

gree, while creating historicist myths at the same time. In this centuries long process the Balkan peoples had gone from religious to historical nationalism. From a limited identity and spatial sense vis-a-vis, those who ruled them, they emerged with a broader consciousness based on time. And that fuller sense through historical awareness provided the validating principle for both national and social revolt.

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Walter F. Weiker, *The Modernization of Turkey: From Ataturk to the Present Day*. New York and London: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1981. 303 pp.

Professor Weiker's latest book touches on most of the social, political, and economic issues which complicate yet propel Republican Turkey's modernization into the twenty-first century. In nine chapters, he presents the various forces, the major leaders, and the political parties involved in developing the necessary infrastructure for such modernization. Despite its title, the book only superficially covers the period from Ataturk to World War II but treats in depth the important years 1945 through 1979. The momentary Turkish retreat from parliamentary democracy (in 1980) does not fundamentally affect the author's general conclusions. Based on his formulation of more than 50 tables, from original Turkish and other research, he explains statistically many of the issues arising out of Turkey's special geo-political position between the Soviet Union and the West, and its special Islamic relationship between the Ottoman caliphate and Kemalist secularism. Despite many stumbling steps, the Turks, in Weiker's view, will continue to modernize toward a state-supported capitalist system, toward parliamentary democracy, and probably acceptance as an integral part of the European community and the West.

Although the author looks positively on this Turkish struggle to modernize along western lines, he carefully notes Turkish setbacks, to be sure, and does not hide the oftentimes extreme political and social problems which they themselves have raised. A temptation has always existed among some Turks to accept an authoritarian solution. In the past forty-five years, internal disagreement often pushed them away from parliamentarianism: an undisciplined press and a divided and often polarized electorate led to the excesses of the Sixties; more recently in the Seventies uncompromising politicization resulted in virtual civil war. The Parliament itself often could not compromise sufficiently with its own leadership to solve fundamental issues within Turkey, issues which led to the impasses and military coups of 1960 and of 1980. Weiker believes that it is still too early to judge the final outcome, and that adherence to the parliamentary institutions established by Ataturk and the early Kemalist reformers of the Twenties seems to be deeply ingrained among the Turks. Despite the excesses Weiker believes the forces of moderation in Turkey can prevail, given good leadership and a willingness to compromise.

Unlike some of his other books, the author here tends to expose rather than to analyse. The major points are covered, but sometimes not enough space is de-

voted to study in depth. For example, the role of Turkish agricultural workers which the author states make up more than 64% of Turkey's 1975 work force, tend to receive perfunctory treatment in some seven pages whereas the mass media (radio, television, literature) receives 10. The author devotes little space to analysis of the role of US funds in Turkey's modernization process. Did US military and economic aid keep Prime Minister Menderes in power, as has been alleged in the Turkish popular press? To what extent was Truman aid responsible for rising expectations of Turks in the 1950s which allegedly allowed and perpetuated the excesses of the Democrat Party? How did the millions pumped in for military aid affect the Turkish private sector, if at all? At one point we are told that the US has provided Turkey \$ 2.7 billion from 1949-1973, a sum which surely must have affected the economy and the process of modernization in some very specific ways. Or did it? Weiker lays little stress on the role of US military power in Turkey or the role of the CIA, groups whose strength may have been a chimera, yet effected strong concerns among the Turkish youth who became radicalized in the mid-Seventies. Were these issues important in the modernization process or merely superficial, used by left-wing groups for their own purposes? This reviewer could find no mention of the World War II Wealth Tax, the memory of which still provokes strong concern among non-Muslim business and professional people in Turkey. To what extent does such a memory act as a psychological barrier to full participation in the modernization process? Or are the non-Muslims all that important? Weiker does not raise the issue. The question of population expansion and the various programs in Turkey of birth control in the Seventies gain little attention in the book. In the intriguing section (p. 201) of the "paradox of land reform" Weiker notes that Islamic land inheritance laws are partially responsible for the extraordinary movement of landless siblings to urban centers in search of gainful employment. Moreover, the Turkish birth rate continues at a high pace. Does the fundamentalist Muslim revival, so apparent in political confrontations, affect attempts at controlling the population? Does this also affect the process of modernization? Again, the issue is not developed.

On a formal level, the organizational outline and the Index sometimes lack consistency. A useful Conclusion in Chapter Three is not mentioned in the Contents, yet an important section on Turkish Workers in Europe is curiously added after the Conclusion. The Index sometimes omits items that would seem to have an important bearing on problems of modernization, e.g., population control. It fails to include the countries mentioned in the book which are neighbors to Turkey and with which the Turks compete economically and politically.

One valuable asset of Weiker's book for readers of this journal is his use of various studies by first-rate Turkish scholars, like sociologist Mübeccel Kiray and political scientists Ergun Özbudun and Metin Heper, to name only a few. These western-trained younger scholars have published important researches and observations bringing a solid Turkish component into such a work. The scholarship of these Turks helps to clarify Turkey's modernization problems. Those who do the "digging" and those who interpret from a different perspective benefit from the merger. What forty years ago were sometimes naive often nationalistic interpretations by the Turks are today sophisticated scholarly, dependable, and relatively unbiased works. That Professor Weiker has the capacity to use these important Tur-

kish sources and has done so in a very clearly-written, well-organized format, makes available for readers of English a trustworthy document which will certainly be the basis for much further research in years to come.

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‘Υπουργείον Ἐξωτερικῶν, 1940-41. *Ἑλληνικά Διπλωματικά Ἔγγραφα*, Athens, 1980, p.p. 238.

Greek diplomatic activity following the Italian invasion of 28 October 1940 offers useful insights into a number of issues which, in their totality, constitute an important chapter of the Second World War's opening phase. Determined not to capitulate to aggression and struggling against overwhelming military odds Greece could turn only to Britain for support. Yet she did so nervously and irresolutely, afraid that the arrival of British forces would embroil her in the broader European conflict and offer Germany the excuse to attack Greece as well. This balancing act, in which Greece tried to maintain the pretence of neutrality while seeking the aid of a principal belligerent, was destined to fail and the Metaxas regime became a pawn of British strategy, receiving little tangible assistance in return. For her part, Britain, preoccupied in North Africa as well as in her own defense, saw in the Italian-Greek war an opportunity to inflict damage upon the Axis and to sponsor a phantom Balkan front, expending considerable diplomatic energy but little military force and thus without a chance for success. Similarly, Balkan cooperation against outsiders, the subject of numerous consultations and pledges throughout the 1930s, proved to be a sham. Bulgaria became a willing tool of the Axis, hoping to secure from Hitler what she had failed to win in the Balkan wars two decades earlier. Yugoslavia's rulers struggled in vain to keep their country out of harm's way, all along debating which of the warring sides had more to offer. Turkey's ever-shifting position on her promises of alliance to Britain and Greece offers a fascinating example of diplomatic double-talk and evasion.

For the casual observer there is a strong temptation to pass moral judgment on such state behavior. On the other hand the historian's task is to explain it, carefully analyzing varying views of the national interest as perceived by those in power. Such analysis is possible only on the basis of extensive and detailed state archival materials.

Collections of diplomatic papers dealing with the Italian and German invasions of Greece have been available in print for some time, drawn on the archives of Britain, Italy, Germany and the United States. In 1941 the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a number of key documents in a slender volume entitled *Diplomatika engrapha. I Italiki epitthesis enantion tis Ellados* (Diplomatic Papers. The Italian Attack Against Greece); an English edition appeared under the title *The Greek White Book* (London, 1942). The present publication, timed to appear on the fortieth anniversary of the Italian invasion, offers a much more complete and elaborate documentary record. It covers the period from 28 October 1940, the day of the Italian ultimatum, to 27 April 1941, when the German forces occupied Athens.