

least been made from the Public Record Office). He has avoided reprinting documents from the PRO previously published, and, in starting the arduous work of making British primary sources on Rumania available, has offered a lead to other historians, who it is hoped will continue this work from 1601 onwards. Indeed, it might be desirable to broaden our perspective regarding Eastern Europe by publishing English documents for Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia. If comprehensiveness be the aim, English volumes which would be the equivalent of the Hurmuzachi collection are still in the offing.

Boston College

RADU FLORESCU

W.E.D. Allen, *Problems of Turkish Power in the Sixteenth Century*. London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1963. Pp. 64 + Appendix.

With the prevailing tendency to equate bigger with better it is refreshing to find a work which proves that good things still do come in small packages. W.E.D. Allen, well-known and respected for his histories of Georgia and of the Ukraine, presents, within the compass of a forty-page essay buttressed by almost forty pages of notes and tables, a far-ranging, provocative study on the vast Turkish expansion of the sixteenth century. The word Turkish is important since Allen deals with the Turks in their Central Asian, Russian, and Indian manifestations as well as in the Ottoman Empire. If upon ending the monograph the reader is left both somewhat dissatisfied and a bit winded by the swiftness of the pace which shifts him back and forth between Istambul and central Asia, he has at least benefited from an imaginative exposure to several problems of major importance.

A point of departure is provided for Allen by Toynbee's declaration (in *Civilization on Trial*, 1948) that the Turks, notably Babur, were unaware of the implications of the Portuguese appearance in the Indian Ocean, and that the Ottomans reacted too late with too little in dealing with the oceanic enterprise of the Castilians and Portuguese. Toynbee had further rubbed in the salt with the added observation that Sokollu's Don-Volga canal scheme failed when attempted in 1568-1570 because the Russians had secured Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1554. Allen rises to the defense of the Turks, stating that, "...there were in the Turkish world men who were concerning themselves with the potential menace of the 'oceanic revolution' within a decade of Vasco da Gama's arrival in India. Further there were men who had comprehended the significance of the decline of Turkestan and who were aware of the new

threat from the north in the Russian expansion down the Volga and along the fluvial network of the Eurasian steppe during the first half of the sixteenth century." (p. 2). The author then proceeds in five chapters to attempt to show that this was so, relying for evidence largely on recent works of scholarship in Russian and Turkish.

One chapter is concerned with economic factors in the history of Turkestan, especially the change in river courses, and the shift in trade routes from a latitudinal to a longitudinal direction. Another deals with the Ottoman reaction to the 'oceanic revolution.' Here Selim I's eastern campaigns are seen as indicating his serious concern with checking the Portuguese expansion in the Indian Ocean. Selim I, Allen contends, "had conceived a great operation on interior lines against western maritime power on the new routes to the east." (p. 12). If this is so Toynbee's contention that the Ottomans took Egypt to forestall a Safavid occupation becomes at best an over-simplification. The evidence presented by Allen to support his illuminating hypothesis is not completely convincing, resting as it does on non-Turkish sources, but hopefully it will stimulate research into the political, religious, and social situation in eastern Anatolia in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.

From Anatolia Allen returns to Turkestan, to discuss the political crisis occasioned by the breakup of the Timurid Empire. He also deals here with economic decline, and the Russian advance against the feeble Turkish khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan. The introduction of firearms played a great role. Allen makes a point with relation to arms bought by Babur and the Safavids which has been noted recently by many observers of modern military aid programs — the recipient nations usually get military hardware older and inferior to that in current use.

The next to last chapter, and the best documented, deals with the Don-Volga canal project. Here Allen relies upon the work of Halil Inalcik. The fall of the central Asian khanates marked the beginning of the Russian problem for the Ottomans. Allen detects a recognition of this by the Ottomans in their conclusion of the Treaty of Amasya in 1555. If this is so Allen offers no explanation other than the individualistic policy of the Khan of the Crimea for the slowness with which the Ottomans reacted to the threat. The Don-Volga scheme, like most which fail, seems in retrospect to have been somewhat absurd from the outset, but despite many hardships the Ottomans were almost successful. Devlet Giray's advocacy of a direct attack upon Moscow as a better way to deal with the threat went unsupported. It is difficult to disagree with Allen's conclusion that he was probably right.

Throughout his essay Allen proves his point that there were men in the Turkish world who were concerned with the problems posed by the Portuguese, the Russians, and economic decline. He is less successful in dealing with the question of why they responded so slowly and with such little success. The fault cannot be ascribed to Allen alone. This is a work of synthesis, and on so many of these matters there is precious little to synthesize. The need for basic research is glaringly evident. A.Z.V. Togan and Halil Inalcik have shown the way, it remains for the rest of us to follow.

Princeton University

NORMAN ITZKOWITZ

Dimitrije Kantakuzin (Dela), *Priredie Djordje Trifunović*. Beograd 1963. Pp. 175. Izdanje "Nolit," édition "Zivi pesnici."

Durant les années difficiles que l'Empire Byzantin traversait, plusieurs Grecs illustres trouvèrent un refuge et une seconde patrie au sein du Despotat Serbe. Parmi ces Grecs, il y avait deux hommes de lettres, qui apprirent à fond la langue serbe littéraire et même l'écrivirent. Antoine Raphael a composé en 1420 un poème important sur la mort du Knez Lazare survenue à Kossyfopedion (1389), et le moine Nikon, père spirituel de la fille de Lazare, Hélène, a écrit aussi quelques petites oeuvres.

Djordje Trifunović étudia les oeuvres de Dimitrije Kantakuzin, auteur serbe du Moyen Age, qui était également d'origine grecque. Cela mis à part, Djordje Trifunović s'intéressa également à une collection d'oeuvres, dans laquelle se trouvaient des anciens textes sur Constantin (Cyrille) et Méthodius. Au début du livre, il y a une préface "Les Frères Thessaloniciens" (Cyrille et Methodius), Belgrade 1964, édition de la "Srpska Knjizevna zadruga."

Dans la première partie de cette monographie (p. 9-36), l'auteur parle de la vie de Dimitrije Kantakuzin et de cette grande ville de mines Novo Brdo. Dimitrije Kantakuzin était né autour de 1435 à Novo Brdo, et sa famille, très probablement, était liée de parenté avec Irène, le femme du Despote Serbe Djuradj Branković.

En deuxième partie, l'auteur fait une analyse des thèmes et de la forme des oeuvres de Dimitrije Kantakuzin, et à la fin il parle de la haute qualité artistique de ses oeuvres.

La plus grande partie de l'ouvrage est consacrée aux oeuvres de Kantakuzin, et il est divisé en deux parties. A gauche, on trouve l'ancien texte slave et à droite la traduction du texte en langue serbe moderne. L'hymne à la Mère de Dieu tient une place artistique prépondérante.