

Germans when signing the Tripartite Pact, assuring Yugoslavia the position of a genuine neutral even while nominally a member of the Axis bloc. In turn, one cannot really explain this success without understanding how stubbornly Yugoslavia resisted German blandishments out of loyalty to the West.

The tragedy of Yugoslavias' fate in 1941 lay in the fact that skilled diplomacy and sheer courage had brought her to the verge of a great diplomatic victory which could have aided the West, but the same urge for freedom sparked the events of March 27 and destroyed this golden opportunity. Mr. Hoptner is undoubtedly right in saying that the West was shortsighted in criticizing Yugoslav diplomacy and welcoming the events of March 27, but he has not perhaps explored the full implications of his position.

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Kazimierz Grzybowski, *The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations: Organization and Institutions*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. XVII + 300.

Mr. Grzybowski's stated purpose is "to describe and analyze... the organization, aims, and activities of the socialist commonwealth, and to trace their evolution, their techniques of international cooperation, and their function in the regional arrangements of the socialist bloc." This is an ambitious set of objectives; and the fact that Mr. Grzybowski falls somewhat short of achieving them neither discredits his research nor detracts from the valuable insights he provides into the legal intricacies of Eastbloc institutions.

Indeed, the book's unique contribution stems from Mr. Grzybowski's training in law. He writes with authority and persuasion when he unravels the administrative complexities of such organs as the Danube Commission, or when (pp. 33-36) he analyzes the dual character of the Soviet-type trading enterprise. Perhaps the book's shortcomings, as well as its strengths, are attributable to the author's legal background. For his economic analysis of CMEA<sup>1</sup> often seems unsophisticated and uncritical, and his perception of political reality within the CMEA complex is obscured at times by too formalistic a treatment.

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1. CMEA, or Comecon, is the abbreviation for the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, established by the USSR in 1949 to coordinate economic activities within the Soviet bloc. Its membership includes the USSR, the countries of Eastern Europe (excluding Albania and Yugoslavia), and Outer Mongolia.

Official communiques and Soviet articles on CMEA activity convey an image of harmony, identity of interests, consensus, and progress. The author seems to accept this image as essentially true. He states that the socialist commonwealth derives its strength from "a uniformity of aims, goals, interests, and ideals" (p. 1). Later he characterizes the post-Stalin period as a time when Soviet interests were subordinated to those of the CMEA group as a whole. Though there is an element of truth in these observations, Mr. Grzybowski fails to see that one force—renascent East European nationalism—has had by far the greatest influence on the evolution of CMEA.

The death and later denunciation of Stalin; the divisions within the Soviet leadership; the Sino-Soviet schism; the decline of the Kremlin as an ultimate source of authority in the Communist world; the economic slowdown in the USSR and Eastern Europe... these momentous events provided a permissive atmosphere for the resurgence of nationalism in Eastern Europe. It is precisely this environment that determined the character of CMEA following Stalin's death.

Gradually CMEA has become a forum where member states try, with considerable success, to promote and defend their vital national interests. The clash of these interests has resulted in compromises, temporary alliances, reciprocal back-scratching, and Gaullist-like withdrawals—tactics used in any organization where conflicting interests are allowed expression.

Mr. Grzybowski acknowledges the existence of conflict between the developed and less-developed CMEA states, and he perceives that national ambitions have blocked progress toward industrial specialization. He sees no real divergence of interests, however, between the USSR and the East European countries as a group, nor among individual member nations. His failure to give sufficient weight to CMEA dissension undoubtedly led to his erroneous conclusion that the member nations had adopted the radical reform of CMEA proposed by Khrushchev in 1962.

In the last half of that year Khrushchev set forth in detail his program to centralize and strengthen the power of CMEA. His major proposals were that CMEA should establish 1) a supra-national planning body; 2) centralized joint investments; 3) the central coordination of national investment plans; and 4) joint ownership of production facilities built with CMEA funds.

Mr. Grzybowski suggests that the first three of these proposals were accepted by the CMEA membership. Raw materials are, he writes, "dis-

tributed according to a centrally prepared plan" (p. 119). CMEA authorized "to direct the investment policies of the commonwealth" (p. 162), and investments are financed "from the center, through a central international banking institution." (p. 151). He further suggests (p. 121) that the membership invested the permanent CMEA commissions with limited central planning authority.

These conclusions are consistent only with what Professor Conquest has termed "the non-conflict model" of Soviet society. There is abundant evidence, however, to indicate that Khrushchev's proposals generated a great deal of conflict; and that his program met with varying degrees of suspicion and hostility among member states, none of which welcomed relinquishing any significant degree of control over domestic economic activity.

Hence no supra-national planning authority was established. Instead (according to Jaroszewicz, Poland's CMEA delegate) the permanent commissions, together with other CMEA organs, was designated to serve as a "joint, continuous, operating staff of collaboration at a high level."<sup>1</sup> In other words, decisions would be binding only with the unanimous consent of the membership, as before. Similarly CMEA failed to establish a central plan for allocating commodities or investments. It was agreed only that member states should circulate their individual national economic plans in draft, rather than final form. The rejection of Khrushchev's proposals was formalized in the official communique following the CMEA Conference of Party first secretaries in July 1963. The communique was noteworthy for its strong reaffirmation of national sovereignty and bilateralism as the guiding principles of CMEA work. In an awkward attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable, the authors of the communique declared that "the best possible basis for multilateral coordination is provided by bilateral consultations between member nations."<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Grzybowski's assessment of CMEA's International Bank for Economic Cooperation is somewhat ambiguous. He seems uncertain, in the face of the often extravagant claims of CMEA spokesmen regarding the Bank's role, whether it is or is not the powerful institution that Khrushchev called for; i.e., whether it really has the independent authority to extend credit, to effect multilateral settlements, and to allocate investment funds for CMEA development projects.

1. *Polish News Bulletin*, Warsaw, 23-27 December 1962.

2. *Pravda*, 28 July 1963.

From the Bank's statutes, and from some of the more serious discussion of its work in recent writings by Eastbloc economists,<sup>1</sup> it appears that the Bank enjoys virtually no independent authority, but acts chiefly as the book-keeper for intra-CMEA accounts. No multilateral settlements can be made by the Bank without explicit permission of the countries involved. Nor can the Bank extend trade credit on its own authority. Any such swing credits extended to a debtor country must first be approved by the particular creditor country, or countries affected.

From an October 1963 CMEA communique it seems that the Bank's investment activities, too, are limited to the role of agent. Thus the Bank "may, upon the instruction of the interested parties, finance the construction... of enterprises... *from resources allocated by these countries.*"<sup>2</sup> (Italics added).

Mr. Grzybowski's book, though deficient in its economic insights, nevertheless is a serious, scholarly work. It is a useful reference for other students of Eastbloc affairs, both because of the detailed discussion of specialized agencies' activities, and for its comprehensive list of good source materials.

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E.D. Tappe (ed.), *Documents Concerning Rumanian History (1427-1601)*. The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1964. Pp. 162.

In this book, Professor Tappe has assembled an assortment of 218 unpublished documents in English, French, Italian, and Latin, which are in some way related to the history of the Rumanian Principalities, and are drawn from archives in Great Britain: the Public Record Office, British Museum, Bodleian Library and other public and private collections. Although of mixed value to the historian, this work justifies Iorga's contention, that given the dearth of native sources, the British archives might prove as valuable a source for the study of Rumanian history as those which he used in France, Austria, and Prussia for the famed 44 volume Hurmuzachi collection. The significance of this new material lies not so much in the evidence provided for revolutionary

1. See in particular articles by Adam Zwaz in *Finanse*, Warsaw, no. 2, February 1965, and by Stefan Zurowski in *Zycie Gospodarcze*, Warsaw, 18 July 1965, also appearing in English in the *Polish News Bulletin* of 24 July 1965.

2. *Pravda*, 24 October 1963.