

aid of punches or hubs. The number of dies in which Franke has "detected" the use of hubs is extremely small in relation to the overall number of dies used. It seems to me that Franke's instances of the use of hubs can more easily be explained by the recutting of dies or better by an individual die-cutter who in the course of cutting several dies has managed to cut parts of two dies so that their differences are indistinguishable to the human eye. The Athenian New Style is one of the most extensive of Greek coinages with over 1,000 obverse dies. Surely here, if anywhere, the engravers would have relied on hubs to speed up their work. Yet the recent exhaustive work by Miss Thompson on this coinage has brought to light no use of hubs. Is it conceivable that hubbing was used in Epiros which was more backward, and where fewer dies were needed, and not in Athens? Franke has promised us a more extensive treatment of this problem in volume II.

Franke has finished his work with a series of studies on the history, religion and culture of ancient Epiros. Here the quality of the work is not maintained at the consistently high level of the first three-fourths. He rightly contends that the Aeacid Kings, including Pyrrhos, were always only Kings of Molossians, and never Kings of the Epirots. On the other hand the contention that King Neoptolemus II was a son of Alexander the Molossian and ruled Epiros not only from 302 to ca. 297, but also from 317 to 312 must surely be wrong. R. Ross Holloway (*R.B.N.*, 1962, pp. 5-28) has already rejected Franke's contention that Pyrrhos struck the Syracusan Zeus Hellanios/Eagle on thunderbolt bronzes, and that the four-litron pieces of Gelon II of Syracuse with his portrait on the obverse and eagle on thunderbolt on the reverse were struck by Gelon for his marriage with the Epirot princess Nereis.

Despite these slight flaws *Die antike Münzen von Epirus*, Vol. I is a fine work which will be used by generations of numismatists and historians of the Balkan peninsula. The only regret is that there is nothing comparable for all the other parts of the Balkans.

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Sherman David Spector, *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference*. New York: Bookman Associates Inc., 1962. 368 pp.

One of the less known aspects of the diplomacy of the First War is the series of negotiations of Rumania with the Allies in 1915 and 1916, which were conducted by Ioan I. C. Bratianu, her prime minister and foreign secretary. It was only after secret agreements with Russia, as well as with Great Britain, France, and Italy, that Rumania made her brief but painful entrance in the military history of the war, from August to December, 1916, which is the period of the "one hundred days."

Rumania's alignment with the Entente in 1916 meant that with-

in the foreseeable future Greater Rumania had to be built at the expense of Austria-Hungary, which held Transylvania, Bukovina, and the Banat of Tamesvar. This decision was not an easy one to take. For Bratianu and for any Rumanian patriot, the country's position between two rival powers, each occupying parts of the unredeemed Fatherland, complicated the foreign policy and created a great dilemma. Indeed, the vital fact in Rumania's national consciousness was that nearly one-half of her co-nationals lived beyond her frontiers, and the great question was which territories to liberate first—or which group of belligerents to join in the great conflict. In 1916 Bratianu's government had decided that the liberation of Bessarabia had to be postponed indefinitely.

In the negotiations that ushered Rumania into the war, Bratianu proved to be a very hard bargainer. The Entente offered him more—not only larger areas but also help in money and men. The failure of Rumania's army was partly due to the late arrival of loan and the non-availability of troops from the Russian or the Macedonian front. The Allies were unwilling to advance from Thessaloniki, because of Greece's problematic neutrality. Bulgaria cooperated with Germany and Austria-Hungary in bringing Rumania to her knees.

Refusing to evacuate his government and the royal family to Russia and hence to Mesopotamia, Bratianu permitted the generals to conclude an armistice (December 9, 1917) and on February 8, 1918, he resigned. Soon after, his successor Alexander Marghiloman brought the country to the side of the Central Powers.

Bratianu appeared again on the scene a few days before Armistice Day. He was the chief political power behind the cabinet headed by General Coanda. The Rumanian army proceeded to occupy the territories which had already seceded from the neighboring empires. The November Revolution in Russia and the Treaty of Brest-Litowsk had made it relatively easy for Rumania to get Bessarabia, which had now proclaimed its autonomy. But the claims to the Banat brought relations of Rumania and Serbia (now the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) to a breaking point.

In Paris Bratianu, appointed premier on December 14, 1918, strained every nerve and utilized his political ingenuity to win the approval of the Big Four for the creation of Greater Rumania that was then under way. This was no easy task because the Great Powers had already proclaimed that they would not recognize Rumania's unilateral acquisitions of territory and they would not hear of the 1916 treaty, which, in their eyes, Rumania had forfeited by signing a separate peace in 1918. Wilson, as it generally known, had denounced all secret treaties. Yet Bratianu persisted and finally attained his goal.

Doubtless the boldest phase of Bratianu's political career was his intervention in Hungary, which had come under the control of Bela Kun, a communist. The Big Four opposed this intervention but were unable to stop it. The Rumanian army inflicted severe losses on the

Hungarians and committed various excesses. Finally, the occupation of Budapest, the collapse of the communist regime, and the entrance of the Great Powers solved the thorny question of Hungarian-Rumanian frontiers and saved Hungary from an aggressive Rumania—the Rumania of Bratianu. Bratianu resigned on September 12, 1919, protesting that the Allies had not honored their 1916 promises. The next cabinet was that of the seven generals under the presidency of Vaitoi-anu, which was succeeded by that of the Transylvanian Vaida Voivod. Bratianu had accomplished his task of building the Greater Rumania long before the Trianon Peace Treaty was signed (June 4, 1920).

Dr. Spector's book is a clear and stimulating account of these events. There is no question that the book fulfils its purpose—to study the most brilliant Rumanian statesman in relation to his greatest achievement. The author gives us a narrative of the events, not an analysis of underlying causes; a study in diplomatic history, not a biography, or a survey of Rumania's national struggle. There is a brilliant and penetrating sketch of the personality of Bratianu (pp. 227-237). The book is richly documented (pp. 238-318) and it includes an excellent bibliography (pp. 319-352). Taken as a whole, it is a solid piece of scholarship—the only book on the subject available in English. It would be a fine idea if similar books were written, in the same language, about the other Balkan countries at the Peace Conference—especially one about the diplomacy of the Greek statesman Venizelos, with whom Bratianu had much in common.

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Dimitrije Djordjević, *Carinski rat Austro-Ugarske i Srbije 1906-1911* [The Customs War of Austria-Hungary and Serbia 1906-1911] Belgrade: Istoriski Institut, 1, 1962, 733 pp.

After the assassination of King Alexander Obrenović in 1903, the Serbian government under the leadership of the new king, Petar Karađordjević, and the Radical Party of Nikola Pašić, charted a new course for the nation. Whereas the Obrenovića, especially Milan, had at times submitted to Habsburg domination and influence in Serbia, the new dynasty adopted a distinctly anti-Austro-Hungarian policy. This course led to the tragic events in Sarajevo in 1914.

Dr. Dimitrije Djordjević in this book has examined the initial major issue to confront Vienna and Belgrade, the so-called "pig war" or customs war of 1906-1911. This volume is the first to be published by the Istoriski Institut (Historical Institute) in Belgrade in the new series entitled "Jugoslovenske zemlje u XX veku" (Jugoslav lands in the XX century). Dr. Djordjević has produced one of the best historical works written in Yugoslavia in the post-war period.

The author's research has been most extensive and thorough. In addition to examining the published source materials—Jugoslav, Austro-Hungarian, German, English, French, Bulgarian, Turkish and