

publishers, the Institute of Balkan Studies, should rectify or another competent English translator should undertake.

An English or American edition would be a valuable gain.

New York

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Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913*. Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966. Pp. 538.

War, according to Clausewitz, is the achievement of national policy by other means. But war which is equated only with violence, international law teaches us, is a misconception. The state of war is essentially a legal condition and accordingly there can be war and no violence or there can be great violence and no war. Indeed, the use of force in inter-state relations, generally considered to be a legitimate monopoly of the state, has time and again been assumed by individuals or groups within the nation state. The actions of these individuals or groups has often forced the state, against its better judgment, if not its wishes, to become involved in the international sphere in actions that it would ordinarily have avoided.

Professor Dakin's study—especially of the Greek side—of the Macedonian struggle in the period before the first World War is an excellent example of how private individuals or groups have by their actions, both in the field of combat and at home, influenced and decided the policies not only of their own government, but also those of the Great Powers.

The struggle for Macedonia was essentially the Greek and Serbian response to the Bulgarian attempt to acquire the area and thus enlarge the borders of the Bulgarian state. The principal Bulgarian instrument in this campaign was the Internal Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) whose cry of "Macedonia for the Macedonians" was acceptable in Sofia, for Macedonian autonomy would merely be a mid-way point to be followed, as in the case of Eastern Rumelia, by a unification with Bulgaria.

Defeated in their war with Turkey in 1897 and enmeshed in the Cretan question the Greek Government was really in no position to pick up the Bulgarian challenge and get deeply involved in the Macedonian struggle in the late 1890's. Such, however, was not the case in Macedonia itself where armed resistance to the IMRO-led comitadji bands was initially

organised by the Greek Orthodox Church and especially by Germanos Karavangelis, the Metropolitan Bishop of Kastoria.

By 1904 Greece had recovered somewhat from its defeat of 1897 and because of increased public pressure and aware of its interests in the north, the Athens government was moved to strengthen its consular posts in Macedonia and to attach to these posts military officers who were to act as intelligence agents — an international practice one might add that has not completely disappeared. However, the actual sending of Greek armed bands into Macedonia was in large measure initiated not by the government itself, but by private individuals and groups — an action that would be repeated almost half a century later with the dispatch of Colonel Grivas to Cyprus without the approval or concurrence of the Athens government. The Greek government was of course aware of these moves by the private individuals and groups concerned since many of the Greek band leaders were army officers who had been allowed by the government to resign their commissions for the express purpose of going to Macedonia. To have resisted the dispatch of these armed Greek bands, to have refused to accept the resignations of the officers involved, or to have punished these officers would have entailed as Crown Prince Constantine rightly admitted in an interview with a British official “a revolution and possibly the overthrow of the Greek dynasty.”

During this period the Great Powers were strapped with the unappetizing task of trying to devise methods to deal with the armed bands whether IMRO, Greek, or Serbian, in what was the Ottoman Empire's last European possession. Their attempts to reform the Ottoman administration in Macedonia were no more successful than their attempts to control the armed bands by the dispatch of European policy officers to assist the Ottoman policy authorities. In the end Macedonia fell to the three Balkan states concerned when they overwhelmed the Young Turks during the first Balkan War. The second Balkan War saw a further division of the area with Bulgaria losing much of what it had gained during the first Balkan War.

What had the Greek armed bands, and one might add the Serbian ones, achieved during the struggle that ravaged Macedonia during these years? They had in large measure, after the initial advantages achieved by the IMRO-led comitadji bands, organised in Macedonia the Greek communities, and in the case of Belgrade, the Serbian communities, against IMRO pressures. With the benevolent assistance of the Ottoman authorities and especially the army, they had defeated and largely des-

troyed the IMRO organisation in Macedonia. Thus Bulgaria's ability during these years of struggle to speak for the Macedonians and to press its claims over the area was denied and the *status quo ante* of 1897 was more or less re-established by the Greek and Serbian armed bands only to be dissolved with the two Balkan Wars.

It can only be hoped that accounts as impartial as Professor Dakin's covering this period will also appear giving the Serbian and Bulgarian sides to what, at least in the past, has always been so emotional a subject. Largely based on the Archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry and those of the British Foreign Office, on unpublished private sources, on interviews, on official published documentation, as well as on biographies, memoirs, and secondary sources, this voluminous book will long remain the definitive work on the subject.

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Joice Nankivell Loch, *A Fringe of Blue: an Autobiography*. John Murray, London. 1968. Pp. 245+15 plates.

Those of us who have visited Mount Athos during the past thirty years cannot be unfamiliar with the name Loch. Some of us will have enjoyed the hospitality of the Tower by the sea at Prosphori. Such readers will turn eagerly to this book. Not all of it is about Prosphori (Mrs. Loch prefers Prosphorion) for the autobiography runs fresh and sparkling over a lifetime of more than threescore years and ten. But what especially grips the mind is the "huge Byzantine tower" at the village guarding the way to Athos, rising up "mystic, wonderful" (113). The author's father would say to his children "What have you ever *done*?" (24). The question could be answered very well in this case, for Joice Loch during her thirty years at "the Tower" (239) has achieved a reputation for practical help which will not soon be forgotten in the history of Greece and particularly Macedonia.

Here we meet a most uncommon woman. Australian by birth she has spent a busy life in repairing what war has wrecked: in Poland, in Russia and in Greece. At the same time she has a shrewd eye and a ready pen. A brisk sense of humour does not hide her "concern" (the Quaker term which keeps cropping up) and her deep compassion for her less fortunate