

ever indistinct and circuitous, stretching from Benjamin von Kallay to Garvilo Princip?

About these political, ideological, and psychological effects of industrialization, Sugar says nothing. Perhaps he should not be expected to: his subject is, after all, economic history. It is nevertheless disappointing to see him emulate those scholars who (to quote Marc Bloch) "are like oceanographers who refuse to look up at the stars because they are too remote from the sea, and consequently are unable to discover the causes of the tides."

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Ghita Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania, 1944-1962*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. XII+378.

This book is to be welcomed as the first history of the Communist regime in Rumania. Beginning its analysis in depth with the Teheran conference in 1943 and ending with open Rumanian resistance to the demands of Soviet Russia twenty years later, Mr. Ionescu's work traces the establishment and evolution of the Communist regime in detail. He adds a brief critical bibliography and an appendix with biographical data on 30 key Rumanian Communists.

Mr. Ionescu's description of the foundation of the Communist regime is not unexpected. He holds that Soviet occupation of Rumania was inevitable once the Allied powers rejected the British proposal for a landing in the Balkans, that only Soviet military occupation made possible the installation of a predominantly Communist government in an overwhelmingly anti-Communist country, and that the People's Democracy of March 1945-December 1946, was a tactical maneuver by Soviet authority, who accepted a temporary division of power between Communist and bourgeois elements.

The dictatorship of the proletariat which followed was as Stalinist as any in Eastern Europe, while the exploitation of the country through war reparations and the Sovroms was more savage than most. The emergence of a sizeable Communist party is to be explained by a combination of despair and opportunism; Mr. Ionescu emphasizes the draconic educational measures which the party leadership found necessary in order to familiarize the new comrades with even the rudiments of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. The Rumanian intellectuals also gave

their ostensible cooperation to the new regime, but in fact produced only artistic chaff while secretly joining the internal migration.

Perhaps the most useful feature of Mr. Ionescu's book is his extensive treatment of the Communist Party. There exists as yet no reliable history of the Rumanian Party in any language, and until one is written *Communism in Rumania* will serve as substitute. A lengthy introduction to the volume deals with the history of the Party before the Soviet occupation brought it to power. A noteworthy aspect of the early history is the importance, if not the outright preponderance, of minority elements, functioning within the party as ethnic or regional groupings. There were the Bessarabians, largely Jewish, and the faction most trusted by Moscow; the Dobrudjans, almost entirely Bulgarian; the Transylvanians, heavily Hungarian; the Bukovinians; and the Jewish intellectuals of Rumanian origin. The ethnic composition of the early Party helps explain the factional struggles of the Party when in power. From 1944 to 1952, Mr. Ionescu argues, real authority was in the hands of Ana Pauker and the so-called Moscovites, most of whom were of minority origin, whereas after 1952 power was gained by Gheorghiu-Dej, the leader of the nativists and himself an ethnic Rumanian. To the Moscovites, the word of the Kremlin was law; it was the nativists who, in 1963, openly defied the Soviet power. Mr. Ionescu also devotes attention to the Patrascanu problem, speculating whether the execution in 1954 of this Transylvanian intellectual and longtime Party member was the consequence of a Titoist deviation.

In his interpretation of more recent events, Mr. Ionescu does not fare so well. His presentation of the Central Committee Declaration of 26 April 1964, an event of great moment not only in the history of the Rumanian regime but of international Communism as well, leaves much to be desired. The reader is almost totally unprepared for the occurrence of the Rumanian nationalist deviation. How has it been possible for a regime which had been imposed upon the Rumanian people by the Soviet army, had scraped together a ruling party by the mass recruitment of former Fascists and of opportunists, had served as a willing instrument for the Soviet exploitation of Rumanian wealth and resources, had alienated the peasantry by the forcible collectivization of agriculture, driven the intellectuals into an internal migration, and in general ruled by force and terror, how has it been possible for such a regime to turn and defy its very creator? And on the very issue of whether Rumania should industrialize throughout her economy?

It is of course true that most observers in the West were astonished

by the appearance of a nationalist deviation in Rumania. Despite accumulating evidence, Western observers were indeed slow to recognize what was occurring. It is also true that Mr. Ionescu discusses the victory of the nativist leadership, the large-scale recruitment and training of a Rumanian technical intelligentsia, the withdrawal of the last Soviet troops in 1958, and other elements vital to any credible explanation. But he does not attempt such an explanation himself, nor deal with the whole body of evidence as to how the deviation developed, nor even give in detail the economic arguments of the two protagonists.

Mr. Ionescu is also open to criticism for something close to Rumanian national bias. He seems to the present reviewer to underplay considerably the importance of the Hungarian autonomous regime in northern Transylvania in 1944-45, and to pass over in silence the atrocities committed by Rumanian forces in the conquest and administration of Transnistria.

But these criticisms notwithstanding, we must be grateful to Mr. Ionescu for a very useful book, one to which students of Eastern Europe and of Rumania will be referring for many years to come.

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Angelo Tamborra, *Imbro I. Tkalac e l'Italia*. Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento Italiano, Biblioteca Scientifica, Serie II: Memorie, Vol. XXIV. Roma: Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento Italiano, 1966. Pp. 357.

Italian studies on the Italo-Slav relations of the last century above all on the Risorgimento period, flourish with considerable satisfaction, to both sides of the Adriatic. They are doubly useful as they help develop an Italo-Yugoslav understanding which had been dimmed over a generation by the ominous nationalist propaganda.

One of the Italian historians who has mostly contributed to the study of the relations between the Slavs and Italians in the Risorgimento period is certainly Professor Angelo Tamborra. Already a few years ago in his masterly book, *Cavour e i Balcani* (1958), he discussed the problem dealing with the relations between the leading Risorgimento's personalities and those of the Serbs, Croats, Hungarians, Greeks, Rumanians and Bulgarians. In that book he brought to light major ideas and projects of the Cavourian diplomacy for an Italo-Balkan and Danubian entente, which unhappily after the formation of the new Balkan and