

Folk-lore and Ancient Greek Religion and in the shedding of ample light on their evident similarities. Though no positive solutions are attempted by the author, the work abounds in plausible suggestions as to evident relationships, which deserve further and more detailed scrutiny. However, the book's main points of interest, around which all its ideas revolve and which will delight with flashes of ingenuity any modern researcher, center around the author's astounding statement in the Introduction that "in the task of interpretation (of ancient literature and art) the assistance offered by the Folk-lore of Greece should be sought." This statement that sums up the author's whole effort and which might have made many a historian of a former age grin with incredulity, has in our days gained positive support and affirmation by modern research.

The book makes fascinating reading throughout, all parallel cases are clearly set and adequately commented on and questions competently posed. It will be found useful by a great variety of scholars and from a great many points of view. Apart from the Classical and the Modern Greek scholars, who are the most likely to benefit from it, the book, as we have also noted before, will appeal to the student of Christian Ritual and Institutions and to any other scholar interested in the long-lived phenomena of the evolution of Culture.

Careful study of this very instructive book will prove amply rewarding.

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PHOTEINE BOURBOULIS

Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic; A Case Study in National Development*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. XVI 367.

Mr. Richard D. Robinson of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, has contributed greatly to our understanding of the social and economic development of the First Turkish Republic. He discusses the emergence of modern Turkey from the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in October, 1923, to the dissolution of the Parliament by the Armed Forces on May 27, 1960. During those years the Turks attempted, with a considerable measure of success, "to make the transition from authoritarianism to liberalism with a minimum of political violence." Turkey became involved in an "explosive economic development," and "emerged as a modern military power."

Mr. Robinson suggests "that the evolution of modern Turkey is an experimental pilot run of accelerated development under western-oriented leadership without recourse to the harsher methods of the totalitarian state." He remains somewhat skeptical, however, about the success of this experiment and looks with pessimism at the 1960 army-inspired revolution.

In the first of nine chapters he provides us with a brief, and to some extent superficial, analysis of the Young Turk movement and its failure to achieve "lasting and basic reforms." In the following chapters we get a glimpse of Mustafa Kemal and his rise to power. Kemal is shown as a person of inordinate energy and resourcefulness who shrewdly took advantage of external events, especially in the case of the Greek-Turkish War. After World War I the Turkish state emerged as a diminished but still powerful country of approximately 300,000 square miles and some 13 million people living under primitive economic conditions. On May 15, 1919, a Greek army landed at Smyrna, with the approval of the Allies, and began a spectacular advance into Anatolia. The Turks, under Kemal's leadership, retaliated by gradually reorganizing their forces which eventually overwhelmed the Greek and opposing Turkish elements. Kemal skillfully utilized an opportunity made possible by unexpected circumstances, namely Venizelos' fall from power and the royalist election gains which alienated the Allies and deprived Greece of valuable foreign assistance. Kemal's victory set the stage for the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923.

On October 29, 1923, Kemal became President of the First Turkish Republic and four months later he abolished the Caliphate. He then instituted a policy of westernization, abrogating the former religious, military, and civil titles and privileges. All ties between state and church were broken, and a legal system, based on secular codes, was introduced. Western law codes, civil, criminal, and commercial, replaced the *sheria*. Although he admired western liberalism and secularism, Kemal Atatürk recognized that Turkey was unprepared for parliamentary democracy. As a consequence, he had to exert dictatorial powers in order to carry out his reforms and permitted only his People's Republican Party to exist. One may agree that authoritarian leadership was necessary for these changes; however, to credit Kemal, as early as 1919, with a "sort of intuitive understanding of what was required" is pure speculation and exaggeration. Although we are given an interesting and valuable interpretation of this dynamic figure in Turkish history, it is far too brief to furnish any appraisal of the man.

Easily, the best part of the book is the portion dealing with economic and social problems, which includes excellent passages on rural life. Turkey was plagued by poverty and had relatively little capital. Any plans to increase and expand government enterprise and economic programs necessitated foreign investments and concomitant interference by foreign nations. In order to avoid external influences the state assumed primary responsibility for the economic development of the nation. The government expropriated foreign-owned business firms and in 1934 Turkey introduced a five year plan for the expansion of agriculture and industry. In Kemal's view only a state controlled program (*étatisme*) could achieve his primary objective of widespread economic expansion. State banks were formed, industrial enterprises launched, communications improved, and mining and power developments were increased. The increase of cultivatable land and improvements in farming methods resulted in greater agricultural production. Mr. Robinson, in assessing the *étatiste* economy, sees both advantages and disadvantages, and concludes that "sensing both theoretically and practically that almost every argument was in favor of direct state participation in economic affairs, Kemal gave substance to Turkish *étatisme* in 1934 with the First Five Year Plan. In 1945, *étatisme* remained a basic tenet of the Turkish republic."

During the Democratic administration of Premier Menderes the Turkish economy made conspicuous progress. Menderes tried to maintain a free economy and at the same time to continue the country's economic development. Rapid strides were made in both industry and agriculture with an expanded output of steel and textiles and an increase in agricultural production. Yet, the nation attempted too much and suffered the consequences: by the sixth year of the Menderes administration the economy had so overextended itself that Turkey was confronted with a bankrupt treasury. Turkey's foreign exchange reserves were exhausted and its foreign debts continued to mount; its decreasing credit and inflation seriously undermined Turkey's efforts to attract foreign investors. Although he had pledged to support a free economy, Menderes could not prevent the expansion of state enterprises helpful to the nation's development. Actually, Turkey's grave economic problems stemmed from the country's yearning to develop rapidly from a primitive economic community into a modern state. Advice from foreign experts that the nation was proceeding too fast and in an uncertain course was not heeded by the government. Mr. Robinson is cautious at this point in his evaluation of the economy

and remarks that "by almost every statistical measure, the Turkish economy had continued to move forward, though there was some question as to the realism of the statistics."

Turkey's economic difficulties resulted in political economic discontent. By the late 1950's the policies of the Menderes government had caused grave misgivings and provoked increasing criticism at home and abroad. As the domestic situation deteriorated, the government became more arbitrary, passing laws which restricted the freedom of speech and of the press, and incarcerating its opponents. In seeking a cause for the "drift back toward authoritarianism," the author stresses factors "imbedded in structural defects of an economic and social nature." On May 27, 1960, an army coup overthrew the Menderes government but Turkey's problems continued under the military junta. The persistent economic difficulties prompt the author to remark in the closing passage of his book that Turkey needs a "powerful political personality." Briefly, "Turkey awaits its second Mustafa Kemal." Is Mr. Robinson stating that Turkey is incapable of adapting democratic procedures and needs an authoritarian ruler? Or does he believe that a second Mustafa Kemal is hiding somewhere waiting for a propitious omen before he can assume control? Certainly, recent political events in Turkey are discouraging and the author recognizes this fact.

Mr. Robinson's treatment of foreign affairs is sound and illuminating. He points out that Turkey's foreign policy can change suddenly and "without reason or warning." One cannot disagree with this point which recent events have confirmed too often. He further states that the determinants of Turkey's foreign policy relate to "national power, historical conditioning and national interest." Yet, after reading this chapter one is left with the impression that the Turks are ready to undertake a military struggle not only for the defense of national interests but also for territorial aggrandizement. The Pan-Turanian feeling that "still pervades the thinking of Turkish leaders," can lead to disastrous results. Mr. Robinson speculates once more when he asks: "Would we see another Turkish drive for empire?"

Mr. Robinson presents his ideas with clarity and examines Turkey's problems in a concise and effective manner. Unfortunately, the book does not allow room for intensive treatment of foreign problems which it discusses altogether too briefly, but this should not detract from its importance. Mr. Robinson has skillfully interlocked economic and social developments with political history to make a compelling narra-

tive. One cannot help but wonder, however, whether Turkey will be able to establish a parliamentary government with full economic and political equality or whether state intervention will deny the Turkish people their democratic rights.

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Charles Packer, *Return to Salonika*. London, Cassell, 1964, Pp. XIII+164.

This is a book about the fortunes of the British Salonika Army during the whole period of its existence—from December 1915 until September 1918. The author enlisted at the age of seventeen, fought in the ranks throughout the campaign, and recounts its various phases vividly enough half a century afterwards by drawing much upon his own personal memories. On a recent revisit to the old front-line area he refreshed his mind with his wartime experiences. He acknowledges his sources, American, German and British (though the spelling of his titles is not faultless: *Weltkreig* and *Mosquitoe*) but makes no claim to have produced a work of significant originality. It is a sketch rather than a history of the campaign in South Eastern Europe.

What does it all mean to our minds today? Packer himself at the very end of his memoirs with his eyes focused upon Pip Ridge and the Macedonian Front writes that "Europe's young men accepted self-immolation at the direction of the generals" and not unnaturally asks "What other period in history can match these years for sheer imbecility?" In an Englishman writing about this remote scene of conflict with the Central Powers this point of view is not surprising. But his preoccupation with the futility of war may seem to some experienced critics<sup>1</sup> to make the author less than fair towards those with the unenviable task of planning victories. Warfare always must be looked at from one of two very different angles, the realistic and the romantic. Both attitudes must be allowed for: *servitude et grandeur militaires*. In addition to this the Greek troops inevitably regarded a war fought in Macedonia not like the English as a foreign adventure but as a major conflict on the home front. Packer frankly draws one significant conclusion about the Serres Division of the Greek Army in completing the capture of the Petit Couronné: "The tactics... showed considerably more imagination than was apparent in the extremely costly and abortive attempt by the British to capture that position in the April -

1. See the searching review by G. Davidge in *The Mosquito*, Sept. 1964.