

not come to light for many years. The Diary of Praëdis gives important information, on the political and military situation of Western Greece during the first year of the War of Independence.

Dr. Protopsaltis has undoubtedly provided access to material of great importance, for which scholars will be grateful. It is to be hoped that the Academy of Athens and Dr. Protopsaltis will be able to complete this fine venture at an early date.

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John C. Campbell, *American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead*. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1965. Pp. XIV + 136.

This slender volume was originally written to serve as the basis for discussion at the Seventh Midwest Seminar on United States Foreign Policy. This Seminar, held at Racine, Wisconsin in May, 1964, was a three-day meeting of government officials, professors and business leaders. It was organized by six midwestern state universities, together with the Brookings Institution, and financed by the Johnson Foundation.

The author of the volume is widely known as an expert on Eastern Europe. He has served as a member of the Policy and Planning Staff of the State Department and is presently Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City.

The first five chapters of Mr. Campbell's book attempt to provide the intelligent layman with a very general statement of the present situation in Communist Eastern Europe and how it came about, beginning with the Soviet occupation of the area and the Communist seizure of power in 1945-48. In dealing with the current situation, the book gives special attention to such contemporary developments as the revival of nationalism and the impact of the Sino-Soviet schism. An entire chapter is devoted to Poland, as a special case within the Bloc, and another to Yugoslavia, as a special case without.

In dealing with Yugoslavia, Mr. Campbell puts forward two propositions. One is that Yugoslavia, as an independent and therefore ultimately deviant Communist state, has been, is, and will continue to be a major issue in the Communist politics of Eastern Europe because its professed Communism makes its deviations and experiments politically available to the other Communist regimes. "A Communist state flaunting its opposition to blocs, totally out of Soviet control in its doctrines and its policies, and taking aid from the West is hardly a comfort-

able colleague in the 'international workers' movement' in which guidance is supposed to come from Moscow." (p. 39). Mr. Campbell argues secondly that organic change has taken place by evolutionary means within Yugoslavia. "Institutions of 'social self-government and socialist democracy,' such as the workers' councils and the local communes, were gradually brought into being and strengthened over the years; they are enshrined in the new constitution. The party organs are still very much in the picture, but the fact remains that these other institutions are acquiring a life of their own." (p. 72).

The sixth and last chapter of the book sets forth the objectives of American policy in Eastern Europe, as Mr. Campbell sees them, and the alternative means available for their achievement. These objectives are: 1) reduction and eventual elimination of the Soviet military presence; 2) achievement of increasing independence for the states of Eastern Europe until such time as they recover control of their own foreign policies; 3) unification of Germany through free elections and 4) free choice by the East European peoples of their own governments and political institutions.

To achieve these objectives the United States may follow the hard line of "Dulles liberation," or the soft line of peaceful engagement. If it adopted the first of these alternatives, the United States would capitalize on the present grave difficulties within the Bloc in order to undermine the policies and plans of their governments. It would bolster popular resistance in the hope of overthrowing these regimes. If, in the sequel, a revolutionary situation should develop in Eastern Europe, the United States would be prepared to face down the Soviet Union in a military confrontation.

If the United States adopted the policy of peaceful engagement, it would maintain normal relations with the regimes and encourage them to follow the path of national deviation by alternately applying pressure (maintenance of American military strength in Western Europe) and offering inducements (long-term credits). By such means American policy would hope to bring the Communist regimes to a position comparable to that of Yugoslavia at the present time, and ultimately, to the present position of a Finland or even of an Austria. A variant of the soft line is a policy which would aim primarily at encouraging evolution within the Soviet Union, on the assumption that liberalization in Moscow would be the surest road to liberalization in Sofia or in Prague.

Although Mr. Campbell presents these various alternatives in a fair and even-tempered manner, he does not hide his aversion for the

Dulles policy of liberation and his own predilection for the policy of peaceful engagement. Among other things, he feels that the hard line is ruled out by the risk of nuclear annihilation which it entails. While Mr. Campbell makes a good case for peaceful engagement, it appears to this reviewer that his case would have been bettered had he emphasized the relative unimportance of Eastern Europe to American national interests and had he given somewhat fuller treatment to the interchanges now going on in Yugoslavia.

In the view of most American policy makers, Eastern Europe is not worth fighting for. This was true even before the advent of nuclear weapons posed the threat of annihilation. In the course of World War II the American leaders repeatedly refused to commit troops in Eastern Europe. And although the Soviet occupation of the area and its subsequent Communization were embarrassing to American principles, there was little willingness in Washington to risk open conflict with the Soviet 'allies' over what was widely regarded as an area of prime military importance to Moscow. To put it concisely, the United States will go to war, or run the risk of war, for Western, but not for Eastern Europe. Thus, whatever American policy wishes to accomplish in this part of the world must be achieved by diplomatic, economic and propaganda pressure.

It is an act of ingratitude to criticize Mr. Campbell for his handling of the Yugoslav issue, for his treatment of Yugoslavia is precisely the most original and the most useful part of his book. This reviewer feels nonetheless that Mr. Campbell understates the prospects for organic evolution in Yugoslavia and tends to present (p. 78) the current economic difficulties of this small state in a somewhat misleading way.

As for understatement, Mr. Campbell says not a word about the development in Yugoslavia of what may be called ultra-revisionism. Such organs of ultra-revisionism as *Perspektive* in Ljubljana, *Praxis* in Zagreb and *Delo* in Belgrade have in recent months raised the question whether "true" Socialism can ever be achieved so long as one party has a monopoly of power and have even questioned the value of the Great October Revolution. On the economic side, it could have been pointed out that any country which attempts to throw off the thralldom of a centrally-administered industry and give increasingly greater play to market forces will face substantial problems and difficulties. The price structure of Yugoslavia, for example, has become so unrealistic under central management that probably inflation alone offers a practical way out. Furthermore, Yugoslavia is not one of the

countries of Europe which has been favored by geology with significant natural endowment. Any return to economic realism will, among other things, manifest itself as an intensification of economic difficulties. But this is essentially the clear-cut emergence of a long-standing problem.

*American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe* is a clear, concise and careful statement of the problem. It will be especially useful to the audience for which it was written, the public-spirited and intelligent layman.

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H. Gordon Skilling, *Communism National and International: Eastern Europe After Stalin*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964. Pp. IX+168.

Joseph Rothschild, *Communist Eastern Europe*. New York: Walker and Company, 1965. Pp. VI+168.

Irwin Isenberg, (Ed.), *Ferment in Eastern Europe*. New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1965. Pp. 216.

The rediscovery of Eastern Europe, as a result of recent developments, has been exploited by authors and publishers with varying degrees of success. Among the recent books dealing with one, another, or all countries and problems of the area over the last few years, Professor Skilling's deserves serious consideration. Published under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, *Communism National and International* is a collection of nine essays on polycentrism. All but the epilogue—on Rumania's "independent course"—had been published previously at various times since 1960. Under the circumstances the book was out of date at the time of publication and is interesting primarily to those critical of political prognostication. It is indeed remarkable that even as careful and thorough an analyst of East European problems as Professor Skilling proved to be wrong more often than right in his assessment of contemporary trends and developments. He was most perspicacious in his evaluation of the forces leading to the gradual desintegration of the Soviet bloc but quite mistaken in his appraisal of the course of individual countries. To a certain degree these shortcomings may be ascribed to the common professional disease of claiming expertise on Eastern Europe as such rather than on just one or two nations. Professor Skilling's most penetrating and accurate analysis is on Czechoslovak problems and, to a lesser extent, Rumanian; least satisfactory