

par Chypre. Plus précisément, les principales étapes de son voyage dans l'espace balkanique ont été Corfou, Lefkade, Patras, Lépante, Corinthe, Thèbes, Chalcis, Almyros, Thessaloniki, Drama, Kavala, Abydos (Tsanakalé), Constantinople et surtout le quartier de Péra, Raïdestos, Gallipoli, Abydos (Tsanakalé), Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Rhodes et Chypre (cf. pp. 35-36).

Cet ouvrage est présenté pour la première fois en grec dans une traduction accompagnée de commentaires détaillés.

Peut-être l'ouvrage aurait-il été mieux rendu en grec par une traduction plus fidèle à partir du texte hébreux. Il faut néanmoins rendre hommage aux auteurs de l'introduction et des commentaires, K. Megalommatitis et A. Savvidis, qui, grâce à leurs analyses et remarques (cf. pp. 115-244: 606 commentaires), grâce aussi à leurs riches références à des thèmes juifs et byzantins, ont rendu cet ouvrage accessible au public.

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C. Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*, University of California Press, Berkeley - Los Angeles - London 1995, pp. xx + 221.

This book once again brings to the fore the problem of the creation of the Ottoman State, a problem which has occupied scholars already from the beginning of the 20th century as the major theme for Ottoman —as well as other— studies. The author of this book, Cemal Kafadar is Associate Professor of History at Harvard University and, amongst other things, is the co-editor of a diligently written tome dedicated to Süleyman the Magnificent and his time¹.

In the "Preface" of this book K. cites two factors which led to the publication of this book. One was the publication of many works (articles and books) during the 80s which, each independently amongst themselves, dealt with the issue of the creation of the Ottoman State and challenged the prevailing contemporary theory. The second factor —according to K.— had to do with the prevalent worldwide tendency in Ottoman studies today. International Ottomanology has lately begun to turn its interest from the "universal domination" of economically related sources (K. calls them "hard data"), such as the *tahrir defterleri*, to the re-evaluation of the neglected literary (in our case

1. *Süleyman the Second and His Time*, ed. by H. İnalcık and C. Kafadar, [Isis] Istanbul 1993.

historiographical) output of the Ottomans². After the "Preface" K. has placed a chronological diagram of events in Asia Minor from 1071 (the Battle of Manzikert) to 1461 (the fall of the Trebizond Empire by the Ottomans), which coincides directly with the subject dealt with in the book. After this there follows a chart of the first Ottoman Sultans from Osman to Bayezid II.

In the "Introduction" (pp. 1-28) K. introduces the reader to the historical background of the subject at hand and to the pre-history of its interpretive methods. The most significant section of the Introduction, however, is that part within which he describes his general approach to the subject. Here he explains his views on the terms *identity* and *influence* in the "national" histories of States (pp. 19-28). K. remarks here on the anxiety of all "nations" which at one time comprised part of the once mighty Ottoman Empire to project and stress their "own" contribution to that State, while, at the same time, a road-race has begun in order to prove the "national-ethnic origins" of even the most insignificant things such as coffee and the baklava dessert. To support this position, K. sharply criticizes the "lid model" according to which Empires, from the moment of their creation, are covered with a lid which hermetically shuts in upon its peoples, and which opens only with the disintegration of the Empire. During the duration of its life, the people within it remain unspoilt, until the cap opens and they continue to live as they did before entering the Empire.

In the first chapter, entitled "The Moderns" (pp. 29-59), he presents all the different theories which have been formulated on the birth of the Ottoman State, this State's main component elements and reasons for its success. At first he presents the theory of the British historian H. A. Gibbons (1916), according to which the Ottomans were an amalgam of idolatrous Turks and Islamicized Byzantines Greeks who comprised the main creative force of the new State. Gibbons' rash dismissal of the Ottoman narrative texts of that era as historical sources is especially emphasized and criticized by K. Once he cites certain minor theories from the period between the two World Wars, he then discusses the two main theories, not only of the interwar period, but also of the 20th century as a whole, being that one of these theories prevailed in Ottomanology for a half century. These are the theories of M. F. Köprülü (1935) and P. Wittek (1938).

Köprülü's theory, according to K., was formulated as a retort to that of

2. An echo of this trend in Greek scholarly bibliography is to be seen in such works as that of El. Zachariadou, *History and Legends of the Early Sultans (1300-1400)*, [MIET] Athens 1991 (in Greek). Ms. Zachariadou has published numerous studies on such themes most of which are written in languages other than Greek.

Gibbons. Köprülü, having at his disposal a wide range of Turkish sources, gave priority to the Türkmen tradition of the Ottomans, to its institutions and the social structure to which he ascribes the success of the Ottomans. The motive for their expansion into Western Asia Minor was, according to Köprülü, the demographic pressure exerted in the East Anatolia by the Mongolian tribes in the second half of the 13th century. Wittek, on the other hand, built his theory upon the *gazi* (warrior for the faith) and his *ethos* as a catalytic factor for the success of the Ottomans. The new feature introduced by these two theories to the scholarly scene, according to K., is the attention given to the Turco-Islamic background of the people and that tribalism and the evolving conditions of the frontier society were recognized as major motivating factors for the Ottomans. According to K., these two theories present significant differentiation between them. Köprülü supports the theory that the Ottoman originated from the Kayı tribe of the Oğuz branch of the Turks, while Wittek believes that there is not enough evidence to support such a claim. The second differentiation—again according to K.—has to do with the way in which the frontier society is interpreted. While Köprülü sees it as a combination of various social forces (warriors, dervishes, emigré school-bureaucrats, tribes-folk) where each one played a particular role, Wittek insists on emphasizing a certain “tribal factor” with catalytic power for the future developments. The reason, according to K., that to this day no systematic study for both theories has been undertaken by historians is the nationalistic character which spiced Köprülü’s theory from the beginning as if he desired to function as an “ethnic” historian emphasizing the role of the Turkish factor in the creation of the Ottoman State and, analogously, de-emphasizing the role of non-Turkish elements (Byzantine tradition, islamicized Christians). Completing his presentation of the various theories promulgated during the interwar period, K. cites G. G. Arnakis’ theory (1947) which argues that the major factor in the development of the Ottoman *beglik* (principality) was the adoption of the administrative experience offered by the socially advanced cities of Bithynia, as for example Proussa/Bursa, to the new conquerors. Before criticizing Wittek’s theory, K. briefly cites certain theories of the postwar period which sought alternative interpretations for the phenomenon of the rise of the Ottomans. These are the theories of Z. V. Togan, M. Akdağ, S. Vryonis and E. Werner.

In the last section of the first chapter K. examines the critiques upon Wittek’s theory—since this theory is the only one which seriously occupied scholarly research—during the 80s by R. Lindner, G. Kaldy-Nagy and R. Jennings. Their critiques, according to K., revolve around the following contradiction: how could the Ottomans be propelled by the ideology of the *gazi* and

have this as a motivating force for their success when they “1. recruited Byzantines into their ranks, 2. fought against other Muslim forces, 3. exerted no pressure to convert or persecute Christians, 4. displayed moderation and an “interest in conciliation and mutual adaptability”, 5. allowed freedom for heterodoxy and pre-Islamic cults”? The basic mistake of the critics, according to K., is that they understood the meaning of *gazi* in a strictly narrow ideological manner. K. shows through certain examples presented that the “Holy War” or “zeal for the Holy War” —which is the official translation of the abstract noun *gaza*— does not actually describe the term, at least as this term should be understood within the historical context of Asia Minor in the 13th century. The dry logic, K. continues, that a *gazi* is an orthodox (sunni) Muslim, who struggles for the prevalence of his faith, slaughtering or proselytizing (by force) every infidel, is a-historical and certainly does not correspond to historical fact. By no means —again according to K.— should the “ideology of Holy War” (component element of the *gazi*) be understood as a clearly set definition.

In the second chapter, “The Sources” (pp. 60-117), K. examines those narrative sources which are known to this date (saints lives, annals, epic poems, heroes’ feats), which were written in the zone of the frontier society. K. attempts, through his new reading of the sources, to sketch this society and especially the ideology of the leading physiognomies within this society, i.e. the *gazis*. In the first section Turko-Muslim sources are examined; sources which were not written, however, in an Ottoman environment and do not have anything to do with the “House of Osman”. From this examination K. concluded that the frontier society was totally open to certain contradictions which seem inconsistent to us today. Two basic elements of the ideology of a *gazi*, as gleaned by K. from the narrative sources, are the compliance of the warrior with a code of honor and an appeal for plundering. The first element maintains a certain flexibility and cannot be limited to a dichotomy sunni/shi’a Islam as well as Islam/infidels. That which the sources basically manifest is a general flexibility which that society showed and an absence of strict dividing lines, as, —according to Kafadar’s own words— “... the culture of Anatolian Muslim frontier society allowed to coexistence of religious syncretism and militancy, adventurism and idealism”.

Advancing to the examination of Ottoman sources, K. overcomes the stumbling block of the lack of narrative sources from the “House of Osman” until the 15th century —and the consequent existence of a gap of over a hundred years when the initial events in the history of the Ottomans took place— with a series of well structured arguments. Following this, he places

the "tribe" of Osman in the environment and structure of the frontier society, as this was described in the preceding section. Finally, he endeavors an appraisal of the value of the Ottoman sources, taking them at face value i.e. neither as totally fiction works, nor as literal historical sources. Coming again to the theme of the *gazi*, K. maintains that their ideology, as formulated in the narrative sources of the frontier society, is one of the basic component elements of the Ottomans (and of other competitive *begliks*) and that this has nothing to do with any circle of erudite or educated sunni Muslim, who supposedly introduced it into the area of the frontier society; thus, he separates the development of the *gazi* spirit from the "hoch-islamisch" élites.

In the final chapter, "The Ottomans" (pp. 118-150), K. attempts to re-synthesize the early history of the Ottomans, giving special attention to certain points which help in the clarification of the reasons which led the Ottomans to such great success, in contrast to the other *begliks* of the area. K. accepts certain arguments which had already been set forth by scholarship (the decline of Byzantium and the immediate contiguity of the Ottoman *beglik* to Byzantium), but he advances further, placing the "tribe" (tribe in an anthropological sense as a political organism of common interest and not necessarily as a genetically homogeneous society) of Osman within the canvas of multi-leveled authority and relationships which evolved in Asia Minor during that period. According to K., Osman displayed a special ability to confront the difficulties caused by multi-dimensioned authority through marriage and alliances. Furthermore, even from the infancy of his state, he endeavored to invest it with a centralized character, in contrast to the other *begliks*. Within this general political program—which, undoubtedly, was not known for its consistency—is placed the policy of the preservation of conquered territories and, with the help of certain coincidences, the securing of a smooth succession of authority, without dissension amongst the successors upon the death of the leader (Osman, Orhan or Murad). K. claims that these actions of Osman did not distance him at all from the ideology of the *gazi*, on the contrary, they coincided totally with this ideology. Subsequent to its establishment as the main power in the region, the Ottoman State passed, according to K., from the stage of exploiting the clashes amongst the various powers in Asia Minor to that of the confronting of significant centrifugal tendencies within the State. The straying of the Ottoman dynasty from the *gazi* ideal was finalized, says K., already from the time of Bayezid I at the end of the 14th century. After the termination of the civil war (1402-1413), the trend towards centralization reverted with a more tenacious manner, and found its best expression in the person of Mehmed II. During his reign, the imperial ideal which was the result of centralization, with the

occupation of Constantinople, realized in practice as the predominant political dogma within the new Empire.

In his "Epilogue" (pp. 151-154), K. outlines the new political ideology which preponderated for all of the 16th century in the Empire and which proved to constitute the tombstone of the *gazi* ideology. After the epilogue there follows extended notes and a select bibliography.

K.'s book may be characterized as a work with interpretive originality, clothed in an exceedingly luxuriant and masterfully structured narrative style. His full bibliographical support, which is not limited merely to historical works, and the great range of sources used, are of the virtues of this work which, I believe, cannot be denied by anyone. Its value, however, lies in the fact that he here formulated a mature and masterfully structured proposal for a major problem in Ottoman history, thus clearing new paths for the "ottomanological" thought and employing methodological tools which have not been used before by the Ottomanists, as, for example, the hagiographical sources. His fresh reading of already known narrative sources gives this work the possibility to contribute new content regarding the interpretation of the term *gazi* which is so crucial for this field. I think that his second chapter may even be considered as pioneering. The discussion of the reasons for Ottoman success in the third chapter does not depart drastically from the foundations layed by former historiography; nevertheless, they are placed within the new theoretical background of the term *gazi* and thus, these reasons acquire new interpretive force and perspective. His critique of Lindner (especially) as well as of other older theories is rich and well supported. As the few negative aspects of the book I merely note the absence of a detailed map of Asia Minor and K.'s inability to satisfactorily deal with the given lack of sources within his step by step presentation of the rise of the Ottoman *beglik* in the first two decades of the 14th century.

In short, K.'s work gives motivation for Ottoman scholarship to release itself from the stuffy atmosphere of "national history" from which not only the Balkan school of Ottomanology has not escaped, but —I am afraid— not even the Western school, for it oftentimes attempted or was compelled to serve "national interests" of a certain school/state in various "scholarly" themes. With this liberation Ottomanology may breath easier the "clean air" brathed by Osman, Orhan and their subjects during the 14th century, without the distorting lens of 19th century nationalism and the Manichaeian dichotomies of a strictly circumscribed ideology of Western origin.