

le chercheur sera guidé dans la recherche de la problématique que pose la diffusion des manuscrits dans les pays roumains, l'évolution et la particularité de l'écriture cyrillique, le style des miniatures, l'école des copistes. L'évaluation de ce travail important ne figurera pourtant pas avant que tous les volumes soient parus.

La démarche dans la description des codes suivie par le rédacteur porte sur les principes de la méthodologie: 1. numéro du code, datation, pagination, dimensions, 2. titre de l'œuvre ou titre figurant entre crochets (intervention du rédacteur), 3. notes des copistes de contenu historique, météorologique, notes des lecteurs, 4. jugements sur le caractère de l'écriture, de la décoration, de la légature et de la provenance de code. Chaque description s'accompagne d'une bibliographie concernant le code (p.ex. édition antérieure ou publication partielle du code). Le souci du rédacteur de respecter la numérotation des codes pourrait justifier cette classification; il serait pourtant souhaitable qu'elle soit complétée par une deuxième classification par ordre des matières traitées: littéraires, juridiques, médicaux etc. Par ailleurs le présent ouvrage est d'un intérêt certain pour l'étude des relations du monde grec avec les principautés roumaines à l'époque en question. Une première lecture pourrait en témoigner: manuels de grammaire, dictionnaires, anthologies, textes littéraires, classiques ou religieux, traductions en roumain, des œuvres de la littérature neohellénique. Le mérite de cet ouvrage nous fait espérer la parution prochaine des volumes suivants.

*Institut d'Etudes Balkaniques*

ATH. E. KARATHANASSIS

Michael B. Petrovich, *A history of modern Serbia, 1804-1918*, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1976.

Michael Boro Petrovich's exhaustive narrative of the frenetic and complicated history of the Second Serbian Kingdom is as laden with facts as the chests of the Kingdom's rulers were with medals, and, as with the military decorations, the result is an effect that is both splendid and cluttered. The two-volume work, sponsored by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, is said to be the most thorough chronicle of the short-lived Balkan republic in any language, and it is difficult to imagine one more so. Every battle and border skirmish, every change of government, the details of every new constitution (seven in 102 years) as well as every facet of the countless political intrigues, any one of which makes Watergate look simple by comparison, are related, along with long intermittent sections on the cultural and economic affairs of Serbia, not to mention its complicated position in world politics.

Although a comprehensive approach may have been necessary to tell the story of a country in an almost impossible situation, that of a province of the Ottoman empire that, through a series of revolutions, wars, and political machinations, became the first autonomous — and later, the first independent — state on the Balkan peninsula, later to become the focus of the international posturing among the European Powers that culminated in the First World War, Petrovich's work may prove too long and convoluted for the casual reader. Also, his writing style, while admittedly tested to the extreme, grows monotonous, particularly in the thick of the political developments. Petrovich sticks almost exclusively to straight narrative,

and only occasionally uses other historical writing techniques such as the reconstruction of conversations, making his book difficult to read straight through. As a reference work, or for someone deeply interested in Serbian history and culture, however, the book is quite useful and abundant.

Petrovich, an American of Serbian descent, writes from a Serbian viewpoint. One can feel his distaste for Serbia's Ottoman oppressors, his delight in Serbia's establishment as a separate principality after the Congress of Berlin in 1878, his rage at Austria-Hungary's arrogant commercial ploys and ultimata toward Serbia just prior to World War One, and his slight tinge of regret as he tells of Serbia's loss of national identity as it became part of the new Yugoslav state in 1918. While such a viewpoint does color his interpretation (one wonders what a history of Serbia by a Russian or Austrian writer would be like), it does provide him with a focal point that saves the book from becoming sterile.

Petrovich sets the stage for Serbia's modern emergence in his first chapter, describing the medieval state of Serbia, which broke from the Byzantine Empire, then in its early stages of decay, in 1180. Under its most renowned ruler of this period, Stephan Dušan, Serbia conquered lands from Bosnia to Greece, and from the Adriatic to the Aegean seas. After his death, however, this healthy empire disintegrated, and became fair game for the expanding Ottoman Empire. Fierce battles took place between these two proud and utterly different peoples — the Serbians and the Turks — the bloodiest of which was the famous Battle of Kosovo in 1389. The ignominy of this defeat and the subsequent Ottoman rule was kept in Serbian memory for over four hundred years through the Serbs' strong tradition of epic poetry. The memory of this event served as a stimulant to later Serbian nationalistic movements.

Under Ottoman rule the Serbs were kept under a reactionary Muslim government, in a barbarous form of militaristic feudalism. Serbia missed out on the development of mercantilism and capitalism, and all social classes, with the exception of peasants and clerics, were effectively wiped out. The Serbian church, in fact, became the one social structure that was genuinely Serbian, and it was the church that helped to keep nationalistic feelings alive. Also, the Serbs did have their own form of local government in the *zagruda*, or rural cooperative village.

In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Serbia's position vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire improved as Turkey was weakened by wars with the Austrians. One outcome of the decay of the Ottoman Empire was the increasing independence of the imperial cavalry, or the janissaries. As the janissaries became harder for the Porte, as the Ottoman government was called, to control, they confiscated the lands of the Serbian peasants and extorted rents in addition to what the Serbs were paying their feudal lords, or sipahis. The janissaries called their expropriated lands *çifliks*, and they were another source of rage on the part of the Serbian peasants. The Ottomans, in a fateful attempt to control their once crack soldiers, sponsored a Serbian army to help control the janissaries, but Napoleon's Eastern European campaigns frightened Sultan Selim III who made peace with the janissary leader Pasvant-Oglu. Serbian discontent grew quickly, and, in response to a bloody purge by the janissaries of suspected revolutionaries, the Serbian people revolted against janissary rule in February of 1804. The leader of the revolt was Karadjordje Petrović, who was to become Serbia's first member of one of its two rival dynasties.

After the Serbs defeated the janissaries, Karadjordje turned his attention to «throwing off the yoke that the Serb has borne since Kossovo». Russia declared war on the Porte in 1807 and this brought about the Russo-Serbian alliance. Petrovich shows his disillusionment with the ambiguity of Russian foreign policy when he writes of the Russian sellout of Serbia in the truce between Russia and the Porte, in which Russian promises for Serbian independence was forgotten. He seems rather unforgiving to the Russians in view of the fact that their position was forced on them by Napoleon.

Karadjordje then turned to Austria, which offered help on the condition that Serbia be annexed to it, a plan that was later dismissed at the Conference of Erfurt. The power play between Austria and Russia for dominance in the Balkans in general and Serbia in particular is one of the themes of Serbian history.

Another theme is the perpetual struggle for power between Karadjordje and his successor princes and kings and those who wanted a more constitutional form of government. Under Karadjordje, the government was extremely autocratic — it consisted of the supreme leader (Karadjordje), a cabinet, and a supreme court, both of which were puppets of the supreme leader. Although he admires Karadjordje, Petrovich, to his credit, consistently sides with Karadjordje's constitutionalist opponents and their counterparts in successive generations.

The First Serbian Insurrection was only temporarily successful, as the Ottomans regained the land they lost. Karadjordje escaped to Austria, and the Turks exacted their revenge cruelly. In 1815, the second Serbian Insurrection began under the leadership of Miloš Obrenović, who was later to become Serbia's first prince and leader of Serbia's other dynasty.

Petrovich has an ambivalent attitude toward Miloš. On the one hand, he describes him as autocratic, and there is much evidence of this in his ruthless punishments and duplicitous maneuverings, not only among the members of his own government and opposition, but in his dealings with the Great Powers. Yet he gives him credit for helping Serbia along to a modernized economy, with a growing merchant class, of which Miloš was a member. Also, Miloš is given credit for agrarian reform, including a free land tenure system.

To make yet another of Serbia's long stories short, the Second Insurrection was a limited success, and Miloš was able to proclaim himself prince of Serbia, and in 1829, after another Russo-Turkish War, the Treaty of Adrianople granted Serbia her autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. Miloš, who had no scruples in this regard, bribed the Ottomans to make him hereditary prince. All Muslims except military personnel were made to leave, and Serbia was awarded six districts it had lost after the first Insurrection. Other concessions, such as the right of Miloš to maintain his own army, were granted. In 1831 the Serbian church, heretofore under Ottoman-appointed Greek domination, was granted autonomy.

An 1834 plot against Miloš's life by Mileta Radojković and others precipitated a constitutional crisis. In early 1835, Miloš presented a new constitution to an assembly of his deputies. This «Presentation Constitution» gave more power to the Council, and provided for a popularly elected Assembly, which had only dummy powers. Party lines were drawn between supporters of Miloš and the Constitutionalists. Miloš himself revoked the constitution shortly after he presented it.

In 1838, the Ottomans, with the complicity of Miloš's opponents, proclaimed what was to be known as the «Turkish Constitution», in which a new council was

formed, no member of which could be dismissed without proof, satisfactory to the Porte, of his having committed a crime against the laws of the land.

Despondent, his power thwarted, Miloš made a feeble attempt to avoid abdication by crossing over to Zemun, in Austria, on the pretext of seeing his son. Members of the Council and others demanded he return or be deposed and Miloš, the same man who had ordered the exiled Karadjordje decapitated and sent to the Porte for the Sultan's pleasure, meekly returned to Serbia and abdicated, in favor of his eldest son Milan.

The sickly Milan died 26 days after assuming the throne, and Miloš's sixteen-year-old son Michael took over. The poor lad had to contend with not only the opposition Constitutionalists, but the supporters of his own father, who also opposed him. In 1842 Toma Vučić-Perisić, backed by between three and four thousand armed Constitutionalist sympathizers, marched on the town of Kragujevač. Prince Michael, in order to avoid bloodshed, ordered his troops to retreat and tried to negotiate, but to no avail. Vučić's forces were victorious, and Michael fled to the Austrian town of Zemun.

Not daring to rule the peasant people of Serbia without an identifiable figurehead, the Constitutional clique, who had assumed control of the council years before, chose Alexander Karadjordjević, son of Karadjordje, to succeed Michael. An electoral assembly, despite pressure from Russia, voted unanimously for Karadjordjević. Deposed prince Miloš plotted against the Karadjordjević regime constantly, even going to the extent of sponsoring a rebellion by a handful of his sympathizers dressed in Austrian hussars! Miloš hoped to have the insurrection blamed on the Austrians.

It was during the reign of Alexander that Serbia's expansionist policies first began to germinate. There was some clamoring among the intelligentsia for a Pan-Slavic state, an idea 75 years ahead of its time, but it was Minister of the Interior Garašanin's idea of a greater Serbia that finally took hold. The idea of a sort of Pan-Serbianism also took hold, as many Serbs volunteered to join the Serbs fighting against Hungary in the revolution of 1848. The issue of whether to side with Russia or Austria was hotly debated. Prince Alexander favored Austria and Vučić was a Russophile. There were even advocates for alliances with France and the Porte!

During the sixteen years of Alexander's reign, there was a constitutional tug-of-war between the prince, who wanted more absolute power, and the Council, who wanted a hand in administration as well as legislation. The upshot of all this maneuvering was the St. Andrew Assembly, called on the urging of the Constitutionalists in 1858. So-called because it took place on November 30, St. Andrew's Day, the Assembly was also anticipated by supporters of the Obrenović family and by the young intelligentsia. Alexander was presented with a demand to resign by the Assembly. He asked to be given 24 hours to formulate his answer, and this was granted. Later that day, he was shocked to see an armed guard of several thousand march on his palace. At that same moment, Garašanin arrived with a carriage at the back entrance which the prince boarded and rode to the safety of the Turkish pasha. It was later speculated that Garašanin had engineered the demonstration and escape. On December 28, 1858, Miloš Obrenović was — again — proclaimed prince of Serbia. This was due to less a desire for return to his rule than a desire for a unifying force. This pattern repeats itself in Serbian history.

Miloš, while retaining his old dictatorial ways, spent most of his second term

playing the Liberals and Conservatives, as the two new political parties were called, against each other. Miloš did, however, purge the evergrowing bureaucracy of corrupt officials, as well as ingratiate himself with the peasantry in other ways. Miloš died of natural causes in 1860 and his son, Michael, became prince, again for the second time. It was the first orderly transfer of power in Serbia's history.

Michael's reign was characterized by an emphasis on war with the Porte and the creation of a South Slav state. He pushed to ratification two laws that gave him virtual control over the government, making the Council and the Assembly rubber-stamp bodies. This was ostensibly to give him room to maneuver for his proposed campaigns. These never occurred. He did, however, negotiate the removal of Turkish garrisons from Serbian soil, and set up the Balkan alliance system with Greece, Romania, and Montenegro. His domestic policies, however, were so repressive that he quickly became unpopular. Prince Michael was assassinated in 1868 by Pavle Raconavić, in an unsuccessful coup.

Miloš's grandnephew, Milan Obrenović, was installed in office after a military coup by Milivoje Blaznavač, the minister of war. In 1869, yet another constitution, this one giving more power to the assembly and granting such reforms as trial by jury, was put in effect. This constitution was the first for Serbia without any Turkish interference.

The efforts that the Serbs put into fighting the Serbo-Turkish wars of 1876-1878 were rewarded in the Treaty of San Stefano, in which Serbia became an independent principality, although the huge amount of territory granted Bulgaria caused great bitterness among the Serbian people.

After a shaky start in independence economically, Serbia and Austria-Hungary signed the Trade Treaty of 1881, an agreement that made Serbia a virtual economic vassal of Austria-Hungary. However, Serbia needed the quick capital that Austria-Hungary had to offer.

A Major blow to Serbian prestige was their defeat in the Serbo-Bulgarian War. An unpopular war, undertaken after the Bulgarian annexation of Eastern Rumelia it could be called a textbook example of overreaching. Serbia's defeat, severe domestic opposition, especially from the new Radical party, and the desire for a divorce from his meddling wife Natalia caused the 35-year-old King (for Serbia was now a kingdom) Milan to abdicate in 1889.

Milan's son Alexander took the throne, commencing a new government, this time made from the Radical party, under *yet another* constitution! This one offered secret elections for the first time in Serbia's history.

Petrovich goes into the details of Milan and Natalia's interference with the regime a bit too much for my taste, but admittedly they did try to steer the course of his reign to fit their desires. Apparently Alexander eventually got fed up, for in his inauguration of the Djordjević cabinet in 1897 (Serbia's thirteenth government in eight years) he vowed to put an end to «(this) fruitless political partisan struggle». This speech marks the beginning of what is called the personal regime of King Alexander.

In 1901 still another constitution, this one urged on by Russia, who wanted to have more power in the Radical-laden assembly, was adopted. The «April Constitution» allowed for a bicameral legislature, with an appointed and elected senate along with the assembly.

In the midst of severe economic troubles with Austria, which were to event-

ually culminate in the «Pig War» of Tarriffs, King Alexander and his wife Draga were gunned down in their bedroom by several junior army officers, who feared that the childless royal couple would be succeeded by one of Draga's hated younger brothers. Alexander was the last of the Obrenović dynasty.

The last chapter, by far the most interesting, delves into the question of World War One and the extent of Serbia's role in causing it. Petrovich absolves the Serbian government but does admit complicity on the part of various members of Serbian military.

The book would have been easier to read if it had been pruned, although its volunimity could be a boon to some. The illustrations are clear and well-chosen, but there are altogether too few maps to illustrate the complex territorial gains, losses and quests of the hardy Serbian people, who are remarkable not so much for having created the kingdom of Serbia but for having survived it.

JOSEPH K. SAURIS

Δοκανάρη Ν. Στ., *‘Ο Βορειοηπειρώτης αγωνιστής Κωνσταντίνος Παλάσκας*, σελ. 62, *Ίωάννινα* 1980.

Παπαδοπούλου Γ. Χ., *‘Η εθνική ελληνική μειονότης εις τήν ‘Αλβανίαν καί τὸ σχολικὸν αὐτῆς ζήτημα (ιστορικὸν ἀρχεῖον 1921-79)*, σελ. 296, *Ίωάννινα* 1981.

Τζιόβα Π. Δ., *Γερβάσιος ‘Ωρολογᾶς, Μητροπολίτης Κορυτσᾶς Βορείου ‘Ηπείρου*, σελ. 156, *Ίωάννινα* 1980.

These three volumes have been published by the Institute of North Epirus Research, Ioannina, which has started the publication of the results of research carried out in 1976. Its aim is to investigate all aspects of the life, of the activity and of the civilisation of the approximately 200.000 Greeks living in Northern Epirus. The latter has been incorporated in Albania by a decision of the great European Powers of 1914 confirmed in 1921 despite its liberation by the Greek Army and despite the supremacy of the Greek element which unanimously favoured the union with Greece.

The book of Mr. Dokanaris deals with the life and the activity of Constantine Palaskas who served his country from early youth to death wherever and whenever this was possible.

The book of Mr. G. Ch. Papadopoulos, a retired official of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who has served in Northern Epirus before 1939, is very useful because it includes all documents dealing with Northern Epirus and adds some statistical data, both with the appropriate comments. He proves on the basis of official documents and data how little Albania complied with the obligations assumed towards minorities by international treaties, to the decisions of the International Law Court of the Hague and to the recommendations of the League of Nations and how little the European Great Powers were justified in incorporating a nearly 70% Greek area in a foreign country.

The book of Mr. Tziovas deals with the activity of a very efficient Greek churchman Gervasios Orologas. He was 1895-1900 and 1902 bishop of Koritsa and 1900-16 bishop of Ioannina. The analysis of his successful activity and of the conditions