

leaders since 1944 but the schematization developed by Professor Jowitt is so "mod," so unrelated to the *modus operandi* of Gheorghiu-Dej, Ceausescu, and other principals as to render "The Case of Romania" a cacophonic parody.

Colleagues from Eastern Europe have repeatedly expressed bewilderment over the jargon and methodology of "Kremlinologists" which they regard as completely alien to their own experiences as members of communist parties or as mere inhabitants of communist countries. Their views may very well be ascribed to methodological retardation and adherence to traditional, perhaps even rudimentary, historical concepts. But no matter how defective the historical method may be in terms of comparative analysis it does provide, at least for case studies of the historically-oriented countries of Eastern Europe, a more accurate basis for analysis of what "*wirklich ist gewesen*." The student of comparative political analysis will applaud Professor Jowitt's virtuosity; the student of Romanian affairs is likely to walk out "'on' time," at the end of the first movement of Jowitt's variations on a theme by Lenin and Gheorghiu-Dej.

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J. F. Brown, *Bulgaria Under Communist Rule*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970. Pp. X + 339.

So little has been written about postwar Bulgaria in English that the scholar greets each new offering with great expectation and hope. It is unfortunate, therefore, that Brown's attempt to fill this void is marred by a collection of platitudes and biased anti-Soviet remnants of the "Cold War" days. In fact the author's acknowledgment that "many parts of . . . (the) book are based on Radio Free Europe analysis" should caution the reader that Mr. Brown is attempting to offer a polemic as sound scholarship. Actually, the author presents two major premises. First, he maintains that the Communist "takeover" in Bulgaria was almost identical to that elsewhere in Eastern Europe, i.e., as he intimates, directed by Moscow and without the aid of a strong native Communist movement. Secondly, he proposes that Bulgaria's wellbeing is (or would be) directly proportionally to its estrangement from the Soviet Union. In order to prove the latter he compares the country unfavorably to Yugoslavia and Rumania. Both of these premises are short-sighted, misleading, and in general mistaken.

To present and support his first premise the author gives in his first chapter a synopsis of pre-war Bulgarian developments consisting of erroneous facts and unsound judgments. Although he documents in his footnotes several excellent sources for this chapter such as Cyril Black's *Development of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria* and Nissan Oren's Ph., D. dissertation on the history of Bulgarian Communist Party, he sometimes strays from their information and assessments. The major source for his summary is Dellin's *Bulgaria*, a 1951 book written specifically for polemical purposes.

Brown states, for example, on page 5 that between the wars the Bulgarian Communist Party achieved "hardly . . . any great success or political aptitude at home." In fact the party was the most successful Communist Party in Eastern Europe. In the unrestricted elections before 1923 it was the second most popular in the country. While no party could match the popularity of the Agrarian Union, the Communist were certainly able to equal at times the support of the others. As late as 1931 they won key elections in the Sofia municipal races and even in 1940 the Communists won a significant number of seats (9 out of 160) in the elections for the twenty-fifth National *Subranie* – at a time when the party was legally prohibited from participating. This was a record not matched by any other individual party except the Agrarian Union.

Further, on page 7 Brown states that the party failed to win the support of the Agrarian leaders in the Fatherland Front. Although Dimitur Gichev and Vergil Dimov did not join, G. M. Dimitrov and Nikola Petkov did. Also the author later rather rashly claims that "many educated Bulgarians even those supporting the new régime" must have looked in dismay at the Constitution of 1947 as compared to the Turnovo Constitution of 1879 (pp. 15-16). His main reason for this statement is that while the Turnovo Document may have been "more honored in the breach than the observance," it was "astonishingly progressive for its time and remained a model for liberal constitutionists for many years." On the other hand, in the Constitution of 1947 "the provisions guaranteeing civil liberties and political freedoms arouse the greatest cynicism." Aside from the prejudicial irrationality of this argument, the author misses the major point that the Turnovo Constitution was, as Black points out, a naive document lacking sound procedures for judicial review and combining for ruling authority an essentially conservative institution, the monarchy, with a liberal one, the unicameral legislature.

This —not the intentions of its progressive authors— was the basic cause of the constitution's failure.

These fundamental errors and misreadings are the shaky props on which the author constructs his implied conclusion that the coming to power of the Bulgarian Communist Party was essentially the same as elsewhere in the East bloc. Hence he neglects the factors that made Bulgaria fundamentally unique in the period immediately after the war and led to its different development in the years that followed. The error of his first premise is compounded by the error of Brown's second.

Inherent in the author's interpretation of the regime is the conclusion that if the coming to power of the Communists in Bulgaria was the same as in, for example, Rumania, then the fact that Rumania differed from the Soviet Union on a number of important and well publicized issues means that the Bulgarian leaders have been negligent in the interests of their own country by following the Soviets on these same issues. In fact, this interpretation denies the basic reality that in Eastern Europe each country is using the resources and opportunities at hand to improve its lot. A westerner may feel that Bulgaria would be better disassociated from the USSR, but this does not necessarily mean that a Bulgarian, Communist or not, should feel the same. While it is certainly true that Bulgaria's russophilism has some limitations, its nature cannot be denied. Brown's concluding statement that "the Bulgarian regime's concept of the Soviet alliance —devotion to the point of servility— has offended the self-respect of *most* [italics supplied] Bulgarians" is an exaggeration. After all, no other country has had so much economic aid from the Soviet Union as Bulgaria.

The polemical style of Brown's work is most evident in its impartial hyperbole. Besides those already mentioned, one more extreme example will serve to illustrate this. On page 132, discussing former premier Kimon Georgiev's retirement in 1959 from a high post in the government, the author writes that "a man who began his career with a good deal of respect ended it in an aura of amused or sad contempt." Aside from the revealing information to the general reader that an important bourgeois politician remained in the highest places of the government fifteen years after the "Communist take-over" in this the most red of Russia's allies, there are many people who would never look upon this courageous statesman who fought the horrors of IMRO in his own country and openly denounced the alliance of his government to Hitler with amused or sad contempt.

The author's most useful contribution —an account of the events over the last quarter century in Bulgaria— is unfortunately marred by his apparent lack of direct experience in the country and is nothing more than a superficial report. For example, by repeatedly labelling the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union a "puppet" party (pp. 29, 69, 214), he misleads the reader from any insight into the real power that this group has. Also in his description of the still vague events of the spring of 1965 (pp. 173-189), when there was an apparent attempt to overthrow Zhivkov, he does no more than scratch the surface. Perhaps the rumors surrounding this event (such as those implicating Chervenkov) cannot be definitively ascertained, but their analysis could have been useful, especially as the author previously had shown no distaste at engaging in speculation.

Finally Brown's assessment that "Bulgarian relations with the United States have never progressed to an extent that promised any real improvement" (p. 283) seem to me to be the grossest misstatement. The increased contacts between the countries since Mrs. Anderson represented Washington there, the many cultural exchanges, the increasing number of American tourists visiting the country as well as increasing number of Bulgarians visiting the United States, the growing number of personal friendships between Bulgarians and Americans, the reestablishment of ambassadorial status between the governments in 1966, and the increasing trade agreements between the two countries even including a Coca-Cola bottling plant in Sofia all contradict this mistaken conclusion.

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Paul Lendvai, *Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969. Pp. XII + 396.

*Eagles in Cobwebs* is a new member of a long tradition of many journalistic books which all English-speaking students of the Balkans have read in their careers. Mr. Lendvai states as his object "a work midway between journalism and history" (p. xii). The work indeed has many of the advantages of journalism, but also suffers from many of the defects to which this kind of account is prone. The author's superb stylistic capabilities make the book very enjoyable both for the general