1956, whereas the educated urban population is now prepared to compromise with the Communist state.

The examples which Burks presented indicate once again that the international position of a nation, its aspirations for independence, progress, and the like, are far more important in shaping its image of another nation than any qualities which the latter may possess. Thus it is the longing of the Hungarian rural population for an end to Communism which turns them toward the United States, rather than any assertions by the American government that it will indeed act in their behalf. Similarly, the shock which the Serbs experienced over the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878 stemmed from their own readiness to disregard the abundant evidence that Russia pinned her hopes on Bulgaria, not Serbia. The attitudes and images held by the public are clearly of small importance so long as political parties are not sufficiently powerful to seriously influence the making of foreign policy. Ferdinand in Bulgaria and Milan Obrenović in Serbia demonstrated how little public opinion, attitudes, and images of other nations count so long as the sovereign can successfully control the political situation. The connection between the public opinion and the foreign policy of the Eastern European countries has hardly been investigated; perhaps this approach would bring a new dimension to the study of the diplomatic history of this region.

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LEONARD BUSHKOFF (and R. V. BURKS, who summarized his own paper)

CHATHAM COLLEGE SYMPOSIUM ON THE SOVIET UNION IN WORLD POLITICS

On 15-16 April 1966, a discussion on "The Soviet Union in World Politics" was held at Chatham College in Pittsburgh. The faculty and students who attended from various colleges and universities in the Pittsburgh area were addressed by three prominent specialists: Professor Marshall Shulman of Tufts University, Mr. Louis Fischer of the Institute for Advanced Study, who dealt with "The Sino-Soviet Conflict"; and Mr. William Griffith of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who spoke on "The Soviet Bloc." Since Mr. Griffith's paper in particular is of interest to Balkan specialists, an attempt will be made to summarize it.

Unfortunately, such a summary can only do scant justice to what was an

extraordinarily succinct, able, and sophisticated presentation,¹ combining a general survey of the current political situation in Communist Eastern Europe with an analysis of causation and a tacit prognosis regarding prospects for the future. Griffith vigorously asserted that the whole concept of a Soviet "bloc" is obsolete; Soviet power in Eastern Europe no longer rests either on fear or on ideological bonds, but more and more on traditional military and economic instruments. The reasons for this transformation lie not only in de-Stalinization and the relative liberalization of Soviet behavior, but in a shift in the global balance of forces away from the Soviet Union and toward the United States. This first became clear with the American victory in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and has been further demonstrated by the American bombing (which the Soviet Union has been unable to stop) of North Viet Nam, by the impressive economic growth of the West as compared to the Communist states, and by the decline of Soviet influence in the underdeveloped countries. It follows that Communist leaders in Eastern Europe believe good relations with the United States, the most powerful state in the world, to be absolutely vital for their security, as well as highly desirable for the economic growth and modernization of their countries.

Nor has this opportunity been ignored. Griffith argued that the character of Eastern European Communism has changed considerably in the past decade. It is, on the whole, no longer characterized by police terrorism, crude social engineering, ideological fanaticism, or real internationalist sentiment. Its new hallmarks are a relative pragmatism, a firm commitment to economic development, and a modernizing, elitist nationalism somewhat reminiscent of the government-sponsored economic Westernization of the late 1930's. Griffith pointed to still other links with the pre-Communist past: in Yugoslavia, a rebirth is well under way of the traditional friction between the advanced, Western-oriented provinces of Croatia and Slovenia, and the less developed Serbian regions; Hungary lives peacefully under a de facto Ausgleich directed toward Moscow, rather than Vienna, but based (as was its nineteenth-century forerunner) on restraint, order, and mutual co-existence; and in Poland, the Communist Party contains within its ranks a substantial group of "Partisans", whose anti-intellectual, anti-Semitic, and anti-Western attitudes somewhat resemble the outlook of the prewar ONR and Falanga.

In directing our attention to parallels, resemblances, and analogies between the Eastern Europe of today and that of the interwar period, Griffith tacitly suggests that the belief, so widely held among scholars in the West (par-

^{1.} The paper is in large part reprinted on pp. 1-24 of *Communism in Europe*, vol. II, ed. by William Griffith (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966).

ticularly those of Eastern European origin) that Communism represents a break with the traditional past no less significant than, say, the partitions of Poland or the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans, is in need of serious examination. This examination should perhaps focus more on continuity than on change, and more on deep-seated geographical, ethnic, religious, and psychological factors than on narrowly political phenomena.¹

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STANFORD UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE ON YUGOSLAVIA

The annual meetings on Eastern Europe at Stanford University, having begun as a seminar on a local or regional basis, have developed into conferences of national, if not international, stature. "Yugoslavia: An Experiment in Socialism", was held on December 3-4, 1965. As the first conference of its kind, it offered an assessment of the past twenty years of Yugoslav history, since the rise to power of Tito and the Communist Party.

Under the chairmanship of Professor Wayne Vucinich of Stanford University, the program opened with a review by Milorad Drachkovitch of the Hoover Institution, of the history of the "Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Interwar Period." The inconsistent efforts of an ever-changing leadership to create and maintain an orthodox Bolshevik party in the face of centrifugal nationalist tensions led to inter-Party rifts and virtual extinction until the advent of Tito and, ironically, of Hitler. Opportunity beckoned in April, 1941, with Hitler's destruction of the Yugoslav state. And Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union encouraged the pragmatism and realism which have remained characteristics of the CPY. "Yugoslavia in World War II" was dealt by Professor Jozo Tomasevich of San Francisco State College, who concentrated on the strengths and weaknesses of both sides in the highly controversial Tito-Mihailovich feud. Tomasevich noted among other factors favoring the partisans their energy and activism; their political program, which offered attractive solutions to the national question while de-emphasizing Marxism; the varied capabilities of their leaders; their appeal to various social elements, including women and the young; the mistakes of their opponents; and their skill in organization and propaganda. A lively discussion followed of both papers, which represent a distillation of work in progress by their authors.

^{1.} The entire Winter 1966 issue of the Journal of International Affairs is devoted to this very topic: "East Central Europe: Continuity and Change".