

the Dodecanese Islands, and the Italian colonies (Libya). Herein is much discussion of the problem of Northern Epirus, which the Greek Government brought before the Council of Foreign Ministers during March-April. While the British and United States Governments insisted on the right of the Greek Government to be heard in the matter and the Soviet Government defended the Albanian right, the issue reached no settlement either in the Council or at the Peace Conference subsequently (pp. 21-22, 51-52, 80-81, 258, 417-419, 462-463, 1380-1381, 1560-1561).

Although there was little question as to the ultimate disposition of the Dodecanese Islands, the problem proved troublesome because of the Soviet contention that it should be considered with other territorial issues and of its position relative to a possible commercial (naval?) base, among other things. The problem came before the Council on April 28, when there was general agreement, although Mr. Molotov observed that there were many other territorial issues to be considered along with it, and the question was deferred. On May 11, the Soviet Foreign Minister noted the Soviet need for "a port of call in the Mediterranean for its merchant ships." The delays and the obvious bargaining continued until June 26, when Molotov, at last, agreed that the Dodecanese should go to Greece and Mr. Byrnes the American Secretary of State, relieved, asked "for a minute or two to recover" from the shock. The matter was settled. (See especially pp. 163 ff, 202 ff, 333 ff, 661).

The problem of the Italian Colonies in North Africa was much more complicated and involved both questions of trusteeship—with a Soviet desire for a UN trusteeship—and ultimate independence. But neither the Council nor the subsequent Peace Conference could resolve the issue, which awaited action by the UN General Assembly and the achievement of Libyan independence at the end of 1951. These documents illustrate the prelude.

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Michael Gamarnikow, *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press 1968.

This volume is an important contribution to the growing literature

on the economic reforms of centrally planned socialist countries. While Russian efforts to improve economic efficiency have received a great deal of public attention, the countries of Eastern Europe have gone much further in revamping their economies, generally by reintroducing market elements.

Gamarnikow's main contribution lies in his detailed and thorough analysis of the various paths reform efforts have taken in almost all Eastern European countries. His study would be useful not only to economists but to all interested in politico-economic developments in the Soviet Bloc. The author's lucid style makes the book easy to follow even for those uninitiated in the esoteric concepts of applied Marxist economics.

Gamarnikow rightly views the economic reforms within the politico-ideological framework that developed in Eastern Europe after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin. He considers economic revisionism in Eastern European countries as the second and perhaps most important stage of destalinization; the first was a purely political one which affected only the power structure of the top party hierarchy.

Economic reforms have been undertaken as a result of a pragmatic evaluation of the irrationalities associated with rigid central planning and/or as the result of pressures from consumers for a larger share of total production. They have invariably involved deviations from rigid central planning and introduction of elements of decentralization and market determination of the allocation of resources. The cult of the plan was as much a characteristic of the Stalin period as the cult of the personality.

Gamarnikow rightly stresses the important role that reforms in the price mechanism play in the success of overall changes in economic structure. However, perhaps his most original contribution is his analysis of the economic costs of extending the reforms. Analysts in the West, in their enthusiastic espousal of reforms in Eastern Europe, often ignore the serious dislocation that an economy replete with inefficient industries can suffer, if the market mechanism is quickly introduced.

Eastern Europe after slavishly imitating the economic system of the Soviet Union throughout Stalin's reign has now been setting the pace for reforms. Introduction of economic reforms in 1965 by the Soviet Union was no more than a timid effort to emulate earlier reforms in Eastern Europe. These Russian efforts have atrophied. As the Czechoslovakian experience suggests, the Soviet union is neither ready nor willing to follow the pace now set in Eastern Europe.

Gamarnikow views economic reforms, particularly in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as an integral component of increased freedom of individual choice. This the Soviet Union is not willing to grant because of the repercussions that such freedom of choice would have within the Russian environment itself.

The grim specter of events in Czechoslovakia hangs grimly over a book written in early 1968. Gamarnikow quotes from Liberman, the foremost proponent of economic reform in the Soviet Union, as saying that his ideas "are being opposed with fixed bayonets by some people interested in their jobs." The Czechoslovakian events suggest that the Soviet Union is willing to oppose such reforms with fixed bayonets in other parts of Europe if it feels that they threaten the solidarity and the control that the Communist party has over events in each socialist country.

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Stephanos Zotos, *The Greeks—The Dilemma of Past and Present*. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969. Pp. 270.

At any given moment in its history a nation represents both a confirmation and a rejection of its past. While compelled by constantly changing times to undergo a never-ending transformation, it nevertheless retains powerful attitudinal characteristics that link it directly with its ancestors. A healthy nation is one that can keep pace with the demands of the present by allowing for change, without losing the stability which only long and respected traditions can provide. The nation's heritage must thus serve as the guide for dealing with the present, but must not obscure the view of the future.

This theme of the impact of the past upon the present is a powerful one and has inspired many in literature and history. It is particularly rewarding when applied to peoples with a long and richly endowed lineage, which has been the object of systematic study over many centuries.

In *The Greeks—The Dilemma of Past and Present* Stephanos Zotos has sought to develop this theme by revealing the profound and inescapable influence of antiquity upon the Greeks of today. He shows that