

Dr. Katsiaounis has mined his historical sources assiduously and to great effect. He has largely cold-shouldered sociological and anthropological studies, which are not without insights into the matters which concern him. He might have made use of Diamond Jenness' brilliant overview of Cypriot economic history and of Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*. But my criticisms are unimportant in view of the fine achievements of this excellent book. No-one who wishes to understand Cyprus today can afford to overlook it.

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Thanos Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics. From Independence to Democracy*, Hurst & Company, London 1997, pp. i-xvii, 1-227.

As the author's annotated bibliography at the end of the book indicates, the Greek military has so far inspired a considerable volume of work: memoirs and biographies, official historiography, journalistic accounts, scholarly monographs, as well as a growing body of unpublished dissertations. On the scholarly level, the subject has been tackled from various perspectives: sociological, institutional-legal, and *stricto sensu* political-historical. Equally varied is the chronological approach, with the years between 1909-1935 and 1950-1967 attracting most attention.

The book of Thanos Veremis emerges as one of few attempts at an all-encompassing study of the military from the founding of the modern Greek state up to the mid-1990s. It is based on extensive and exhaustive historical research, of which earlier products were the author's PhD dissertation (*The Greek Army in Politics 1922-1935*, Oxford 1974) and his subsequent monograph *I epemvaseis tou stratou stin elliniki politiki 1916-1935* (Military Interventions in Greek Politics), Athens 1977. Since then Professor Veremis, who currently directs the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), has been acknowledged as a leading authority on the role of the military and Greek security matters in general.

The main Chapters are preceded by a concise introduction in 19th century Greek politics, focusing on state formation and nation-building. This provides the necessary context for the subsequent analysis of the military and its political role up to the present time. In this part, the author outlines the evolving social and political background against which the Greek army was transformed from a policing force into a more substantial instrument of

irredentist policy, before entering the political arena in the early decades of this century.

The Contents reflect a combination of chronological and thematic approaches. Chapter 1 deals with the arduous and tortuous process of forming a regular army in the Greek state that emerged after an eight-year long War of Independence fought primarily by irregular troops. Dispensing with the Ottoman legacy of unruly warlords and building a, however small, national army became a symbol of the young state's westernising aspirations. In fact, much of this effort was directed by Western, mostly French and Bavarian, "experts". Of cardinal importance was the selection and education of officers, not merely for the army's capacity but for the entire state-building process as such. While preserving an elitist character which little contributed to the backbone of the army, i.e. the infantry and the cavalry, the Military Academy until 1887 was the only institution providing "sorely needed" technical higher education in the country.

As the Greek state tackled its nation-building mission in earnest, the army found itself at the forefront both as a mechanism of emulating and disseminating the state's "ethnic truth" and as the obvious agent of Greek irredentism. Its failure to successfully pursue the latter mission was seen as a symptom of the state's inability to promote the interests of the Nation either in peace or war. By the turn of the century, this would cause a serious identity crisis which combined with professional grievances to trigger the first military intervention in Greek politics, the 1909 *pronunciamento*. This event is widely considered a landmark in Greek political history, although its presumed character as a "veritable bourgeois revolution" has long been refuted by historians. Yet its positive effects in speeding up long-needed reforms and ushering in Eleftherios Venizelos in Greek political life are undeniable. Chapter 3 lucidly recapitulates the discussion of this important topic.

For a brief period, the Greek state led by Venizelos was able to bridge the gap between "ethnic truth and reality". This was achieved during the victorious Balkan Wars, which incidentally opened fresh career opportunities to a previously congested and frustrated officer corps. The idyll did not last long however. World War I proved a watershed for both army politics and civil-military relations, as it brought about the deepest crisis in the Greek body politic, the so-called "National Schism" (*Dihasmos*). As the country was temporarily divided between two political authorities, two parallel military hierarchies emerged. After the state was reunited under Venizelos in June 1917, a biased Army List helped to perpetuate the division within the officer corps for nearly two decades. In Chapter 4 Professor Veremis thoroughly

examines the origins and impact of the tidal pattern of military politics between 1916-1935, as Venizelist and anti-Venizelist officers were retired and reinstated in turns.

Chapters 4-7 are based on an impressive amount of research which permits a thorough interpretation of the endemic political activism of the military in the inter-war years. Central to this interpretation are the officers' self-image, their corporate identity —or the lack of it— and patronage. These are examined in Chapter 5. In addition to a wealth of primary sources and memoirs, the author has made good use of interviews, having distributed some 150 questionnaires to former officers between 1969 and 1973. Individual cases are brought up in order to illustrate the author's points: the myth of Greek army professionalism, the impact of the influx of reserve officers during the war period, the significance of the Army List issue, the importance of clientelistic networks for determining the course of military conspiracies, and the ultimate dependence of such networks on political patrons. What strikes the reader, among other things, is the casual view of military rebellion entertained by those officers interviewed nearly forty years after the period in question.

By focusing on the abortive 1st of March 1935 Venizelist coup, Professor Veremis tours the reader through the kaleidoscopic microcosm of military groupings and their rivalries, which plagued and ultimately destroyed the inter-war Greek republic. The uneasy civilian-military relationship and the role of charismatic leadership, that of Venizelos in particular, are also examined in Chapter 7. The author offers a solid interpretation of one of those "fateful events" in modern Greek history, which were habitually attributed, at least in part, to the sinister role of foreign powers.

A new chapter for military politics was opened by yet another period of war and civil strife within thirty years: World War II and, even more so, the protracted civil war eventually rendered pre-war cleavages obsolete. Following the defeat of the left-wing resistance movement shortly after liberation, the Greek officer corps, purged of all leftist and republican elements, became the guardian and guarantor of the post-war regime. This new role signified the army's virtual autonomy from political control, which was attained during the exceptional circumstances of the civil war and abetted by the powerful American military mission. In their effort to bar political influence from the army and safeguard their own sizeable investment of military aid, the Americans did nothing to discourage the activity of clandestine organisations with overt authoritarian tendencies, particularly IDEA and its offshoots. Apart from scheming and plotting, IDEA exerted a great deal of influence on

promotions and vital appointments, a factor of crucial importance for the success of the Colonels' coup in April 1967.

Chapters 9-10 deal with the Colonels' military regime, the only occasion—with the exception of General Pangalos' brief spell in power in 1925-1926—that the military attempted to rule the country directly, having cut its "umbilical cord" with both the politicians and the palace. As it happened, for some time the junta tried to base its power on clientelistic networks and kinship, while elevating loyal army cadres to the status of a "new and privileged establishment". Yet, as the author points out, the regime's main source of support and "legitimacy" was American patronage. Dictator Papadopoulos' attempt to diversify this source by restoring a measure of controlled political life failed and led to his own demise. The return to civilian rule was never a serious option for the officers who ruled Greece in 1967-1974 until their disastrous intervention in Cyprus brought the country on the brink of war.

In the final Chapter the author treads some new ground, that of civil-military relations in the post-1974 era. The ignominious collapse of the dictatorship discredited the officers' political aspirations and signified an era of political disengagement and increased professionalism. For the first time since the war, army affairs were firmly brought under civilian control. The persistent tension in Greek-Turkish relations also reinvested the army with the vital role of defending the country, which it had somewhat lost in the years of international *détente* and domestic political activism. The elevation of Andreas Papandreou's socialist government to power in 1981 was perceived by many as "the ultimate test of democratic consolidation" in Greece. Papandreou's rule also contributed to bring the officer corps more into line with the rest of society by corroding its relatively homogenous conservative outlook. Yet, the same period witnessed a resurgence of populism and clientelism, as officers sought to improve their career opportunities by involving themselves in party politics. The practice of recalling retired officers initiated in 1990, the author aptly remarks, had a grave impact on morale and effectiveness, as shown during the Imia crisis, in early 1996.

Resting on solid historical ground, the author does not eschew a comparative approach, though he comes out quite sceptical about the value of a general theoretical framework. Regarding the often used, particularly in the cases of developing states, model of the army as an "agent of modernisation", Professor Veremis makes his point clear: "the Greek military has never acted as agents of modernisation but rather as sources of political turmoil", being increasingly isolated from the rest of Greek society, at least until 1974. Moreover, unlike their colleagues in Latin American and other comparable

cases, Greek officers never developed a strong corporate identity. This proved to be the case during the Colonels' regime, in particular: its leaders were only too anxious to shed their military identity "and assume the more respected civilian garb". If any model ought to be applied in the case of the Greek military, Professor Veremis prefers Samuel Huntington's "soldier as guardian" of the existing order.

Professor Veremis' book, while valuable to the "expert" reader and to students of Greek history and society in general, is also well-suited to appeal to the "non-initiated" reader. Tersely written, it comes complete with a substantial chronology of modern Greek history and, more important, a supplement of biographical notes on the principal *dramatis personae*. The researcher will also greatly benefit from the annotated bibliography, which covers the sources and all major works on the Greek military, published and unpublished.

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Todor Simovski, *Atlas of the Inhabited Places of the Aegean Macedonia*, Skopje 1997.

Todor Simovski has recently published his latest book, *Atlas na naselenite mesta vo Egejska Makedonija* – *Atlas of the Inhabited Places of the Aegean Macedonia*, Skopje 1997, essentially as part two of his study *Naselenite mesta vo Egejska Makedonija* (*Inhabited places of Aegean Macedonia*), INI, Skopje 1978. The book is in three parts. The first consists of a long introduction (pp. iii-xxxviii) in Slavo-Macedonian and English, describing the demographic upheavals and the renaming of toponyms in Greece in general and in Greek Macedonia in particular. The second part consists of an alphabetical list of communities with their old and new names (pp. 3-91) and vice versa (pp. 95-150). And the third part consists of a bibliography (pp. 151-158) and twenty-eight colour maps of the prefectures and provinces of Greek Macedonia in which dual names are used for the local communities (pp. 161-245).

In the Introduction, Simovski reiterates the familiar views of Slavo-Macedonian historians about the modern history of Macedonia. Indeed, earlier studies of his have played a part in the formation of these views<sup>1</sup>. In this

1. Compare Todor Simovski, "The Balkan Wars and their Repercussions on the Ethnic Situation in Aegean Macedonia", *Glasnik na I.N.I.* 3 (1972); *Naselenite mesta vo Egejska Makedonija*, vol. 1, I.N.I., Skopje 1978. Needless to say, Simovski uses the term "Aegean" rather than Greek Macedonia.