From adversity to alliance : Greece, Yugoslavia and Balkan strategy, 1944-1959
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Abstract
During the early Cold War period, Greek-Yugoslav relations were
primarily determined by strategy rather than by ideology. In 1944-1948, Tito
was seen in Athens as the most powerful ally of a hostile superpower, who
was pursuing an expansionist policy at Greece’s expense. In 1948, the TitoStalin split changed Balkan balances overnight. Athens opted to approach the
Yugoslav leader, a former enemy who now was deprived of superpower
support and thus unable to threaten Greek security. In 1952-1955 Greece and
Yugoslavia joined Turkey in a Balkan entente which soon became a Balkan
alliance. But even after the decline of this alliance, in 1955-1956, the Greeks
were anxious to keep their contacts with Yugoslavia, in order to prevent it
from coming closer to Moscow and to Sofia.
primarily determined by strategy rather than by ideology. In 1944-1948, Tito
was seen in Athens as the most powerful ally of a hostile superpower, who
was pursuing an expansionist policy at Greece’s expense. In 1948, the TitoStalin split changed Balkan balances overnight. Athens opted to approach the
Yugoslav leader, a former enemy who now was deprived of superpower
support and thus unable to threaten Greek security. In 1952-1955 Greece and
Yugoslavia joined Turkey in a Balkan entente which soon became a Balkan
alliance. But even after the decline of this alliance, in 1955-1956, the Greeks
were anxious to keep their contacts with Yugoslavia, in order to prevent it
from coming closer to Moscow and to Sofia.
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