

GREECE AND ITS BALKAN NEIGHBORS (1948-1949)

THE UNITED NATIONS ATTEMPTS AT CONCILIATION *

When Greece emerged from the Second World War, it was shattered economically and torn by civil strife within the country, spearheaded by a Communist-led and dominated guerrilla movement which, in turn, received aid and assistance in Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.¹ The United Kingdom and the United States assisted the Greek Government in attempts to bring some order out of much chaos, while the Soviet Union and its Balkan satellites played a very different rôle during those critical years. At the same time, the United Nations, during its earliest years, became intimately involved with the Greek problem. Indeed, the Security Council of the United Nations sent its first Commission of Investigation to Greece in 1947 to inquire into the situation along the northern frontiers of Greece. ✓

The Initial Rôle of the United Nations

The Security Council first considered the problem of Greece as a result of a complaint of the Soviet Union, on January 21, 1946, which charged that the presence of British troops in Greece was a threat to international peace and security. On August 24, 1946, the Ukrainian SSR charged that the policy of the Greek Government had produced a situation endangering international

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1. In general see Dimitrios G. Kousoulas, *The Price of Freedom: Greece in World Affairs, 1939-1953* (Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University, 1953), 210 pp; *Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party* (London, Oxford, 1965), 306 pp; Richard V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University, 1961), 244 pp; Evangelos Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia* (Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1964), 261 pp; Stephen G. Xydis, *Greece and the Great Powers, 1944-1947: Prelude to the "Truman Doctrine"* (Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963), 758 pp; *Aid to Greece and Turkey: A Collection of State Papers* (Department of State *Bulletin Supplement*, Vol. XVI, No 409A [May 4, 1947], 827-909).

peace and security. On neither occasion was the Security Council disposed to support these propaganda charges. The Security Council became much more concerned with the problem of threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece by the fall of 1946, however, and especially when the Representative of Greece, on December 3, under Articles 34 and 35 (1) of the Charter, requested that it give early consideration which, he charged, was leading to friction between Greece, on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, on the other. The Greek Government declared that the guerrillas in Greece were receiving support from the northern neighbors, that groups of men were being trained for guerrilla activities in Greece, and that, generally, much foreign assistance was being given to their violent and subversive operations against the legitimate, constitutional Government of the country.²

The Security Council considered the problem during December 10-19, 1946 and, on December 19 unanimously approved a resolution establishing a Commission of Investigation on which the eleven members of that body were represented and to which liaison representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia were attached. This Commission, which was to make an on-the-spot investigation of the disturbed situation along the northern Greek frontiers, signed its report in Geneva, Switzerland on May 23, 1947. Among other things, it found that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had, in fact, been assisting the Greek guerrilla movement, as charged, and it proposed that the Security Council recommend that the four parties concerned do their best to establish normal and good neighborly relations, abstain from any action likely to maintain or increase the tension and refrain from any support of elements in neighboring countries aiming at the overthrow of the lawful governments of those countries. Secondly, the Commission proposed that the four parties enter into new frontier conventions along the lines of the Greek-Bulgarian convention of 1931. It was also suggested that the proposed Commission study the question of international refugees and the practicability of the transfer of minorities. The representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland, who held the Government of Greece solely responsible for the troubled situation along the northern frontiers, subscribed neither to the conclusions nor the recommendations of the Commission.³

2. For a summary account see Harry N. Howard, *The United Nations and the Problem of Greece*. Department of State Publication 2909, Near Eastern Series 9 (Washington, D.C., U.S.G.P.O., 1947), 1-3. See also the author's *Greece and the United Nations, 1946-1949; A Summary Record*. Department of State Publication 3645 (Washington, D.C., U.S.G.P.O., 1949), 31 pp., for chronology and documentation.

3. See U. N. D. oc. S/360: United Nations, Security Council, *Report by the Commission*

The Security Council discussed the Greek problem during June-August 1947, but because of five Soviet vetoes, was unable to reach any decision. The question was taken off the agenda on September 15, 1947 on the motion of the United States Representative and on September 23, the General Assembly decided to place the question of "threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece" on its own.⁴ On October 21, by a vote of 40 to 6, with 11 abstentions, the General Assembly approved a resolution establishing the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), with representatives of eleven nations, although the Soviet Union and Poland refused to serve, and endowed it with powers of observation and conciliation, in general accord with the recommendations of the original Commission of Investigation. Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were called upon forthwith to cease giving assistance to the Greek guerrilla movement and Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia were called upon to cooperate in the settlement of their disputes by peaceful means. To that end it was recommended that the four parties concerned:⁵

- 1) Establish normal diplomatic and good neighbourly relations among themselves as soon as possible;
- 2) Establish frontier conventions providing for effective machinery for the regulation and control of their common frontiers and the pacific settlement of frontier incidents and disputes;
- 3) Cooperate in the settlement of the problems arising out of the presence of refugees in the four states concerned; and
- 4) Study the practicability of concluding agreements for the voluntary transfer of minorities.

The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans⁶ began its work in Greece in November 1947 and did not conclude its efforts until 1951, when the Greek guerrillas had been defeated and the situation along the northern frontiers had changed basically, as it did especially after the Yugoslav defection from the Cominform on July 10, 1948. The northern neighbors of Greece, in line with Soviet policy, refused to cooperate with the Special Committee, with the result that its work was largely confined to observation. UNSCOB was unable substantially to assist the four Governments in any effort at concili-

of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents to the Security Council, May 23, 1947, Vols., I-III; The United Nations and the Problem of Greece, cited, 3-26.

4. Harry N. Howard, *The General Assembly and the Problem of Greece* (The Department of State Bulletin Supplement, Vol. XVII, No. 440A [December 7, 1949], 1097-1149).

5. Resolution 109 (II), October 21, 1947.

6. UNSCOB was composed of representatives of Australia, Brazil, China, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and The United States).

ation, whether in the matter of the establishment of normal relations at the time or in that of regularizing the situation along the frontiers. In its Report to the General Assembly on June 30, 1948,⁷ the Special Committee declared that, as long as the northern neighbors provided support to the Greek guerrillas, the independence and integrity of Greece would be under threat. But, despite the refusal of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to cooperate with it and their challenge to its legitimacy, the Special Committee was convinced that it would be possible to assist the four Governments toward a peaceful settlement in the interest of all, if Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, like Greece,⁸ were prepared to act in accordance with the resolution of October 21, 1947 and in the spirit of the Charter. The Third General Assembly continued the Committee in its resolution of November 27, 1948.⁹

The Evatt Efforts at Conciliation

But the Third General Assembly, on the initiative of President Herbert Vere Evatt, the Minister of External Affairs of Australia, also decided to establish a Conciliation Committee under Dr. Evatt's chairmanship, despite a previous commitment of the Australian Delegation not to submit new proposals in connection with the Greek problem. The United States Delegation, with Mr. John Foster Dulles handling the Greek question, was substantially opposed to Dr. Evatt's initiative, largely on the grounds that (1) UNSCOB was already charged to deal with problems of "conciliation" and was certainly more competent in the light of its year's experience than an ad hoc group like the one which Dr. Evatt had proposed; and (2) as long as there were no change in Soviet policy in the Balkan region and with regard to Greece, the exercise in "conciliation" was altogether likely to prove fruitless. Nevertheless it was considered unwise to throw too much cold water on any effort of this kind, since it

7. See U.N. Doc. A/574: *Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans*. It also submitted two interim Reports (U. N. Docs. A/521, 522). For convenience these Reports, together with that of June 30, 1948, may be found in United States Department of State, *Documents and State Papers*, Vol. I, No. 6 (September 1948), 373-375, 376-412. For the Reports of September 10, October 22, 1948 (A/644, 692) see *ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 6, pp. 413-423 and Vol. I, No. 10 (January 1949), 603-608.

8. While Bulgaria laid all the responsibility on Greece, and Albania insisted on Greek renunciation of the claim on Northern Epirus, and both refused cooperation with UNSCOB, Greece expressed its desire to cooperate and its willingness to resume relations with Bulgaria.

9. For a summary of discussions see Harry N. Howard, "The Problem of Greece in the Third Session of the General Assembly," *Documents and State Papers*, Vol. I, No. 10 (January 1949), 545-614.

would put the United States in a false light, and on November 10, 1948 the Political and Security Committee established a Conciliation Committee to methods and procedures with the representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia looking toward a settlement of their difficulties.¹⁰

The Evatt effort essentially began two days later, on November 12, when conversations were held with representatives of the four Governments. Dr. Evatt explained that he was trying to achieve something in the way of resolving controversies. The representatives of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia indicated somewhat vaguely that they were interested in resolving these differences, as did Mr. Pipinelis, of Greece, who made it clear, however, that the Greek Government would not tolerate any interference in Greek internal affairs. Mr. Bebler, of Yugoslavia, who professed to believe that the United States and the United Kingdom were using Greece as a base of operations in the Balkan area, wondered whether the question might not be brought before the Council of Foreign Ministers and whether Greece might not be "neutralized" under the United Nations. But he did not respond when Dr. Evatt inquired whether Yugoslavia might be willing to give up its arms under a United Nations guarantee. The representatives of Albania, Greece and Bulgaria agreed that diplomatic relations should be restored and it was also agreed that ministers should be exchanged between Greece and Yugoslavia.

Following three days of conversations, at the meeting of November 15, Dr. Evatt circulated an eight-point program as his first concrete set of suggestions for the solution of problems between Greece and its northern neighbors, embodying: (1) diplomatic exchanges; (2) immediate agreement in principle to draw up new or revised frontier conventions; (3) mutual patrol of frontiers; (4) assistance of UN observers; (5) acceptance of existing frontiers as definitive; (6) acceleration of the repatriation of Greek children who had been removed across the border; (7) agreement in principle to regulate questions of refugees and minorities once diplomatic relations had been restored; and (8) establishment of a small body for good offices or mediation. There was, however, general skepticism relative to this program, and on November 17, it was somewhat modified, especially in a proposal for mixed frontier com-

10. U. N. Doc. A/728; A/C.1/380. The Conciliation Committee was composed of the President of the General Assembly (Dr. Herbert Vere Evatt), the Secretary-General (Trygve Lie), the Chairman of the First Committee (Paul Henri Spaak), and the Rapporteur (Ambassador Selim Sarper, of Turkey). They were "to act in the capacity of conciliatories jointly to convene immediately in Paris a meeting of representatives of the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia to explore the possibilities of reaching agreement amongst themselves as to the methods and procedure to be adopted with a view to resolving present difficulties between them."

missions, to be composed of a representative of each government under an independent chairman, the commissions to have full access to territories on either side of the border. Proposals and counter-proposals followed each other to the end of November, although all possessed a certain similarity in the matter of the renewal of diplomatic relations and the establishment of mixed frontier commissions. Albania and Greece, under the proposals, were immediately to negotiate with a view to drawing up a frontier convention.

By the end of November, it appeared to Dr. Evatt that some progress had been made. Nevertheless, when Dr. Evatt submitted three draft bilateral declarations, based essentially on the proposals of November 12, as he did on December 1, he had a mixed reception. The common features in all the draft declarations concerned the establishment of diplomatic relations, the exchange of ministers, the negotiation of frontier conventions, the patrolling of frontiers and the prevention of incidents, the establishment of mixed frontier commissions and the signature of the declarations. Dr. Bebler raised some questions as to mediating authority of the mixed commissions, and Professor Vladiguerov considered the Greek-Bulgarian draft "acceptable." Mr. Pipinelis thought the proposed Greek-Bulgarian and Greek-Yugoslav drafts acceptable, but the Greek-Albanian draft proved a stumbling block. By December 2, it was clear, in any event, that Albania would sign no declaration with Greece which did not provide a clearcut Greek renunciation of the Greek claim to Northern Epirus.¹¹

In the end, on December 8, a spokesman for the United Nations denied a tendentious report in *Le Monde* (December 7) "that certain agreements had been reached between the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Balkans and the Government of Bulgaria," and declared that a published Bulgarian telegram "was extremely misleading and likely to interfere with the work of the Conciliation Commission." While the discussions were still in progress, "no agreements had been reached with anyone," and the "discussions with the representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia had been solely in relation to exploring the possibilities of an agreement."¹²

11. It may also be noted that the EAM, led and dominated by the Greek Communist Party, during this period, not only supported the Greek Government's claim to Northern Epirus, but claimed territorial rectifications along the Greek-Bulgarian frontier in Western Thrace and laid claims to Turkish territory in Eastern Thrace as well. The EAM-KKE claims were advanced in cables to the Paris Peace Conference on July 31, 1946 and to the Council of Foreign Ministers on November 11, 1946. See especially U.N. Doc. S/AC.4/56, p. 24; EAM Annex No. 29, pp. 4-5. Summarized in Howard, *The United Nations and the Problem of Greece*, 20.

12. U. N. Press Release BAL/401 (December 8, 1948).

Nevertheless, on December 9, Foreign Minister Edvard Kardelj, of Yugoslavia, sent a cable to Dr. Evatt, which was published in *Politika* on December 11, indicating Yugoslavia's readiness to negotiate despite the "artificially contrived alleged proofs" of Yugoslavia's assistance to the Greek guerillas in the General Assembly's resolution of November 27, 1948. The telegram cited the terms of the Greek-Yugoslav draft agreement, but asserted that this question was tied to relations between Greece and Albania and Greece and Bulgaria. Mr. Kardelj considered it impossible to conceive of improvement in relations if agreement did not include the "entire problem" and did not settle the problem of the Greek-Albanian frontier. Failure in the conciliatory effort, it was charged, therefore lay within the responsibility of the Greek Government. While a despatch in *The New York Times*, on December 15, also attributed "failure" in the talks to the Greek refusal "to treat existing boundaries between Albania and Greece as definitive," the final United Nations press release gave a different account.¹³ Dr. Evatt stated on December 14 that the Conciliation Committee had "made very considerable progress" and that "a draft agreement had been prepared after many points had been accepted by all parties." However, he said that "an outstanding question upon which agreement had not been reached was the formal request made that Greece should agree to treat the existing boundaries between Albania and Greece as definitive." As a matter of practice, Dr. Evatt remarked, the actual existing boundaries between them were recognized *de facto* and it was obvious that no party "could alter them contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter."¹⁴ In conclusion, Dr. Evatt expressed his gratitude to the representatives of all four countries for their cooperation, and stated his confidence that

the work we have begun and almost succeeded in completing, will be completed. The work of the Committee will go on formally at Lake Success when the Assembly meets for the resumption of its business and in the meantime, the good offices of the Secretary - General and myself will be available to all four parties.

13. United Nations Press Release BAL/402 (December 14, 1948).

14. The Greek Delegation had taken almost precisely this position throughout the talks, emphasizing that it merely sought not to prejudge its claims, which were before the Council of Foreign Ministers, and stating that it would seek solution only through pacific means. Indeed, long since, the Greek Government had sought normalization of relations with its northern neighbors, had considered its frontier conventions with Yugoslavia (1927) and Bulgaria (1931) legally in force, had submitted a model frontier convention to UNSCOB in February 1948 (U.N. Docs. A/574; A. AC. 16/114 and Annex B), and was quite willing to accept a proposition for neutral chairmen for the proposed mixed frontier commissions, which was eliminated from the proposed agreements, since the representatives of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia refused to consider the proposals.

At the close of the Third General Assembly, therefore, it appeared that some progress had been made, especially as to the possible establishment of mixed frontier commissions and the drafting of frontier conventions, although the Albanian Government refused to sign any agreement unless Greece gave a formal renunciation of its longstanding claim to Northern Epirus, and the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments refused to sign unless the Albanian Government did so.

In the interval between the first and second parts of the Third General Assembly there was a considerable controversy concerning the "conciliation" discussions which had taken place in Paris. On December 15, 1948, the Greek Government issued a public statement expressing regret at the discontinuance of the Conciliation Committee until April 1949, noting that it had shown its good will during the talks, and declaring that the obstacles to pacification had been raised by the northern neighbors. Special note was taken of the problem of Northern Epirus, in which the attitude of Greece had been "entirely realistic" and had facilitated the task of the Committee, although the "lawful claim" of Greece had been maintained.

In turn, on December 28, Foreign Minister Kardelj told the Yugoslav Parliament that the entire trouble in Greece lay at the Anglo-American doorstep, since the United Kingdom and the United States had imposed a regime on the Greek people which the overwhelming majority of the people did not want. This situation, he asserted, had "created in Greece a condition of open warfare between the people and the Athens Government," which was aided by British and American interference." Moreover, "false" charges had been brought against Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to "conceal" the real situation. Finally, Dr. Kardelj charged that the negotiations in the Conciliation Committee had broken down with no agreement, since the Greek Government opposed the declaration that existing frontiers be considered final. The Yugoslav delegation had rejected the idea of signing a separate declaration, since "the relations of Greece and her northern neighbors represent a whole which can only be solved as such."

Nevertheless, on January 5, 1949, Secretary-General Trygve Lie announced Dr. Evatt's intention to resume the discussions in April, when the General Assembly reconvened. Moreover, on January 8, in response to a question from the Athens journal, *Akropolis*,¹⁵ Dr. Evatt reiterated his hopes. Although there were outstanding differences over Northern Epirus, he felt that, once diplomatic representatives had been exchanged, "this and other differences might well be settled through diplomatic channels." He thought the work of the

15. U. N. Doc. A/AC. 16/565.

Conciliation Committee and of UNSCOB were largely complementary, and, provided "the progress already made" were "indicative of a sincere desire by all parties to reach agreement," it might reasonably be hoped that ultimate agreement could be achieved in April at Lake Success.

The Bulgarian Government threw some cold water on these hopes, when, on January 28, 1949,¹⁶ it issued a statement accusing the General Assembly — as the Yugoslav Government had done — of acting on the basis of false charges when it renewed UNSCOB, and asserted that agreement could have been reached in the Conciliation Committee "on basic questions insuring the means and procedure for settling the differences actually dividing the present Athens Government and its three northern neighbors." After outlining the proposals which had come from the Conciliation Committee, the Bulgarian Government declared that it had "completely cooperated" with the Committee, and had "accepted all the proposals as explained and supplemented in agreements concerning, directly or indirectly, Bulgaria's sovereignty and independence." While the Bulgarian Government declared its readiness to reach a settlement and had authorized its envoy to sign the agreement, it accused Dr. Evatt at the meeting of December 1, of eliminating the reference to "the acceptance of present frontiers." To the Bulgarian Government, it was clear that the Greek Government did not "wish to eliminate its disagreements with its northern neighbors," but had other aims. Dr. Evatt was accused of "persuading the Bulgarian and Albanian Governments to sign an agreement without a clause for the recognition of frontiers," which was "against logic" and did not "represent a basis for the improvement of relations and achievement of cooperation." Dr. Evatt was also accused of trying "to clear the Athens Government of any responsibility by declaring that the Greek Government could not make such a declaration because of the internal situation in Greece." In the end, of course, the Greek Government was held responsible for "failure" in the discussions:

It is now clear to all that it is not the Governments of the States which showed readiness to recognize existing frontiers, but the Athens Government which threatens the territorial unity of Albania and Bulgaria, that the Athens Government is leading an aggressive policy, that it threatens Balkan peace.

But the Greek Government responded the next day, January 29, accusing the Bulgarian Government not only of calumniating it, but Dr. Evatt as well. It also charged that the Bulgarian Government had completely ignored the fact that, from their beginning, the Conciliation Committee's discussions

16. See *Rabotnichesko Delo* and *Otechestven Front*, January 28, 1950, for text.

had been "placed within the framework of the decisions of the United Nations, connected with the aggression on Greece by her neighbors, and were certainly not to constitute anything else than a means to allay pressure exerted on her borders." In the Greek view,

under no conditions were these talks to constitute a peace council for settlement of territorial or other relevant problems, and this was made plain from the very first moment. It was therefore out of place and time to try to settle the North Epirus question during these talks.

Meanwhile, there was little to suggest that the Greek Communist Party, then undergoing a purge, was giving up the struggle. At its Fifth Plenum during January 30-31, 1949, it openly rejected all compromise, promised that "victory" would be achieved in 1949, talked of detaching "Aegean Macedonia" from Greece, and openly proclaimed that, without the assistance received from the "Popular Democracies" to the north, progress could not have been achieved.¹⁷ The Greek Government, to the contrary, pursued a constructive, if naturally cautious, policy relative to the problem of conciliation. It was skeptical concerning possible negotiations with Yugoslavia, but was interested in exploiting the situation along constructive lines, either through the Conciliation Committee or through UNSCOB. It had in mind, evidently, an agreement whereby the Greek-Yugoslav frontier would be closed to guerrilla operations, possible conclusion of a commercial agreement, measures for the reestablishment of railway communications with Yugoslavia, and resumption of traffic in the Yugoslav Free Zone in Thessaloniki. But it also felt that there might be "intercession" in Sofia and Tirana looking toward establishment of diplomatic relations and the solution of pertinent problems. If an initiative could be undertaken in these directions, it was felt that the discussions in April 1949 would be continued on firmer foundations for the conclusion of formal agreements among those concerned.

As had been foreshadowed, when the General Assembly reconvened at Lake Success in April 1949, Dr. Evatt reactivated the Conciliation Committee, despite the skepticism of some of its members. He broadened the concept of the discussions somewhat in his announcement of April 14, which declared that the aim of the talks was "to explore the possibilities of future cooperation for the peaceful solution of all the differences between the four Balkan countries."¹⁸ There was little evidence, however, that he was prepared to deal with

17. See especially U.N. Doc. A/935: *Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans*....August 2, 1949, Ch. III.

18. See U. N. Doc. A/935, Ch. II.

the complicated problems involved. Meanwhile, UNSCOB, which had a clear and well-defined mandate for conciliation, as well as for observation, from the General Assembly in the resolution of November 27, 1948, found its own conciliatory rôle complicated, and was delayed in fulfilling its rôle out of deference to Dr. Evatt, although it was well-known that the President of the General Assembly had ignored and ridiculed that body on a number of occasions.

The Conciliation Committee held a preliminary meeting on April 19,¹⁹ with Ambassador Sarper and Ambassador van Langenhove (Belgium). Ambassador van Langenhove opposed resumption of the discussions, in view of all the complicated issues, while Dr. Evatt insisted on his "mandate" and, ultimately, it was agreed that, in behalf of the Committee, with Ambassador Sarper always present, Dr. Evatt should see individual representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia, with a view to finding out whether the situation had, indeed, changed since December 1948. The Committee met with Mr. Pipinelis on April 19, little was said about "conciliation," and Dr. Evatt did not reveal the contents of a cable which he had sent to the Greek Foreign Minister, Mr. Tsaldaris, on that day relative to certain executions said to have taken place in Greece. A meeting was also held with the Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav Delegations, but, two days later, on April 21, the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Delegations suggested that Dr. Evatt first talk with the Albanian representative and then vaguely repeated the positions which they had taken in December. The Albanian representative, Mr. Prifti, in turn, indicated that the Albanian attitude as to a formal Greek renunciation of the claim to Northern Albania had not changed. Dr. Evatt felt that Albania should not have taken that position, but that Greece should not hesitate to give a guarantee as to pacific procedure concerning the claim.

As the Conciliation Committee's discussions proceeded during the next several days, there was much talk of the Greek problem, and much denunciation of the Greek Government, on the part of the Soviet *bloc* of representatives in the First Committee.²⁰ Moreover, on April 20, Mr. Miltiades Porphy-

19. See U. N. Press Release SC/931. It was announced after the meeting that "arrangements had been made to continue the efforts at mediation especially in view of the substantial progress already made in the negotiations at Paris. Official information had been received that representatives of all four countries concerned would be available for participation in the talks." In addition to Dr. Evatt and Trygve Lie, Ambassadors Fernand van Langenhove (Belgium) and Selim Sarper (Turkey) served on the Committee.

20. See especially the remarks of Mr. Popović (April 11, U. N. Doc. A/AC.24/SR.31; April 14, A/PV.194); Mr. Gromyko (April 13, A/PV. 132); Mr. Katz-Suchy (April 18, 26; A/C.1/SR. 243, 250).

rogenis, who served as "Minister of Justice," in the so-called "Provisional Democratic Government of Greece," cabled, evidently from Prague, calling for a cease fire, a general amnesty and new elections, in the administration of which the guerrilla forces in Greece would participate. There was even a suggestion that Mr. Porphyrogenis would come to New York to assist in the conciliatory effort.

More serious, of course, were the discussions which took place among Dean Rusk, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Hector McNeil, Minister of State and Head of the United Kingdom Delegation, and Andrei Gromyko, who was leading the Soviet Delegation, which began on April 26, at the home of Secretary-General Trygve Lie.²¹ Mr. Rusk expressed the hope that Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union would use their influence to bring about a settlement of the Greek question, "in order that the Greek people might concentrate on the reconstruction of their country." Mr. Gromyko thought that withdrawal of foreign troops would solve the problem, but was reminded that "our military assistance to Greece had become necessary because of conditions created in Greece by armed rebellion against the Greek Government by guerrillas, directly assisted by Greece's three northern neighbors." Mr. Gromyko's attention was also invited to the efforts of UNSCOB and to Dr. Evatt's conciliation efforts at Lake Success. Mr. Gromyko, however, took the same attitude toward UNSCOB which the Soviet Delegation had adopted during the debates in the General Assembly during 1947-1948.

At Mr. Gromyko's invitation, MM. Rusk and McNeil met with Mr. Gromyko on May 4, since the latter desired to discuss the problem "in more concrete terms," although it was soon made clear to him that the discussion was to be purely informal and would "imply no change in the forum for discussing the Greek question from existing United Nations channels." Mr. Gromyko then

21. Department of State Press Release No. 378. May 20, 1949. The British statement, May 20, is in *The New York Times*, May 21, 1949. They were issued at the time because of a tendentious TASS release characterizing these meetings. According to the TASS account, MM. Rusk and McNeil had proposed the conversations and Mr. Gromyko had accepted and proposed that account be taken of the "peace" declaration "of the Provisional Greek Democratic Government" for termination of the "civil war," which called for (1) an appeal to terminate military operations; (2) a general amnesty, and (3) free parliamentary elections, with the participation of the "Greek democratic circles" and "People's Liberation Movement." At the same time, it was said, Mr. Gromyko pointed out further the desirability of (1) establishing supervision on the part of the representatives of the Powers, including the USSR, to assure correct conduct of the Greek elections, and (2) organization of a joint commission with USSR participation, for control of the frontiers. Military assistance to Greece would cease with the establishment of such control and a date would be set for withdrawal of foreign forces.

referred to certain proposals which had been made by Mr. Porphyrogenis on April 20, which he characterized "as calling for a cease fire, a general amnesty and new elections in the administration of which the guerrilla forces would participate,"²² as already noted. Mr. Rusk, however, reiterated that the primary issues was "the illegal furnishing of assistance across Greece's northern frontier to rebels in Greece and that the United Nations was the appropriate forum for discussion of that issue."

A third meeting was held on May 14 at Flushing Meadow, and during this conversation, MM. Rusk and McNeil repeated that while "we would welcome the restoration of peace in Greece, we could not negotiate on the matter except in an appropriate international forum which provided for full participation by the Greek Government." Mr. Rusk again "specifically referred to UNSCOB and to Dr. Evatt's conciliation efforts," and reiterated that "the main issue was the illegal activities of Greece's northern neighbors, particularly Albania and Bulgaria, in furnishing assistance to rebels in Greece." At the close of the conversation on May 14, Mr. Gromyko presented three additional points:

First, the Soviet Union would be willing to participate with the Great Powers in the supervision of a new Greek election; second, the Soviet Union would be willing to join with the Great Powers in a commission to "control" the northern frontier of Greece; and third, all foreign military assistance, both material and personnel, would have to be withdrawn from Greece.

Meanwhile, the effort of the Conciliation Committee had, of course, continued in a number of meetings during the early part of May, and the United States and the United Kingdom urged the Greek Government to accept the formula which the Committee had worked out by May 5 and submitted on May 6 and which did not commit Greece as to the substance of the question of Northern Epirus, but only to pacific procedures under the United Nations Charter. Acceptance, it was felt, would gain for Greece considerable moral credit both in Evatt's view and in world public opinion, while it would be tragic if Greece were blamed in any way for a possible breakdown in the talks. The new draft proposal for Greece and Albania declared:²³

22. Nevertheless, on May 7, the "Free Greece" radio announced that reports which had appeared in the foreign press concerning alleged conditions and proposals made by or acceptable to the "Provisional Democratic Government" did "not correspond" with its views. The "Provisional Democratic Government" was "always devoted to the idea of pacification and agreement in Greece" but had "not yet officially expounded anywhere its concrete view on this question."

23. While the Conciliation Committee, under Dr. Evatt's chairmanship, appears to have

1. There being no state of war between the two countries, the two Governments agree to exchange diplomatic representatives as early as possible. Outstanding differences or disputes between the Governments may be taken up by them through regular diplomatic channels.

2. The two Governments will enter into immediate negotiations with a view to the drawing up of a frontier convention.

3. Each Government agrees to patrol its own frontiers *up to the existing boundaries between the two states* for the purpose of doing everything within its power to avoid frontier incidents and of preventing any breach of international law in the frontier zones.

4. In order to assist the two Governments in relation to frontier matters, there will be established a mixed Albanian-Greek frontier commission. Such commission will be constituted of one representative of each Government and will *in the frontier zone* be given access to *the territories belonging to either State on its side* of the border. In the first instance, the commission will be established for a period of one year. The Commission will continue to function after the expiration of that period unless within one month before such expiration either Government notifies the other of its intention to terminate the Commission.

5. The functions of the mixed frontier Commission will be to act as a mediating authority in order to prevent border incidents and to settle disputes arising therefrom; to assist the Governments in handling expeditiously and wherever possible on the spot controversies arising under frontier conventions between them and generally to assist the Governments in assuring most friendly relations between the Greek and Albanian authorities on either side of the border.

On May 9, Ambassador Dendramis substantially accepted the new formula of the Conciliation Committee, although he had a few amendments to propose, particularly in paragraph 4.²⁴ There was no change in the positions of Albania, which continued to insist on a formal Greek renunciation of the claim to Northern Epirus.

As the Third Session of the General Assembly drew toward its close, UNSCOB which had its own functions to perform, cabled to Dr. Evatt for information concerning the efforts of the Conciliation Committee in New York, particularly since it was "considering the most appropriate means for

kept relatively few records, this text was published in connection with Dr. Evatt's statement of May 18, as embodied in U.N. Press Release BAL/480 and 480/Corr. 1.

24. See the communication of the Greek Delegation, dated May 11 and submitted on May 12, which indicated that the frontier Commission "*in the frontier zone*" would "be given access to *its territory* by either State on *its side* of the border."

resuming its conciliatory rôle following the adjournment of the third session of the General Assembly."²⁵ Dr. Evatt received the UNSCOB cable by May 14, and there were indications that he planned to make some kind of report to UNSCOB, since there was no question that that body should be informed officially as to what had taken place in New York. But there was still some question as to whether the President of the General Assembly would do so, and he made no reference to the Greek problem at all or to his conciliation efforts when he made his final address to the General Assembly on the afternoon of May 18.²⁶

Dr. Evatt saw Ambassador Dendramis on May 19 at Lake Success, and subsequently both Dr. Evatt and Ambassador Dendramis issued statements,²⁷ with the latter calling attention to the conciliatory attitude which the Greek Government had taken during the work of the Conciliation Committee, and paying tribute to the efforts of the Committee and its Chairman. At the same time, the Greek Delegation released the text of its note of May 12 to the Conciliation Committee, together with the text of the Evatt formula as accepted by the Greek Government.

Dr. Evatt also issued a statement on May 19 in behalf of the Conciliation Committee, although Ambassador van Langenhove and Ambassador Sarper did not sign it because of the Evatt remarks concerning the position of Albania in the discussions.²⁸ In essence, Dr. Evatt summarized the work of the Conciliation Committee, indicating that at Paris a draft text had been prepared and that, subject only to the point that Albania had demanded "that Greece should formally (*de jure*) recognize the existing boundaries between the two countries as definitive," agreement had been reached. The Greek Government had rejected this demand. However,

full accord was reached for the renewal of diplomatic relations, for the revision or making of frontier conventions in order to prevent incidents and for the establishment of joint frontier commissions to act as conciliating bodies in the event of disputes arising from incidents at the borders.

At New York, Dr. Evatt declared,

25. U. N. Docs. A/AC.16/690; A/AC.16/SR.156, pp. 5-6; A/935, Ch. II, paras. 27-30.

26. Nevertheless, an inaccurate account of the work of the Conciliation Committee appeared in *The New York Post* on May 18, 1949.

27. U. N. Press Release BAL/481.

28. U.N. Press Release BAL/480 and 480/Corr. I. Particular exception was taken to the Evatt statements that (1) Albania had neither accepted nor rejected the Evatt proposal; and (2) in the opinion of the "Committee," Bulgaria and Yugoslavia would make favorable replies if Albania did so.

it became apparent that if Albania and Greece would agree as to the territorial question so far as it was linked up with the question of boundaries, all four governments would be ready to sign the draft accord. In view of the difference between Albania and Greece arising from the demand by Albania, I suggested an amended draft agreement between Albania and Greece.

This agreement had added a phrase, notably in paragraph 4, "from which it is reasonably plain that there would be an acceptance by both Albania and Greece of the existing boundaries which, in my opinion, should, in the circumstances have been sufficient assurance to Albania as well as to Greece." Dr. Evatt indicated that on May 12, the Greek Government had accepted the formula "in substance," but that the Albanian Government had not yet replied, although it had received the revised draft on May 6. The Albanian representative, however, on May 19, had "insisted that his government had not rejected the amended draft." Dr. Evatt thought the Bulgarian and Yugoslav replies would be favorable provided Albania accepted the new draft. He added that the work of the Committee was at an end and felt that the Albanian Government had had "ample time since May 6 to accept, reject or amend the new formula and also that the new formula" assured "the existing boundaries between Albania and Greece." He concluded :

The new formula is a satisfactory one and should be acceptable in substance to Albania as it has been accepted in substance by Greece. While Albania's final reply has not been furnished, I sincerely hope that the governments themselves will reach final agreement, and for that purpose the good offices of the UN will always be available.

A copy of the statement was being sent to UNSCOB, which had "broad conciliatory functions," and, in view of the "progress" now made and "the very close approximation to full agreement," Dr. Evatt felt that "an early attempt to complete its work might well be successful."

Somewhat more realistic, perhaps, was the statement of the Department of State on May 20, fully supported by that of the British Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, which had summarized the Rusk-McNeil-Gromyko discussions.²⁹ The basic issue in the Greek situation, it was declared, was

29. Department of State Press Release No. 378, May 20, 1949; *New York Times*, May 21, 1949. For Dr. Evatt's account see Herbert Vere Evatt, *The Task of Nations* (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949, 6755.

the violation of Greece's northern frontier by military and other assistance to the rebel forces in Greece. This illegal foreign intervention has been repeatedly exposed by the competent organs of the United Nations and denounced by the overwhelming majority of the General Assembly as endangering the peace and as inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter. The United Nations has had this problem before it since 1946 and has established the means for settling it. The General Assembly elected both the Soviet Union and Poland to membership in the present United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, but both have refused to take their seats. The action of the Soviet Union in blocking effective action in the Security Council, in refusing to participate in the effort of the General Assembly to bring about a settlement and in lending encouragement to the illegal operations which have disturbed the peace, explain why peace has not yet been achieved.

Internal questions such as an amnesty and elections are matters for determination by the Greek Government. We believe that that Government has made a sincere and genuine effort to settle the matter with the help of the United Nations and in a manner consistent with the security of Greece. It was in direct response to the situation created by the illegal intervention of Greece's northern neighbors. So long as that situation continues, the United States will not relax its determination to assist the Greeks in protecting themselves against this form of aggression. We would, however, welcome a *bona fide* effort by the Soviet Union to remove the threat to the peace and security of the Greek people, and hope that it will use its influence in full support of the United Nations in seeking a settlement.

The Department of State added that the United States was prepared, of course, to discuss any matter with the Soviet Union "in the proper forum." But, in the case of the Greek question, the proper forum was "the United Nations, in which the Greek Government would have full participation."

The Conciliatory Effort of UNSCOB

While the conciliatory rôle of UNSCOB had been suspended, as already noted, during the Evatt effort, on May 27, 1949 it addressed communications to the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia, drawing their attention to its functions under the original resolutions of October 21, 1947 and November 27, 1948 and to the Evatt statement of May 19, 1948, and reminded them that its good offices continued to be available. In its Report of August 2, 1949,³⁰ the Special Committee noted the stated

30. U.N. Doc. A/935, paras. 26-35.

willingness of the Greek Government to enter into diplomatic relations with Albania and Bulgaria and its readiness to settle differences, the essential condition being the cessation of assistance to Greek guerrillas. While it maintained its claim to Northern Epirus, it did not seek to alter the frontiers "contrary to the principles and aims of the United Nations Charter." In the case of Bulgaria, the Greek Government also demanded a cessation of assistance to the guerrillas, implementation of the peace treaty of February 10, 1947, respect for the frontiers established by the peace treaty, and repatriation of Greek children taken into Bulgaria. But there was no outstanding question, it was stated, between Greece and Yugoslavia which could not be settled amicably. On the other hand, it was impossible for the Special Committee to obtain any response from the Albanian Government or the other northern neighbors. The Albanian position, however, was well known. The Bulgarian Government, it appeared, demanded renunciation of alleged Greek aims against Bulgaria and the alleged Greek violations of the Bulgarian frontier, which the Special Committee had not substantiated. Similarly, the Yugoslav Government did not respond to UNSCOB overtures, although the evidence indicated that there were possibilities for improvement of relations between the two countries.

As the Special Committee recorded, previously operative frontier conventions regulating border incidents between Greece and its northern neighbors in the interwar era had been rendered ineffective by the disturbed conditions, although meetings had been held on occasion during 1948 and 1949 between Greek frontier authorities and those of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. There had been, however, a complete absence of frontier relations between Greece and Albania.

The Conciliatory Effort at the Fourth General Assembly

When the Fourth General Assembly convened in September 1949, it seemed desirable to reconstitute the Conciliation Committee, a procedure which the United States Delegation now favored and, indeed, the addresses of Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, on September 21 and 26, stressed a conciliatory note.³¹ Those involved in the effort, moreover, were able to draw upon the experience, both of the previous Conciliation Committee and of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, and this time careful records were kept of the essential documentation. A draft resolution was prepared in the United States Delegation, but, in view of the past, it was deemed appropriate that the Australian Delegation should

31. U. N. Docs. A/PV. 222, 229.

initiate the resolution, which Ambassador Makin did before the First Committee on September 28.³² The new Conciliation Committee was to consist

of the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the First Committee, to continue the work of the Conciliation Committee appointed at the Third Regular Session in an endeavour to reach a pacific settlement of existing differences between Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other, to make any necessary recommendations thereto, and to consult in its discretion with other powers which might be able to assist.

It was obvious at once that the Australian proposal had almost universal support and no proposals were made as to amendments, although the Soviet *bloc* of states sought to delay the vote, and inferred once more that the primary concern of the new Committee should be the internal situation in Greece, including the matter of alleged executions and death sentences. Mr. Pipinelis, of the Greek Delegation, indicated that his Government was ready to cooperate with the new Conciliation Committee, and the resolution was unanimously approved on September 29.³³

In its own approach to the problem of conciliation, the United States sought to avoid any appearance of intransigence, to explore any genuine Soviet disposition to settle the Greek problem on acceptable terms, and seize the initiative from the Soviet Union in any conciliatory effort, but to confine the discussions to the problem of threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece, and avoid any irrelevant discussions looking toward foreign intervention in Greek internal affairs. This procedure, of course, was in line with the letter and spirit of the General Assembly's resolutions in 1947 and 1948. The Greek Delegation was to be kept informed of all developments and embarrassment of Yugoslavia, now isolated from its former associates, was to be avoided. It was also desired to avoid a repetition of Soviet *bloc* propaganda debates on the Greek question, and, at the same time, if possible, the Soviet *bloc* was to be prevented from utilizing the consultations for purely propaganda purposes. The reality, however, hardly conformed to the dream.

The new Conciliation Committee held no less than twenty-nine meetings during October 4-22, 1949.³⁴ It was agreed at the outset that the meetings

32. U. N. Doc. A/C. 1/481.

33. In general see U.N. Docs. A/C.1/SR. 274-276, for discussion.

34. U. N. Doc. A/C. 1/506: Report of the Conciliation Committee; reprinted in Harry N. Howard, *The Greek Question in the Fourth General Assembly of the United Nations*. Department of State Publication 3785 (Washington, D. C., 1950), 24-27. The Committee consisted of Mr. Romulo, President of the General Assembly; Mr. Lie, the Secretary-General; Mr. Lester Pearson, Chairman of the First Committee; and Ambassador Sarper, Vice Chairman.

should be informal, but, in contrast to the Evatt procedure, that records should be kept, and that the work should begin on the basis of the proposals which had been made by the previous Conciliation Committee, under Dr. Evatt's chairmanship. It was soon clear that the positions of the parties had not undergone substantial change, although there were a few different nuances in the development of the problem. The Yugoslav Delegation, for example, was much more favorably disposed toward the Committee, although it found it somewhat difficult to follow the discussions in view of its relationship, or lack thereof, with the Soviet *bloc* and its Balkan neighbors, and was even fearful of a possible Soviet-American arrangement at the expense of Yugoslavia.

After preliminary explorations, there was a brief lull in the work of the Committee which, however, began another round on October 13, when the Soviet Representative, Mr. Malik, reiterated the Soviet proposals of April - May 1949, now officially presented to the Conciliation Committee, calling for an appeal by the Powers to the parties for a cessation of military operations, general amnesty, free parliamentary elections, under supervision and with Soviet participation, the establishment of a joint Commission of the Powers, including the Soviet Union, to control the frontiers of Greece, and the withdrawal of foreign troops.³⁵ Mr. Malik indicated, however, that the Soviet Union was prepared to consider the Evatt draft proposals, which had been based on the international issues involved.

On October 14, the Conciliation Committee presented to all delegations consulted, including that of the United States, a series of "Tentative Suggestions for Draft Agreements between Greece and Each of Her Northern Neighbours Based on Conversations with the Parties Concerned."³⁶ Since the Greek-Albanian frontier constituted the central issue, in the formal sense, at any rate, the Committee began with that aspect of the problem. As to Albania and Greece, for instance, it was suggested, "there being no state of war between the two countries," that they "agree to exchange diplomatic representatives as early as possible," and outstanding differences could be taken up through the regular diplomatic channels. Two alternatives were proposed to cover the problem of the Greek-Albanian frontier:

A. The two Parties agree to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other's territorial integrity.

B. The two Parties agree not to use force or the threat of force for the purpose of changing the existing boundaries.

35. U. N. Doc. A/C.1/506, Annex 1 and 2; Howard, 25.

36. U. N. Doc. A/C.1/506; Howard, 25-26.

It was also suggested that a mixed Frontier Commission be established in order to assist "in relation to frontier matters." This Commission was to be composed of one representative of each Government, and it was stated that "by agreement of the two representatives," the Commission would "have access to the frontier zones of either State." The Commission was to be established in the first instance, for one year, but was to continue after expiration, unless within one month prior to such expiration each party notified the other of its intention to terminate it. The Commission, as largely in the previous formulation, was to act as "a mediating authority in order to prevent border incidents and to settle disputes arising therefrom"; to assist in handling expeditiously and wherever possible on the spot, controversies arising under frontier conventions and, generally, "to assist the Governments in assuring most friendly relations," between Greece and its northern neighbors. It was proposed that the parties enter immediately into negotiations for the purpose of drawing up frontier conventions or, where appropriate, revise old ones. While no specific texts were suggested, the Conciliation Commission raised the question of a neutral chairman for each of the proposed mixed Frontier Commissions or of a referee to whom appeal could be made in the event of disagreements in the Commission. It was suggested that the neutral chairman or referee might be chosen by the parties or by an international agency, in case of failure to agree. Likewise, the problem of the repatriation of Greek children was raised, and it was stated that there seemed to be "general agreement on the implementation" of the General Assembly's resolution of November 27, 1948 on this matter.

The United States and United Kingdom Delegations were well disposed toward the "tentative suggestions" of the Conciliation Committee, although they also felt that UNSCOB should not be given up for what the British considered "a pound of tea."³⁷ Similarly, the Greek Delegation was favorably inclined to the suggestions, although Mr. Pipinelis preferred alternative B, and suggested that the phraseology as to peaceful intent could be taken from Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, and thought the statement as to the right of access of the proposed Frontier Commission to the frontier areas was not as precise as the Evatt formula of May 6. The Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav Delegations, which also received the proposals on October 14, varied in their reactions. The Yugoslav Delegation made no comments at all to the

37. The United States and United Kingdom Delegations, like that of the Soviet Union, conferred with the Committee on a number of occasions. Those involved were Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen, who handled the Greek problem for the Delegation of the United States, and MM. Gerald A. Drew and Harry N. Howard. Mr. Hector McNeil and Mr. Edward H. Peck acted for the United Kingdom Delegation.

Committee, although there were private comments that the Soviet Union had sold out the Greek guerrillas, and that the United Kingdom and the United States had won a moral victory over the Soviet Union. The Yugoslav Delegation was not disposed to impede the work of the Committee, but indicated that its ultimate attitude would depend not only on the character of the proposed agreements, but on the Albanian and Bulgarian positions. On October 17, it may be noted, the so-called "Provisional Democratic Government of Greece" announced that the "Democratic Army" was grounding arms temporarily, but not giving up the struggle for "Democratic Greece," a development which led some to think that the Soviet Union might, perhaps, take a favorable attitude toward the work of the Conciliation Committee.

The formal replies were forthcoming on the afternoon of October 17. The representative of Albania, Mr. Prifti, who adopted completely the Soviet position, had no special observations as to the renewal of diplomatic relations, the preparation of frontier conventions, and the establishment of a mixed Frontier Commission, but he conditioned any acceptance of a draft agreement, as hitherto, on formal Greek renunciation of the claim to Northern Epirus, through the insertion of a clause stating that "the Government of the People's Republic of Albania and the Government of Greece agree that the existing boundaries between Albania and Greece are final."³⁸ Since the Albanian Government knew this was unacceptable, the Albanian action meant that the effort of the Committee would fail. Mr. Prifti also considered the idea of a neutral chairman for the proposed Frontier Commission useless and stated that, since there were no Greek children in Albania, the question of their repatriation did not concern Albania. He also thought it useless to send UN observers to Albania to confirm the disarmament of Greek guerrillas, since the Albanian Government had already announced that they had been disarmed and interned. In line with the Soviet position, Mr. Prifti emphasized that "the problem was not one of Greece's relations with her northern neighbors, but of the internal Greek situation," and "fully associated himself with the proposals which had been presented to the Committee by the Soviet Delegation for the regulation of the position in Greece."

The Soviet-Albanian position, of course, was not acceptable and it reflected a basic rejection of the formula proposed by the Conciliation Committee. The Greek Delegation, on the other hand, was favorably inclined, with the understanding that acceptance of the formula implied the dropping of the So-

38. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/506, Annex 4; Howard, 26. On the Greek children, see U.N. Doc. A/1014, October 20, 1949: *Joint Report by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies Addressed to the Secretary-General.*

viet terms and that agreement would in no way impair UNSCOB's competence and that signature would not complete the work of that body, since the only question of substance, namely that of UN verification of the interning and disarming of the guerrillas, was untouched. In its statement to the Conciliation Committee,³⁹ the Greek Delegation proposed the following wording with respect to the Greek-Albanian frontier:

The two parties agree to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other's territorial integrity or political independence. In particular the two parties agree not to use force or the threat of force for the purpose of changing the existing boundaries between them.

The Greek Delegation indicated that the control system of the frontier zone would be ineffective if the proposed Frontier Commission were denied access to the zone, "except by agreement between the representatives of the two parties in the Commission," although the Greek Government stated its willingness to accept the free discharge of the Commission's functions on Greek territory. The Greek Delegation also considered it imperative that there be a referee named by the United Nations, if there were to be no neutral chairman of the proposed Commission. It also called for prompt and sincere implementation of the resolution concerning the repatriation of the Greek children, and recalled the importance of "verification of the disarmament of guerrillas in Albania and Bulgaria." In reply to a question put by the Committee, however, the Greek Delegation stated orally that, in principle, it was willing "to sign an agreement as set out in the 'Tentative Suggestions' which had been communicated to the Parties."

The Yugoslav Delegation, likewise, in principle, accepted the draft agreement, although it suggested a few changes, and considered the question of a neutral chairman superfluous and the reference to the Greek children unnecessary.⁴⁰ The Bulgarian reply did not come until October 20, after the Committee had suspended its work, although the Bulgarian Representative, Mr. Mevorah, had told the committee on October 17 that Bulgaria would "not accept any draft agreement unless an agreement could also be reached with Albania." This view was confirmed on October 20, when the Bulgarian Government "agreed in principle" with the "Tentative Suggestions," but added its understanding that Agreement between Bulgaria and Greece "could only be achieved within the framework of a general agreement between interested Bal-

39. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/506, Annex 5; Howard, 26.

40. U. N. Doc. A/C.1/506, Annex 6; Howard, 27.

kan countries.”⁴¹ But it is also noteworthy that, as in the case of Albania and the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian Government emphasized that

in order to achieve in an effective manner the ends sought by the Conciliation Committee, it would be necessary to arrive at a general pacification inside Greece, this being possible only, in the first place, by a general amnesty and democratic elections.

It was now clear, with the Soviet, Albanian and Bulgarian positions with respect to the proposals, that the work of the Conciliation Committee was at an end, and President Romulo's immediate reaction was that it had been a useless exercise. In a preliminary report to the First Committee on October 18,⁴² after twenty-nine meetings, President Romulo expressed regret that “in spite of its best efforts it was unable to develop a basis of conciliation on which agreement could be reached between the governments of Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece.” Nevertheless, he said, the discussions had clarified the issues and, perhaps, narrowed, the points of difference.” Moreover, he assured the Committee that the Conciliation Committee “would be happy to resume its efforts at any time during the present session whenever the parties concerned consider this desirable.” While its work was to be suspended, President Romulo felt that the Committee had done “everything in its power to facilitate agreement between the parties concerned.” Whether through the Conciliation Committee or through direct negotiations, it was essential, he thought, “to reach such an agreement if conditions of security and stability are to be restored to the areas concerned.”

The final and more detailed Report to the First Committee, on October 22,⁴³ summarized the work of the Conciliation Committee. The Report indicated that, while Greece and Yugoslavia had accepted the proposals substantially, and Albania and Bulgaria had made little or no comment as to the problems of renewal of diplomatic relations and the preparation of frontier conventions, they had rejected the idea of neutral chairmen for the proposed Frontier Commissions, along with the verification by the United Nations of the disarming and interning of Greek guerrillas in Albania or Bulgaria. Moreover, both Albania and Bulgaria, in line with Soviet policy, insisted on entering into the Greek internal problems of a general amnesty and free elections, a proposition which they would have utterly rejected if applied to Albania and Bulgaria. Finally, as a condition of any proposed agreements, both Albania and Bulgaria insisted on formal Greek renunciation of the claim to Northern Epirus.

41. U. N. Doc. A/C.1/506, Annex 7; Howard, 27.

42. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/506, Annex 8; Howard, 27.

43. U. N. Doc. A/C.1/506, as cited.

The Report of the Conciliation Committee entered into the discussion of the First Committee on a number of occasions during consideration of the Greek problem, and members of the Soviet *bloc* constantly brought up the failure of the Conciliation Committee to enter into the question of alleged Greek executions and death sentences.⁴⁴ The Soviet Delegation, moreover, introduced into the First Committee a resolution embodying the proposals which had already been rejected in the Conciliation Committee, with an additional paragraph calling for the dissolution of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.⁴⁵ On November 4, when the resolution continuing UNSCOB was approved in the First Committee, a number of delegations, and especially those of Mexico, Peru and Australia, expressed hope that the work of the Conciliation Committee would continue.⁴⁶ On November 18, the General Assembly, in plenary session, approved the continuation of UNSCOB (50-6-2), with its conciliatory rôle, and unanimously adopted the resolution on the repatriation of the Greek children.⁴⁷

While the work of the Conciliation Committee had really come to an end, it did consider the problem of the repatriation of Greek children late in November and more Soviet propaganda was made on the problem of alleged executions in Greece, especially in December 1949. But the latter meetings of the Committee were not fruitful at all, and could not be, granted the political context of the time. Meanwhile, partly in view of developments in the Conciliation Committee, but in any case because it was something of an urgent problem at the time, some thought was given to the functions of UNSCOB under its renewed terms of reference for the year 1950. Once more UNSCOB was instructed to⁴⁸

continue to assist the four Governments concerned in the implementation of the Assembly's resolutions, in particular to promote the restoration of normal relations between Greece and her northern neighbours and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Balkans...

44. See, for example, U. N. Doc. A/C.1/SR. 298, 302.

45. U. N. Docs. A/C.1/SR.311; A/C.1/518.

46. U. N. Doc. A/C.1/SR. 311.

47. U. N. Doc. A/PV. 246-247.

48. U. N. General Assembly Resolution 228 (IV), November 18, 1949. See the working papers prepared by the UNSCOB Secretariat on "Preliminary Study on Problems of 'Conciliation'" (A/AC.16/W.107, January 9, 1950); "Reports from Zones of Observation" (A/AC. 16/W.108, January 12, 1950); "Problems Involved in the Implementation of General Assembly Recommendations" (A/AC.16/W.109, January 13, 1950); "Greek Internal Refugees" (A/AC.16/W.110, January 13, 1950); "Summary of Data Relating to International

As in the past, the Special Committee on the Balkans was authorized, "in its discretion, to appoint and utilize the services and good offices of one or more persons, whether or not members of the Special Committee."

There was no further developments in the Greek problem until the final session of the General Assembly on December 10, 1949, when President Romulo stated that, in the light of the further conversations of the Conciliation Committee with representatives of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, he thought the prospects for peace encouraging and was confident of progress "if all parties abide in good faith by the resolutions of the General Assembly and the provisions of the Charter."⁴⁹ Mr. Romulo also considered that the fact that there had been no executions in Greece since the enactment of the leniency legislation on September 30 was a happy augury, indicating that "attitudes of humanitarianism and tolerance, compatible with security and public order," could not "but help to facilitate the work of conciliation which must eventually take place among the States involved in this problem."

In the weeks which followed the end of the General Assembly, there were indications that Greece was moving toward a more normal political and economic development. On January 20, 1950, the Greek Government repeated its willingness to (1) make further efforts to resolve its differences with Yugoslavia; (2) re-establish normal diplomatic and good neighborly relations with Albania and Bulgaria; and (3) renew previously operative frontier conventions or conclude new ones. But, despite the publicly expressed optimism of President Romulo at the close of the Fourth General Assembly, there were no concrete results at all, and considerable skepticism as to whether there would be any. The International Red Cross encountered much difficulty in carrying out its tasks in connection with the Greek children taken into the northern neighborhood of Greece. The International Red Cross appealed to the UN Secretary-General, who was much concerned over the absence of practical results. Relations between Greece and Yugoslavia did, indeed, move toward improvement and even rapprochement, when, on February 28, 1953, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia signed an *entente*, and, subsequently, relations with Bulgaria underwent something of a change. Albania, however, turned in a different direction.

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Refugees in Greece" (A/AC.16/W.112. January 17, 1950). The Australian Delegation, on January 17, 1950, submitted a working paper on "Repatriation of Greek Children."

49. U. N. Doc. A/PV. 276.