

kish sources and has done so in a very clearly-written, well-organized format, makes available for readers of English a trustworthy document which will certainly be the basis for much further research in years to come.

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‘Υπουργείον Ἐξωτερικῶν, 1940-41. *Ἑλληνικά Διπλωματικά Ἔγγραφα*, Athens, 1980, p.p. 238.

Greek diplomatic activity following the Italian invasion of 28 October 1940 offers useful insights into a number of issues which, in their totality, constitute an important chapter of the Second World War's opening phase. Determined not to capitulate to aggression and struggling against overwhelming military odds Greece could turn only to Britain for support. Yet she did so nervously and irresolutely, afraid that the arrival of British forces would embroil her in the broader European conflict and offer Germany the excuse to attack Greece as well. This balancing act, in which Greece tried to maintain the pretence of neutrality while seeking the aid of a principal belligerent, was destined to fail and the Metaxas regime became a pawn of British strategy, receiving little tangible assistance in return. For her part, Britain, preoccupied in North Africa as well as in her own defense, saw in the Italian-Greek war an opportunity to inflict damage upon the Axis and to sponsor a phantom Balkan front, expending considerable diplomatic energy but little military force and thus without a chance for success. Similarly, Balkan cooperation against outsiders, the subject of numerous consultations and pledges throughout the 1930s, proved to be a sham. Bulgaria became a willing tool of the Axis, hoping to secure from Hitler what she had failed to win in the Balkan wars two decades earlier. Yugoslavia's rulers struggled in vain to keep their country out of harm's way, all along debating which of the warring sides had more to offer. Turkey's ever-shifting position on her promises of alliance to Britain and Greece offers a fascinating example of diplomatic double-talk and evasion.

For the casual observer there is a strong temptation to pass moral judgment on such state behavior. On the other hand the historian's task is to explain it, carefully analyzing varying views of the national interest as perceived by those in power. Such analysis is possible only on the basis of extensive and detailed state archival materials.

Collections of diplomatic papers dealing with the Italian and German invasions of Greece have been available in print for some time, drawn on the archives of Britain, Italy, Germany and the United States. In 1941 the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a number of key documents in a slender volume entitled *Diplomatika engrapha. I Italiki epithesis enantion tis Ellados* (Diplomatic Papers. The Italian Attack Against Greece); an English edition appeared under the title *The Greek White Book* (London, 1942). The present publication, timed to appear on the fortieth anniversary of the Italian invasion, offers a much more complete and elaborate documentary record. It covers the period from 28 October 1940, the day of the Italian ultimatum, to 27 April 1941, when the German forces occupied Athens.

The book contains 239 documents, printed in their entirety and chronologically arranged. A neatly organized "log" provides basic information on each document: date, sender, addressee, and brief summary of contents. Occasional footnotes give additional cross-references and supplementary details. Greek translations of documents originally in French or English are given in an appendix, and there is also a detailed index of names. With few exceptions the documents are of a diplomatic nature; there are also a number of bulletins issued by the Greek General Headquarters reporting on the war's progress and the minutes of British-Greek military consultations.

In his introduction the editor, K. Svolopoulos, professor of diplomatic history at the School of Law and Economics of the University of Thessaloniki, states that the purpose of the compilation is to offer a balanced coverage of the principal diplomatic developments of the period under review without commentary or analysis. He also explains that because parts of the wartime records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were destroyed or otherwise lost, the collection contains many documents from the files of the Greek embassy in London. Given Britain's dominant role, this heavy reliance on the Athens - London diplomatic traffic appears to be justified.

Most of the documents appearing in these pages deal with Greek efforts to secure from Britain more weapons, equipment and air support, to ascertain the attitude of Yugoslavia and Turkey in the event of a German advance through Bulgaria, and to determine the best moment for British troops to come to Greece if Germany did attack. Slowly all hope of substantial assistance and regional cooperation fades and Greece faces two formidable enemies virtually alone: when British forces arrive, it is "too little, too late". In the last days before capitulation there are references to Greek requests, rejected by Britain, to have the government in exile go to Cyprus, part of which might be declared "Greek".

Perhaps the most significant portion of the collection is that of the minutes of British-Greek military consultations aimed at coordinating the deployment of their forces in northern Greece. The question of a misunderstanding between the two military commands, or of the failure of General Papagos to honor a key agreement (to cover the British advance to the Aliakmon line with Greek forces withdrawn from the fortifications in western Macedonia) has been the subject of considerable debate. Most recently, John S. Koliopoulos, in his excellent book entitled *Greece and the British Connection, 1935-1941* (Oxford, 1977), suggested that Papagos' subsequent explanations on this issue are not altogether convincing. The minutes of the controversial meeting in question (22 February 1941), reprinted here but apparently available to Koliopoulos, suggest that responsibility for the resulting confusion must be shared by all. Papagos was clearly pressured to agree to action against his better judgment and was therefore less than anxious to go along with the plan. However, the lack of clarity on the actual execution of the plan is striking and may indeed have been at the root of the problem.

Collections of this kind do, of course, confront the researcher with certain troublesome problems. By reproducing only the "finished product" of diplomacy they present the formal side of governmental conduct, leaving one to speculate about the gyrations of the decision-making process. Also, despite assurances concerning balanced coverage and objectivity on controversial issues, one cannot help but

wonder about possible documents not selected for publication. In research one does not like to have to rely on someone else's judgment as to what sources are important. Nevertheless, as long as the archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the period of the Second World War remain closed, this volume will be an indispensable source on a multitude of topics. The editor and his collaborators deserve the gratitude of all students of contemporary Greek history.

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Thomas A. Bailey, *The Marshall Plan Summer: An Eyewitness Report on Europe and the Russians in 1947*. Stanford: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1977. viii+256 pp., Bibliography, Index.

Early in 1947 the American diplomatic historian Thomas A. Bailey was asked to lecture at the National War College in the coming fall. In preparation for this assignment the National War College sent him to Europe during that summer where he visited Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Scandinavia, and the low lands. *The Marshall Plan Summer* is the curious result of this journey. Presented as "a diary — a primary source — and as such an historical document of some value," (p. vii) its being offered for publication thirty years after the events took place weakens its claim to being a primary source; especially as a very flexible time sense is used. At one moment the observations are clearly from 1947, at the next data is interpreted in the light of more recent events and analysis.

True to his belief that American foreign policy is determined by public opinion, Prof. Bailey explains numerous events in terms of American ethnic voting blocks and shows no hesitation to repeat undocumented rumors. It may be possible that, "about two million German troops had been demobilized in the British zone, but only five hundred thousand rifles had been surrendered", (p. 77) but no supporting reference is provided. Of course these were the working notes of a man preparing a course and were not gathered with publication in mind. Why then were they published? Two themes run through the book; one deals with the summer during which the Marshall Plan was being debated and the other with revisionist scholarship in the United States today. Thus though the author focuses on the environment in which the Marshall Plan developed, he frequently takes the revisionists to task for their willingness to absolve the Soviet Union of any blame for the Cold War. Unfortunately, some of the evidence offered seems too obvious to be of value. Reporting a vote in the Norwegian parliament in which only the eleven Communist members voted to grant Russia bases in Spitzbergen, Bailey writes, "A detective would want no better evidence that the Norwegian Communists were more favorably disposed to the interests of the USSR than to those of the United States" (p. 192). Few scholars, revisionist or otherwise, will find this surprising, nor should they have in 1947.

Bailey is on sound ground in his challenge to the oversimplifications presented by many revisionist writers but given his own stand on the role of public opinion, his portrayal of American generosity, the Marshall Plan, must be weighed against