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**Centre and Periphery in the 1874 Greek Elections: Competition for Political Control in Gortynia\***

“The whole of Classical mythology might represent the relics of a gigantic ‘song map’: that all the to-ing and fro-ing of gods and goddesses, the caves and sacred springs, the sphinxes and chimaeras, and all the men and women who became nightingales or ravens, echoes or narcissi, stones or stars - could all be interpreted in terms of totemic geography”.

Bruce Chatwin, *The Songlines*.

In his article “Regionalism and Local Community”, John Campbell touches upon the issue of territorial identity in modern Greek culture, suggesting that regional sentiment for such large administrative units as the Morea or Roumeli, unlike that observed in Spain and Italy, is relatively weak, when compared to its traditional identification with the historical district (ἐπαρχία, the Ottoman qaza) and the community, i.e. the village or the town<sup>1</sup>. Taking Campbell’s position as a starting point, I shall examine some familiar properties of Greek national political culture with particular reference to the tension between centre and periphery, using the district of Gortynia as a case study<sup>2</sup>. I shall focus on

\* This paper was presented in preliminary form in Monemvasia at the 6th annual symposium of the *Monemvasiotikos Homilos* on the “Contribution of the Peloponnese to the Development of Modern Hellenism”, 23-25 July, 1993.

1. J. K. Campbell, “Regionalism and Local Community”, in Muriel Dimen, Ernestine Friedl (eds), *Regional Variation in Modern Greece and Cyprus: Toward a Perspective on the Ethnography of Greece*, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol. 268, New York 1976, pp. 18-19.

2. The concepts of region and centralization in terms of the relative power of regional elites to central state authority are analyzed by P. Schneider, Jane Schneider and E. Hansen, “Modernization and Development: the Role of Regional Elites and Non-corporate Groups in the European Mediterranean”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 14 (1972)

features specifically pertaining to a pervasive absence of trust, on the process by which it shaped a bipolar structure of local coalition building and on the tactical use of tradition in an attempt to revive deferential elements, traces from the pre-revolutionary system of local social domination surviving into the restructured social circumstances of the 1870's. These issues will be viewed as part of the story of national integration and, more particularly, the development of a nationally integrated political system, one that suffered a particularly severe strain with the constitutional crisis of 1874<sup>3</sup>.

The national election of June 1874 has been recorded as one of the most violent elections of the nineteenth century and the absurd culmination of Dimitrios Voulgaris's equivocal political career<sup>4</sup>. It was called after the unexpected dissolution of parliament on April 27 (OS), for two related purposes: (a) to secure for Prime Minister Dimitrios Voulgaris the parliamentary majority required to pass the budget of the current fiscal year and, consequently, (b) to prolong his grip on power in order to bring about a conservative revision of the 1864 constitution, one that would resolve a political crisis, acknowledged as such by all across the political spectrum, on his own terms. By this revision Voulgaris wished to restrict the power of parliament, thus undermining the

328-350; dividing Mediterranean societies into categories of regional elite structures on the basis of their relationship to international market forces and postulating that modernizing elites are those most dependent on foreign influence, they single out one category, in which "dependence and development elites are nearly equipotential; neither gains undisputed hegemony". This inconclusive tension, according to the authors "seems especially pronounced in regions peripheral to, but not remote from, the original industrial core-regions penetrated by expanding markets well before the nineteenth century" (p. 384).

3. The evolution of methods employed to mobilize voters, crude forms of which are examined in this article, is directly linked to the integration of the national political system, as suggested recently in the late Gunnar Hering's masterly, *Die politischen Parteien in Griechenland: 1821-1936*, München 1992, v. 1, pp. 30, 37-38.

On the relevant issue of the normalization of electoral practices, in his study of Greek electoral legislation and performance, G. Sotirelis has pointed out the definite distinction between electoral practices before and after the reformed electoral law of 1877; Γιώργος Σωτηρόλης, *Σύνταγμα και Έκλογές στην Ελλάδα, 1864-1909. Ίδεολογία και Πράξη της Καθολικής Ψηφοφορίας*, Athens 1991, pp. 314 ff. Of course, the 1877 law was but an outcome of the resolution of the constitutional crisis of 1874.

4. In his *The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923*, London 1972, p. 142, Douglas Dakin characterized the electoral contest of 1874 as Voulgaris's "notorious last election".

privileged position it had attained after the 1862 revolution, which deposed King Otho.

This analysis will concentrate on events in the constituency of Gortynia, the power base of Theodoros Deliyannis; the main evidence comes from Deliyannis's personal papers and conveys the point of view of his political interests<sup>5</sup>. Since the revolution of 1821 the Deliyannis family had expanded its influence from its local power base in Gortynia to encompass the national political stage. Thus, the local political antagonisms in their constituency of Gortynia had acquired broader political implications. This observation notwithstanding, the Deliyannis had successfully managed to preserve their independence from all political parties by refusing to submit to the political leaders who had benefited from post-revolutionary circumstances and had become heads of cabinets<sup>6</sup>. Nonetheless, for a section of political activists among the constituents of Gortynia the 1874 election was of critical importance for political developments on the central stage, towards which they had already been trained to turn their attention, thanks to the consistent strategy of the Deliyannis family.

5. The Deliyannis family papers are preserved at the Etaireia Filon tou Laou. I am grateful to Professor N. Bratsiotis and the Society for their permission to study the papers; I also wish to thank the staff of the Society for their generous assistance. Dr. Eftykhia Liata recently published a catalogue of this collection: *Εἰτηγία Λιάτα, Ἀρχεῖα Οἰκογενείας Δελιγιάννη. Γενικό Εὔρετήριο*, Athens 1992. On p. 62, the contents of file VI/50.1 are described as pertaining to the by-elections (ἐπαναληπτική) of June 1874; no such election took place. Documents relating to the national election of that month to the sixth parliamentary period have been catalogued in the following file VI/51.2. Nevertheless, I found the relevant material in file VI/50.1. Furthermore, a few papers which I had found included among these documents during my initial research in 1977, have been rearranged into other files.

6. Κατερίνα Γαρδίκια Ἀλεξανδροπούλου, "Βουλευτές, Κόμματα καὶ Ὅμαδες στὴν Πρώτη Κοινοβουλευτικὴ Περίοδο, 1844-1847: Ἀνάλυση Ὀνομαστικῶν Ψηφοφοριῶν", in *Ἀφιέρωμα στὸν Πανεπιστημιακὸ Δάσκαλο Βασίλειο Βλ. Σφυρόερα*, Athens 1992, p. 269; on the family disputes among the Deliyannis, see Katerina Gardikas, *Parties and Politics in Greece, 1875-1885: Towards a Two-party System*, Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of London 1988, pp. 399-400 and T. Κανδηλῶρος, *Ἡ Γορτυνία*, Patras 1898, p. 334. In terms, however, of the two-way division of the Constituent Assembly of 1862, Theodoros Deliyannis belonged to the "mountain" party; on the relationship of the two parties in the Assembly to later parties, see Hering, *op.cit.*, p. 50, and Κατερίνα Γαρδίκια Ἀλεξανδροπούλου, "'Ἡ Διάρθρωση τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Κοινοβουλίου, 1865-1867'", in *Ἑλληνικὴ Ἱστορικὴ Ἑταιρεία, II' Πανελλήνιο Ἱστορικό Συνέδριο Πρακτικά*, Θεσσαλονίκη 1993, p. 339.

Theodoros Deliyannis's correspondence during the period under examination on several occasions confirms that, for local supporters as well as opponents, his presence in national politics was crucial. In private letters of support these followers expressed diverse and personal perceptions of national politics. Despite their frequent use of national rhetoric to mask partisan language, they present no underlying common discourse of political backing for Deliyannis, which could have emerged had some nation-wide political organization existed to promote and channel such support. Perhaps the one common feature among these letters is their recognition in Deliyannis of a strong and patriotic figure of local descent but of national stature—in effect an acknowledgement of a claim to national leadership, that was founded on local political tradition<sup>7</sup>.

Indeed, this national perspective was by no means universal. Political actors at the local level were conscious that their perception of events differed from that of Athens. L. Sakellariadis tried to make this

7. D. S. Baroutsas, a businessman from the town of Stemnitsa in Gortynia, resident of Syros, wrote to offer his material support for Deliyannis's reelection in the national interest; D. S. Baroutsas, Syros 19 May 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis, Deliyannis Papers VI/50.1; hereinafter all cited documents are assumed to belong to this file, unless stated otherwise. His opponent, the *kapetanios* Konstantinos Plapoutas, was busy circulating rumours against Deliyannis to the effect that his election would be annulled by the government on grounds that Deliyannis was an enemy of the king and a republican; K. Lambrynopoulos, Vytina 31 May 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis. For his part, Aristeidis Alexakis, a lawyer practicing in Tripolis and a political activist from Stemnitsa, anticipated that Deliyannis would become the leader of the opposition in the new parliament, a position, according to Alexakis, of equal status to that of prime minister; A. Alexakis, Stemnitsa 12 May 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis. The significance of the national opposition was also prominent in the thoughts of Georgiadis, in a letter from Athens to his relatives in Langadia: "The general political condition of our country and our own political interests require that we are with the opposition, which is currently very strong". He added: "The cabinet is weak and dares not cough, as all the leading men of the nation, i.e. Koumoundouros, Deligeorgis, Lomvardos, Trikoupis, etc. the Petimezas, the Mavromikhalis etc. oppose it and, if it interferes with the elections, they will be annulled". G. K. Georgiadis, Athens 13 May 1874, to Nikitas K. Nikita. Regardless of their accuracy, the significance of these statements lies in the importance they attribute to the role of the national opposition. Resentment towards the educated and meddlesome circles of the capital drove Athanasios Antonopoulos, a nephew of Deliyannis and leading political figure from Dimitsana, to attach a cultural dimension to his aversion for "Doctor" Georgiadis from Athens, implied in the ironic use of the title; A. A. Antonopoulos, Dimitsana 2 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis. On his relation to Deliyannis, see Κανδηλώρος, *op.cit.*, p. 196.

point clear, when he wrote from Sternitsa to dissuade Deliyannis from abstaining and thus leaving local concerns unattended: "The current situation does not allow for the requirements of history, which has a sufficient number of other matters to encompass"<sup>8</sup>. Oblivious of the broader political scene, within the constituency they shared the prevailing atmosphere of mutual suspicion with few exceptions. These exceptions apply to two or three individuals close to Deliyannis, such as Georgios Ladopoulos and Khristos Digenopoulos, who wrote to Deliyannis regularly from Tripolis (of the two only Ladopoulos was actively involved in politics at the time) and Georgios Plapoutas, who was with Deliyannis in Athens and was therefore not among the correspondents<sup>9</sup>.

Despite the close communication between Digenopoulos and Ladopoulos, each for his own part supplied Deliyannis with diametrically opposed information, opinions and advice on the local scene from the very beginning of the election campaign. Digenopoulos, who, in his very words, "had served as both friend and opponent of all the politicians of Gortynia and had studied their character as well as that of their political brokers (κομματάρχαι)"<sup>10</sup>, recommended that Deliyannis collaborate with the leader of the local ministerial party, Vasilios Nikolopoulos, minister of justice in the Voulgaris cabinet and brother-in-law of the Prime Minister: "cooperation does not imply the acceptance of the cabinet's policies", he rationalized<sup>11</sup>. If, however, Deliyannis considered this cooperation damaging, Digenopoulos, for whom the election was doomed in any event, recommended that Deliyannis abstain. Ladopoulos, on the other hand, advised Deliyannis to mobilize his supporters to ensure electoral success or at least to contain electoral fraud and, if necessary, to hold a thousand-strong protest rally of their supporters in Dimitsana, the district capital<sup>12</sup>. Both correspondents were convinced that the government would attempt to rig the election<sup>13</sup>. Deliyannis

8. L. Sakellariadis, Sternitsa 18 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

9. The Plapoutas family was evidently divided in its loyalties; see p. 24, below and note 7, above.

10. Kh. G. Digenopoulos, Tripolis 6 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

11. Kh. G. Digenopoulos, Tripolis 9 May 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

12. G. D. Boukouras, Tripolis 7 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

13. G. Ladopoulos, Tripolis 10 May 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis. Likewise, 11 May 1874. In a draft document written 20 days before the elections, Deliyannis made a detailed note of the local history of electoral fraud perpetrated by Nikolopoulos in the elections of

delayed in announcing his decision to abstain; it reached his constituency only ten days before the election; until that day he conducted the organization of the campaign by mail and telegraph from Athens to Tripolis and the towns of Gortynia; this brief correspondence provides us with some written evidence regarding this remarkable process<sup>14</sup>.

The calculations and tactics of the political actors involved were determined by the method of voting peculiar to Greek elections: the use of the lead ballot, the σφαιρίδιον. It allowed each voter, if he so wished, to vote for or against all or any number of candidates. If, however, the voters chose to cast their ballots along partisan lines, this method produced a plurality system<sup>15</sup>. Thus, each candidate, while contributing to the joint effort of the electoral list (συνδυασμός) which had sponsored his nomination, no less sought his personal electoral survival by negotiating private arrangements with his political opponents, in order to cancel the effects of such a plurality system; that is, to contain his own losses in the worst likely outcome, the defeat of his party. Therefore, even a joint candidacy of the two leading local figures, Niko-lopoulos and Deliyannis, could not be precluded at the outset.

It was the loss of this kind of flexibility that Sakellariadis deplored from Sternitsa, as soon as he was informed of Deliyannis's decision to abstain. He was concerned about being deprived of the possibility to enter into dealings with the opposition behind the scenes and claimed that his party was submitting to them unconditionally. For him, deceiving the opponent was a perfectly legitimate choice for both candidates and voters.

If the opposition had at least some courage, our opponents would approach us; since, however, it is not so, nothing prevents them from claiming the support of our friends;

1868 and 1872 through government appointees, military detachments, released convicts and tax-collectors. Judging by the rhetorical style of the document, it was probably intended for public delivery, oral or printed.

14. Public fatigue with unfair elections was reflected in the general decline in turnout figures; Gardikas, *Parties and Politics*, pp. 321-22, 340; Kharilaos Trikoupis also abstained; *ibid.*, p. 413.

15. On the political implications of the use of the lead ballot, see Gardikas, *op.cit.*, pp. 298-99, and Σωτηρέλης, *op.cit.*, pp. 227 ff.

matters being the way they are, our friends have no grounds to deny them their support, which otherwise they would have offered while acting against them<sup>16</sup>.

This seemingly cynical approach to the forthcoming political contest reveals, through the very rational behaviour of the participants, the extent to which the two levels of competition, the local and the national, were distinct from one another, each being guided by its own specific rules. At the local level the participants aimed at achieving their advance to the second, the national level. Insofar as the game was conducted according to the local rules, the local game could be self-contained; national parties and, indeed, the prospect of cabinet formation could be ignored. In such a sense and only assuming that the two levels were indeed distinct, Nikolopoulos and Deliyannis, if they wished to proceed to the next level, were compelled to cooperate in a game of "chicken". Similar circumstances, of course, determined the strategies of the lesser figures of the local political scene, generating, however, a substantially different game. The choices of these local figures were limited to a degree defined by social hierarchy and relative political weight and by their information of other players' moves; conversely, their power and freedom of choice obstructed national party integration. Their initial objective had to be their appointment for participation in the local game by one of the two leaders, i.e., not their formal participation in the elections, but rather their informal selection for one of the alternative electoral lists. The outcome of this phase, as informal as it was crucial, could sometimes become final only on the eve of the election. Furthermore, each participant carried over his debts and credits, contractual or affective, from one contest to the next, thus producing in the electorate a sense of continuity, albeit precarious, between elections<sup>17</sup>.

Cabinet formation only became a concern at the national level, since it was resolved in parliament<sup>18</sup>. Only those successful at the previous level had a chance to bid for this more advanced game of government spoils played out in Athens. Its rules need not concern us

16. L. Sakellariadis, Stemnitsa 18 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

17. Schneider, Schneider and Hansen, *op.cit.*, p. 336.

18. Gardikas, *op.cit.*, p. 408.

here. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the articulation between the two levels and its implications for subsequent political developments. At the national level the incumbent ministry, Voulgaris and his cabinet, in their effort to remain in power, naturally sought to control the outcome at the local level. For lack of a party mechanism by which to accomplish local control from the centre, the alternative was resort to coercion. Conversely, it was the failure of coercive methods and their being discredited a year later, which encouraged and, indeed, assisted national party leaderships to promote more rigorous and extensive party structures, based on patron-client relationships, policy platform and other legitimate motives, generating a protracted yet irreversible process<sup>19</sup>. Thus, coercion from the political centre, hitherto endemic in Greek elections in varying degrees, was to be limited by the emergence of modern party structures, except, of course, when circumstances of geopolitical consequences prevailed<sup>20</sup>. Therefore, the 1874 elections marked a watershed in this transition.

This absence of trust was inherent in Greek political culture<sup>21</sup>. Notwithstanding the use of excessively sentimental language, political relationships were lax as well as transient, while political activity was intensive. In an otherwise servile declaration of allegiance to his leader, Georgios Boukouras reminded him that he “had decided to become his [Deliannis’s] friend a year ago”<sup>22</sup>. These allegiances were subject to reshuffling with each electoral contest. The last national election had occurred in February 1873, while the previous municipal elections had been held in January 1874. By June 1874 the mayors were either about to assume or to hand over their municipal functions; some of them were

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 360, 403-406; Hering, *op.cit.*, pp. 36-37.

20. Such circumstances had prevailed, when King George put an end to the development of an incipient two-party system in 1867, by disbanding the Koumoundouros cabinet, and thus essentially began to influence the selection of cabinets; Κατερίνα Γαρδικιά 'Αλεξάνδροπούλου, “Η Διάρθρωση του 'Ελληνικού Κοινοβουλίου”, p. 341.

21. It is reflected in the small cohesion of local political partnerships; Gardikas, *op.cit.*, pp. 154-55. For a theoretical approach to trust in relation to “instrumental and power activities” and to the social division of labour, see S. N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, *Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relationships and the Structure of Trust in Society*, Cambridge 1984, pp. 29-42; on the “relative fragility of trust that is prevalent” in patron-client relationships in Mediterranean societies, *ibid.*, pp. 214-15.

22. G. D. Boukouras, Tripolis 28 May 1874, to Th. P. Deliannis.



among Deliyannis's correspondents<sup>23</sup>. Each election was in fact an opportunity for new alliances under new terms or for friction and dissolution of old bonds. Kharalambos Rigopoulos felt personally insulted for having lost Deliyannis's support in his bid for municipal office at Langadia; he therefore declared his support for Nikolopoulos, despite his dependence on Deliyannis for the resolution of an outstanding legal matter<sup>24</sup>. In Vytina Lambrynopoulos found himself unable to promise his support for the entire list of Deliyannis, because of agreements concluded during the preceding municipal election. Indeed, Lambrynopoulos had agreed with Theophilopoulos, the successful municipal candidate, that he would support the choice of the mayor at the next national election<sup>25</sup>. Since the mayor had publicly declared his support for Nikolopoulos, the best that Lambrynopoulos could offer Deliyannis and his local party was the following:

On account of local circumstances, he [Lambrynopoulos] cannot appear publicly as your friend; however, in agreement with Theophilopoulos, they can both vote for you and Nikolopoulos as individual candidates, while your comrades will secretly receive approximately 250 votes from Lambrynopoulos<sup>26</sup>.

Hoping to take advantage of Deliyannis's handicapped position, Gontikas tried to dictate his own terms before entering Deliyannis's electoral list. He requested guaranteed placement in future electoral lists and stipulated that he would share the votes of his own supporters with his colleagues in the Deliyannis list, only if he received a "guarantee in cash" from Lambrynopoulos and Boukouras. This guarantee should be understood as a thinly disguised form of extortion: if their supporters failed to vote for Gontikas, he would not return the cash to Lambrynopoulos and Boukouras. Implied in these conditions was a further threat that, if not satisfied, Gontikas would reach secret agreements with

23. Th. Boukouras, Magouliana 14 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis; [illegible signature], Dimitsana 16 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

24. Kh. Rigopoulos, Langadia 14 May 1874, to "Konstantinos".

25. G. Ladopoulos, Tripolis 18 May 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

26. G. Boukouras, Dimitsana 1 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

rival candidates for his own electoral survival. His political weight, however, was too limited for his conditions to be deemed other than impudent<sup>27</sup>. Gontikas's rejected terms also included an attempt to forge a more durable partisan association; this, however, Deliyannis's advisers, with their attention committed to the local scene, and in the interest of future flexibility, evaded as a burden, rather than solicited as an asset<sup>28</sup>.

Deliyannis avoided much of the compromise and friction involved in drafting an electoral list by deciding not to stand<sup>29</sup>. Nevertheless, the pertinent arguments and dilemmas found their way into his correspondence. Beyond the two or three trusted individuals, who constituted the nucleus of his local party and took up about half of the six openings in the list, the remaining positions were open to negotiations. It is worth noting that, in principle, all were equally likely candidates. There existed but few constraints of any nature, revolving around two principal arguments: (a) That candidates be mutually compatible. Gontikas, for instance, refused to join, if Boukouras were included, as they had conflicting political interests in the municipality of Mylaon (Magouliana). Conversely, candidate selection was affected by developments in the opposition camp; A. Bahliotis would become available to Deliyannis, if unsatisfied by Nikolopoulos's offer<sup>30</sup>. (b) Arguments pertaining to the influence of each prospective candidate over each of the eleven

27. G. Ladopoulos, Tripolis 23 May 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

28. See p. 21, below.

29. The late announcement of his withdrawal no doubt prevented those who had been seeking Deliyannis's nomination from standing as independent candidates, an eventuality for which there appears some concern in his correspondence. The contest was thenceforth reduced to a race to prevent and, on the part of Nikolopoulos, to force more voters to the polls. G. Boukouras, Tripolis 28 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis. The same correspondent proposed to Deliyannis a tour of the district after the election, to restore their damaged influence; *ibid*.

Deliyannis made a note of coercive measures used against those peasants of Tropaia who wished to abstain: they were forced to go to the polling station by tax officials, who visited their sheep pens accusing them of submitting false tax statements to conceal the size of their flocks, and threatened them with detention. In the towns of Vytina and Sternitsa the mayors threatened the builders from Langadia working there with penalties, if they refused to return to their own town to vote. Sternitsa was dominated by the Nikolopoulos interest under the leadership of the Roïlos family; no date.

30. G. Ladopoulos, Tripolis 5 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

municipal units of the constituency. Balancing interests in eleven municipalities by selecting the right set of six parliamentary candidates required subtle calculations, not to mention political skill, qualities displayed by Digenopoulos in a memorandum to Deliyannis. In the manner of an election counselor, Digenopoulos submitted to Deliyannis numerical estimates of alternative electoral lists. In the same vein, Ladopoulos warned his leader that, if they chose Gontikas as their partner in order to increase their votes in Magoulia, they would forfeit the support of Oikonomopoulos, thus losing votes in Valtessiniko<sup>31</sup>. Coalition-building had to take into account antagonisms between municipalities. Complaints were being expressed that Dimitsana, the district capital, ought to have a candidate on Deliyannis's list and that Langadia had been over-represented in the 1873 elections<sup>32</sup>. Digenopoulos further recommended that, if Deliyannis insisted on standing, regardless of his warnings, it were best to avoid bringing into his list new allies, who would incur unnecessary obligations for the future<sup>33</sup>. Such defensive attitudes reveal the small distance in power between leaders and partners and no doubt constituted an impediment for greater party cohesion.

Insights into the government camp suggest that there the selection of members for the ministerial list was primarily in the hands of Nikolopoulos with input from a local "assembly" (συνέλευσις) convened by the eparch, the ranking district official<sup>34</sup>.

The evidence is scanty on the subject of campaign funding. A letter from Antonopoulos, a nephew of Deliyannis, in Dimitsana, recommended the expenditure of 12,000 drachmae for the campaign offering to cover his uncle's share, which was set at 2,000 drs. per member of the list<sup>35</sup>. Of interest is a relevant note containing a list of the eleven

31. Kh. Digenopoulos, Tripolis 6 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis; G. Ladopoulos, Tripolis 29 May 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

32. G. Ladopoulos, Tripolis 5 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

33. Kh. Digenopoulos, Tripolis 6 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

34. I. Lambrynopoulos, Vytina 6 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

35. A. Antonopoulos, Dimitsana 2 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis. Ladopoulos reported Gontikas to have claimed that, if Deliyannis could come up with 20,000 drs., all the power of Voulgaris would not suffice to suppress the will of the district. Nevertheless, in Digenopoulos's view, it appeared that most candidates were short of money on account of the frequency of past elections; the particular circumstances of this election moreover required a serious cash outlay, set by Digenopoulos to 25,000 drs. Kh. Digenopoulos, Tri-

municipalities, an adjoining column under the heading “total amount”, followed by two more columns with rounded estimates of votes for Deliyannis and Nikolopoulos respectively. The figures in the first column correspond to the number of votes distributed between the two opposing parties, i.e. the campaign funds appear to be allotted to each municipality in direct, one to one, proportion to the expected number of voters, a reasonable measure of its size. The total amount for the constituency adds up to 11,100 drachmae, to be distributed to the *κομματάρχαι*, “who are expected to fight with the utmost sacrifice and self-negation”<sup>36</sup>.

The correspondents had immediate access to the postal network and were informed of its schedules<sup>37</sup>. They, in turn, used private messengers to set up a local network of verbal communications, selectively reading the contents of Deliyannis’s letters to others, supplementing all this with personal travel across the constituency. Urgent and confidential instructions would be transmitted by cable in cryptic messages<sup>38</sup>.

In such an environment rumours would be hard to distinguish from accurate political information. The distribution of political information in a highly competitive context met with much obstruction. As a result,

polis 6 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis. On the particular issue of direct bribing, see Σωτηρέλης, *op.cit.*, pp. 398-407, who suggests that during this period the practice was relatively insignificant, when compared both to other illicit methods used at the time and to its increased application later on.

36. Note in Th. Boukouras’s hand, no date. During my recent research in the archive I failed to find this document among these papers. During my first visits in 1977 I had photographed it immediately after the document of 11 June 1874, to which it presumably referred, and from which it has apparently been separated.

According to an account of electoral expenses for the 1873 election —it was unclear to me which party this account referred to— the amount spent in Gortynia for which the accountant was responsible, was 2,218 drachmae; the document, however, does not permit the assumption that this was the total expenditure in the constituency. The particular items mentioned refer to expenses for Telegrams, travel, hotels, messengers, bodyguards and ammunition and fees to officials. However, the greater part of the expenses (1,300 drs. or 58%) were remittals to individuals for further distribution in their own municipalities; VI/49.2.

37. A letter from Athens was received in Tripolis within three days (G. Ladopoulos, Tripolis 15 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis); likewise, a letter from Athens had reached Dimitsana within three days (illegible signature, Dimitsana 14 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis) and Magoulia within four (Th. Boukouras, Magoulia 14 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis).

38. G. Ladopoulos, Tripolis 15 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

Deliyannis's decision to abstain and his directives to his supporters to stay away from the polling stations failed to reach some municipalities, such as Iraia (Paloumba), where the Nikolopoulos party had secured absolute control and made sure that even those few individuals, who may have been notified, were coerced into silence<sup>39</sup>.

Coffee shop proprietors, for their part, combined business with politics, endeavouring to maintain a flow of information from Athens by directly subscribing to Athenian newspapers of their choice<sup>40</sup>.

The geographic fragmentation of political activity is further suggested by the following passage from a letter regretting Deliyannis's withdrawal from the election and spelling out some of the efforts and preparations, that had been made in vain upon local initiative.

I am leaving right now, in order to notify our friends about your letters, because they had made sure that all the citizens vote for you and your list and that the sign on the ballot boxes would be a young vine; the people were determined not to reject you, as I had worked to this end ever since the dissolution of parliament...<sup>41</sup>.

Worth noting is the locally designated party symbol on the ballot boxes of the members of the Deliyannist list, specifically for the municipality of Dimitsana. Since by law ballot boxes were arranged alphabetically, such symbols were devised to inform the voters as to the political allegiances of each candidate.

Political competition, however fluid, evolved around a bipolar structure, the outcome of coalition formation at the district level. A similar picture appeared at the *municipal level*, each municipality corresponding to a polling station. Municipal political leaders also considered themselves heads of factions or parties, which often included their kin, and saw their association to either side as a coalition among equals, rather than a partnership of individual followers<sup>42</sup>. Likewise, in his esti-

39. G. Boukouras, Tripolis 28 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

40. G. Ladopoulos, Tripolis 21 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

41. [Illegible signature], Dimitsana 14 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

42. K. Lambrynopoulos, Vytina 31 May 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis and, extensively, G. Ladopoulos, Tripolis 5 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

mates of election results for each municipality, Ladoupoulos separated the votes of Deliyannis's supporters (ἴδια δυνάμεις) from those to be added by each of his coalition partners to Deliyannis's ballot box and, possibly, to that of his other partners as well<sup>43</sup>. Despite this arduous process of coalition building, which involved relatively independent-minded individuals with some control over admissions into the coalition, the bipolar structure prevailed, watered down by the voters' freedom of choice specific to the Greek voting system. The intention of Georgiadis, a relative of the Plapoutas, to draft a list on behalf of their family exclusively in order to challenge both dominant lists, met with rejection by his uncle Konstantinos Plapoutas, who had joined the pro-cabinet list; Georgios Plapoutas, on the other hand, a cousin of Konstantinos, belonged to the Deliyannis side. A bipolar rationale is evident in Georgiadis's justification of his own political choice in a letter to a relative in Langadia:

Your local differences ought not to be taken into account, for it is immaterial whether I associate myself with Nikolopoulos or Deliyannis; I must be successful, regardless whether Deliyannis also succeeds, because, were Nikolopoulos to win, the outcome would be the same; both are our enemies.

Antonopoulos from Dimitsana informed Deliyannis about the intentions of the local "third-party-ites" (τριτοκομῖται) to pledge the 250 to 300 votes they controlled to the Deliyannist list, with the exclusion of Lambrynopoulos. A bipolar pattern is also suggested here, along, however, with the option of vote plumping and splitting<sup>44</sup>. Another possible form of coalition could be an arrangement with individual members of the opposing party to divide the municipalities into domains of the candidates concerned, again after a bipolar rationale, and conduct uncontested elections (μονομερῆς καὶ ἀποκλειστική ἐκλογή) accordingly<sup>45</sup>.

43. G. Ladopoulos, Tripolis 5 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis. Digenopoulos argued along the same line, but drew entirely opposite conclusions; Kh. Digenopoulos, Tripolis 6 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

44. A. A. Antonopoulos, Dimitsana 2 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

45. Kh. Digenopoulos, Tripolis 6 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

The analysis so far has presented a political culture of brief memories, loose commitments, short-lived priorities and a geographic fragmentation of political activity. The use of tradition, however, to elicit deferential elements in this otherwise individualistic social environment, "in which, individuals at all levels are politicians"<sup>46</sup>, constituted a rational tactical option for Deliyannis. He put it into effect through the connotative use of verbal symbols. The focus of this concern was, by necessity, local<sup>47</sup>.

The two poles of the political configuration in Gortynia consisted in the forces of Nikolopoulos and Deliyannis. The latter pole, the one with deeper historical grounding in the district, is consistently mentioned as "the system", τό σύστημα, a term denoting its local political network, in situations referring to both friends and opponents of the Deliyannis family. In a letter dated 8 June 1873 Ioannis Koromantzios described both opposing party structures as συστήματα<sup>48</sup>. Kh. Rigopoulos referred to a letter by Deliyannis in the mid 1860's, in which Deliyannis, in Paris at the time, praised Rigopoulos for his sacrifices for the σύστημα<sup>49</sup>. During the 1874 campaign I. Lambrynopoulos used the same term to

46. Schneider, Schneider and Hansen, *op.cit.*

47. Deference is here understood in a sense derived from Newby's article, H. Newby, "The Deferential Dialectic", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 17 (1975) 139-164, as an attribute of political interaction of, primarily, local relevance (p. 157). Regarding the difference between deference and influence, the latter implying the exchange of concrete goods characteristic of patronage networks, the two terms are not mutually exclusive. Both concepts may thus contribute to the understanding of a particular society. While the commonly used designation "deferential society" suggests a society dominated by deferential relationships, a better approach would evaluate the "deferential component" of that society with respect to its own specific power relationships. See also J. G. A. Pocock, "The Classical Theory of Deference", *American Historical Review*, 81 (1976) 516-523.

Theodoros Deliyannis's precarious political standing at the local level is best highlighted by the narrow margin by which he was reelected in 1879; Gardikas, *op.cit.*, p. 151. Indeed, Deliyannis's control over his constituency was tenuous. In the 1872 election, another violent election conducted by the Voulgaris cabinet, he had decided not to stand against his local rival Nikolopoulos, claiming reasons of health, according to a Deliyannist pamphlet published in Tripolis on 15 February and signed by six friendly lawyers from Gortynia practicing in Tripolis. Among the signatories were Khristos Digenopoulos and Georgios Ladopoulos. The rhetoric of the pamphlet is distinctly patriotic, referring exclusively to national causes; VI/47.1.

48. I. Koromantzios et al., Kontovazena 8 January 1873, to Th. P. Deliyannis, VI/49.2.

49. Kh. Rigopoulos, Langadia 14 May 1874, to Konstantinos (?).

denote the Deliyannis local party interest: a former friend is reported to have become an avowed enemy of Deliyannis's "system"<sup>50</sup>. Already in 1862 friends from Langadia urged Theodoros Deliyannis to make peace with his family and enter politics, in order to salvage the family "system", for whose sake these friends had borne many sacrifices<sup>51</sup>. Subsequently, Deliyannis carried the same term to Athens as the title of a short-lived journal in 1876<sup>52</sup>.

One would have expected the term "system" to apply to a more solid structure, than that displayed by Greek local parties. The term, however, possessed its own historical weight, associated with the pre-independence past of the Deliyannis family and its political influence in the region. Its use in 1874, therefore, helped link Theodoros's current political career to that of his ancestors. The term σύστημα in a political context appears with a great variety of interrelated meanings in sources written by a number of authors shortly before as well as soon after the 1821 revolution. These meanings range from "organization", "regime" and "associations", conspiratorial or other, "legitimate authorities", to "social orders" as well as "parties".

In a contract signed by Theodoros Papagiannopoulos (Deliyannis) and other Moreot notables in Constantinople in August 1816 the term "σύστημα" was used three times in the phrase "σύστημα ἀδελφότητος" as a subcategory of "our fatherland" (ἡ πατρίς μας)<sup>53</sup>; this "σύστημα" denoted a contractual association of regional political interests, that stipulated a mutual commitment of support, both in the imperial capital and at home<sup>54</sup>. A similar contract signed in Langadia in November 1817

50. I. Lambrynopoulos, Vytina 6 June 1874, to Th. P. Deliyannis.

51. Gardikas, *op.cit.*, p. 299.

52. Λιάτα, *op.cit.*, p. 106.

53. J. C. Alexander, "Some Aspects of the Strife Among the Moreot Christian Notables, 1789-1816", *Ἑπετηρίς Ἑταιρείας Στερεοελλαδικῶν Μελετῶν*, 5 (1974-1975) 503. Several decades earlier, in a document signed in Vostitsa in January 1789 reinstating Sotirios Lontos as leader of the qaza, the local notables and other friends pledged their support and resources "for the salvation of the good system of our fatherland". Regardless of the partisan nature the document, the term "good system" is used in the broader sense of honest district government. *Ἱστορικόν Ἀρχεῖον τοῦ Στρατηγοῦ Ἀνδρέα Λόντου (1779-1847)*, vol. 1, Athens 1914, p. 3; also Alexander, *op.cit.*, p. 485, n. 2.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 489. Theodoros Papagiannopoulos had visited Constantinople with his brother Kanellos in May 1816. There he joined two more of his brothers, Anagnostis, the *vekil* or representative of the Morea notables, and Nikolakis, in order to salvage the family



by Theodoros's brother, Dimitrios Papagiannopoulos (Deliyannis), and other parties<sup>55</sup> is more revealing as to the purpose of such an association, also named "σύστημα ἀδελφότητος", a term used interchangeably with "συντροφία": to protect the interests of the signatories from similar associations by neighbours and from other local antagonists. The scope of this agreement was local in coverage.

*Systima* was furthermore used in a political, yet considerably different, sense, in a circular letter dated 12 January 1822 from Theodoros Kolokotronis to the eparchs of Karytaina, notifying them that "the systems (συστήματα) of our fatherland (πατρίς) and our nation (ἔθνος) have been constituted" and therefore requesting men and supplies for a campaign into Roumeli<sup>56</sup>. Here the term *systima* should probably be taken to denote legally constituted national corporate authorities, for instance the national assembly in session in Epidaurus at the time, as opposed to the temporary regional administrations (συστήματα<sup>57</sup>), that had so far exercised authority.

The term is also used extensively in Kanellos Deliyannis's memoirs, often interchangeably with the term "party" (μερίς), in connection to circumstances before and during the Greek revolution, in an Ottoman imperial, a Moreot regional, as well as a national, Greek, context. He

interest after the execution of their father Ioannis; K. Δεληγιάννης, *Ἀπομνημονεύματα*, Γ. Τσουνκαλῆς (ed.), v. 1, Athens 1957, pp. 72-73.

In the Greek business circles of the capital the term "σύστημα" was familiar in names of associations such as the prestigious association of Greek merchants "Σύστημα Ἑλλήνων ἐμπόρων Κωνσταντινουπόλεως". The term had, in all likelihood, appealed to the family at home and may have influenced its adoption for the social status it conferred. I am indebted to Professor Despoina Papastathis for this insight; see extensively in T. Σκλαβενίτης, "Τὰ Ἐμπορικά Ἐγχειρίδια τῆς Βενετοκρατίας καί τῆς Τουρκοκρατίας καί ἡ Ἐμπορική Ἐγκυκλοπαίδεια τοῦ Νικολάου Παπαδοπούλου", in N. Παπαδόπουλος, *Ἐρμῆς ὁ Κερδοῖος, ἦτοι Ἐμπορική Ἐγκυκλοπαίδεια*, Τ. Ε. Σκλαβενίτης, Π. Α. Μιχαηλᾶρης (eds.), *Παράρτημα τῆς Ἀνατύπωσης*, Athens 1987, pp. 58-65, primarily on the important literary and printing enterprise of this "system". Especially revealing is the way in which the national designations of the association were used interchangeably: Σύστημα τῶν ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει Ἑλλήνων (οἱ Ἑλληνοῤῥωμαίων οἱ Γραικοῤῥωμαίων οἱ Γραικῶν) Μεγαλεμπόρων; *ibid.*, p. 65. Cf. Ἀνθιμος Γαζῆς, *Λεξικόν Ἑλληνικόν πρὸς Χρῆσιν τῶν περὶ τοὺς Παλαιούς Συγγραφεῖς Ἐνασχολουμένων*, Venice 1809-1816, v. 3, p. 529a.

55. N. Μπρατσωῆτης (ed.), *Ἀρχεῖον Κανέλλου Δεληγιάννη. Τὰ Ἐγγράφα 1779-1827*, Athens 1993, pp. 28-29.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

57. Hering, *op.cit.*, p. 65.

refers, for instance, to the system of the Grand Vezir; Halet efendi on the one hand, who, according to Kanellos Deliyannis, had assisted the Moreot notables in 1815, and, on the other, Şâkir Ahmed paşa, who had been appointed *vali* of the Morea late the same year, with Rauf Mehmed paşa, the Grand Vezir, belonged to opposing “parties (μερίδες) and systems”<sup>58</sup>. Later on in his narrative, Kanellos attacked N. Spiliadis as the blind instrument of Kolokotronis’s “system”<sup>59</sup>, a faction, which the author then dubbed “the klephtic system”<sup>60</sup>. The same term, however, holds a more universal meaning in a passage relating events immediately preceding the Greek revolt: Theodorakis Deliyannis was able to lull the anxieties of the Tripolitsa Turks in 1821 “as he knew the Turkish idiom (διάλεκτον) and the Turkish system (σύστημα) and spoke freely”<sup>61</sup>. Here the term “*systima*” could be interpreted as “administration”. Kanellos then writes how, anticipating the fall of Tripolitsa to the Greek forces and wishing to undermine Kolokotronis’s authority in the Morea over the army, he proclaimed that, “if we survive until that time [sc. the fall of Tripolitsa], we shall then deliberate and, with the districts’ consent, we shall have a steady system”<sup>62</sup>.

Other authors, as, for instance, Panagiotis Skouzes, a merchant from Athens, in his account of events in Athens of the 1770’s and 1780’s written in 1841, used the term σύστημα in connection with struggles among the local notables. According to Skouzes, the opponents of the ruling group of notables reversed the hereditary communal leadership by introducing elections for the appointment of notables: “ἤλλαξαν τό σύστημα”<sup>63</sup>. The new regime, the people resulting from the new election rules, Skouzes also labeled νέον σύστημα<sup>64</sup>. Photakos, Theodoros Kolokotronis’s secretary, used the term in his memoirs in the sense of social

58. Δεληγιάννης, *op.cit.*, p. 68. Kanellos also uses “κόμμα” (p. 146) to allude to political contacts even across ethnic boundaries.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 198.

63. Π. Σκουζές, *Χρονικό τῆς Σκλαβωμένης Ἀθήνας στά Χρόνια τῆς Τυρανίας τοῦ Χατζαλλή*, Γ. Βαλέτας (ed.), Athens 1984 <1948>, p. 46. I wish to thank my husband John C. Alexander for his assistance and helpful criticism.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

order or estate, referring to the klephts<sup>65</sup> as well as the Moreot notables; in the latter case he observed, that this system included both Muslim and Christian members and was divided into two non-sectarian factions, whose aim was to control the appointment of a friendly *vali* for the Morea, through their agents, or *vekils*, in the imperial capital<sup>66</sup>. Ioannis Philimon, for his part, in his history of the Philiki Etaireia, used it to denote the Greek ecclesiastic authority under Ottoman rule<sup>67</sup>, but also social orders such as that of the klephts<sup>68</sup>, the notables<sup>69</sup> as well as the Phanariots<sup>70</sup>. However, in a more restricted use of the word, he speaks of the system —the conspiratorial association— of the Philiki Etaireia<sup>71</sup>. The same author, in his introduction to the first edition of the memoirs of Germanos, metropolitan of Palaiai Patrai, wrote about the Philiki Etaireia, that it lacked a “ἔγκαιρον διοργανισμόν Κεντρικῶν Συστημάτων” to control its branch organizations<sup>72</sup>. For his part, A. Kontakis, a notable from the district of Kynouria, in his memoirs referred to the local faction as “τοπικόν σύστημα”<sup>73</sup>.

The loose definition of the term “σύστημα” in contemporary minds permitted its usage in ways revealing interesting, yet implicit, associations. For instance, for Kanellos Deliyannis the phrase “κλεπτικόν σύστημα”, which other authors understood as klephtic class, denoted the

65. Φωτάκος [Φώτιος Χρυσανθόπουλος], *Ἀπομνημονεύματα περί τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐπαναστάσεως*, Athens 1955, pp. 40-41. Likewise, D. Ainian, in his memoirs refers to the klephtic class as “σύστημα τῶν κλεπτῶν”, and to that of the *armatoloi* as “σύστημα τῶν ἀρματολῶν”; Δ. Αἰνιάν, *Ἀπομνημονεύματα*, Athens 1956, pp. 16-17, 42.

66. Φωτάκος, *op.cit.*, pp. 43-45.

67. Ἰ. Φιλήμων, *Δοκίμιον Ἱστορικόν περί τῆς Φιλικῆς Ἐταιρίας*, Nafplion 1834, p. 33.

68. The klephtic system were the “ἄξιωματικοί τοῦ ἔθνους” and “τό σύστημα τῶν Κλεπτῶν ἦτο μ' ἄλλους λόγους τό Πρώτυπον [sic] Πολεμικόν Σχολεῖον τῆς μελλούσης Μεταβολῆς”; *ibid.*, p. 41; also pp. 37-38.

69. Referring to “τό Σύστημα τῶν ΠΡΟΕΣΤΩΤΩΝ”, Philimon wrote: “Γεννᾶται δέ ἡ ἀνάγκη συστημάτων, συντιθεμένων ἀπό τοὺς ἰδίους Κατοίκους” (*ibid.*, p. 42), which he also termed “τάξις” (p. 45).

70. “Ἡ τάξις τῶν Φαναριωτῶν [...] Ἦτον ἄρα ἓν Σύστημα ἀνθρώπων, φέρον τά ἐλαττώματα τῶν παλαιῶν Ὀλιγαρχιῶν”; *ibid.*, p. 51.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. α' - β', ι'.

72. Παλαιῶν Πατρῶν Γερμανός, *Ἀπομνημονεύματα*, Ἐμ. Πρωτοψάλτης (ed.), Athens 1956, p. 20.

73. Α. Κοντάκης, *Ἀπομνημονεύματα*, Ἐμ. Πρωτοψάλτης (ed.), Athens 1957, p. 21.

enemy party, the Kolokotronis faction, in the political cleavages which thrived during the 1821 revolution. It is probable that Deliyannis perceived this conflict in class terms. A similar ambiguity could apply to the usage of σύστημα for system of governance or constitution on the one hand and party on the other. Evidently, in the mind of Kanellos Deliyannis, himself a product of the pre-revolutionary Moreot world writing his *apologia* between 1854 and 1856, as well as in the minds of Skouzes and others, the concepts of regime, constitution, class and party had been conflated and become equally legitimate sources of political authority. Having thus been part of the Deliyannis family's loosely defined political vocabulary, "σύστημα" then survived in the sense of "party" or "faction"<sup>74</sup>. More than half a century later, Theodoros Deliyannis was preserving the term "σύστημα" in its partisan sense, in an effort to sustain the deferential component in his relation with his constituents, against a volatile and elusive local as well as national political environment.

The crisis of 1874, the outcome of institutional tensions generated in the course of Greek political modernization, underscores the considerable separation between the national and the local levels of politics. Precisely because national politics were divided by fundamental issues of authority, local political competition collapsed, unable to introduce, let alone sanction, some cast of relevant political platform at the local level. Competition at that level had become virtually meaningless for a number of principal competitors with a stake on the national stage, who opted out<sup>75</sup>. At the local level political activity remained geographically fragmented, reflecting relative equality of political power, status and, consequently, of chances for success among the participants. This degree of independence continued to encourage absence of trust and fluid political structures. Typically, agreements became ephemeral transactions with explicitly stated terms, rather than long-term relationships based upon implicit mutual obligations. No doubt, the two divergent concepts of politics were driven to incompatible extremes in the 1874 elections.

74. The preceding analysis begs the question, whether the Greek political vocabulary of the pre- and early post-revolutionary years was defined by class and region.

75. Deliyannis and Trikoupis abstained; see note 14 above.