

# *Abstracts*

*EFTHYMIOS NICOLAÏDIS*

## WAS THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT A VEHICLE FOR THE IDEAS OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION?

The paper presents how the spreading of the knowledge of the so called “scientific revolution” which occurred in the Greek-language Colleges of the Ottoman Empire at the times of the Greek Enlightenment (after the last quarter of the 18th century), was prepared from the beginning of this century. Indeed, a number of Greek scholars were familiar with this new knowledge—or “new science” as called by them—already from the beginning of the 18th century, as they came in contact with that science in the European countries where they studied or visited. But, mainly for ideological reasons, these scholars presented to their Greek-speaking pupils only the “Greek science”, that means scientific knowledge prior to the scientific revolution, in order to revive that science in the country where it originated.

*ALEXANDER KITROEFF*

## GREEK NATIONHOOD AND MODERNITY IN THE 19th C.

This paper examines and analyzes the idea of the Greek nation from the middle to the end of the nineteenth century. This article argues that Greek nationhood evolved away from a primarily cultural or ethnic type of nationalism and towards a mainly civic or political nationalism between the 1860s and 1890s.

*I.K. HASSIOTIS*

## FROM THE “REFLEDGING” TO THE “ILLUMINATION OF THE NATION”: ASPECTS OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN THE GREEK CHURCH UNDER OTTOMAN DOMINATION

Three major historical questions are briefly discussed in this study:  
a) How far may the anti-Westernism of the Greek Orthodox Church conduce to the cultural isolationism of the Orthodox world (at least the Greek sector);

b) how far did the initiatives of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, as also of its individual functionaries, be described as ecumenical, or at least pan-Balkan, at a political level; and c) how far, geographically and ethnologically speaking, did the Great Church influence the processes of ethnogenesis in the Orthodox communities under its jurisdiction. The author arrives to the following conclusions: a) Although chronic aversion to the Occident was a fundamental aspect of the Church's ideology, it did not engender thoroughgoing cultural isolationism in a considerable part of the Orthodox population, even in the early years of Ottoman rule. b) Politically the Oecumenical Patriarchate was the head of the Greeks ("η κεφαλή του Γένους των Ρωμαίων"). Yet its general religious and ecclesiastical policy remained firmly supranational and pan-Orthodox, at least until the end of the eighteenth century. c) The Great Church made no deliberate attempt either to accelerate or slow down the processes of ethnogenesis as regards the "Romaic" and even more the "non-Romaic" peoples under its jurisdiction. Hellenisation is traceable, but numerically and geographically was not widespread; and in any case was due to historical factors, in which the Church did not play an active, or at least decisive, role.

TRAIAN STOIANOVICH

#### SOCIETY AND THE REASON OF LANGUAGE

A combination of circumstances occurring in western Europe and the Balkans and eastern Europe alike during the second half of the eighteenth century favored the eastward and southeastward diffusion of certain aspects of Enlightenment thought. If there was a supply of new ideas in western Europe, however, what facilitated their southeastward diffusion was the existence, along the maritime fringes of the Ottoman Empire and in the Habsburg frontiers adjacent to the Ottoman, of a growing demand for appropriate new ideas. One important event in western Europe was the publication of Montesquieu's *De l'esprit des lois* (1748), which redefined Europe —partly in terms of geography and climate but even more in terms of law, moderation, commerce, and the circulation of goods and ideas, so that Europe's *other* became *Oriental despotism*. Once admired as the "new Romans", the Ottoman Empire became an object of criticism. Europe itself came to be understood as the territories in which a demand for an unimpeded circulation of goods and ideas existed or could be created. In other words, the extent of Europe could be said to coincide with territories in which there were elites with Enlightenment goals.

At about the same time, in response to the growth of the commerce of Greeks and Macedo-Vlachs with western Europe and Russia, of the growth of the commerce of Greeks and Serbs and of the church and educational reforms of Maria Theresa in the Habsburg Monarchy, of study by Greeks in Italian medical schools and other faculties and of Serbs in German and Hungarian higher schools, and of the rise in the Austrian territories of a Serb burgher class, a growing number of Serbs and Greeks began to identify after 1770 with some of the Enlightenment goals. By and large, the Greek and Serb exponents of the new ideas did not seek a rupture with their own past but only with a past that they did not regard as their own. The acceptance of Enlightenment ideas thus was generally not an act of "de-Byzantinization". On the other hand, under the influence of German pietism, whose center was the University of Halle but which was also propagated by German merchants who went to the Leipzig fairs, it could take the form of attachment to such ideas as rational piety and enlightened virtue.

By the 1780s, there was the beginning among Serb and Greek writers of what, in another connection, Fernand Braudel has called a "verbal inflation", and which I myself associate with what I call the Third Axial Age. Clearly evident in the work of one of the most admired Serb authors, Dositej Obradović, that verbal inflation was the result of his quest for "clear, definite, and constant ideas". To identify the art of communication, he borrowed a Russian term, *slovesnost*, whose purpose he understood as enlightening the understanding, pleasing the imagination, moving the passions, and influencing the will, an activity that western Europeans commonly called rhetoric. Among the words that he borrowed from the western European languages or coined by analogy were the terms for fashion (*moda*), capital (*kapital*), nation (*nacija*), and public sphere (*opštestvo*).

Among Greek and Serb writers alike, there was, by the 1780s, a linguistic turn, a shift from a discourse of philosophy under which language was subsumed to a discourse of language under which philosophy was subsumed. An examination of the work of Condillac, Volney, Noah Webster, and Johann Georg Hamann indicates that a similar turn began somewhat earlier in western Europe and at about the same time in the United States. One may associate this turn with certain writers but also with certain areas—with the Ionian Islands, Epirus, Macedonia, and Thessaly among the Greeks and with Karlovac (Carlstadt) and other western regions among the Serbs, with areas distant from centers of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, such as Constantinople and Sremski Karlovci. The turn further reflected the simultaneous movement from conceptions of "universality" to conceptions of nationality, both of which differ,

however, from conceptions of locality. They were, therefore, also an affirmation by the new elites of their own identification with Europe and the idea of a culture of dialogue.

CHARLES REARICK

#### LOCAL COLOR IN POST-ENLIGHTENMENT CULTURE

France, the heartland of the Enlightenment, was also home to path-breaking thinkers who sought alternatives to the *philosophes'* project of universalizing rationalism and "top-down" civilizing, radiating out from Paris to the rest of Europe. One of the most influential, wide-ranging scholars to forge a post-Enlightenment synthesis was Claude Fauriel, whose contributions include the publication of Europe's first full-scale, scholarly collection of modern Greek folk songs (1824-1825). In that collection Fauriel showed how a Romantic appreciation of local color and cosmopolitan diversity could be combined with an Enlightenment espousal of secular education, rational government, and political liberty. Through the past two centuries, French cultural and political spokesmen have continued to grapple with those post-Enlightenment issues and the divergent legacies of Fauriel's era. In a mutating variety of ways, French regionalists and some French national leaders have worked to defend and to promote heterogeneous cultural life within France, Europe, and the world.

KEITH HITCHINS

#### THE ROMANIAN ENLIGHTENMENT IN TRANSYLVANIA

This paper suggests that a significant variant of the European Enlightenment arose among the Romanian intellectual elite in Transylvania in the latter decades of the eighteenth and the early decades of the nineteenth century. Against the background of both the general Enlightenment and the prevailing political and social conditions in Transylvania, it attempts to identify the specific characteristics of what may be called the Romanian Enlightenment. To do so, it analyzes the works of three leading representatives of the Romanian elite —Samuil Micu, Gheorghe Șincai, and Petru Maior— and examines their relationship with the Habsburg Court of Vienna, particularly with Joseph II. It is evident that the Romanian elite adhered to certain salient principles of the

European Enlightenment, notable faith in reason and knowledge and a commitment to apply these instruments to the improvement of the human condition. But in even greater measure they were preoccupied with the idea of nation. It was their striving to interweave the tenets of the European Enlightenment, which was essentially cosmopolitan, with the aspirations of nationhood, which were ethnic and particular, that gave the Romanian Enlightenment its distinctive character.

CARL MAX KORTEPETER

DID THE TURKS ATTAIN ENLIGHTENMENT THROUGH DEFEAT IN WARFARE?

In this study of the relationship between the European Enlightenment and the Ottoman Empire, I believed initially that one would find a clear progression of European ideas and influence of the eighteenth century not so much in the spheres of religion, philosophy and literature but possibly in the field of advanced European technology with regard to military reform. What I have discovered, largely by making detailed analyses of technical experts such as Baron de Tott, reports of European ambassadors and observations of other European military officers, is that indeed there were very serious attempts by the progressive-minded sultans and their vezirs to bring about a reform of the Ottoman armed forces. In the first instance, however, there was such a cultural gap between the ordinary Ottoman recruit, often devoid of military discipline and any knowledge of modern machinery, that European military instructors required a long time period to turn these recruits into enlightened modern soldiers. If the vezirs and the society permitted a serious period of training, the young Ottoman troops became quite proficient in such areas as maintaining and firing the then modern artillery. A second major observation, however, is to note what a crippling stranglehold the ranking members of the Ulema maintained over not only the ordinary recruit, but also the highest-ranking members of the entourages of the sultans. Thus, almost throughout the period of detailed study, from roughly 1730 to 1839, the Ulema and the reactionary former elite troops, the Janissaries, were able to interrupt or to thwart any consistent reform. Only with the serious influence of dedicated German officers in the nineteenth century, after the Janissaries and the Ulema had been discredited in the 1830s, did the Ottomans begin to create a modern army.

*JAMES J. REID*

WAS THERE A TANZIMAT SOCIAL REFORM?

The article argues that the late 18th and 19th-century “reformers” failed to grasp the underlying issues in the reforms that they proposed and mostly failed to implement. At least, then, the Tanzimat era did witness many social changes but most of these alterations occurred less as the result of any specific reforms and simply through the process of time.