

wonder about possible documents not selected for publication. In research one does not like to have to rely on someone else's judgment as to what sources are important. Nevertheless, as long as the archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the period of the Second World War remain closed, this volume will be an indispensable source on a multitude of topics. The editor and his collaborators deserve the gratitude of all students of contemporary Greek history.

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Thomas A. Bailey, *The Marshall Plan Summer: An Eyewitness Report on Europe and the Russians in 1947*. Stanford: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1977. viii+256 pp., Bibliography, Index.

Early in 1947 the American diplomatic historian Thomas A. Bailey was asked to lecture at the National War College in the coming fall. In preparation for this assignment the National War College sent him to Europe during that summer where he visited Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Scandinavia, and the low lands. *The Marshall Plan Summer* is the curious result of this journey. Presented as "a diary — a primary source — and as such an historical document of some value," (p. vii) its being offered for publication thirty years after the events took place weakens its claim to being a primary source; especially as a very flexible time sense is used. At one moment the observations are clearly from 1947, at the next data is interpreted in the light of more recent events and analysis.

True to his belief that American foreign policy is determined by public opinion, Prof. Bailey explains numerous events in terms of American ethnic voting blocks and shows no hesitation to repeat undocumented rumors. It may be possible that, "about two million German troops had been demobilized in the British zone, but only five hundred thousand rifles had been surrendered", (p. 77) but no supporting reference is provided. Of course these were the working notes of a man preparing a course and were not gathered with publication in mind. Why then were they published? Two themes run through the book; one deals with the summer during which the Marshall Plan was being debated and the other with revisionist scholarship in the United States today. Thus though the author focuses on the environment in which the Marshall Plan developed, he frequently takes the revisionists to task for their willingness to absolve the Soviet Union of any blame for the Cold War. Unfortunately, some of the evidence offered seems too obvious to be of value. Reporting a vote in the Norwegian parliament in which only the eleven Communist members voted to grant Russia bases in Spitzbergen, Bailey writes, "A detective would want no better evidence that the Norwegian Communists were more favorably disposed to the interests of the USSR than to those of the United States" (p. 192). Few scholars, revisionist or otherwise, will find this surprising, nor should they have in 1947.

Bailey is on sound ground in his challenge to the oversimplifications presented by many revisionist writers but given his own stand on the role of public opinion, his portrayal of American generosity, the Marshall Plan, must be weighed against

the opposition the proposal met in Congress. Had the Soviet block come forward as eager recipients, had Moscow not recalled Czechoslovakia's initial expression of interest, would the Plan have passed? Would, for example, Polish-American voters have tolerated aid to a Russian dominated Poland? Indeed, without what was seen as a clear Soviet threat to Western Europe would the United States have been so generous?

Readers interested in European conditions immediately after the Second World War will find this book worth reading and certainly well written but its contribution to an understanding of the Marshall Plan appears limited.

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John H. Moore, *Growth With Self-Management: Yugoslav Industrialization, 1952-1975*. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. Pp. xiii — 334. ISBN: 0-8179-7201-3.

The theory of decentralized socialism became the center of the "socialist controversy" in the 1930s. Although the number of participants was very large, the names of two antagonists, Oskar Lange and Friedrich Hayek, came to be associated with the controversy of whether the marginal conditions of efficient resource allocation are compatible with socialism. Since there was no empirical prototype of market (or decentralized) socialism, the debate remained an intellectual exercise whose main claims could not be tested empirically. The schism between Stalin and Tito in 1948 compelled the Yugoslavs to find an alternative form of social organization and create a distinct prototype of socialism. The Yugoslavs adopted "workers' self-management" which was perceived by western writers to be an approximation of Lange's market socialism.

Because of its experimental nature, the Yugoslav system received great attention in the West. Benjamin N. Ward was one of the earliest economists to study the Yugoslavian alternative to Soviet type of planning. His work was followed by the works of other authors; John H. Moore's book is the most recent addition to an impressive list of works on the Yugoslavian economy. His work is, however, distinctly different from the works of others.

The author starts with the correct observation that "Workers' self-management was... experimental; it was adopted above all for political reasons" (p. 3). Because of its experimental nature, the system required frequent changes; its political imperatives imposed constraints and changes that were political in nature, not economic. As Joseph T. Bombelles has observed, "What actually happened in Yugoslavia after the early 1950s was a change in instruments used in directing economic development, but the direction continued to be prescribed by the top political leadership".

Moore's book is not concerned with the theory of decentralized socialism. Its purpose is "to measure and analyze Yugoslavia's success in generating industrial growth during the first twenty years or so of worker's self-management" (p. 4). The Yugoslav prototype retained the emphasis on high rates of investment and