

sible for the Soviet Union to accept this project. Why was there such concentration on nondiscrimination for the Danube when there were other important waterways, specifically, the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal?"

There are many gems in these two volumes which now await convenient mining for those who will now be able to study them carefully. They are commended to all research students.

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Stephen Fischer-Galati, *The New Rumania: From People's Democracy to Socialist Republic*. Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Studies in International Communism, 10. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, The M.I.T. Press, 1967. Pp. 126.

Professor Fischer-Galati has written a clear and convincing historical analysis of the "desatellization" of Rumania. Since the work is a companion volume to John Michael Montias's *The Economic Development of Rumania* in M.I.T.'s series: Studies in International Communism, Fischer-Galati concentrates on the political aspects of Bucharest's deviation from Moscow.

The author demonstrates that Rumania's posture of independence was not a sudden reversal of a policy of subservience to the Kremlin; but that the public revelations of disagreement between Bucharest and Moscow in 1963 and particularly in April, 1964, showed a split which had resulted from the pragmatic actions taken by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej throughout his career. If before 1963 there was less noticeable ferment in Rumania than in Hungary or Poland, this apparent compliance resulted from Gheorghiu-Dej's skillful ability to keep Rumanian politics quiet and in hand.

Gheorghiu-Dej, in fact, emerges as the central figure in guiding Rumania's independent path. The author traces his role to the days of liberation (August, 1944) when, as a "native" centrist between the "Moscovites" (e.g. Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca) and the free communists led by Lucretiu Patrascanu, he was able to emerge as a national leader.

While Gheorghiu-Dej was still imprisoned in the spring of 1944, the Kremlin was attempting to obtain Marshal Antonescu's surrender,

or if this failed, to liberate Rumania by means of Soviet troops. The facts of Gheorghiu-Dej's release in April are still unclear, but in the months that followed, Fischer-Galati writes, Gheorghiu-Dej and his associates worked behind the scenes with Patrascanu to secure Rumania's liberation by Rumanians, and not by Russians. They succeeded in the coup of August 23, 1944—a week before the Red Army entered Bucharest. The question who had the honor of liberating Rumania—the Rumanian Communists or the Red Army—has been a passionate historical debate used as a weapon in the Bucharest-Moscow political battle.

In the years 1944-1952 Gheorghiu-Dej and his supporters—Chivu Stoica, Emil Bodnares, Nicolae Ceausescu, Gheorghe Apostol—used their Rumanian nationality to strike a different and more popular stance than that of the Moscovites led by the Jew Pauker and the Hungarian Luca. Nevertheless, they subdued any anti-Kremlin appearances and let Patrascanu take the lead in this direction. In fact the Gheorghiu-Dej group became staunch Stalinists, and the Kremlin connection in the forties and the early fifties was their mainstay. In this way, however, the native Stalinists outmaneuvered both the free communists and the "Moscovites." By June, 1952, both Pauker and Luca on the one hand and Patrascanu on the other had been removed, and Gheorghiu-Dej was head of party and government.

In the Krushchev period Gheorghiu-Dej continued as a Stalinist but maintained his position despite the rivalry of men whom the Kremlin preferred. Throughout this time, Fischer-Galati maintains, the Rumanian leader was taking steps to lead his country down an independent economic and foreign policy path. His success was such that the downfall of Krushchev in 1964 was in part a result of Rumanian independence.

Not the least of Gheorghiu-Dej's advantages in this period was his very Stalinism. The separation from Moscow in the fifties did not indicate liberalism at home, but on the contrary was fostered by brutal methods. In 1954 the Rumanian leadership executed Patrascanu. At the same time it downgraded Krushchev's allies in Bucharest, notably Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chisnevski, while Gheorghiu-Dej placed his group "under the protective umbrella of the Stalinists in the Kremlin and the nationalists of the Chinese Communist Party" (p. 49). Yet he avoided becoming entirely attached to the Soviet anti-party faction, which was destined to fail. It is significant that Bucharest's autonomous foreign policy at first directed itself most strongly toward Peking, a

Stalinist ally (although Fischer-Galati states that Rumania was ideologically closer to the Soviet Union than to China—at least after the open rift of 1960, p. 79). However, also in 1954, reconciliation gradually began between Bucharest and Belgrade (p. 52) and increased by strides throughout the decade so that in the early sixties Rumanians were not only cordial with Yugoslavia but were also flirting with the non-Communist West, particularly with France but even with the United States. Fischer-Galati shows that Bucharest's independence in foreign policy served as a strong bargaining lever vis-à-vis Moscow in economic matters but he also maintains that in the sixties the Rumanians pursued their foreign policy for its own value. After Gheorgiu-Dej established more clearly his separate path he used Khrushchev's ideology of polycentrism to his own advantage; and despite his accusations of revision against the Kremlin, he found this aspect of revision to his satisfaction.

The author concludes that Gheorghiu-Dej's successors have merely continued his policies of independence, and despite some unprecedented acts of liberalization, to an even lesser extent than he. Ceausescu's concept of independence is more "nationalistic, doctrinaire, and provincial." "Gheorghiu-Dej was becoming more closely identified with Titoism than Gomulkaism... Ceausescu's 'New Rumania' is the Rumania of a representative but all-powerful Rumanian Communist Party" (p. 115). "The Rumanian course at present is less spectacular than in Gheorgiu-Dej's days. It represents a stage of consolidation of the gains achieved under Gheorghiu-Dej's leadership, the attainment of the major political goal of the Rumanian party—an independent Communist Rumania" (p. 116). However, it seems that the recent independent positions taken by Bucharest after the author finished his volume do not bear his conclusion out.

By relying heavily on major policy speeches and on statements and articles by party leaders in the Central Committee's daily *Scinteia* the author has shown that the signs of discord between the USSR and Rumania were present before the public break in the mid-sixties. However, his repeated insistence that scholars did not appreciate these differences before 1963 is tiring.

Fischer-Galati provokes some interesting questions which because of the book's scope or emphasis are left unanswered. Although he points out the nationalistic nature of the victory of the Rumanian Gheorghiu-Dej over the minority "Moscovites," Pauker and Luca, he refers only briefly to the role of anti-Semitism in this victory. A more thorough

analysis of this problem, especially since the Rumanian purges of 1952 were almost contemporaneous with the infamous "doctors plot" in Moscow, would not have been superfluous. Furthermore, even though the author portrays Gheorghiu-Dej as the dynamo of Rumanian separateness there is the unmistakable impression that events in Moscow played the key part in driving the two states in different directions. While the Rumanian leader remained a Stalinist, the rulers in the Kremlin introduced the Thaw. Ironically, it seems that this factor contributed importantly to Bucharest's independent stance, that in one sense Krushchev broke from Georghiu-Dej and orthodoxy rather than vice versa. Perhaps there is need for another monograph which could investigate the significance of this aspect of Rumanian-Soviet relations. In general, for both the specialist and the casual reader, *The New Rumania* is a valuable informative interpretation of the Danubian country's role in modern Eastern Europe.

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D.M. Pippidi, *Contributii la istoria veche a Romaniei* (Contributions à l'histoire ancienne de la Roumanie), IIe éd., Bucarest, 1967. Pp. 597 + 30 planches.

Depuis 1958, lors de l'apparition de la première édition des *Contributii la istoria veche a Romaniei* (Contributions à l'histoire ancienne de la Roumanie) et jusqu'à nos jours la recherche du passé de la Roumanie a constitué une préoccupation constante du professeur D.M. Pippidi et elle s'est concrétisée dans la publication de nombreuses études. Une partie de ces travaux ont été ajoutés à ceux formant l'ancienne édition, épuisée d'ailleurs rapidement, de sorte que l'actuelle édition est double comme volume par rapport à la précédente.

L'ouvrage comprend pour la plupart des recherches fondées sur des documents épigraphiques inédits, dont certains ont une importance exceptionnelle, provenant des villes grecques du littoral dobrogéen de la mer Noire, et surtout d'Histria. D'autres études représentent des interprétations nouvelles de certaines inscriptions découvertes depuis plus longtemps. Enfin une partie de ces *Contributions* concernent des sources antiques qui, tout en étant d'un grand intérêt pour l'histoire de la Roumanie, n'ont pas été suffisamment mis en lumière, ou bien elles n'ont