

# *Abstracts*

WINTHROP LINDSAY ADAMS

## HISTORICAL PERCEPTIONS OF GRECO-MACEDONIAN ETHNICITY IN THE HELLENISTIC AGE

Whatever the perceptions and problems of Greek and Macedonian ethnicity among themselves in the Age of Philip and Alexander, those questions took on their own dynamics in the Hellenistic period. Partially because of the expanded orbit of their own Hellenic world following the conquests and death of Alexander, and largely because the principals were forced to deal with large numbers of people for whom the traditional ethnic differentiation between the two was essentially meaningless, the distinctions and barriers between Greeks and Macedonians broke down. Demetrius Poliorcetes could still reorganize a "League of Corinth" to aid the Antigonid cause in Greece in 302 B.C., and the propaganda slogan of "freedom and autonomy" for the Greek cities (ἐλευθερία καὶ αὐτονομία) was used throughout the period, but in its political rather than ethnic sense.

By the end of the Third Century, Polybius (quoting from the treaty between Hannibal and Philip V) referred to the exchange of oaths between "Macedonia and the rest of Greece" (7.9.3) and Carthage to uphold that treaty's obligations, in what clearly was an official formula accepted by both the Carthaginians and Macedonians. Likewise, the Achaean envoy Lykiskos (again in Polybius), addressing the Spartans on the Aetolian threat, spoke of the politics and rivalry among Greek states, but in doing so specifically stated that Achaea and Macedonia were of the same people (ὁμοφύλους) (9.32.7). Whether dealing with external or internal threats, the ethnic perceptions of the Greeks and Macedonians had become inclusive. Finally, despite the Roman organization of a province of Macedonia separate from Greece in the Second Century, Strabo prefaced his treatment of Macedonia in the First Century with the statement that Macedonia was part of Greece, but then had to go on to justify placing it topographically in the study with Thrace (7.9). Clearly a transformation had occurred in which

Macedonia as part of Greece became the standard paradigm, and any deviation from that must be explained.

LAWRENCE A. TRITLE

ATHENIAN FRIENDS, MACEDONIAN ENEMIES

Who were the ancient Macedonians: Greek or a Greek-like people inhabiting the mountainous region to the north of Greece proper? This issue has been debated by scholars through the twentieth century and in the early 1990s even figured in political discussions from Skopje to Athens and beyond. The problem is usually approached from a viewpoint of "otherness", i.e., that Greeks and Macedonians were different. This paper suggests that the opposite viewpoint be considered, namely that the differences between Greeks and Macedonians were small, that only degrees of "sameness" separated them.

This paper proceeds from this initial rationale. It investigates the relationships and particularly the friendships cultivated and enjoyed by Athenians and Macedonians, hence the title "Athenian Friends, Macedonian Enemies". Examination of these relationships suggests that the practice and observance of the Greek ritual of *xenia*—guest friendship—found in Homeric times continued into the relatively sophisticated classical era where it occasionally created misunderstandings of one kind or another for those bound by it. Yet these practices are part of Hellenic life and suggest another reason for arguing that the ancient Macedonians were Greek.

D. HATZOPOULOS

CHARLES XII OF SWEDEN AND STANISLAUS LESZCZYNSKI, KING OF POLAND,  
IN THE CORRESPONDENCE OF NICHOLAS MAVROKORDATOS

Following the disastrous defeat inflicted upon his army by the Russians at Poltava on June 27, 1709, Charles XII, king of Sweden, and the remnants of his army fled into Ottoman territory. The initial

admiration with which his hosts greeted him turned soon into embarrassment and despair. Indeed, the king of Sweden had no intention of leaving the Ottoman Empire, unless it joined him in a new war against Peter I of Russia. In order to force the recalcitrant Ottoman Government to follow his policies, he established, from his camp, a powerful political network in Constantinople, which was joined even by the mother of the Sultan.

Charles's persistence bore him fruits: in July 1711, at Pruth, Peter's army was checked by the Ottoman troops. However, Turkish failure to pursue the victory enraged Charles and from that moment his relations with the Ottoman administration soured. During the same period the behaviour of his troops, refugees from Poltava like him, worsened and turned disastrous. Lack of discipline and contempt for the locals soon created an unbearable situation in Moldavia. Nicholas Mavrokordatos, who returned to his position on September 25, 1711, has provided substantial, but until now overlooked and unexplored, information about the events, in five letters addressed to his friends. According to his painful descriptions of the situation, the Swedes behaved like wild beasts, destroying, stealing, raping, killing, and finally paralyzing Moldavia. Shaken by Mavrokordatos's reports, which drew Charles's ire when he found out about them, the Sultan decided to intervene, in order to put an end to the depredations. Indeed, following a bloody fight, the king of Sweden and his unruly troops were arrested in February 1713.

Mavrokordatos's letters also clarify the issue of Stanislaus Leszcynski's arrival in the Empire in early 1713. According to the Prince's letter of February 20, 1713, to Iakovos Manos, Stanislaus had no intention of returning the Polish crown to his protector Charles, as Voltaire, who received his information from Stanislaus, and subsequent historians suggest. Instead, he intended to join the Swedish king and, with him, ask the Ottoman Government to restore him to the throne by launching an invasion of Poland. Indeed, Mavrokordatos says that Stanislaus wrote one letter to the Grand Vizir Suleyman Pasha and another to the Tatar khan, in which he asked them to help him recover his throne. However, Charles's arrest put an end to Stanislaus's projects. Mavrokordatos undertook a serious effort to extricate him from the bottleneck, into which he had placed himself, by coming to the Empire at such an inopportune time. The Ottoman administration was indeed

disgusted with the antics of Charles, now considered mad, and of his friend, the king of Poland, who continued to entertain the idea of provoking the invasion of Poland by the Ottoman army. The only thing that the Porte wanted desperately, was to get rid of both of them. Stanislaus left the Empire in May 1714, while his friend, Charles, was forced to leave in October of the same year.

*GIORGOS AGELOPOULOS*

PERCEPTIONS, CONSTRUCTION, AND DEFINITION OF GREEK NATIONAL IDENTITY  
IN LATE NINETEENTH - EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY MACEDONIA

The notion of belonging to a nationality was introduced in rural Macedonia during the late nineteenth century. This paper examines the process according to which Greek national identity developed during that period. Applying a "modernist" approach on nation building and examining the issue at the level of the individual by using an anthropological methodology, reveals the incompetibility between ethnic, cultural and national identities. People who belonged to the same ethnic group or shared the same culture in Macedonia during the period under examination, very often identified themselves with different nations.

The decision of identification with a nationality during the late nineteenth-early twentieth century was a political one, very often irrelevant to the ethnic or a cultural identity of individual actors. It was taken according to the needs, priorities, beliefs and fears of those who conducted it.

*ELEUTHERIA MANTA*

THE ECONOMIC RECESSION IN ALBANIA AND ITALIAN INFILTRATION:  
THE LOAN OF 1931

During the period after the First World War, Albania was the least developed of the Balkan countries, as was apparent in all sectors of its economic life. The economic situation was further exacerbated in the

early 1930s, when the effects of the world economic crisis began to make themselves felt in the Balkans. As a profoundly underdeveloped country, Albania was much harder hit than the other Balkan states. Incapable of coping with the relentlessly mounting problems, the Albanian government appealed for economic aid from Italy, Albania's great ally, who was the only power that was prepared to make a loan which no-one expected would ever be repaid. Italy's main intention was to gain complete control of the Albanian administration (as it had already done with the army).

According to the terms of the 1931 economic agreement, Italy was undertaking to lend Albania ten million gold francs annually for the next ten years for the purpose of balancing the state budget and assisting the country's development in the sectors of public works, economy, and education. With this agreement, the Italians attained their primary goal, which was total administrative and financial control over Albania: the committee that was to supervise the spending of the loan and the organisers—advisors who were to be appointed to four vital ministries would form the base from which that control was exercised. If one bears in mind that control of the army was also in Italian hands, it is clear how far the Italians had already infiltrated the country.

*SPYRIDON SFETAS*

AUTONOMIST MOVEMENTS OF THE SLAVOPHONES IN 1944:

THE ATTITUDE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GREECE

AND THE PROTECTION OF THE GREEK-YUGOSLAV BORDER

In this brief study the writer uses mainly archival material to document the view that the autonomist movements of the Slavophones in Greek Macedonia were above all a result of the expansionist policy of the political and military agencies in Yugoslav Macedonia and were fomented by the military liaison officers operating in Greek Macedonia. The KKE handled the Macedonian Question sensitively, in order to keep EAM together. However, the recognition of the existence of a "macedonian nation" which was the KKE's fundamental mistake and the source of its inconsistent policy towards the Macedonian Question, the confu-

sion of the national and ideological sphere, and above all the influence of external factors, all had the effect of making the Slavophones in Greek Macedonia opt for different political choices than the official party line. But the situation was not of control, and the majority of the Slavophones preferred to fight in the ranks of ELAS.

*KYRIAKOS D. KENTROTIS*

THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION AS PRESENTED IN THE GERMAN PRESS  
(1990-1994)

An examination of articles and reports in the German press about the Macedonian Question reveals that German journalists i) have been increasingly presenting and analysing the political aspects of the issue in recent years; ii) make little or no reference to archaeological and linguistic data; and iii) deliberately cultivate sympathy for the FYROM.

*C. IFANTIS - G. KAZAMIAS*

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND BALKAN CHALLENGES: NATIONAL POLICIES  
AND INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES

The article discusses the issues and dilemmas that Western states and institutions faced in South-eastern Europe as a result of the "reactivation of history" in the region and the policies pursued as a response to the risks generated by the Yugoslav imbroglio. The overall argument is that the Balkan conflict is strictly linked to the post-Cold War power dislocation in the international system, which is manifestly demonstrated by the involvement of the leading powers and institutions in the dynamics of crisis and by the real danger that the disorder will spill over to regions previously regarded as stable areas of the European sub-system. The analysis considers in turn: a) the response of the European Union and the USA; and b) the prospects of constructing a new, badly needed security regime in the area. It is argued that the Balkan states cannot be separated from Europe's wider security concerns. The region needs to be

---

integrated into continent-wide structures, in order to both defuse local conflicts and prevent the recurrence of future such.