Delayed learning from Kosovo : any chance for common understandings of facts and law?
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Abstract
In this piece, written in 1999 with a Postscript of 2003, the author examines whether the conditions for humanitarian intervention had been met for
the NATO intervention in Kosovo. His negative conclusion is based not only
on the absence of UN Security Council authorization but also on the blatant
failure to exhaust all peaceful means, especially the use of unacceptable
ultimatums to Yugoslavia at Rambouillet. In addition, there was excessive
and disproportionate use of force and sides were taken against one of the two communities in a conflict for which both had some share of responsibility.
Further, this was not only a matter of human rights but also of the preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the state which required a more
comprehensive approach. A review of history shows the complexity of the situation, with both sides bearing some of the blame, and emphasizes the need for impartial and compassionate international action. Instead, the Serbs were demonized and there was a cowboy-style shoot out which has produced predictably a continuing and expensive instability in an environment of lawlessness leading to the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo Serbs. In conclusion, it is to be regretted that this illadvised action has given a bad name to humanitarian intervention with no decent end in sight. In the Postscript, the author further expresses his grave concern about the modem use of massive barbarous firepower in ways that cause incredible and indiscriminate suffering to civilians, and the attempts to justify it as “collateral damage”, which is even ironic when carried out under the banner of humanitarian intervention or preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction.
the NATO intervention in Kosovo. His negative conclusion is based not only
on the absence of UN Security Council authorization but also on the blatant
failure to exhaust all peaceful means, especially the use of unacceptable
ultimatums to Yugoslavia at Rambouillet. In addition, there was excessive
and disproportionate use of force and sides were taken against one of the two communities in a conflict for which both had some share of responsibility.
Further, this was not only a matter of human rights but also of the preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of the state which required a more
comprehensive approach. A review of history shows the complexity of the situation, with both sides bearing some of the blame, and emphasizes the need for impartial and compassionate international action. Instead, the Serbs were demonized and there was a cowboy-style shoot out which has produced predictably a continuing and expensive instability in an environment of lawlessness leading to the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo Serbs. In conclusion, it is to be regretted that this illadvised action has given a bad name to humanitarian intervention with no decent end in sight. In the Postscript, the author further expresses his grave concern about the modem use of massive barbarous firepower in ways that cause incredible and indiscriminate suffering to civilians, and the attempts to justify it as “collateral damage”, which is even ironic when carried out under the banner of humanitarian intervention or preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction.
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