

Apart from the poetry, there are some jottings by Sepheris called *Conversation with Fabrice* (a pseudonym for George Theotokas) anonymously and inaccurately translated — eg. Ion Dragoumis becomes 'the Ionian Dragoumis'; a review by Peter Levi of Ezra Pound's translation (*sic*) of Sophocles' *Women of Trachis*; an extraordinary piece entitled *The Irrelevance of Incest to Oedipus* by N.K. Sandars who appears never to have heard of Claude Lévi-Strauss; a review by J.B. McLaughlin of Sir Maurice Bowra's *Pindar*; a long, useful essay on *The Literary-Historical Back-ground of Modern Greek Literature* by Robin Fletcher; and, of all things, some notes by Ghika on his translation into Greek of Edward Lear's nonsense poem *The Courtship of the Yonghy-Bonghy-Bo* which, without the poem they refer to, are merely tantalising. (Incidentally Ghika's translation has now been published with the very same cover as adorns this issue of *Agenda* and is described rather ambiguously as having been "drawn specially by N.H. Ghika").

It can be seen, then, what a complete hotch-potch this Greek *Agenda* is. As was intimated at the beginning of this critique, provided we forget any pretensions to an over-all theme or purpose, this collection of oddments is not without value. It would be unlikely to enlighten any reader previously unacquainted with Greek literature or one conversant only with ancient Greek writers who was curious to see what course the literature had taken in more recent times. But for those who are already at various stages along the path towards initiation, it provides some useful clues as to the nature of the mysteries.

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Kosta St. Pavlovich, *Razgovori sa Slobodanom Jovanovicem, 1941-1945*. (Conversations with Slobodan Yovanovich, 1941-1945) Windsor Ontario: Avala Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. 102.

This small volume is in fact the political diary of the Chief of Cabinet of the Royal Yugoslav Government-in-exile under Prime Minister Slobodan Yovanovich. It deals essentially with the reasons which led Churchill's Government to abandon the Serbs and their leader, General Mihailovich, and to side instead with Tito's guerrillas in the 1941-1945 civil war in occupied Yugoslavia. It reveals for the first time in print the

intimate thoughts of Yovanovich, a university professor, a Serb, and an uncompromising supporter of Mihailovich. It also provides important commentary on the actions of the Yugoslav Government during the German attack on Yugoslavia in April 1941, on the conflict and changing coalitions within the Yugoslav Government-in-exile, on the role of King Peter II and the royal family in London, and on the establishment of the Tito-Subasich interim government.

These "Conversations" reveal that during the war the Serb leaders in London sought to achieve the following aims: First, through repeated diplomatic demarches with the Soviet Government, to bring pressure on Tito to cease his revolutionary activities and to honor his agreement with Mihailovich of November 1941, according to which Tito's forces were to be subordinated to the legitimately designated authority in occupied Yugoslavia, namely, Mihailovich. Secondly, the continuation of the fight against the foreign occupiers and the Quisling regimes in Yugoslavia, short of self-destructive operations. Thirdly, to counteract the Croatian separatist movement, manifested by the formation of the Independent State of Croatia under Pavelich and promoted by the Croatian members of the Government-in-exile. Finally, the reestablishment of pre-war Yugoslavia.

Initially the British Government had given at least the appearance of supporting the Serbian objectives. However, after the Teheran Conference in November 1943, Churchill took a negative attitude toward these objectives generally and Mihailovich's movement in particular. Such a drastic reorientation in British policy was dictated by the momentous decisions reached at Teheran, which left the Soviet Union the dominant power in Eastern Europe and virtually assured that Russian influence would extend into Central Europe and the Balkans. Specifically, Churchill's plan for an Anglo-American invasion of the Balkans (which he had advocated in January 1943 at Casablanca, in August at Quebec, in November in Cairo, and again at Teheran) was finally rejected by Roosevelt and Stalin, thus frustrating Churchill's hope of preventing the bolshevization of the Balkans and Central Europe. Instead, a tentative Anglo-Soviet agreement was reached, dividing on a fifty-fifty basis their responsibility for Yugoslavia. This arrangement, which was confirmed in the October 9, 1944 "spheres of influence" agreement, granted the Soviet Union the right to influence Yugoslav affairs.

Pavlovich's record clearly illustrates that the cancellation of the

Balkan offensive in the direction of Europe's "under-belly"—Sicily-Italy-Yugoslavia—motivated Britain to abandon the Serbian cause and, therefore, Mihailovich. Consequently, although they had been alerted for this purpose, Mihailovich's forces were no longer needed for Churchill's anti-bolshevization campaign. Similarly, the preparation of Yugoslav Government forces to participate in such a campaign—for which Churchill had requested King Peter and his Government to move from London to Cairo in June 1943—was called off. Significantly, Eden had personally asked Prime Minister Yovanovich to direct Mihailovich to preserve his forces by keeping them temporarily inactive until the hour of their decisive involvement in the contemplated Balkan invasion. Now the abandonment of this plan made cooperation with Mihailovich not only less important to Britain but even dangerous to maintain: continued support to an anti-Communist Mihailovich (and to his Serbian supporters in London) might cause the first serious split within the Alliance. Furthermore, since after Teheran the Soviet Union was to have an equal say in Yugoslav affairs, Britain could no longer support the Serbian aims of reestablishing an anti-Soviet Kingdom of Yugoslavia by the destruction of Tito's Communist-controlled movement. If Britain could find an apolitical Mihailovich, tolerant of Tito's pro-Soviet revolutionary aspirations, she would have continued her support. Indeed, late in 1944 and again in March 1945, the British considered the creation of such a new leader.

In Yovanovich's view, Britain's decision to abandon Mihailovich cannot be completely explained by the rejection of Churchill's Balkan Front plan at Teheran, or by the Anglo-Soviet division of responsibility over Yugoslavia on a fifty-fifty basis. The author attached particular importance to the British belief that Europe's stability requires a strong Austria, and that the latter could be revived in the form of a "Central European Catholic Bloc." This idea is said to have been formulated by William Robert Seton-Watson who, according to Yovanovich, persuaded the British Government that a strong, multi-ethnic, Catholic Austria would be sufficiently united ideologically, and that in a modernized form such a state could prevent the bolshevization of Central Europe and the prussianization of German-speaking peoples. It would also destroy Serbian hegemony in Yugoslavia by frustrating efforts to "serbianize" the entire country. Furthermore, Churchill reportedly viewed Yugoslavia as an artificial creation, and feared that the Orthodox and allegedly Russophile Serbs might strive for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Yovanovich reports learning from Sir George Rendel, British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government-in-exile, that the contemplated "Central European Catholic Bloc" would necessitate the partitioning of Yugoslavia into a western half which, consisting mainly of Catholic Croats and Slovenes, would be incorporated into the "Bloc," while the politically unreliable eastern half would be permitted to fall under the influence of the Soviet Union. An alternate British plan provided for the establishment of a Federal Yugoslavia, with a fragmented and therefore devitalized Serbia, with constitutional guarantees for political self-determination and even the right of secession. Under this scheme, the Catholic and presumably anti-Communist Croats and Slovenes, under British tutelage, would be expected to strive for a democratic Croatia which would counter-balance an otherwise Communist-controlled Yugoslavia. Obviously, both plans reflect a division of influence over Yugoslav affairs between Britain and the Soviet Union, a division believed to have been accepted at Teheran and "formalized" in October, 1944. According to Yovanovich, the first plan was abandoned because the Russians did not support it, while the second plan was, of course, nominally incorporated into Tito's federalist scheme.

The student of this period in Yugoslav history will be interested in the reaction of the London-based Serb leaders to these machinations. According to Pavlovich, in May 1944 Prime Minister Yovanovich, acting as the spokesman for all Serbian political parties (including the Socialist Party), asked the British Government to support both resistance movements in Yugoslavia. Since the British were already supplying Tito, this would have meant that aid to Mihailovich would also be resumed. In return, Mihailovich was prepared to order a general mobilization and uprising against the Germans and to do everything possible to put an end to the civil war. Yovanovich emphasized to the British that he expected the Soviet Government to declare Mihailovich a traitor, as they had done with Polish General Bor-Komorowski, commander of the Warsaw uprising. The British replied with two counter-proposals. In May 1944 they suggested that Mihailovich's forces join Tito, in order to create a broadly based national resistance movement. As for Mihailovich, they promised to get him out of Yugoslavia. In September the British suggested that Mihailovich be replaced by another Serbian general, in which case they were prepared to resume support to the anti-Communist forces. The replacement of Mihailovich was again contemplated by the British in March 1945, when British troops were supposed to land on a section

of the Dalmatian coast which was known to be controlled by Mihailovich's men. The British offered to place Mihailovich's units under their own command and designated General Mirkovich as Mihailovich's successor. However, this British operation never materialized. Furthermore, the British proposals were unanimously rejected by the Serbian political parties which interpreted them as an invitation to the Serbian people to commit national suicide, to destroy a resistance movement which had fought for freedom and democracy, and to accelerate the process of establishing a Communist regime in Yugoslavia.

According to Yovanovich, the British Government sought to have Mihailovich removed because he was totally unacceptable to the Soviet authorities. Lord Emory, a member of Churchill's Cabinet, told Yovanovich that the Russians were not against Mihailovich's movement as such but against the General himself. Interestingly, Pavlovich's diary shows no evidence that the Russians ever accused Mihailovich of collaborating with the enemy, although they did blame certain guerrilla leaders who were said to be connected with Mihailovich's movement. Thus the question of Mihailovich's accommodation with the enemy does not appear as a reason for the withdrawal of British support for him. It is not mentioned in British communications with Prime Minister Yovanovich, nor does it appear in the Prime Minister's confidential conversations with the author of this diary. Instead, one is lead to conclude that the removal of Mihailovich, and the British hope that the two resistance movements in Yugoslavia might be persuaded to peacefully coexist, reflect the Anglo-Soviet compromise as regards their influence in Yugoslavia. It also appears that at least for a while Churchill hoped to exert a moderating influence on Tito's Communist program, thus condemning Mihailovich to serve as the sacrificial lamb on the alter of a Churchill-Tito accommodation. Yovanovich explicitly states that the main motivation of the British in assisting Tito was to convey the impression to the Russians that London was willing to bring about a pro-Russian regime in Yugoslavia with the hidden intent, however, of dissuading the Russians from occupying the country. Once the Red army had left, the British naively hoped, they would turn Tito into their own man, balancing his Marxism with Croatian Catholicism.

When in April 1945, the true nature of the Tito regime became evident the Serbian leaders asked Canonic John Albert Douglas, General Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Anglican Church, to see Churchill and inquire whether the British Prime Minister would be able to do

anything for Yugoslavia and for the Serbs. Churchill reportedly replied that everything was lost and that there was nothing he could do. Canonic Douglas allegedly reminded Churchill that there was one very important thing he could still do: state publicly that he had erred in his wartime policies with regard to Yugoslavia and the Serbs... Yovanovich concludes that the cause of Serbia was lost because too many forces—the Croats, Tito, the Russians—conspired against it and because Britain, deprived of the powerful partnership and influence of a strong France, would not support Mihailovich, the London-based Serbs, and their plans for a democratic Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

As in the case of all diaries and personal narratives of this type, the reader must constantly bear in mind that the writing of history represents a synthesis of conflicting accounts. This small book offers valuable insight into the thoughts and aspirations of an often neglected aspect of Yugoslavia's wartime political world. It will thus be welcomed by students of allied policies regarding Yugoslavia and the Balkans generally. On the other hand, the absence of any explanatory notes and cross-references, and the non-discursive nature of the author's style make this diary meaningful only for those who are quite familiar with Yugoslav affairs before and during the War. And, of course, the fact that it has not as yet been translated from the Serbo-Croat drastically reduces its usefulness. Such a translation, together with extensive explanatory annotations, would be highly desirable. Furthermore, since the author of the diary remained in close association with Yovanovich until the latter's death in London in 1958, it is to be hoped that another volume, covering their conversations after 1945 would soon follow.

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Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*. Baltimore, Maryland, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971. Pp. 410.

Professor Vali has assayed the task of writing a comprehensive history of Turkish foreign policy under the Republic, essentially from the period of Atatürk to the present. In his writing, he goes back to the beginnings and traces the emergence of Turkey as a nation-state from the matrix of