

be strongly defended as the only port from which the Yugoslav army could easily be supplied. The Greek army opposed either alternative, feeling it was vital to defend as much of the national territory as possible. These differences were never really resolved, and led to friction at the general staff level, friction which Zotos reflects to some degree by subtly suggesting that the British lacked a sincere interest in the Greek people, that their commitment to defend Greece was not serious, being an adventure or gamble whose failure could easily be written off. This may or may not be true; but is it reasonable to expect the broad loyalties, compassion and sympathy which men ordinarily reserve for their families or perhaps their own nation to extend to another country, of whose language, culture and aspirations they may know little or nothing? Sentiment is not a vital or even desirable element in relations between states; it is unrealistic for Zotos to invoke it, however subtly, in what purports to be a sober historical study.

The treatment of other key events—most notably those leading up to the outbreak of fighting in Athens in December 1944—are no less incomplete and unanalytical. But it would be unfair and essentially irrelevant to dissect further a work intended for a general, not a scholarly audience. As such, it is fair and straightforward. Those seeking detailed data, careful analysis and acute insights into men and politics will turn elsewhere.

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Center for Slavic and East European Studies, *The Florida State University Slavic Papers*. Vol. I. Tallahassee : n.p. 1967. Pp. 111.

One of the newest of the American centers for the study of Eastern Europe is at Florida State University. This anthology by its faculty marks a collective debut on the scholarly scene, and is the first of a series which we hope will grow and prosper.

It is obvious that there are serious, perhaps insurmountable difficulties to creating a unified entity from a mass of disparate papers which lack any central theme, chronological focus, or common approach aside from a very general interest in Eastern Europe. This book rises no higher above this obstacle than most collections. Its nine papers include two

of a highly esoteric, rather peripheral nature : a brief, technical, linguistic study of Czech prosody by Elizabeth Pribić, and the written commentary by Paul Cutter for a musical broadcast about the Slovenian composers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The other seven essays are of broader interest. Donald Hodges ably summarizes the criticisms of contemporary "Yugoslav Philosophers in the Struggle Against Bureaucracy" particularly those writing for the maverick journal *Praxis*. William Laird and Žarko Bilbija deal with economic issues, the former in a brief review article of Gregory Grossman's *Economic Systems* (1967), the latter in a long analysis of the ideas of the obscure Soviet agrarian, neo-populist economist, A. V. Chayanov (1888-1939).

Two essays are directed at the historian. In "George Sagić-Fisher : Patriot of two Worlds," Nikola Pribić presents a concise portrait of a liberal *prečani* Serb who, emigrating to the southern United States in 1816 or 1817, played a minor role in the politics of revolutionary Texas in the 1830's and those of California during the Gold Rush of the 1850's. A paper of somewhat greater significance is that by Victor Mamatey on "Wilson and the Restoration of Poland : New Documents." Though a few exchanges between Wilson and the State Department in 1917 are presented, the title is really a misnomer : this is actually a succinct summary of the development of a Wilsonian policy during March-November 1917 on the restoration of Poland. This was closely linked with the decline of Tsarist Russia; until this occurred, the other Entente Powers preserved a strictly neutral attitude on what was a vital interest for St. Petersburg. Mamatey argues quite convincingly that Wilson's policy derived from his belief that a solution of the Polish problem through democracy and self-determination would help insure world peace, and thus rejects the much-criticized contention by Louis Gerson (in *Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland, 1914-1920*) that Wilson was primarily interested in the Polish-American vote.

Economic history is represented by two thoughtful essays. In "Theory of Economic Integration and Experience of the Balkan and Danubian Countries before 1914," George Maceshish attacks the widely held notion that the Habsburg empire was an integrated economic entity. Even in the heyday of free trade during the nineteenth century, he contends, the various parts of the empire continued their traditional practice of mutual economic discrimination. Their bitter competition also extended to industry, with Hungary trying to develop an industrial base against those of Bohemia and German Austria, and also

to personal career opportunities, where German and Magyar dominance sharply limited the possibilities for advancement open to members of the subject nations. Basically, Macesish stands with those who regard the empire as an anachronism, whose benefits to its citizens, in the economic sphere at least, had virtually ended long before 1918, and whose much advertised "unity" was more of a myth than a reality. The dissolution of the empire was nevertheless regretted by some Western circles, and their attempts to revive trade in Central Europe just after World War I by having tariff and other restrictions lowered and by fostering international cooperation are dealt with by Tous-saint Hočevár in "The Portorož Conference : A Plea for Liberalization of Trade in the Danubian Area." The conference, held at a Slovenian coastal resort in October-November 1921, was led by Great Britain and especially France, despite the tacit opposition of the successor states. Its accomplishments were confined to minor issues such as the reduction of international postal rates, the reestablishment of telegraph and telephone communications, the distribution of rolling stock from the Habsburg railway system, the easing of international rail travel, and so on. Why was so little achieved? Unlike the industrialized Western states, whom Hočevár regards as primarily interested in protecting their investments by restoring a semblance of the economic *status quo ante bellum*, the successor states were not only concerned with preserving their newly won independence from any encroachments by a Danubian economic federation, but were ready to use almost any protectionist device to encourage industrialization. Hence they rejected the conference proposals for regional free trade, a rejection Hočevár finds justified in light of the pressing need for jobs for their surplus agricultural population. This argument would be stronger if these countries had indeed systematically encouraged industrialization in the 1920's. But this did not occur. Instead, protective tariffs and other trade restrictions all too often only benefited inefficient industries which used political influence to exclude foreign competitors. The general public was of course the loser.

This collection of papers, in common with many, might have benefited from careful editing, particularly of grammar and punctuation errors. Some sort of synthesis or at least a general introduction would have given it some unity. We hope this can be done in future issues whose appearance we look forward to with interest.

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