# Abstracts

# N. C. MOUTSOPOULOS

# THOUGHTS AND OBSERVATIONS OCCASIONED BY THE RECENT EXCAVATIONS AT THE GREAT LAURA AT THE FOOT OF MOUNT TZAREVETZ NEAR VELIKO TĂRNOVO. ROUND TOWERS AND UNDERGROUND PASSAGES IN FORTIFIED MEDIEVAL SETTLEMENTS

This study concerns certain observations and comparisons made by the author in the course of a recent visit to the excavations at Veliko Tărnovo and his discussion and exchange of views with Professor Athanas Popov, who is in charge of the excavations.

The wall which protects the monastery complex on the side facing the nearby River Jantra is fortified at intervals by semicircular towers, which reveal many common features with similar towers in Ohrid and Kastoria and with another semicircular tower recently excavated by the writer at Redina. In the context of this examination of semicircular fortifying towers, the author also ventures a typological classification (fig. 10) and comparative dating. A staircase ends at one of the square towers in the fortification system of the Great Laura at Veliko Tărnovo. The staircase was evidently roofed at one time with a (barrel?) vault and was used for pumping water out of the interior of the tower (fig. 3), which, in this instance, also functioned as a filter system for the river water. The author recently excavated a similar, but more intricate and complex system in the fortified Byzantine settlement at Redina. 75 kms north-east of Thessaloniki (near the mouth of the River Strymon) (fig. 7-9). The author also takes this opportunity to mention the underground passages which frequently accompanied city fortifications from the Mycenaean period onwards and which until a short time ago were known only through the legends which are frequently attached to the ruins of medieval fortifications.

#### IVAN DJAMBOV

# CHRISTIAN INSCRIPTIONS AND MONOGRAMS IN THE PATRIARCHATE OF TĂRNOVO (XIVs.)

The article presents number of interesting monograms and inscriptions of bulgarian kings and patriarchs carved on pottery of the type "sgraphito", discovered during archeological researches in the ancient bulgarian capital Tarnovgrad. On the base of many analogues, the author arrives at number of conclusions concerning the content and reference of these monograms and inscriptions. These are especially monograms and inscriptions of the bulgarian kings Ivan Alexandre (1331-1371) and Ivan Chichman (1371-1393). As for those of bulgarian patriarchs, the interest turns upon the monogram of patriarch Theodossii Tarnovski.

All these monograms and inscriptions attest the level of culture and art of the population of the capital of the Second Bulgarian kingdom during the XIVth century.

# V. DEMETRIADES

# SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE OTTOMAN-TURKISH JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS (HÜCCETS)

The study of a large number of Turkish judicial documents (hüccets) from the Vlatadon Monastery collection in Thessaloniki reveals the development of some features in writing this kind of documents, such as the opening formula, the use of the kadi's seal or the last phrase. Having those observations in mind, we can find out whether a hüccet is an original or a copy, a genuine or a forgery.

#### JOHN NICOLOPOULOS

# FROM AGATHANGELOS TO THE *MEGALE IDEA:* RUSSIA AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN GREEK NATIONALISM

The socio-economic and political processes which forged strong links between Greeks and Russia in the 18th and 19th centuries have been adequately described. Subject of this paper is the myth of unconditional Russian support to the Greeks on their initiative, offering them an irresistable model for the necessary transition from Byzantine universalism to modern nationalism, a transition which was completed with the emergence of the *Megale Idea*.

The climate of expectation of deliverance through the Russians was reflected in popular media, as well as in more literate forms. A pseudonymus collection of prophesies called *Agathangelos* enjoyed extraordinary popularity. Polyeides, author of the book, wrote it from the point of view of the Greek diaspora in Central Europe. His historical material forms three sections: the Catholic West, the Protestant North and the Orthodox East. Protestantism will crush Catholicism and prepare the way for the ultimate triumph of Orthodoxy. In the East he celebrates the rising star of Russia.

The new zealots appropriated *Agathangelos* as a favorite medium for their propaganda. Their first organizational umbrella was the "Russian Party", led by a coalition of the remnants of the Capodistrian beaurocracy.

The apocalyptic visions of *Agathangelos* seemed to materialize with the eruption of the Anatolian crisis in 1839 and the anticipation of the imminent dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

The banner of Agathangelism covered two classes of rebels to the Othonian regime; it became the medium of protest of the "plebeian" base of the Russian Party, especially the Peloponnesean peasantry.

Urbanization and economic development in the 20th century changed the terms of reference of social and political conflict and emigration depopulated the focal areas of primitive rebellion.

#### HARALD HEPPNER

# AUSTRIAN PLANS FOR GOVERNING THE IONIAN ISLANDS

Neither the Austrian Adria-policy nor the Austrian-Greek relations have ever been thoroughly investigated. The present study is meant to contribute to these topics.

As long as the Habsburg Monarchy had hardly any access to the sea, there existed no plans for a closer contact between Austria and Greece. Such a question first turned up during the time of Prince Eugene, when the Imperial troops had gained ground in the Balkans and the Kingdom of Naples belonged to the Habsburg Empire. The main reasons for these attempts were commercial ones. Due to political and economical changes in the second half of the eighteenth century, Joseph II and Tsarina Catherine started talks on the division of the Balkan area. Austria showed particular interest in Corfu and the Ionian Islands. It was not before Napoleon's campaigns and the dissolution of the Venetian Republic in 1797 that the Viennese Court had a chance to realize these intentions. But the development of Austrian-French relations forced the Imperial government to disclaim its Venetian inheritance in Greece, in order to secure the possession of the Dalmatian coast. During the Congress of Vienna (1815) England temporarily supported the plans to concede Corfu to Austria in order to prevent a political influence of Russia. After the Battle of Waterloo the British government decided to take over the protectorate of the Ionian Islands. Austria would have liked to gain complete control over this archipelago—not only because of economical reasons but also to be able to control the upcoming Greek National Movement and to counterbalance Russia.

# G. L. ARŠ

#### ON THE LIFE IN RUSSIA OF THE GREEK PATRIOTIC FAMILY OF YPSILANTI

The author describes the life of former hospodar of Wallachia Constantine Ypsilanti exiled in Russia, and his formation to a Greek patriot. Most attention is paid to the stay in Russia of the "Inspector General" of Philiki Etaireia, the national hero of Greece Alexander Ypsilanti. The article deals with his military career and public connections in Russia, his national-patriotic activity on the eve of the revolution of 1821. The fates of Georgios and Nicolas Ypsilanti after their liberation from detention in Austria is also followed. The work is mainly based on unpublished documents in the Soviet archives.

## COSTIS J. AILIANOS

# AN EARLY ATTEMPT OF A EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: 1881

During the 19th cent., the Great Powers in their intention to reach solutions on pending regional issues, conceded to a way of cooperation which, although it did not aim at a broader scope of uniting their foreign policy,

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it reminded, to a certain extent, the present system of European Political Cooperation.

The last phase of the annexation of Thessaly and a part of Epirus by Greece, in 1881, presented the Great Powers the oportunity of implementing among them a more technical and systematic cooperation, aiming at finding a definite and workable solution of this long-standing difference between Greece and Turkey. On the proposal of the french Minister for Foreign Affairs, the six Powers decided, most probably for the first time, that their ambassadors in Constantinople send to their capitals "identical telegrams", so that the ministers could evaluate the evolution of the negotiations held in Constantinople on the same basis. The ambassadors, in the course of their consultations, broadened the mandate they were given by making suggestions as to demarches to be undertaken either to the Porte or to Athens.

Though the E.E.C. machinery is much more elaborate and different in its basic conception-as it aims at the unification of the foreign policy of the member-states and, ultimately, the "European Union"—the two systems are characterized by some identical principles and intentions: a better mutual understanding among the cooperating states, the better harmonization of their views, the reinforcement of their solidarity and the undertaking of concerted action. Similarities and differences between them should be viewed through the conception of their ultimate aims.

This study does not intend to compare the two systems; its purpose is rather to contribute to the historical evolution of the idea of the unification of Europe. Fortuitous proposals, as the one in 1881, may create the convenient climate to allow the germination of ideas of great political dimensions.

# BERND J. FISCHER

#### **ITALIAN POLICY IN ALBANIA, 1894-1943**

"Italian Policy in Albania, 1894-1943" is a brief overview of policy during the most active years of Italian interest in Albania. The paper identifies three principle policy-makers and their three respective policy directions, beginning with cultural contacts and culminating in invasion and annexation.

The first phase, as exemplified by the Italo-Albanian lawyer and publicist Anselmo Lorrecchio, had as its goal the cultural awakening of Albanians as a prelude to some form of Albanian unity. Of the three, this phase was perhaps the most useful with regard to indigenous development. This semiprivate, primarily cultural interest was rapidly superceded by direct government involvement under Premier Francesco Crispi who took it upon himself to rapidly expand Italian influence across the Adriatic. Crispi's policies, although they alienated many Albanian patriots, made many Albanians more aware of their national interests and individuality. Ultimately, Crispi's policies were at least somewhat responsible for Albania's premature independence.

The third phase, which culminates in the invasion and annexation of Albania in 1939, constituted the most active and yet least productive phase of Italian policy in Albania. Fascist policy initially hoped to politically subjugate Albania by the establishment of an economic protectorate. While Mussolini and, more significantly, Count Ciano were able to accomplish the latter, King Zog effectively prevented the Italians from peacefully achieving their ultimate goal. Zog's victory, however, was a pyrrhic one in that his success provoked armed aggression and eventual annexation.

While Italian policy during this period began altruistically, as the government became increasingly involved, Italian policy became increasingly more furious, as well as increasingly less fruitful for both Rome and Tirana. The most positive result came about unintentionally. Italy's policy encouraged the Albanians to more rapidly develop a national consciousness in order to stand as a unit against Italian expansion.

# ARETI TOUNDA-FERGADI

# VIOLATIONS OF THE GREEK NEUTRALITY BY THE ENTENTE POWERS DURING WORLD WAR I

The neutrality policy followed by Greece during World War I became clearer after October 1915, i.e. when Eleftherios Venizelos resigned as prime minister for a second time.

During the years 1915-1917 Greek neutrality was violated numerous times by the Entente Powers. These Powers occupied particular islands of the Aegean Sea, which had been held by Greece since the First Balkan War. The Entente Powers used them mainly as military bases and, generally speaking, for the purpose of serving their own interests.

This proposition is established by the analysis of the events which occurred at the island of Kastellorizo in December 1915 and the consequent occupation of this island by the French, the occupation of the island of Milo and the transfer of British and French forces through the island of Mytilini during approximately the same period.

# BASIL KONDIS

#### THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF GREEK-SOVIET RELATIONS IN 1924

After the October Revolution, the Greek government severed its relations with Russia. In fact, in order to ensure British and French support for Greek national claims at the Paris Peace Conference, Venizelos actually declared himself willing to send an expeditionary force to the Ukraine in January 1919 to assist the Allies in their efforts to overthrow the Bolsheviks. However, five years later, in 1924, Greece renewed its relations with Soviet Russia. It is the purpose of this article to examine and analyse the circumstances that compelled the Greek government to recognise the Soviet Union.

#### MONTY WOODHOUSE

# THE ALIAKMON LINE: AN ANGLO-GREEK MISUNDERSTANDING IN 1941

The plan to form an allied front against the German invasion of Greece in April 1941 was severely compromised by a disagreement between the Greek and British General Staffs over the line to be held and the timing of its formation. These questions were discussed at meetings in Athens on 14-15 January, 22-23 February, and 2-4 March, 1941.

The choice of a defensive line lay between the northern frontier of Greece (continued by the River Nestos or the Strymon) and the so-called "Aliakmon line" running west and south of Thessaloniki. Since the latter choice would entail abandoning the northern capital, the Greeks were reluctant to adopt it if there was any hope that the Yugoslavs (and more doubtfully, the Turks) would join the allied front.

At the February meetings in Athens, General Papagos and his staff thought it was agreed that before he ordered a withdrawal to the Aliakmon line, the British would ascertain the Yugoslavs' intentions. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, undertook to raise the question with Prince Paul, the Yugoslav Regent, by telegram; but he and his staff all thought it was agreed that Papagos would order the Greek withdrawal without awaiting the Yugoslav reply. Although Eden received a negative reply from Belgrade, while on a visit to Ankyra, he failed to communicate it to the Greeks in time to affect Papagos' decision.

The misunderstanding arose partly from the lack of a common language understood by all those present. The discussions were mainly in French, aided by a bilingual Anglo-French interpreter (General Heywood). But two separate records were kept, in Greek and English (both of which survive), and these were not compared for accuracy.

The meetings in early March attempted to repair the misunderstanding. Papagos thought it too late to make an orderly withdrawal to the Aliakmon line, and wanted to revert to the frontier line. The British still insisted on the Aliakmon line. The Greeks formed the impression that the British might refuse to send a force to Greece at all unless their wishes prevailed. Under strong pressure from the King of Greece, who emphasised the political consequences of a breach with Britain, Papagos reluctantly gave way.

Only in the case of the final session on 4 March were the two records harmonised, the Greek being a straightforward translation of the English. The final agreement on an immediate withdrawal of the Greek forces to the Aliakmon line was drafted in French. By then it proved too late to form and hold the line successfully against the German attack. Probably it would have been impossible in any case; but the lesson for allies remains—always to ensure that agreements recorded in different languages are unequivocally harmonised.

# PLATES



Fig. 1. Veliko Tirnovo; Tzarevetz: Passage secret.




Fig. 2. Veliko Tirnovo; Tzarevetz: L'escalier qui conduit de la ville Haute à la tour carrée, mouillée à Yantra.




Fig. 3. Esquisse du système de l'approvisionement en eau aux pieds de Tzarevetz. 1: Coupe transversale, 2: Croquis isometrique de l'escalier, 3: plan.




Fig. 4. Tour ronde de l'enseinte de Grand Laure de Tzarevetz (aprés la restauration).



Fig. 5. Tour ronde de l'enseinte de Grand Laure de Tzarevetz (au cours de restauration).



Fig. 6. Tour ronde de l'enseinte de Grand Laure de Tzarevetz.




Fig. 7. L'escalier de Redina qui conduit du château aux pieds du rocher.




Fig. 8. L'escalier voûté à Redina.




Fig. 9. L'escalier voûté à Redina.




Fig. 10. Système de défense avec tours rondes.




Fig. 11. Tour ronde de l'enseinte de Castoria.




Fig. 12. Tour ronde de l'enseinte de Redina ( $\Pi 6$ ).








Fig. 13. Tour ronde de Redina (116). Plan.








Tabl. 2a. Monogrammes des tzars bulgares,




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Tabl. 3a, b. Le monogramme qui représent une date.



 Tabl. 4a. Le récipient sur le fond duquel sont inscrits deux monogrammes. b, c, d. Des récipients avec d'autres monogrammes et inscriptions.



Tabl. 5a-d. Graphites dans la partie extérieure des récipients,