal the mechanisms by which popular law managed to adjust itself to the regulations of the official law implemented by the Church, as also to those followed by Ottoman law, and to impose its own ideology upon important areas of private and public law.

In conclusion, the circumstances we have investigated here comprise the preconditions for the organisation and development of a singular collective mode of conduct characterised by autonomy on many levels. On account of the special circumstances examined above, however, this autonomy was not free of certain elements of dependence, which were die sometimes to the time and sometimes to the manner in which individual and collective behaviour operated in Thessaly and Magnesia.