

flikte ihren Nährboden entzog (man denke z.B. nur an das auffallende Fehlen fast jeglicher erotischen Äusserung in Byzanz) und diemit ihrer Tendenz, die einmal gewonnene Ordnung zu bewahren, und in dem Bewußtsein, alles in Vollkommenheit zu besitzen, kaum das Bedürfnis wecken konnte, neue Wege in der Dichtung zu suchen. Schließlich sollte auch nicht übersehen werden, daß gerade das, was uns heute an der byzantinischen Kunst und Liturgie fasziniert, uns die entsprechende Dichtung oft unerträglich macht.

So aber zeigt sich Byzanz auch hier dergestalt, wie der Verfasser es in seinem ganzen Werk erwiesen hat, und es ist eben des Verfassers Verdienst, diese unzähligen Bezüge auf die "Neue Mitte" im politischen, kulturellen und privaten Bereich zusammengestellt und im Zusammenhang dargestellt zu haben.

Möge diese Festgabe eines jungen Lehrstuhls an eine alte Alma Mater den Widerklang in der Öffentlichkeit finden, der ihr als Thema und als Buch gebührt.

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Malcolm D. Rivkin, *Area Development for National Growth. The Turkish Experience*. Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York, 1965.

This is an interesting and valuable book. Its aim is to analyze the area development policies of the Turkish Republic. It examines the origins, changes and effects of these policies for the period since Kemal Atatürk began his modernization and development drive in the 1920's. The literature on economic development, both theoretical and empirical, has generally not dealt adequately with the problem of regional development within a nation. Analyses and plans usually focus on the nation as a unit devoid of its spatial dimension. This is not surprising since the consideration of the factor of spatial differentiation greatly complicates the overall analytical problem. Yet, the economic development problem does have a spatial dimension. Development plans which ignore this dimension may be incomplete. Economic development histories which ignore the causes and effects of regional differentiation may fail to take into account important development factors. The economic development of Turkey during the last forty years has been significant, giving rise to some of the classic problems associated with rapid growth. Some studies on Turkish economic development are available but none from a systematic regional point of view. Mr. Rivkin's book is a valuable contri-

bution because it closes this gap and because the Turkish experience has relevance for other developing countries, especially those facing a polarization of their economic and social life in one or very few urban centers.

The book is divided into five parts. Part I includes a general discussion of the process of urban concentration that has occurred in many developing nations. Part II treats the goals, priorities and organization of Turkey's area development efforts between 1923 and 1950, the period of the one party rule. Part III deals with the same issues for the period 1950-1960 during which an experiment in multi-party democracy was tried but ended in revolution. Part IV examines a particular case area, Zonguldak by the Black Sea, where public activities similar to those applied elsewhere in the country were aimed at creating economic growth. Part V summarizes the lessons from the Turkish experience. It is Part II which is the most interesting because it defines the regional problems with which the Turkish leaders were initially confronted and analyzes the policies they pursued which gave Turkish development its character.

When the Turkish Republic was established in 1923 under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk, Turkey was confronted with many of the problems typically facing developing nations today. One of these was that a major urban area, Istanbul, was the center of all economic, political and cultural life. The rest of Turkey, with the rather minor exception of Izmir, was a nation of primitive peasants, centuries apart from the western world in attitudes and in productive processes. Several towns dotted the barren countryside of Asia Minor but they were mostly small market or military communities isolated both from Istanbul and the surrounding peasant culture. Atatürk's overall goals were to create a nation economically strong (this invariably implies industrialization), politically independent of foreign domination, yet oriented towards the western civilization.

Several factors dictated policies which had immediate implications for the spatial development of Turkey. Some of these factors, like the need for national integration and the desire to exploit the resources of the interior, are common to many countries striving for development. Other factors were more typically Turkish. These included the strong desire to westernize the Turkish culture (by introducing, for example, the latin alphabet), Atatürk's revulsion against Ottoman life and its symbolic seat at Istanbul, the fear of invasion and therefore the vulnerability of the coastal areas, and the feeling of debt to the peasants of

Anatolia who supported the Kemalist armies in the war against the Greeks in the early 1920's.

These considerations dictated sweeping policies which were pursued vigorously by the new regime. These were the creation of a new administrative and cultural center in Ankara at the center of Anatolia, the transformation of many provincial towns into governmental and cultural centers for the surrounding hinterlands, the extension of railroad lines to these provincial centers linking them with Ankara and the western coast, and the establishment of large industrial enterprises owned and operated by the state in many interior centers. The last policy was at least in part a response to the weakness of private initiative. In choosing the sites for its new industries the government was willing to forego economic considerations in order to serve the goals of industrialization, cultural penetration of the interior and national defence.

This pattern of regional development can be described as one of selective concentration. No such easy classification is possible for the period since 1950. Not only Ankara but also Istanbul and Izmir became chief targets of public interest. Along with the emphasis on these centers, the government undertook to disperse public investment widely throughout the country. There were large investments in industry, in agriculture, in highway construction and in other infrastructure. Mechanization in agriculture and the further breakdown of rural isolation through the highway program contributed to the heavy migration to the urban areas in the 1950's. The policy of dispersion of investments had less coordination than the programs of the earlier period and many investments were costly and unproductive. Several of the government's policies reflected a high concern with popularity. The overall goal became economic development as quickly as possible and at any cost. Considerable development took place but there was also inflation, balance of payments difficulties and eventually a slowdown of development and political instability.

What can we learn from the Turkish experience? A major lesson is that countries pursuing economic development and faced with the center-periphery conflict will gain more by a selective concentration rather than by a dispersion of investments over space. In view of the usually limited resources available for development, programs emphasizing dispersion will have a small impact on the periphery while the center will continue to attract investors, cosmopolitan professionals and migrants. In fact, small changes in the periphery may be just enough to cut people loose from their traditional rural environment while the grow-

ing attractions of the urban areas will do the rest. The physical and social problems of the center will be intensified and the gap between it and the periphery will grow.

Students of regional economic development will benefit from reading this book. It is a good case study of a neglected aspect of economic developments.

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Gotthard Jäschke, *Die Türkisch-Orthodox Kirche*. Sonderdruck aus: *Der Islam*. Bd. 39, 1964.

In der obigen Abhandlung befasst sich der Verfasser mit der sogenannten türkisch-orthodoxen Kirche und mit ihrem Führer und Vorkämpfer, Papa Evthim (Pater Evthimios). Unabhängig von den Theorien über ihre Herkunft werden die Karamanlides als Mitglieder der griechisch-orthodoxen Gemeinde betrachtet (Rum-millieti). Aus diesem Grunde wurden sie auch im Jahre 1923 zu den Griechen gezählt und fielen unter das Gesetz über den zwangsweisen Austausch der Bevölkerung. Weil sie türkisch sprachen, übersetzte die Kirche kultische und andere Bücher ins Türkische und druckte sie mit griechischen Lettern. Im Jahre 1917, als sich die Beziehungen zwischen Griechenland und der Türkei verschlechterten, sprach man zum ersten Mal über die Gründung eines besonderen Patriarchats, angeblich um einem Verlangen der Karamanlides nachzukommen. In Verbindung mit den erfolgreichen Verhandlungen über die griechischen Ansprüche und dem Anfang des Kampfes um die Autonomie des Pontus wurde unter den Karamanlides Propaganda gegen das Patriarchat gemacht, und von den Einwohnern von Saframpolis wurde eine öffentliche Erklärung abgegeben, dass sie Türken seien und mit ihren türkischen Brüdern in Frieden leben wollten. Sie wollten sich von dem Patriarchat in Konstantinopel trennen und ein eigenes türkisch-orthodoxes Patriarchat gründen. Der grossen Nationalversammlung im Jahre 1921 wurde ein Gesetz über die Gründung eines unabhängigen türkisch-orthodoxen Patriarchats mit Sitz in Kaiseri vorgelegt, weil das Patriarchat in Konstantinopel seit Jahrhunderten das ottomanische Reich beunruhige, den griechischen Interessen diene und die türkisch-orthodoxe Bevölkerung unterdrücke.

An die Spitze der Bewegung stellte sich der verheiratete Priester Evthimios Karahisaridis aus Keskin. Er beschuldigte in einem Rundschreiben das Patriarchat in Konstantinopel, die türkisch-orthodoxen