

raçhane in Istanbul: First Preliminary Report" (231-236) by R. Martin Harrison and Nezi Firatli. Carl D. Sheppard in his note on "A Radio-carbon Date for the Wooden Tie Beams in the West Gallery of St. Sophia, Istanbul" (237-240) reports on four specimens of wood submitted to radiocarbon analysis and concludes that the wood of the beam itself is A.D.  $470 \pm 70$  and the wood casings A.D.  $830 \pm 70$ . Also pointed out is the presence in Byzantine art before the tenth century and after the sixth of elements associated with Sassanian art. In his short article called "A Note on Nicetas David Paphlago and the *Vita Ignatii* (241-247)" Romilly J. H. Jenkins concludes that Nicetas-David Paphlago, rhetor, didaskalos, "philosopher," and monk (but at no time bishop of Dadybra), was one man, whether as author of *encomia*, or of *VI*, or in the pages of *VE*. Donald M. Nicol gives us a prosopographical note on "Constantine Akropolites" (249-256), who was a son of the statesman and historian (1217-1282). The Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos took an active interest in his upbringing and education but Constantine was an outspoken critic of Michael's unionist policy with Rome and of Patriarch John Bekkos. The final note on "The Byzantine Mission to the Slavs" (257 - 265) by Harvard's Professor Roman Jakobson constitutes the report on the Dumbarton Oaks Symposium of 1964 and concluding remarks about crucial problems of Cyrillo-Methodian studies.

*Dumbarton Oaks Number Nineteen* is lavishly illustrated by more than one hundred plates, figures, and sketches of first-rate quality. The articles represent accurately the current work being done in Byzantine studies in history, archaeology, and philology and indicate quite clearly the solid, productive work that is being done in this ever-growing field of knowledge.

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Ivan Avakumović, *History of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia*. Vol. I. Aberdeen: The Aberdeen University Press, 1964. Pp. xii + 207.

Prosperity and adversity were paired characteristics in the early history of Yugoslav Communism. From a position of real importance in 1919-20, the Communist Party virtually disintegrated in 1921. It hung on doggedly in the political shadow-world where the policeman, the impassioned idealist, and the professional party worker all meet, until

the late 1930's, when its stock rose sharply as the War approached. Thereafter, the Party occupied a prominent position on the world stage. The Axis invasion, the partisan movement, the victory in 1945, the break with Stalin, all have been examined and chronicled, and not least by the Yugoslav Communists themselves, to whom it forms a sort of saga, which opens at that moment in December 1937 when Tito became Secretary General of their Party. The Party's early history is another matter. Certainly it has not received much approval from the current rulers in Belgrade, who see it as a record of mistakes, weakness, cowardice, even treason. Nor has there been any serious investigation in the West. Hence this book is truly a ground-breaker.

The scope is limited: from the beginnings of Marxist socialism in the Yugoslav lands in the 1890's down to the winter of 1940-41; a second volume presumably will cover the War years. The approach is systematic, precise, relatively unbiased (of this, more below), enormously detailed and, in a purely factual sense, knowledgeable: there is no doubt that, when it comes to digging out membership figures, the exact dates of a Party meeting, or the maneuvers of one faction or another, Professor Avakumović is our man. His book can hardly be surpassed for the sheer volume of data (frequently overflowing into lengthy footnotes) which it contains, not only on the Communist Party, but, for example, on the Socialists, Democrats, Francovici, Ustaši, and Ljotić's Fascists, on trade unions, intellectuals, and especially on politics in the universities. A rather primitive index makes it difficult to tap this flow, but it nevertheless is of great value; Professor Avakumović certainly deserves our gratitude.

He begins by briefly describing the socialist movement as it existed before 1914. In the absence of substantial industry, urban centers, or (in most of the Habsburg provinces) political liberties and a broad franchise, the socialists were extremely feeble. Their difficulties were aggravated by disagreements on several key issues: whether or not to seek peasant support, to back "bourgeois" reform governments or parties, to concentrate on trade union work at the expense of political action, or even to challenge the authorities by following the syndicalist example of direct action. The socialists were, however, broadly agreed in condemning nationalism, and the Serbian socialists adamantly opposed their country's participation in the Balkan and World Wars. Avakumović treats this opposition with considerable irony, noting its trifling impact on the Serbian people and even, he implies, on the socialists themselves, two of whose leaders (having been conscripted) were cited for gallantry

in combat. It is worth mentioning in passing that the violence and excitement of battle may fire the blood of even the most reluctant participant; and psychological insight is far more useful than irony in understanding the behavior of young radicals.

World War I made normal political life impossible in much of Yugoslavia, and drove many socialists into new surroundings: France, Switzerland, and Russia. The Bolshevik Revolution greatly encouraged the more radical among them, who were reinforced by the creation on Russian soil of a Yugoslav Communist group from former war prisoners. A close connection was thus established to the very font of revolution. The end of the War and the instability of the new Yugoslav state offered the radicals major opportunities; so did the establishment of Communism in Hungary. The Serb Social Democrats took the lead in forming radical elements from the entire country into a Communist party in April 1919. This precipitated a split with the moderate socialists of Slovenia and Croatia, who organized a socialist party patterned on those of the West. A significant gap thus appeared between the trade union socialist of the advanced, developed regions, and the radical intellectuals of the underdeveloped central and southern provinces; the Marxists, no less than their liberal adversaries, were beginning to pay a price for Yugoslavia's complex history.

Not that the radicals were so very radical, however. They had no intention of emulating the Bolsheviks by using a tiny cadre of workers and intellectuals as the core of a revolutionary party of peasants, ethnic minorities and all those uprooted and dispossessed by the War and the rapid changes of Yugoslav society. The Communists looked instead to the working class centers, Germany above all, to ignite a blaze which they assumed would spread to the Balkans. Hence the Party leaders confined themselves to the traditional instruments of sociopolitical conflict: strikes, demonstrations, rallies, and elections. Their strategy did not change despite their impressive showing in the 1920 parliamentary election, when the Party swept Macedonia and Montenegro and did very well in Serbia. The government responded by partially banning the Party and, after some of its younger members struck back with terror, outlawed it entirely in mid-1921.

The Party thereafter went into a steady decline. The heterogeneous background and outlook of its members, the practical difficulties involved in side-stepping the police, the frustrations born of long political impotence, and especially the heightening of national rivalries within the country, all led to continuous Party factionalism, splits, di-

visions, and intervention by the Comintern, particularly over policy toward the nationalities. The Comintern clearly regarded Yugoslavia as a vulnerable target, and hoped that its component nationalities, especially the Croats, could be brought around if the Yugoslav Party reversed its stand and advocated complete self-determination (i.e., the dissolution of Yugoslavia) for them. The opposition of the principal Party leaders on this and other issues was not fully overcome until 1928; only then did the Party become a reliable instrument of the Comintern.

In the process, however, much of its dynamism, idealism, and sense of purpose were lost. The Party was further hurt by the harsh police measures of the dictatorship (which Avakumović euphemistically refers to as a "personal" regime) of King Alexander. Communism began to revive only in 1934-35, benefitting from the greater freedom of political life after Alexander's assassination, the new Soviet popular front policy against German and Italian expansion, and the painful effects of the world depression on Yugoslav living standards. The Party made substantial advances among the Serbian and Montenegrin youth, particularly at the University of Belgrade, among intellectuals, women's groups, and a wide variety of leftists and liberals whose disgust with the ineffectiveness of the parliamentary system and the pro-Axis foreign policy of Stoyadinović led them to tacit approval of the Party's role in spurring Yugoslav politics toward the left. Avakumović argues that the Nazi-Soviet pact and the Communist support of Germany during the first year of World War II soured Yugoslav opinion on the Communists, whose influence was declining rapidly during early 1941; his inference is clearly that the Communists were more or less "saved" by the German invasion, which plunged Yugoslavia into chaos and thus made a Communist revolution possible. This thesis (so reminiscent of the proposition that the Bolshevik Revolution stemmed very largely from the defeats inflicted on Tsarism by Germany), though it may raise more questions than it answers, at least holds out a promise that Avakumović's second volume will deal with *issues*, rather than facts alone.

For while the present volume may have merit as a quarry from which to dredge up data, it leaves much to be desired as a political *history*. The writing is reminiscent of a military report or a financial statement: terse, dense, and lifeless. Although dozens of thumb-nail biographies of leading Communists are given, not one of these figures acquires vitality or depth. Analysis and interpretation are pared to an absolute minimum, and the data is strung together on the narrowest chronological thread. No time is spent in following up tangents; for example, Avakumović

mentions casually that two (Filipović and Marković) of the three Serb intellectuals who led the Party in 1919-20 were mathematicians. Is this only a coincidence? Or does it give some indication of the appeal of Marxism—"the science of society"—to some scientifically-trained intellectuals, particularly in a country where emotional, irrational nationalism often dominated politics? Of all this, Avakumović says nothing.

Nor does he give more than the scantiest treatment to the doctrine or ideology of the Yugoslav Communists. This is perhaps justifiable for the period after 1928, when the Party accepted the doctrine of Comintern infallibility. But prior to this, the Party fought for its own policies, justifying them in ideological as well as practical terms. Thus a major factor (which Avakumović does not mention) in the Communist opposition to collaboration with the Croat Peasant Party was the fear of being swamped by a mass of backward peasants; many Communists saw progress, reason, and economic growth as products of the city and opposed even a tactical alliance with the village.

The extremely narrow focus of the book leaves little opportunity for a firm answer to the basic question of whether Communism in Yugoslavia evolved from the conditions of the country itself or whether it was simply an alien growth, supported only by misfits and malcontents. Avakumović's position is indicated by his emphasis on the Party's skill at organization and propaganda, and on the help it received in the late 1930's from many influential (and, he obviously feels, foolish and misguided) fellow-travellers. That it might also have been greatly, perhaps decisively, aided by the failures of the *ancien régime* finds no place in his interpretation. In actuality, the permanent political crisis which afflicted Yugoslavia from 1919 onward reached a new level of intensity in the mid-1930's due to both the revival of German power and aspirations, and the effects of the world depression. Neither the Yugoslav governments nor the mass opposition parties offered effective solutions (the embryonic authoritarianism of Stoyadinović was hardly appealing to a political class addicted to the theory, if not the practice, of parliamentarianism) to these problems. The Communists, however, appeared to do so, and gained considerable success, particularly among the young, by their plans for filling the psychological and intellectual vacuum. It is perhaps significant that Avakumović's bibliography does not even cite the two books which best analyze the difficulties then facing Yugoslavia: J. B. Hoptner, *Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941* (1962), and, above all, the exhaustive study by Jozo Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yugoslavia* (1955). The restraints and limitations

which Avakumović decrees for himself, the lack of both perspective and understanding with which he views his subject, lead to the waste of a great opportunity; this is truly a history in only one dimension, with the whole heart and substance of the matter left out.

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J. K. Campbell, *Honour, Family, and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. xii + 393.\*

Many anthropologists will happily read but most historians, even Balkanologists, may regrettably overlook *Honour, Family, and Patronage*, an anthropological study of the Sarakatsan shepherds of the district of Zagori to the northeast of Jannina, where a group of communities of 4,000 persons, or 5 per cent of all Sarakatsani in Greece, lives a pastoral existence.

As an addition to the growing list of studies of "little communities" (see *Balkan Studies*, VI, No 1, 1965, 208-12), Campbell's contribution appears to have been inspired in part by Julian A. Pitt-Rivers, *The People of the Sierra* (London, 1954), especially in its concern with the values of Mediterranean cultures. Parts of his excellent chapter on "Kinsmen and Affines" were earlier incorporated as an essay on "The Kindred in a Greek Mountain Community," in *Mediterranean Countrymen*, edited by J. A. Pitt-Rivers (see *Balkan Studies*, VII, No 1, 1966, 212-16) and published as one of the volumes of the series "Recherches Méditerranéennes" of the French Maison des Sciences de l'Homme (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1963).

*Honour, Family, and Patronage* is based on field work undertaken during 1954 and 1955, but the author also acknowledges his indebtedness to Mme. A. Chatzimichalis, the foremost Greek scholar of Sarakatsan folklore, as well as to other scholars. Indeed, the Sarakatsani are one of the best known of the many clusters of "little communities" of Balkan shepherds, but Campbell's analysis is infinitely superior to that of any previous study of Sarakatsan society and culture. The only study of comparable scope is the even more recent *Pasteurs nomades méditerranéens: Les Saracatsans de Grèce* (Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1965) of G. B. Kavadias.

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\* In view of the interest generated by this pioneering study, *Balkan Studies* is printing two reviews of it, one by a Greek scholar (see V, No. 2, 1964, 363-77), and this critique by an American historian with anthropological concerns.