

probable trends rather than on results achieved. Understandably, such a research orientation is necessitated by the fact that the author was unable to secure any reliable public opinion indicators in order to measure the extent of political loyalties in Yugoslavia. Lacking such evidence, the author isolates a series of probable integrational indicators such as the myth of partisan solidarity, the mystique of an independent road to socialism, the formation of a professional elite loyal to the new system, etc. The author maintains that all these and several other elements may have created a positive integrational trend, and a new sense of national solidarity. However, this inference is carefully weighted against the possibility that disintegrative forces of ancient political loyalties among the Serbs, of ethnic separatism and religious fanaticism, may still be latent. Moreover, the consolidation of the new system may not be unequivocally asserted due to the fact that new institutions, and especially the agricultural collectives, do not show a tendency to become nationally shared institutions.

Besides the problem of national integration, the study dwells on integration at the supranational level. In this sense, Yugoslavia's active neutralism, and the ideological affinities and political sympathies with liberal ambitions of several communist parties in Eastern and Western Europe, have contributed not only to Yugoslavia's confidence in her indigenous Marxist road, but they have also unleashed an upsurge of national or ethnic communist tendencies. The latter have brought about a new pattern in international relations, and a new constellation of power within the Soviet bloc and the world.

On the whole, this is an excellently written text for the study of socialist Yugoslavia. It is equipped with an extensive native and English bibliography. Perhaps, in the book's next edition, the author could amplify the discussion regarding the role and future of peasants in Yugoslav theory and practice.

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Dietrich Orlow, *The Nazis in the Balkans: A Case Study of Totalitarian Politics*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968. Pp. 235.

*The Nazis in the Balkans* is a misleading title but, strangely, this is a welcome deficiency; departing from what that title seems to imply, the

author has by-passed the wide but tinted and distorting window-panels of facile generalities and has looked instead through a key-hole into the actuality of totalitarian politics. What he reports in this case study is both illuminating and sobering. The familiar image of a totalitarian system as being a monolithic structure neatly controlled from an omnipotent and omniscient center is effectively challenged. On the other hand, the author documents the role of the "ruling elite" by bringing into the open its political practices, personal dealings, rivalries, ambitions, and intrigues.

Professor Orlow has selected a relatively obscure semi-official agency, the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft in Vienna (SOEG—no connection with the one in Munich). Its genesis, growth, influence, and eventual demise are detailed with great care and sensitivity by the author. As a historical entity the SOEG is of little importance. As a case study into the realities of the Third Reich, it proves to be a fascinating subject.

The SOEG was originally conceived as a semi-governmental "society" in February 1940 by three Nazi officials, with the Reich Minister of Economics Walther Funk being the most prominent among them. Obviously, these officials believed that with Germany's victory in Europe, the countries of Southeast Europe would become subservient units of the Third Reich. Funk apparently felt that his Ministry should stake a claim in the area and play a key role in controlling the economic life of those countries. The SOEG was to be used as the instrument for making the formulation of economic policy for the area a fief of Funk's ministry. To avoid the opposition of other Nazi officials in Berlin who might have different ideas for the area, Funk selected Vienna as the seat of the new "Gesellschaft." In the following years, the SOEG embarked on an effort to establish itself as a serious and valuable agency through agreements with the Nazi officials of other agencies, who found such cooperation useful to their own ambitions, as well as through the exchange of favors, the exploitation of political infighting among other Nazi officials, well-orchestrated publicity and the public association with top Nazis, and the shrewd creation of the image of a well-placed, well-connected, and influential agency. The SOEG officials used the form of *Dachgesellschaft*, "an umbrella form of administrative organization," suitable to control and subordinate the activities of other agencies having dealings with Southeast Europe. The author lists more than a dozen of such affiliated agencies—more accurately, of Nazi officials.

Following the occupation of the area by the German armies, SO-

EG speedily established field offices in the Balkan countries, using as a rule selected agents from the ranks of Germans who were already in the area as employees of other official or semi-official agencies. SOEG's activities benefited, first of all, those who held important positions within the organization. It provided them with prestige, power, and material benefits. While the SOEG never became an administrative agency, it provided its officials with a prestigious platform and valuable contacts.

Many readers who lived in the occupied Balkan countries will probably find the table of SOEG's sordid activities painfully fascinating. But in the opinion of this reviewer, the more valuable contribution of this book lies in its account of totalitarian politics—Nazi style. Behind the monolithic facade, one can clearly see the *personalization* of the state apparatus. Agencies were created, positions were abolished, agreements struck, alliances formed, all on a very personal basis among top Nazi officials. Highly placed members of the ruling elite fought other equally important officials to wrest from them fiefs of authority or to place under their control additional sources of power. Only in rare occasions did the Center (Hitler himself in the last analysis) intervene as the supreme arbiter. Once the Center had taken a stand only fools dared to continue a feud. To quote the author "the National Socialist totalitarian system of politics consisted not of two but of three layers of 'reality'. Behind an outwardly monolithic facade of glittering uniforms and pseudo-military discipline lay organizational chaos and neo-feudal jousts for power. But this second layer was also only part of the entire picture. Beyond was the subtle underlying unity of the system...the unity of shared goals and interests. The conflicts among the agencies were never over the basic issue of whether the National Socialist goals were morally right and should be carried out." (p. 185). Professor Orlow has performed a valuable service by probing into the realities of totalitarian politics. To go into minor points of criticism (at times he appears to assign SOEG a greater role and significance than that indicated by other passages) will serve little useful purpose.

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