German defensive policy in the Balkans, a case study: the buildup in Greece, 1943

Abstract

Following the collapse of Rommel’s forces in North Africa and
the Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria (November 1942) Hitler and the German High Command began to worry about the security
of the vulnerable and weakly defended southern tier of their «Festung
Europa». This concern centered on the Balkans, and most importantly,
Greece. Indeed, throughout 1943, the Germans made a genuine effort
to reinforce their position in Greece and throughout the Balkans; and
the buildup accellerated in May 1943, following the success of an ingenious
British «ruse de guerre» designed to mislead the German High
Command on the eve of the Allied invasion of Sicily.
My essay traces the nature of the German buildup in some detail;
it also attempts to clarify the strategic assumptions of Hitler and his
advisors upon which the buildup was based. I will argue that, in 1943,
the Balkans were an area of primary strategic concern for the Germans,
and that fear of major Amglo-American operation in the area
was very great. I will attempt to demonstrate, however, that German
fears vis-a-vis the Balkans were predicated upon some fundament
inaccurate assumptions about the nature of, and tensions within, the
Allied coalition
My essay is based principally upon unpublished German miliraty
records - war diaries, intelligent assessments, situation reports, etc. As
far as I know, it is the first attempt by a historian to trace the German
military buildup in Greee in 1943 in great detail.